



CONSTANTINE KARAMANLIS AND THE CYPRUS CRISIS OF JULY- AUGUST 1974: A RE-ASSESSMENT

A critique of Alexis Papachelas (2021) *A Dark Room, 1967-1974* [*Ένα σκοτεινό δωμάτιο, 1967-1974*] (Athens: Metaixmio), pp. 630

Vassilis K. Fouskas

Certain Western powers have attempted to create a rift between President Makarios and our government by asking us to condemn his policies. In this fashion, they have shown that they do not understand anything about the Cyprus situation. Makarios is not an isolated leader. He is the genuine spokesman for his people, and his policy expresses the will of the overwhelming majority of the Cypriots. It is therefore both useless and dangerous to turn against Makarios.

Andreas G. Papandreou (interview to Eric Rouleau) *Le Monde*, 4 October 1964

Background

Alexis Papachelas is a Greek investigative journalist with degrees in history and journalism from Bard College (BA) and Columbia University (MSc), USA, respectively. He returned to his mother country, Greece, in the 1990s and has since led pioneering TV programmes, such as *The New Files* (Οι Νέοι Φάκελλοι). He is currently the Executive Editor of *Kathimerini*, Greece's mainstream right-of-centre daily, and a columnist. With deep ties and connections to the Greek, American and Greek-American establishments and having interviewed a plethora of world class political celebrities and pundits, he can air information and news that bring discomfort to the ruling elites of both sides of the Atlantic. His previous major work, *The Rape of Greek Democracy – The American Factor*,

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* This extensive review article appeared first online in the *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* (<https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/cjsb20/current>) and we re-publish it with the kind permission of Taylor & Francis.

1947-1967 [Ο Βιασμός της Ελληνικής δημοκρατίας – Ο Αμερικανικός παράγων, 1947-1967], published in 1997, established, through archival work, certain arguments, which were previously commonly-held speculative views only in left-wing minority circles in Greece, but also internationally. *The Rape of Greek Democracy*, effectively, vindicated the thesis developed by Andreas G. Papandreou's brilliant account, *Democracy at Gunpoint. The Greek Front*, which shows how the CIA subverted democracy in Greece and established the dictatorship of the Colonels – 1967-1974. In this contemporary work – it was published in 1971, three years after his release from prison – Papandreou makes a major political claim that Papachelas' historical account of 26 years later vindicates. The claim was that the Greek dictatorship was established in order, first, to facilitate a pro-NATO solution to the issue of Cyprus, which entailed partition of the island between Greece and Turkey and, second, to prevent the coming to power of Andreas G. Papandreou in Greece, leading a democratic mass movement, replacing his ailing father, George Papandreou, leader of the popular Centre Union party. Arguably, the domestic upheavals and the battles of George Papandreou to control the army and establish parliamentary authority over the Crown, even these radical processes, were articulated over, and hemmed in by, the influence of the CIA in Greek affairs, the issue of Cyprus and the role of the Greek Cypriot charismatic leader, Archbishop Makarios III.¹

Makarios, instead of subscribing to NATO's policy of trying to block leftist-communist forces from increasing their electoral influence, preferred the non-aligned movement in tandem with George's son, Andreas.² AKEL, the Cypriot Communist Party, had been a key supporter of Makarios and was never outlawed. Turkish Cypriots were also members of AKEL, some even occupying leading positions in the party. Makarios was the "uncontrollable priest", who opted to take sides with the non-aligned movement, playing off the USSR against the USA, in order to maintain and strengthen Cyprus as an independent republic with a Greek majority (80%) and a Turkish minority (18%). As he explained many times to both Karamanlis and George Papandreou even before the advent of the dictatorship, his strategic aim was to strengthen and centralise the institutions of the Cypriot state, rather than weaken them, unless

¹ It would be appropriate to note here, even in passing, that Andreas was accused of being the leader of ASPIDA organisation in the army, a backronym of "Officers Save Fatherland Ideals Democracy Meritocracy", which forms the Greek word for "Shield" – ASPIDA. Presumably, ASPIDA was formed as a counter-balancing force to IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers), a secret right-wing anti-communist organisation within the army. Andreas was accused of cultivating communism and socialism within the army, wanting to control the armed forces and bring Greece into the Soviet orbit. Andreas had categorically refused all the accusations and worked with his father to bring the defence ministry under political-civilian control. To all intents and purposes, the Cold War pro-American and conservative establishment in Greece did everything it could to prevent Andreas from coming to power. I thank William Mallinson for rightly insisting that a reference to the ASPIDA affair should be made.

² KKE, the Greek Communist Party, was outlawed, but it was very influential through the cover party of the United Left, which was legal, and under the leadership of Ilias Iliou won 24% of the popular vote in the election of 1958, sending a chilling message to Washington about communism's influence in Greece in just less than ten years after the end of the Civil War and the insertion of Greece into Western security structures.

a sustainable process of *enosis* (union with Greece) could have realistically taken root.³ Makarios was severely criticised by both Karamanlis and George Papandreou for his vision about Cyprus' independent position in Cold War politics.⁴

Before the advent of the dictatorship in April 1967, the USA tried to placate the Papandreous and the Turks alike, offering a smart NATO plan – euphemistically now called the “Acheson plan”, after the name of Dean Acheson, a former US Secretary of State, who led the US delegation in a series of meetings in 1964. Squaring the circle in Cold War conditions, Acheson gave *enosis* to the Greeks and “partition” to the Turks. *Enosis* would be given to the Greeks on the proviso that a large Turkish military base would be established on Cyprus, effectively amounting to partition. That was the idea. And whereas the elderly Papandreou was ready to accept the plan, Turkey turned it down because her generals argued that a military base, never mind its size, could not offer adequate strategic depth for defence purposes and in precarious island conditions in which ethnic Turks were a minority. More territory was needed. So, it was Turkey that turned down Acheson's secret arrangements, not Greece – “secret” because the meetings were taking place unbeknownst to Makarios, although later he found out about them, denouncing them publicly.⁵ The plan, it should be noted, presupposed the elimination of Makarios, because it was anticipated that he would oppose a NATO solution for Cyprus, since such a solution would be tantamount to the dissolution of the Cypriot state without *enosis*. Years later, Andreas G. Papandreou's official biographer, historian Stan Draenos, affirms that this was indeed the case.⁶ Thus, Papachelas' account, *The Rape of Greek Democracy, 1947-1967*, which also reveals that the leading group of the Greek Colonels that established the dictatorship were on the payroll of the CIA, withstood the test of time, remaining a classic in its field.⁷

³ In his book reviewed here, Papachelas quotes Makarios exhibiting precisely this position but, as with Karamanlis and George Papandreou, shows no appreciation of it.

⁴ Several references by Papachelas to CIA and other sources reveal an interesting definition of “nationalism” on behalf of US officials. According to them, nationalists are those who pursue an independent state-national policy brushing off the requirements and guidelines of the USA. Internationalism/globalism, in this respect, means a national-state policy that accepts the imposition of US instructions and policy parameters, regardless of whether this particular state-national policy draws from nationalist/racist/conservative discourses. This has some relevance today in order, for example, to understand the various liberal discourses about globalisation, (neo)-liberalism and nationalism, and what we make of them.

⁵ This point is also forcefully made by Marios Evriviades in his Introduction to the book by Kostas Venizelos and Michalis Ignatiou (2002) *Kissinger's Secret Files* [Τα μυστικά αρχεία του Κίσσιντζερ] (Athens: A.A. Livanis), pp. 31-2. It should be noted that both Makarios, who found out about the conspiracy, and Andreas G. Papandreou opposed Acheson's plan, which would have led to the vivisection of Cyprus among NATO powers, Greece, Turkey and Britain. This opposition, nevertheless did not impede George Papandreou, who had accepted the concession to Turkey of a military base on Cyprus. Further evidence on these issues in State Department (2002), *Foreign Relations of the United States; Cyprus, Greece, Turkey 1964-68*, v.XVI, Washington DC.

⁶ Stan Draenos (2012) *Andreas Papandreou. The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick* (London: I.B. Tauris), and my review of the book in *The Political Quarterly*, v.84, n.2, 2013.

⁷ A recent account along the same lines is the work by Şevki Kiralp, “Cyprus between *enosis*, partition and independence: domestic politics, diplomacy and external intervention (1967-74)”,

Current values: Papachelas' "dark room"

If this is the case with his previous work, what is the added value of this one? Given that the rigorous negotiating parameters of US foreign policy in Cyprus were set by Acheson's approach which aimed at keeping both Greece and Turkey happy in Cold War conditions at the expense of the independence of Cyprus and Makarios himself, how did the events unfold over the seven years of dictatorial rule in Greece, leading eventually to the forceful vivisection of the island, a rather distorted materialisation of Acheson's schemes in July-August 1974?⁸ Did CIA field officers in Athens, most of whom were Greek-Americans, encourage the – fiercely anti-communist and anti-Makarios – Greek junta of Dimitrios Ioannides to go ahead with the 15 July 1974 coup against Makarios, giving the long-awaited excuse to Turkey to invade five days later and partition the island according to its long-term national policy? What was the role of Constantine Karamanlis in the crisis of summer 1974, the right-wing leader and one of the architects of the Cyprus compromise for the constitutional arrangements of 1959-60, who was living in Paris? I am of the impression that one of the book's purposes – apart from looking at the factional conflicts within the junta and the role of the USA in the coup against Makarios – is to extol Karamanlis' management of the crisis, which avoided a disastrous war with Turkey in summer 1974, given the plight of the Greek military and the situation on the ground in Cyprus. Papachelas bestows Karamanlis with impeccable leadership skills without whom the events might have unfolded in directions much worse than they actually did, namely, the illegal invasion and occupation of one third of the island by Turkish forces, armies of refugees on both sides, especially the Greek Cypriot side, land and property problems, scores of casualties and many other atrocities committed by both sides, unaccounted for and missing people, all issues unresolved to date. In sum, this is where I want to focus on.

With a flair for history and a talent for narration via suspense and documented plotting that make readers hold their breath while reading, and wanting to finish a rather large book in one sitting, Papachelas' story unfolds around a number of protagonists, who can be grouped as follows:

- The Greek Colonels from 21 April 1967 to 25 November 1973, after which Dimitrios Ioannides, the head of junta's security apparatus and a highly volatile character, toppled Giorgos Papadopoulos' faction and assumed

Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, v.19, n.6, 2017, pp. 591-609. Kiralp shows how Makarios resisted as much as he could plots of Greek and Turkish nationalists to topple and/or assassinate him, a policy that went hand in glove with US policy in Cyprus, the aim being its NATOisation.

⁸ Van Coufoudakis was perhaps the first to tackle the issue of continuity between Acheson's partition plan(s) – it was not one but several, although their philosophy was the same, that of partition – and the events of summer 1974 in his pioneering article, "US foreign policy and the Cyprus question: an interpretation", *Millennium*, v.5, n.3, 1976-77. A broader perspective of this argument is offered by Michael Attalides' classic (1979) *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics* (Edinburgh: Q Press). Since then, a number of scholarly works evolve along these research lines bringing up more archival evidence vindicating Coufoudakis' view – e.g. the work by William Mallinson.

- power, blocking off the (partial or pseudo) democratisation process that Papadopoulos himself had initiated;
- The CIA station in Athens and its Greek-American agents, such as Peter Koromilas, John Fatseas and Gus Laskaris Avrakotos;
 - The American Embassy in Athens and the Italian-American Ambassador, Henry Tasca;
 - Greek shipowners and influential Greek-Americans, especially Tom Pappas (a businessman), Spiro Agnew (US vice president) and Aristotle Onassis (a shipping tycoon) and, last but not least,
 - Henry Kissinger, Archbishop Makarios and Constantine Karamanlis.

Unlike his previous book, the Papandreous do not figure much here, but he does not fail to mention Avrakotos' view of Andreas G. Papandreou, who confessed to junta officers that the official American line was to release him from prison but to "want this m***** f***** be killed", because he would get back to punish everybody – this demonstrates a taste of the kind of backstage language and style used at the time in the highly extra-institutional setting the junta regime was operating in its communication with the CIA. It is important to note that Ioannides refused to talk to and/or take instructions from the American Embassy in Athens and the Ambassador. Ioannides told Tasca that his interlocutor was the CIA's station in Athens, not the Embassy. In a way, Ioannides' position made sense, because the CIA was the key source of power in Greece, as it was in other countries on the capitalist periphery, such as Chile. Andreas Papandreou had repeatedly argued in the 1960s that the pecking order of US state branches that determine Greek affairs in Cold War conditions was as follows: first came the CIA, second the American Pentagon and, third the State Department. There is no democracy in dark rooms, only plotting.

According to Papachelas, the juncture of the Yom Kippur war (October 1973) and whether or not it influenced Kissinger's policy in the Eastern Mediterranean through acts of "omission or commission"⁹ – Papadopoulos' junta offered lukewarm support to USA's pro-Israel policy and Makarios nothing at all, so Kissinger would have wished to punish both – is not something that should be factored into any research agenda.¹⁰ Nor can a valid factor be – he claims lack of evidence – a (probable) secret understanding, upon the CIA's instigation, between Ioannides and the Turkish PM, Bulent Ecevit, in summer 1974, which allowed Turkish forces to land on Cyprus on the early morning of 20 July 1974 while Greek and Greek Cypriot forces abstained from fighting – what Papachelas

⁹ In his pithy account on Kissinger and Cyprus, William Mallinson, a former British diplomat and now Professor of Political Ideas and Institutions at Guglielmo Marconi University in Italy, makes smart use of the British archives to argue for Kissinger's "stalling tactics", which provided ample time for the Turks to carry out their plans creating a *fait accompli*; see, William D. E. Mallinson (2016) *Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus. Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing).

¹⁰ I am not sure this is true. On this point, Papachelas' account is documented by very few secondary sources and without fieldwork on the Yom Kippur War archival material. Some indication on the extent to which the Yom Kippur crisis might have influenced Kissinger's strategic considerations are to be found in Vassilis K. Fouskas, "Uncomfortable questions: Cyprus, October 1973 – August 1974", *Contemporary European History*, v.14, n.1, 2005, pp. 45-63.

calls “the silence of the Greek arms”. Further, as opposed to claims made by two Greek Cypriot investigative journalists, Kostas Venizelos and Michalis Ignatiou, Ioannides received no encouragement from any of the CIA agents in Athens to topple Makarios on 15 July 1974, promising to him that Turkey would take no action as long as Greece did not proclaim *enosis* and insofar as Turkish forces were not obstructed militarily.¹¹ Makarios, after all, was disliked by Western, Turkish and Greek elites alike during the junta and before it. Why should Turkey move militarily into Cyprus instead of seeing the act of his subversion as a favour to all NATO powers concerned, including Greece and Turkey? In the end, Papachelas admits again and again that he does not possess enough evidence to argue that it was the CIA that gave the green light to Ioannides to topple Makarios, using the Greek forces in Cyprus (ELDYK – Hellenic Forces in Cyprus) to trigger the Turkish invasion.¹²

When it comes to the complexities between business and the junta, Papachelas has fewer ambiguities or inhibitions. He seems, for example, perturbed by the connection between Aristotle Onassis and Papadopoulos. Onassis, who gave away as a gift to Papadopoulos a villa in Lagonissi, Attica, expected support from Papadopoulos in his bid to acquire a large refinery in Greece, something which was opposed by Nikos Makarezos, one of the other two officers leading the junta. Makarezos had close contacts with another Greek shipowner, Stavros Niarchos, who was bidding for the same refinery. Also, Papachelas does not fail to expose the activities of Tom Pappas in Greece, which combined a good dose of “politics” as well as “economics”. Pappas, a key sponsor of Richard Nixon’s electoral campaign, was one of the main actors pushing the Greek junta to also support Nixon’s campaign financially.¹³ Pappas, who saw his oil business

¹¹ In *Kissinger’s Secret Files*, op. cit., Venizelos and Ignatiou argue that the encouragement came from Gus Laskaris Avrakotos, a middle rank agent at the CIA’s station in Athens, who had direct access to, and influence on, Ioannides. Despite the fact that Papachelas makes reference to their work, he refrains from commenting on this very point, effectively saying that there is no hard evidence that Avrakotos or any other CIA agent gave the green light to Ioannides to topple Makarios. Papachelas admits that Ioannides ceased effectively to communicate with Henry Tasca and the officials of the US Embassy, his direct interlocutors being agents of the CIA station in Athens. However, he avoids defining this connection as Ioannides’ *source* of power. This has a certain significance, because it would have showed the subordinate character of Ioannides’ regime to US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, which viewed Turkey as geo-strategically more important than Greece.

¹² The opposite is argued by general Gregorios Bonanos, head of staff during the Turkish invasion. Bonanos, who himself prompted the Cypriot National Guard and the Greek forces in Cyprus not to resist the landing of Turkish forces in the early hours of 20 July 1974, insists in his memoirs that Ioannides told him he had assurances by the Americans that the toppling of Makarios would not trigger a Turkish invasion.

¹³ Elias Demetracopoulos, a Greek journalist who contributed so much to the disclosure of the Watergate scandal in summer 1974, argued that the Greek junta of Papadopoulos financed Nixon’s campaign with some \$549,000 (Papachelas, p. 55); see also the account on the life and times of Demetracopoulos by James H. Barron (2019) *The Greek Connection. The Life of Elias Demetracopoulos and the Untold Story of Watergate* (London and New York: Melville House), p.xi. Today’s equivalent of this amount of money is \$4 million. Barron argues that the bagman for Nixon’s illegal funding was Pappas, “who later became known on the Watergate tapes as ‘the Greek bearing gifts’”, *ibid.* For a balanced assessment of Barron’s work including an assessment of Demetracopoulos’ revelations concerning the connection between the junta and the US

and petrol stations in Greece flourishing under the logo of “ESSO PAPPAS”, was politically very influential in both the USA and Greece.¹⁴ It is also worth noting that Pappas had clashed with the Papandreous in the 1960s over his petroleum monopoly in Greece.

Papachelas shows that Pappas contributed to the appointment of Spiro Agnew as Vice President and that he also pushed the Ioannides government, especially the head of general staff, Gregorios Bonanos, to topple Makarios; indeed, Karamanlis, upon his return to politics as head of the Greek state from 24 July 1974 onwards, did not replace Bonanos (see below).¹⁵ Pappas was also a family friend of Ioannides’ puppet Prime Minister, Adamantios Androutsopoulos. Time and again, Papachelas insists that he has no hard evidence to argue that Ioannides received any institutional or extra-institutional form of encouragement, or prompting, from the USA to topple Makarios. As regards Avrakotos, Papachelas says that he might have said to Ioannides what he had said of Andreas Papandreou: “Don’t worry about America, just get rid of this m***** f*****” – meaning, Makarios.¹⁶ Repeatedly and again and almost agonisingly, Papachelas states that there is no hard evidence proving that Avrakotos or any other CIA agent pushed or encouraged Ioannides to topple Makarios on 15 July 1974. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, no hard evidence can get halfway around the world before the historical truth has a chance to get its pants on – yet it will get its pants on. But there may well be more to the affair than meets the eye, especially as far as Constantine Karamanlis is concerned.

In his self-imposed exile in Paris after losing the November 1963 election to the Centre Union party of the Papandreous, Karamanlis was anything but politically inactive. William Mallinson argues that his political activities were not unequivocally anti-junta as those of Andreas Papandreou and others inside and outside Greece. Mallinson reveals that Karamanlis met Pappas in London and told him that he approved of the appointment of Spyros Markezinis as Prime Minister by the Papadopoulos’ faction of the junta. Then Mallinson adds: “That the Paris-based Karamanlis should even see the likes of Pappas (who was despised by the anti-American Greek Left) suggests that he was involved in the politics of the junta, even if only at arm’s length”.¹⁷

Papachelas offers some vivid descriptions about the way in which Turkey, several months before the invasion of Cyprus, started challenging Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, due mainly to indications that there was oil in the northern Aegean, near the island of Thassos. Turkey licensed her state company, TPAO, to search for oil on Greece’s continental shelf, effectively

establishment, see Stan Draenos, “Exile on K Street”, *Washington Monthly*, November-December 2020.

¹⁴ Also, it was Pappas who brought *Coca-Cola* to Greece.

¹⁵ Bonanos was only discharged on 19 August 1974, three days after the end of hostilities on Cyprus.

¹⁶ Papachelas, p. 222.

¹⁷ William Mallinson (2011) *Britain and Cyprus. Key Themes and Documents since WWII* (London: I.B. Tauris), p. 185.

arguing that the Greek islands possessed no continental shelf. Kissinger, who found out about the Aegean crisis via the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, began thinking along the lines of a “condominium” between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean, where American interests and companies would also be involved. Turkish policy became USA policy and the USA proposed this officially to Ioannides, but Ioannides’ regime turned down the idea of “sharing the resources of the Aegean Sea”. It was then that Greece threatened to extend its territorial waters from 6 to 12 nautical miles, something which Turkey considered as a *casus belli*. The inescapable conclusion is that Turkey, being geo-strategically a more prominent ally than Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean theatre, managed to stand her ground and influence US policy across the Thrace-Aegean-Cyprus arc: once the partition of Cyprus had materialised, then partition or a “condominium” of the Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey would eventually come to fruition. This was valid back then, as it is probably valid today and it is one of the merits of Papachelas’ account that brings this issue up. Thus, the USA had had “no American interest”, as Kissinger put it more than once in conversations with his NSC (National Security Council) team, to oppose, discourage or stop a Turkish invasion of Cyprus, so much so that the Soviet Union was not committed to Cyprus’ independence and Makarios’ survival. Papachelas, with certain bitterness, observes that then, as now, Greece attempted to approach France, seeking to diversify her sources of military aid, so that she could avoid being entirely dependent on the USA. In fact, Greece and Cyprus have been doing that since the junta years, annoying both the Americans and the British. Karamanlis’ own policy of withdrawing Greece from NATO’s military structures in the wake of Turkey’s operations on Cyprus was very much influenced by De Gaulle’s similar practice. Makarios’ license to France to set up on Cypriot soil in 1971 a French listening and broadcasting post upset the British because it was interfering with their own spying installations on the island.¹⁸

Re-assessment: beyond the “dark room”

Having said this, we cannot but turn to the essential question, and seek to construct a substantive answer: what is the added value of Papachelas’ new book? All of the above, albeit great reminders, was more or less known and, in some instances, also very well documented and detailed, as indeed is Papachelas’ own account, whatever its omissions or misapprehensions.

The straightforward answer here is rather simple. It is a tape of 38-minutes’ duration, recording Ioannides’ chaotic War Council of 20 July 1974 – the dark room with “no adults in it” – to paraphrase the title of Yanis Varoufakis’ statement about his experience as Greece’s Economy Minister during the negotiations of his country with her lenders in the first half of 2015.¹⁹ It is

¹⁸ Ibid. The French listening post and broadcasting in Cyprus is at Cape Greco. See also, Vassilis K. Fouskas (2003) *Zones of Conflict. US Foreign Policy in the Balkans and the Greater Middle East* (London: Pluto).

¹⁹ See, Yanis Varoufakis (2017) *Adults in the Room. My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment* (London: Bodley Head), and my review of it in the magazine of The Fabian Society, London, as

thanks to Papachelas' investigative journalism, networking, passion and persistence that we possess this very important document. The dialogue and the arguments, which Papachelas exhibits in full – it might have been better if they had been placed in an Annex – show a completely disorganised state of affairs, a “government” body in total disarray, without strategy, cohesion or vision as to how to react in those critical conditions. Many at that meeting believed that the Turks would not start a war, as Turkey had proclaimed that her soldiers would not shoot unless they were shot at first – a ridiculous statement from every point of view, especially if one factors in the bombing of the Kerynia district and the military camp of ELDYK early on the morning of 20 July.²⁰ The document is revealing, in that it exposes the plight and the disarray of Greece's state machine under the Colonels and Ioannides powerless and precarious position. However, there is an important omission.

The “detail” that Papachelas omits here is Bonanos' procrastinating tactics during this tumultuous meeting, which summarises the key *political* position of a dilapidated Greek state. Repeatedly pressurised by Cypriot headquarters to approve their demands to resist the landing forces on the morning of 20 July, Bonanos wired to the Cypriots the famous phrase: “Turkey attacks Cyprus. But we are Greece”.²¹ This shows clearly that the political position of the Greek state was anything but *enosis* – yet all journalistic accounts available to date, from *The Guardian* to *Washington Post* and elsewhere, the junta “had overthrown Makarios and proclaimed *enosis* with Greece”. This did not happen. Bonanos and many other senior generals and officers, I repeat, were not sacked by Karamanlis when the latter assumed power on 24 July. There is sheer bureaucratic-political continuity between the junta regime and Karamanlis new government. Yet, after the debacle of failing to deter Turkish aggression, Papachelas' narrative begins discreetly extolling and praising Karamanlis' leadership in the crisis of late July and August 1974. Although this is done very tactfully, it nevertheless betrays Papachelas' ideological preferences. Ultimately, I would argue, his admiration of Karamanlis' policy and leadership during the crisis contradicts the findings of his previous work on the Cyprus issue and the roles of the two Papandreous and Makarios himself.

“A whistleblower's tale” (21 August 2017): <https://fabians.org.uk/book-review-a-whistleblowers-tale/> (accessed: 5 November 2021).

²⁰ Deliberate planning by the Turkish General Staff to invade Cyprus began as early as 1970. Detailed operational planning started after the Yom Kippur War and intensified from January 1974 onwards. On 20 July 1974 at 3.30am, the first Turkish commandos landed to clear the Pente Mili beach and mark it for the incoming landing craft. At 4.40am, a general alert was issued to all commanders to start hostilities. Some nine minutes later the first air sorties from air bases in Turkey started, one of their first targets being the ELDYK barracks in Makedonitissa, near Nicosia. See, Edward J. Erickson and Mesut Uyar (2020) *Phase Line Attila. The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974* (Virginia: Marine Corps University Press). Papachelas' account does not provide these operational details. However, they are significant to completely demolish the silly argument of the disintegrating ruling elites of Greece at the time.

²¹ See, Giorgos Sergis, “The Turkish invasion” [«Η Τουρκική εισβολή»] *Eleftherotypia*, Istorika (special insert), 19 April 2001. Having contributed, as Greece, to the toppling of Makarios, thus triggering the Turkish invasion, Bonanos had the cheek to refute any responsibility at the moment when the Greek forces of ELDYK, that is, the Greek state – and not just Cypriots or Cyprus – were bombed in Cyprus.

As we saw earlier, Papachelas' work, *The Rape of Greek Democracy*, demonstrates the profound anti-communism, pro-Americanism and pro-NATO cultural formation of Greece's political elites, especially of Constantine Karamanlis and George Papandreou. A pro-NATO solution to the Cyprus issue eliminating Makarios' non-aligned position in Cold War conditions would have been a perfect solution to the Cyprus issue. At the same time, it would have done justice to US Cold War policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, which was based on a pecking order of strategic preferences vis-à-vis Turkey and Greece by privileging the former at the expense of the latter. At the same time, the USA's real red line was that *no war* between Greece and Turkey should ever take place. For instance, if the Turks prevailed in Cyprus after a fight, so be it. As long as there was no war, American interests were under no threat, and the USA would still be on top of things. If the Greeks prevailed in Cyprus after a fight, that would also be fine, as long as there was no war – no American interest would be at stake.

Both Turkey and Greece were NATO powers. These two sets of objectives – the primacy of Turkey vis-à-vis Greece and the thesis of “no war between them” under no circumstances – are the key to any substantive understanding of US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, then and, I believe, now. I will try to show that Karamanlis was not so much conscious of the second, most crucial set of objectives of US policy in the region and that this accounted for his management of, and hesitations over, the crisis in summer 1974.

An understanding along the lines of the Acheson plan(s) between Turkish and Greek political elites through backchannels, facilitated by the USA, had already been in place even after the failure of Acheson's mission. The USA had decided upon the set of imperial policy constraints in Cold War conditions to be imposed on Greece and Turkey, taking into account the preferences of all parties concerned. But eliminating Makarios' non-aligned policy, and/or Makarios himself, was rather implausible in conditions of even a semi-parliamentary democracy in Greece. Equally serious was the left-wing influence of Andreas Papandreou on his father, pushing the democratisation process in Greece to its institutional limits. Andreas had openly declared his support for Makarios and opposed any NATO plan that would have led to the vivisection and NATOisation of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, with Britain keeping her two sovereign military bases on the island. The United Left, at the time under the charismatic leadership of Ilias Iliou, was also in agreement with Makarios' policy and, partially, with Andreas Papandreou's. NATOisation, ie partition or the “double *enosis*” of Cyprus in conditions of parliamentary democracy – albeit truncated – in Greece was an impossible undertaking. Thus, the shift to dictatorial rule became a necessity. And it became a necessity not just for this external reason – the Cyprus issue – but also for domestic ones. As we have shown elsewhere, post-war socio-economic development, rapid urbanisation and politicisation of Greek civil society pushed for an opening up of the political system and concession of extensive civic and political rights, including the legalisation of the

Greek Communist Party.²² The Centre Union party of George Papandreou and especially its left-wing faction under the leadership of his son Andreas were the precise politico-ideological expression of this democratisation process from the bottom up. In Cold War conditions, and given the legacy of the Civil War in Greece and the influence of communism, this represented an explosive mix for US security and class interests in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. Democracy in Greece was subverted by a combination of external and internal interference and structural processes, blocking off the democratisation process under the influence of the two Papandreous, while facilitating a NATO solution to the Cyprus issue via the elimination of Makarios. Today, we have evidence showing that Nihat Erim, the architect of Turkey's policy in Cyprus in the 1950s and PM of Turkey for eight months in 1971, had managed to reach an understanding with the junta of Papadopoulos – it lasted until 25 November 1973 – on how to partition the island between Turkey and Greece, leaving the sovereign British bases on the island intact.²³ But so far, we have no evidence that a similar understanding existed between Ioannides' faction and the Turkish government, at the time under the social democratic party of Bülent Ecevit.

But if the above is the case, as Papachelas in his previous book and so many other researchers have amply demonstrated with undisputed archival material, why should Karamanlis' handling of the crisis (23/24 July – 16 August 1974) be fully justified? Papachelas' narrative (and judgement), among others, draws from the security assessment put forth by Greece's discredited Joint Chiefs of Staff, who painted a grim picture to Karamanlis as regards the readiness of the Greek military and whether or not it could successfully intervene in Cyprus to stop Turkey's advance, while at the same time defending Greek territories in Thrace and the Greek islands. The assessment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was disheartening and abysmal, discouraging Karamanlis' cabinet from ordering any military action (the generals pointed out Turkey's military superiority, the demoralisation of the Greek army, Cyprus's almost impossible defence etc.). It is said that Karamanlis' famous phrase that "Cyprus is too far away for Greece to defend it" is based on this military-security assessment. Karamanlis became head of state only after the collapse of the Ioannides' junta, which happened to have been at the time when the Turkish forces had created the Kerynia-northern Nicosia *lodgement* – their first major objective – crossing over the Pentadaktylos range of mountains, that is the creation of the bridgehead and the airhead in that zone. This happened at 2pm on 22 July 1974 (4pm Cyprus time).²⁴ A "ceasefire" was called just then. The Turkish General Staff had achieved its first and fundamental operational objective. At that point, the lodgement was only in need of reinforcements, which it duly received (see below) during the "ceasefire".

²² Among other, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Constantine Dimoulas (2013) *Greece, Financialisation and the EU: The Political Economy of Debt and Destruction* (London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan), chapter 4 ("Passive revolution and the American Factor, 1940s-70s", pp. 81-109, available in Greek by Epikentro publishers and in Serbian and Croatian by Albatros plus.

²³ Note that the Treaty of Guarantee provides that restoration of the *status quo ante* in the Republic of Cyprus should ideally be achieved via an understanding reached between all three Guarantor Powers, i.e. Britain, Turkey and Greece.

²⁴ This was brought about through UN Security Council Resolution 353.

The second set of objectives for Turkey was to be achieved either diplomatically via the round of negotiations that started in Geneva during the “ceasefire” or, failing this, militarily. This entailed an expansion of the lodgement to include all the areas claimed during the discussions of the aborted Acheson plan(s) in 1964, aiming at securitising the entire island under the aegis of Turkish military power, thus achieving political-strategic control of the whole of Cyprus. But all diplomatic initiatives and negotiations between 25 July and 13 August, mediated and chaired by Britain’s Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, came to naught. Glafkos Clerides, who was heading the Greek Cypriot delegation, was pushed to the corner during the final round of negotiations, having to accept the cantonisation of Cyprus, a form of political federalism (or rather co-federalism) with a weak central authority *cum* Turkish troops all over Cyprus. What was at issue at the time was not so much the weak central authority solution forestalling the aborted Annan Plan some 30 year later (2003-04), but the fact that Turkey’s military forces would have legitimately been spread across Cyprus, wherever Turkish Cypriot enclaves or population could be found. Had Clerides accepted the proposal, Turkey would have achieved her major security aim, which was the strategic control of the entire island and its legally adjacent sea, seabed and air lanes, cutting it off completely from Greece’s sea, seabed and air orbits. The USA and NATO could not care less because, whoever the winner in the negotiations, it would still be a NATO power in charge, so the USA would be in control. There is also evidence that it was Kissinger who pushed Güneş to table the “cantonisation” proposal.²⁵

On 13 August, Clerides asked for a 36-hour recess to discuss further with Karamanlis and consider the proposals, but his request was rejected by Güneş, Turkey’s foreign minister, who was negotiating on behalf of his government. The following day, the Turkish troops broke out of the lodgement, attacked ELDYK’s military camp and occupied 36% of Cyprus, while ethnically cleansing their area by pushing the Greek Cypriots to the south. Greek Cypriot paramilitary forces – but not ELDYK or the Cypriot National Guard – led by “EOKA B” did something similar: they committed atrocities against the Turkish Cypriots, facilitating the Turkish plan to bring the Turkish Cypriots into the occupied zone.²⁶ Interestingly, something which Papachelas’ narrative omits, Clerides also approached the Soviet observer at the Geneva conference, Viktor Menin, asking for a limited Russian military presence on Cyprus. Menin’s response was quite astonishing: he said to Clerides that his request had to be cleared first with the Americans. This, as William Hale says, suggests that there

²⁵ See, William D. Mallinson (2016) *Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus*, op. cit.

²⁶ EOKA B, formed in 1971, was a secret paramilitary organisation led by general Giorgos Grivas. Its chief aim was to eliminate Makarios – in fact it carried out several attempts against Makarios’ life – in order to unite part of the island with Greece, while conceding a portion of it to Turkey (double *enosis*). Across Cyprus, EOKA B pursued a “strategy of tension” – similar to one pursued in Italy by the Red Brigades in the 1970s – trying to de-stabilise Makarios’ rule creating conditions for its undoing, violent or otherwise. In the case of Italy, the aim was to stop the Italian Communist Party (PCI) coming to power. Further details on this in Vassilis K. Fouskas (1997) *Italy, Europe, the Left. The Transformation of Italian Communism and the European Imperative* (London: Routledge). I thank Marios Evriviades for pointing out to me the larger Cold War picture and the various “Gladio” structures as regards the strategy of EOKA B.

might have been “a US-Soviet understanding that neither superpower would intervene unilaterally in Cyprus”.²⁷ This proves my earlier assertion, namely that the USA could not care who was going to win the battle for Cyprus – the Turks or the Greeks. *All they cared about was not to have a war between Turkey and Greece.* This, in my view, is a strategic assessment upon which Karamanlis, the leader of a small NATO state, had failed to capitalise upon in this critical juncture for his country.

One of the issues Papachelas leaves rather under-researched is the one connected to the wires sent to Athens by Greece’s State Information Service in Cyprus – the so-called “KYP” – stationed in Kerynia.²⁸ Papachelas reveals that the head of staff there, Alexander Simeoforides, was repeatedly wiring Athens about the concentration of forces in Turkey’s coastal area opposite Cyprus and even on the very morning of the invasion he was reporting with surprise that the army on board the Turkish ships was totally unprotected and standing as if in a parade. He could register nothing of the fervour and agonising preparedness of a landing force getting ready to fight in a difficult mission: taking the Kerynia beach of Pente Mili and creating both a bridgehead and an airhead²⁹ uniting the Kerynia district with the main Turkish enclave stretching from the northern suburbs of Nicosia up to Pantedaktylos mountain range – the so-called Kionelli-Templos-Aghios Ilarionas position. It seems as if they knew that “the Greek arms would remain silent”. One question here is inescapable: who reassured the Turkish General Staff that they would not meet any resistance when landing on Cypriot soil – which, indeed, was the case? Papachelas seems to be failing to direct his research towards finding answers to this question. Admittedly, given the lack of archival evidence – many sources are still unclassified – no one can have an easy ride in trying to find answers to this. But it is a legitimate question that should be asked, so that readers can make their own independent inferences.³⁰


²⁷ William Hale (2000) *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass), p. 158.

²⁸ KYP, to all intents and purposes, was an extension of the CIA in Greece and Cyprus, having minimal freedom of action in defending the sovereign (bourgeois) rights of the Greek state.

²⁹ In military terminology, the simultaneous creation of a bridgehead and airhead constitutes a *lodgement*.

³⁰ A good military study of Turkey’s two advances on Cyprus is given by Edward J. Erickson and Mesut Uyar, *op. cit.* The study is rather pro-Turkish, but the information is invaluable and unobtainable from pro-Greek sources, such as the classic study by Giorgos Sergis (1999), *op. cit.* Characteristically, Erickson’s and Uyar’s military study notes how the Greek side, despite the fact it had the capacity to successfully defend the Pente Mili beach near Kerynia where the first landing took place, or to protect the Agyrta pass so that the Turks would fail to create their planned lodgement, did not take action on any of these occasions during the crucial first two days of the invasion. They say that “further research is needed on these issues”. The answer, of course, is that the Cypriot National Guard and ELDYK had no specific orders from Athens to enter into hostilities. Any resistance put up was based on various scattered local decisions, failing to implement any pre-existing plan. See also, Vassilis K. Fouskas, “Uncomfortable questions...”, *op. cit.*

The failed negotiations in Geneva apart, what else happened on the ground during the “lull” of 23 July-13 August? This is the most pertinent question that touches upon Karamanlis’ management of the crisis, that had presumably succeeded in avoiding a disastrous war between Greece and Turkey.



Source: *Military Histories* and Malcolm Brooke. Used with permission. https://www.militaryhistories.co.uk/greengreenline/1974_4 (accessed on 4 November 2021; permission obtained on 8 November 2021). SBA stands for Sovereign Base Areas (British).

Thus, we are led to another and highly significant issue that Papachelas fails to tackle, which is whether there had existed any real ceasefire at all – let alone halting – of the forward march of the Turkish troops on Cyprus. From 23 July until 13 August the Turkish forces were expanding the lodgement, whereas orders from Athens under Karamanlis were to “respect the ceasefire”.³¹ Note that they were not expanding the lodgement in order to protect the enclaved Turkish Cypriots under attack from Greek Cypriot forces in various parts of

³¹ Numerous accounts demonstrate this, especially witnesses by combatants whom I have interviewed, such as an ELDYK veteran from the village of Kato Tritos, Lesvos-island, Loukas Vareltzis. In this respect, very disturbing is the personal witness of another ELDYK veteran, primary school teacher, Athanassios Chryssafis, who wrote a voluminous book of 1,600 pages honouring his betrayed ELDYK comrades. See, Athanassios Gr. Chryssafis (2019), *The Unknown Soldiers of ELDYK, 211 Battalion and National Guard* [Οι άγνωστοι στρατιώτες της ΕΛΔΥΚ του 211 Τ.Π. και της Εθνοφρουράς] (Salonica: Chryssafis).

Cyprus, but in order to securitise the area around the lodgement and prepare the second phase of their advance. During that period of “lull”, the Turkish troops captured Sysklipos (24 July), the Buffavento Castle, Agridaki and Aghios Ermolaos (all between 24 July and 2 August), whereas on 6 August they captured the large villages of Lapithos and Karavas. At the same time, the Turkish General Staff did not cease for a moment to send reinforcements to Cyprus by sea and air. Whereas on 20-22 July Turkey had brought ashore onto Cyprus some 13,500 soldiers, by 12 August the number had almost tripled with the entire VI Corps combat units and headquarter elements having set up on Cypriot soil.³² Also, in early August the latest state-of-the-art M48 Paton tanks arrived, which were to be used to break out of the bridgehead on 14 August. The Turkish troops began the second major operational phase on Cyprus on 14 August by attacking, among others, the military camp of ELDYK, defended by 318 lightly armed soldiers. Athens had given no order to the commander of ELDYK, Panagiotis Stavroulopoulos, to retreat to positions covered by the Cypriot National Guard, the result being heavy casualties and unnecessary loss of life for both sides in a deeply unequal battle that lasted over two days (60 hours in total).³³ Papachelas’ account omits all this, because he focuses on the diplomatic detail of events, albeit selectively, brushing off the operational detail unfolding on the ground. However, the chain of Greek command had Athens at its top and, since 24 July 1974, was politically sourced from the office of Karamanlis himself. In fact, one of Karamanlis’ mistakes had been his decision to leave the top military officers of his army intact, all of whom had been appointed either by Papadopoulos’ or Ioannides’ regimes. This resulted in major operational inconsistencies and deficiencies that skewed the implementation of any rational political directive that Karamanlis himself tried several times to articulate. Greek deterrence was as ineffective as the demoralised and disintegrating leadership of the Greek army, preventing any unity between the army and the Greek people in Greece and Cyprus. One such example of failed deterrence is pointed out by Giorgos Sergis, a retired brigadier:

[...] Karamanlis ordered the operational readiness of a division, so that it could depart immediately for Cyprus if so decided. But instead of executing the political order, the General Staff decided to form a committee under the deputy Army General, lieutenant General Eptidios, to study the possibility of forming a division of special composition, its mission being to take action outside the country’s borders. Thus,

³² That was a total of about 40,000 troops. To this should be added the pre-existing Turkish Forces in Cyprus (TURKDYK), legally stationed there, as had been the case with the Greek force of ELDYK since 1960, as well as 19 battalions of Turkish Cypriots, numbering some 15,000 men. See, Giorgos Sergis (1999) *The Battle of Cyprus, July-August 1974: Anatomy of a Tragedy* [Η μάχη της Κύπρου, Ιούλιος-Αύγουστος 1974: ανατομία μιας τραγωδίας] (Athens: Vlassis bros), p. 570.

³³ Military assessments show that the attack on ELDYK’s camp and the occupation of the area was rather insignificant for the Turkish political and military objectives as from the Greek perspective. An orderly retreat under the circumstances – note that Commander Stavroulopoulos had repeatedly asked for reinforcements but received none – would have prevented unnecessary loss of life on both sides.

Karamanlis' political order to form a division for action as soon as possible was transformed into a feasibility study to form a division.³⁴

No one can, however, criticise Karamanlis for not being pro-active. On 14 August 1974, upon receiving the news of Turkey's second major advance on Cyprus, he proposed sending to the island a submarine mission and a squadron of warplanes, as well as a division transported to Cyprus via a convoy. He also proposed that he and Evangelos Averoff, his defence minister and one of the architects, together with Karamanlis, of Cyprus' 1959-60 constitutional arrangements, get on board the convoy, thereby drawing international support on moral grounds. The Chiefs of Staff and Averoff opposed all the above on grounds of severe operational weakness. Karamanlis, alone, had to back down. Furthermore, the idea of having the Sixth Fleet of the USA transposing between Cyprus and Turkey, an idea aired before and after the first landing of Turkish forces, does not belong to Karamanlis or any of his staff, but to prominent Greek journalist, Elias Demetracopoulos. Demetracopoulos, convinced of Turkey's invasion being imminent after the coup against Makarios on 15 July, pushed Senator James William Fulbright to contact Kissinger to authorise "the Sixth Fleet to pay a goodwill visit to the ports of Cyprus".³⁵ But Kissinger rejected this proposal without any discussion. Thus, Kissinger's policy in Cyprus, which was the avoidance of war, at any cost, between Greece and Turkey, as this would have had catastrophic consequences for NATO's Balkan and Middle Eastern policy, succeeded. Had Karamanlis' deterrence policy gone ahead during the "lull", or even at the very last minute to block the second Turkish advance, the USA would have been alarmed that a full-scale war between two NATO allies was imminent, pushing her to intervene on the spot to stop the warring parties. This might have saved the lives of thousands of people on Cyprus, ethnic cleansing would have been avoided, the refugee waves would have been halted, and a permanent scourge in Greek-Turkish relations would have been removed as negotiations would have continued on a new basis.

Papachelas touches upon these issues and agrees with Karamanlis' final decision not to order any military action in Cyprus via sending Greek mainland forces as Cyprus was in any case "far away". However, the big picture is missed, and the big picture is, namely, as already emphasised above, the USA's policy of avoiding a war, at all costs – I repeat, at all costs – between Greece and Turkey. Thus, our – rather counter-intuitive – argument is that had Karamanlis taken the risk to send selectively Greek military units – especially submarines and air-force – to Cyprus, even as late as 14 August, the USA might have intervened to stop not just Greece, but also Turkey's further advance on Cyprus. Turkey would have simply rested on the laurels of the first advance,

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 559-60, my translation. Sergis, a military officer himself, served as a junior officer at the time near Evros, the only land border (in Thrace, northern Greece) which the country shares with Turkey.

³⁵ James H. Barron (2019), op. cit., p. 337. In early July, taking stock of Makarios' public letter to the junta, Demetracopoulos convinced Fulbright to put pressure on Kissinger to block Ioannides' plan to topple Makarios. Again, Kissinger refused to do so. To date, democrat Senator Fulbright (1905-1995) remains the longest serving chairman in the history of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

which was roughly a version of the Acheson plan that George Papandreou had accepted back in 1964. No doubt, hard bargaining would have ensued in finding the appropriate form of federal governance for Cyprus, but no further loss of life and no unnecessary refugee waves and ethnic killing by both sides would have occurred.

New beginnings?

Papachelas' work is not the last word on the Cyprus issue. In fact, no historical research can be honoured with such an adage, nor even this review and re-assessment of Karamanlis' choices at the time, with all its possible or probable additions to our knowledge. But the historical method is vital and it has to do with the belief in counter-factual history: "What would have happened if...". Papachelas seems to be asking this question between the lines, when he reluctantly passes his soft judgement on Karamanlis' management of the crisis, but he does not get down to the bone by seeking alternatives available to Karamanlis and by way of setting out the fundamental objectives of US policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, as this extensive review has tried to do. Nor does he criticise Karamanlis' briefing of the Cyprus issue to his ministers and generals, when Turkey's second advance was already under way.³⁶

The fundamental objectives of US policy were the *imperial policy constraints* within which Karamanlis' new cabinet was forced to operate: primacy of Turkey vis-à-vis Greece within NATO; and no war at all costs between Turkey and Greece. The diplomatic negotiating constraint was Acheson's policy of "double *enosis*", although the USA were not interested in whether Cyprus would become entirely Turkish or entirely Greek, since both states were members of NATO. Counter-factual history does not mean offering alternatives outside the policy constraints set by the mighty and powerful, as this would be totally unrealistic and ahistorical, especially given the size, capacity and clout of a small country such as Greece. Fundamentally, what was also lacking in the case of Greece was a mass popular movement pressing for the demolition of the imperial constraints putting forth the issue of peace between Turkish and Greek people on an anti-imperialist platform. No mass popular movement toppled the junta.³⁷ In fact, at the time, it was Turkey that was experiencing mass demonstrations led by left-wing and communist forces and the Cyprus intervention by Ecevit's regime waived a lot of pressure from it on the domestic front. In Greece, the junta disintegrated from within, completely doomed by its failure to eliminate Makarios and Makarios' policy. It was not the Turkish invasion that toppled the junta, the Turkish invasion had simply triggered it. However, the process of internal disintegration was over-determined by external imperial agencies, chiefly among whom were the USA and its agencies in Athens, especially the CIA. Karamanlis and the regime of the junta generals that Karamanlis left

³⁶ In his briefing, Karamanlis castigates Makarios for siding with the non-aligned movement and turning down the NATOisation, ie partition, of Cyprus.

³⁷ Nicos Poulantzas, writing from Paris, was one of the first Marxist intellectuals to offer some theorisations on this very point; see his *La crise des dictatures* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1975).

intact was the “no war at all costs” solution for the USA. That is how Kissinger prevailed.

As I have tried to show here, Karamanlis *did* have deterrence choices and certain freedom of action within those imperial constraints, and he saw those choices, but did not snatch the opportunities that momentarily were springing up, only to disappear again almost instantly. At times, he fell prey to the views of a discredited military, whom he failed to sack upon assuming office on 24 July. This bureaucratic milieu was bound to skew every effort towards a credible deterrence policy, cementing a democratic unity between the people and the army. His key minister, Evangelos Averoff, also played a negative role in this respect. Despite all the shortcomings of a democratic transition process that was flawed, my fundamental argument here has been that had Karamanlis been fully convinced of the fact that America’s crucial imperial-policy objective towards Turkey and Greece was the avoidance of war between them at all costs – I repeat: *at all costs* – then he could have pursued with determination a set of policies of deterrence that would have led the USA to intervene immediately to stop the war between the two NATO allies. This would have prevented further bloodshed, resulting in a better socio-political outcome for the Cypriot people, both Turkish and Greek. Karamanlis had no deterrence policy in July-August 1974, because he was entrapped within the disintegrating bureaucratic and demoralising environment of junta generals, receiving no encouragement whatsoever from Averoff. Importantly, there were no direct or indirect channels of communication between Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou. Karamanlis is responsible for keeping the top military brass and bureaucratic elites in Athens intact from 24 July to 17 August 1974. An understanding with Andreas Papandreou during this crucial period would have produced a much better outcome for all parties concerned.

I am of the conviction that the Papandreous – the missing link in Papachelas’ account, unlike his previous book – had the ability and the foresight to pursue such alternatives in the 1960s; Andreas and Makarios, in particular, would have been in a position to schedule credible deterrence initiatives that would have forced the USA to intervene both diplomatically and militarily. Makarios and Andreas had the political gift to push the system of imperialist constraints suffocating Greece and Cyprus to its limits. They were pursuing what can be called – for lack of a better term – the *politics of limits*. Makarios, together with his confidante, Zinon Rossides, was always driving a hard bargain on every matter concerning Cyprus. At times, he had even drawn on his side the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community.³⁸ Neither Makarios nor Andreas were the favourites of Washington. They are not the favourites of Papachelas either.

³⁸ This was the case, for example, with the negotiations over the fate of the British bases on Cyprus in 1959-60. In order to achieve his aims, Makarios threatened the British with a complete withdrawal from the negotiations, invalidating the constitutional arrangements and the compromise achieved earlier with the agreement of the Turkish and Greek governments. On this, see the penetrating analysis by Achilleas K. Emilianides (2021) *A Prolonged Game of Chess* [Ένα μακρόσυρτο παιχνίδι σκακιού] (Nicosia: Hippasus).

The USA and primarily the CIA, did not want Andreas Papandreou to succeed his father as Greece's PM in the 1960s. His public politics were far too much on the left, bordering on socialism and even communism. When before the advent of the dictatorship he was explaining in private to the US Embassy that his anti-Americanism and socialism should be seen as a buffer against the electoral advances of the far-left and communism and that, once in power, he would have never taken Greece outside NATO, the hawks of the US Embassy in Athens in the 1960s used to call him a "demagogue" that should not be trusted. The wires sent to Washington sounded more or less like this: "This is what Andreas told us over dinner; but we don't trust him".³⁹ In the end, it was a matter of trust. And it was this lack of trust in Andreas by the USA that made the Greek people undergo a brutal dictatorship and the vivisection Cyprus, against any principle of international law or morality. Had Andreas Papandreou not been prevented by the USA to form a government, no junta would have taken power in Greece and Turkey would have not invaded Cyprus. If this point of view is accepted, then a new beginning for the historical research on the Cyprus issue might be in the offing.

Acknowledgements

I am indebted to Marios Evriviades, Stan Draenos and William Mallinson for their perceptive and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this article, also protecting me from inaccuracies and mistakes. I also thank them for drawing my attention to some sources I was unaware of. I am, however, solely responsible for the content of the article.

³⁹ My source here is the marvellous account by Stan Draenos on Andreas Papandreou, *op. cit.* For further context and analysis, see Vassilis K. Fouskas and Constantine Dimoulas (2013), *op. cit.*, pp. 100-106.