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## THE PROBLEM WITH FACEBOOK “Move fast and break things”



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When Facebook first became widely available in 2006 it seemed like the best idea since sliced bread!

Within a couple of years it took over the world. Only now we come to realise that it may have done exactly that. It appears that it has quite literally amassed such control over our lives and decision making that in the hands of someone with the right software and psychographic analysis Facebook really can sway election results and create “leaders”. What’s more is that at a time of ever tightening regulations and supervision in most industries Facebook is still operating in an almost unregulated cyber-wild west with trolls and bots springing up all over the place spreading misinformation and data analysis companies harvesting the personal data of millions of users for their own purposes.

Over the last year their mantra “move fast and break things” seems to have hit the nail on the head.

The investigation into the possibility of Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections has worked as a catalyst and opened the floodgates into the multisided threat that social media platforms such as Facebook potentially pose to society and security.

Revelations that a company called Cambridge Analytica (which included Steve Bannon, Trump’s ex chief strategist on its board) improperly acquired the personal data of 85 million Facebook users and used it in its campaign to elect Donald Trump, have led to the company’s file for bankruptcy and Facebook’s founder and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, testifying in the US Senate and Congress. Although he has so far refused to appear before the UK and EU Parliaments there is speculation by both bodies that such hearings will also take place.

The US Congress and Senate testimonies of Mark Zuckerberg although tough have not really been revealing in terms of new information. They have, however, achieved to bring forward the pressing need to activate a process to regulate Facebook and other social platforms.

Social platforms, despite the fact that their business models are strictly profit maximising based on advertising they have a social responsibility not only to protect the privacy of their users, but they should also bear responsibility that content which appears on them is not offensive, violent or otherwise dangerous. Clearly there is a mismatch here. Data protection is not compatible with profits. Especially since profits arise from apps that require access to users' data or from digitally targeted campaigns that again require access to data in order to enable them to psychographically segment their audience. This conflict of interest that any social platform would have between their business model and their social responsibility makes self-regulation an ineffective remedy. On the other hand, intense regulation which will restrict access to data will also restrict the users' ability to get almost any use out of social media platforms and will effectively limit their social and economic contribution which is otherwise enormous.

Social platform regulation, as with data protection regulation, is a hot potato. General Data Protections Regulation (GDPR) that will come into force later this month in Europe applies to Facebook itself which will have to adapt to some extent with regard to its EU users and is in the process of updating its terms of service with EU users. GDPR does create issues with companies across most industries, however, not only operational arising from newly introduced restrictions but also budgetary as GDPR will be adding to the cost of operation of most companies in order to comply with it. Nevertheless, the EU is a step ahead of the US here in terms of data protection.

Social Media platforms are woven into our daily lives for over a decade. They have transformed our access to information and to other people to an extent that could hardly have been anticipated in the nineties when internet was first opened to commercial use.

They provide enormous networking and business opportunities through digital campaigning not just for individuals but to companies of all sizes. In fact, there are industries that rely almost entirely on digital marketing through social media. The Forex industry, which makes up a large part of the Financial Sector in Cyprus is one of these industries. Digital marketing budgets run in the millions yearly even for relatively small forex companies.

In the same way the application of digital targeted marketing technologies to election campaigns, referred to as Computational politics (a practice that has been around for just over a decade), utilises personal data available on social media to profile and categorise voters.

The level of data detail – behavioural, demographic and psychographic data - that can be harvested from social platforms has made scoring, rating and categorising consumers and voters increasingly granular. Clouds such as IBM, Adobe and Oracle sell political data and detailed consumer/voter information such as credit card usage and television viewing patterns.

With the use of Data Management Platforms (DMPs) political campaigns can target increasingly smaller audience segments and recognise individuals through social media so they can microtarget (political micro targeting PMT) them with bespoke messages in other words use ‘psychographic neuromarketing’. For instance, during the 2016 US presidential election this was used by the Trump campaign to discourage Hillary Clinton voters from turning up to vote. This is known as voter suppression and is achieved through emotion based targeting. This was one of the practices used extensively by Cambridge Analytica, as explained they the CEO of the company Alexander Nix during a presentation on Data and Psychographics. According to Chris Wiley, an ex-employee of Cambridge Analytical who was instrumental in developing the personality model used by the company and has already testified in Parliament, the same model was used for the Brexit ‘leave’ campaign.

The relentless quest for access to personal data and its use for psychological profiling for commercial and political use is not new to this century. The vast, cross-device access to data and the sophistication of software developed for psychographic analysis though are very new. In fact, the use of psychographic analysis may be reaching a level of manipulation that can be deemed unethical.

Details gradually revealed of the Cambridge Analytica story and their administration of Trump Campaigns are raising concerns for democratic discourse and governance and demonstrate the need for increased transparency and accountability in digital politics.

To start with the Facebook users’ data improperly (as there is no conclusive evidence and since the field of social media platforms is not sufficiently regulated and legislation does not exist to cover this it cannot be deemed illegal but it is certainly improper) acquired by Cambridge Analytica came through the purchase of an app developed by a Cambridge Academic, Psychologist Aleksandr Kogan who also had affiliation at the time with the University of St Petersburg.

The app which harvested users’ data on Facebook, with the excuse that it was for academic research, was no simple Facebook quiz though. Rather, it was attached to a 5-factor personality test in the form of a questionnaire where individuals were rated on 5 traits:

- Openness
- Conscientiousness
- Extroversion
- Agreeableness
- Neuroticism.

This was OCEAN, the acronym of the above five words which was the name of model used by Cambridge Analytica. The first step for those filling out the questionnaire was to grant access to their Facebook profiles. Once they did, an app harvested their data and that of their friends. Which is how the data of 85 million people came into the hands of Cambridge Analytica.

Based on experimental psychology, as well as, on all other personal Facebook data available Cambridge Analytica was able to create strategy of developing messages tailored to the vulnerabilities of individual voters. Using OCEAN they determined the personality of individuals which affects behaviour and behaviour influences how one votes. In a presentation available on You Tube Nix claims that by getting hundreds of thousands of US citizens take the OCEAN personality test they were able to form a model predicting the personality of every single US citizen. This is only partly true. According to Chris Wiley indeed over 300 thousand people took the test but through the app the data of all their friends (total 85 million) was also added to the intelligence used by the company.

In the same way that firms launch promotional campaigns for a candidate they may use social platforms to spread negative stories and misinformation with the aim of throwing mud at the opponent again tailor-made to specifically targeted groups and individuals. In politics negative campaigning has historically proven very fruitful. Now negative campaigning and misinformation use trolls and bots programmed to operate on algorithms to multiply the reach of influence. A network of Twitter and Facebook accounts are set up and ran by trolls and bots which boost popularity of fake news and misinformation therefore overwhelming search engines so that these selected stories show up on newsfeeds.


As several researches during and after the 2016 US elections revealed trolls and bots operated extensively during the campaign. A large amount of research in this area is being carried out at the University of Oxford by the Computational Propaganda Project. A research at the University of southern California found that 20% of all political tweets sent between 16<sup>th</sup> September and 21<sup>st</sup> October 2016 were generated by bots.

It is hard to argue this is not manipulation of public opinion. Yet all this psychographic digital campaigning on social media is made to operate under the radar of the public. The campaigns are usually designed, as explained by Cambridge Analytica CEO during a channel 4 hidden camera documentary, to

appear realistic enough so that the public does not suspect that it is smear campaign. SCL Elections, the parent company of Cambridge Analytica was also commissioned candidates to run campaign elections in African countries and Brazil.

The speed at which progress and breakthroughs are made in cyberspace is such that renders cybersecurity ineffective. Regulation is a step in the right direction and the EU is certainly ahead in the field of individual data protection. Regulations and legislation, however, still mostly cover traditional media and media campaigning. They too need to be extended to cover digital platforms and analytics firms and they need to be continuously amended to keep abreast of new developments. Regulatory authorities are probably doomed to be technologically a step behind the actual field they are meant to be supervising but the closer they are the better. A code of ethics, however, needs to be laid out in cyber space, just as in business, to filter at least some of the shady practices before they are established for good as norm and acceptable. In February a German court ruled Facebook use of data illegal. Facebook is in the process of appealing. Yet there is no indication that people are willing to let go of Facebook. Even after all these revelations Facebook confirms that they have not lost users. It is hardly surprising. Facebook is a monopoly in that there is no other platform offering quite the extent of reach that Facebook offers. It is understandable that people are reluctant to abandon it. During his Senate testimony Mark Zuckerberg was asked whether he would be willing to deny advertisers access to users' data. The answer given was unclear. Advertising is the source of income and as long as, Facebook does not charge subscription it needs to make money from advertising. In other words a user could have their data protected but only at a price. In reality, however, it will be more complicated than that one would expect. Political and commercial campaigns all over the world contribute astronomical figures to social platforms for advertising every year.

## WHY A BIZONAL–BICOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT IS HARD TO ACHIEVE



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As Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue "Bitterly divided communities cannot accept the logic of majority rule or tolerate the rights of minorities" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 173). As they further add, "the concept of a culturally homogeneous and therefore, legitimately sovereign territory could justify both the formation and the break- up of states" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 173). Indeed the above statement is very instructive for the case of Cyprus. Hirst and Thompson (1996) argue that "nationalism is in essence a claim that political power should reflect cultural homogeneity, according to some common set of historically specific political understandings of the content of the nation" (Hirst and Thompson, 1996, p. 172).

This observation describes quite precisely the socio-psychological predicament that prevails in the two ethnic groups in Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriot side, susceptible to vulnerability due to its small strategic scale, (rightly) legitimately, is adamant not to forfeit its internationally recognized prerogative to exercise its legal authority on the whole island. This is derived from the UN Security Council Resolution 186 of 1964, (which is based on *jus cogens*, -peremptory norm- but also from Protocol 10 regarding the Cypriot accession to the EU in 2004). Its legitimization has been, since 1964, derived from the hegemonic ideology of the Hellenization of the Cypriot state as a *sui generis* second Greek state, albeit smaller. The collective mindset of the majority of Greek-Cypriot society has been assimilated into this hegemonic narrative. The institutional dividend as this has been accrued from the 2004 accession to the EU has enhanced further this narrative.

The influence of historical contexts on inter-ethnic conflicts shows, how structure (the Cypriot state) and culture (nationalism) and their dynamic interplay condition social-political discourses and historical narratives (Hellenization) that orient and establish the articulation of hegemonic interests and their legitimization. Kincheloe and McLaren (2002) argue: "[That] issues of power and justice and the ways that the economy; matters of race, class and gender; ideologies; discourses; education; religion; and other social institutions; and cultural dynamics interact to construct a social system! (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2002, p. 90).

They emphasize the centrality of critical interpretation... and underline that a central aspect of...socio-cultural analysis involves dissecting the ways people connect their everyday experiences to the cultural representations of such experiences...[within] ... [the] situating socio-historical structures ...[and] in relation to cultural texts that reinforce an ideology of privilege and entitlement for empowered members of the society... [and] discover the ways they and their subjects have been entangled in the ideological process (Kincheloe and McLaren, 2002, p.96 -103).

The critical investigation on the influence of the Cypriot historical context on the state's socio-cultural and political arrangements since 1950 and onwards and how this context has conditioned the overall political and cultural orientation of the island to this day is a fundamental prerequisite if one wishes to gain a deeper understanding of how to regulate ethnic relations fairly and peacefully. The EOKA historical discourse has been, and still is, the dominant political narrative on the island and constitutes the ideological *raison d'etre* of the Cypriot state. It is deeply ingrained in the collective mind-set and historical consciousness of Greek- Cypriot society. As such it sets the political and socio-cultural boundaries and limitations, for better or worse, on any inter-communal reconciliation discourse through the hegemony of Hellenization. It safeguards and preserves Greek-Cypriot national distinctiveness vis-avis Turkish-Cypriots. It represents an ethnocentric cognitive system which leads to a holistic encapsulation of the historical narrative [and politically marginalizes any other competing narratives] in relation to inter-communal reconciliation.

Hellenization has been the hegemonic narrative in the Republic of Cyprus, which as a 'consensual power' maintains and preserves its political and socio-cultural engulfment on a (*sui generis*) second smaller Greek state. This institutional control and the manner in which it is materialized, has significantly conditioned the island's bi-ethnic historical dimension. Critical Analysis with its social deconstructive potency can shed light on all aspects of the Cyprus Issue and their historical dynamic that contributed to the establishment of the current social and political formation on the island, and orients to a great extent its future as well. Since 1983, a dominant organic trend or a social regularity has been assimilated in both ethnic groups. Let us have a quick look. Since 1960, the historical development of inter ethnic relations experienced various types of models of regulation. From a short-lived social and political pluralism up until 1963, to subjugation and segregation of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriot community until 1974, and from then onwards the longest in time *de facto* partition between the communities, with each community enjoying its own distinct social regularity. This distinctive attribute has been extensively internalized by each community and it is manifested by two distinct stratification systems. However, between the two systems lies a fundamental difference; neither in terms of habit, customs and tradition nor in terms of class power and prestige,



which by themselves are formidable cultural forces and condition behavioral outcomes, but rather in terms of legitimacy. The social regularity in the government controlled areas enjoys both internal and external legitimization. Following accession to the EU in 2004, it has safeguarded its international legitimacy for all socioeconomic strata. This legitimacy is derived from the international recognition the Republic of Cyprus enjoys. In stark contrast to the above, the “TRNC” enjoys only internal legitimization. These organic trends concretely condition behavioral patterns and attitudes and influence the Greek Cypriots’ collective mindset. And most probably, in like manner, they influence collective attitudes in the occupied north. The 1959- 1960 agreements encapsulated the misinterpretation of history, the result being unprecedented hardship on both communities. Today, history might have superseded the current framework of the inter-communal dialogue.

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## CYPRUS HISTORY – IGNORE AT YOUR OWN PERIL



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Scratch the surface of the Cyprus Problem and what will you find? The ever-popular answer to that question could probably be the post-modernist, constructivist explanation of differing historical narratives of a local power-sharing struggle between two ethnic communities, whose perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of their history of conflict supposedly matter more than realities on the ground—such attempts even taking at times the form of a self-imposed Jesuit flogging of shame, especially among Greek Cypriots. Alas, more often than not, we nowadays jump into an overt analysis of the inter-relationship between these two deeply divided communities—although there are actually a few more on the island—still struggling with their own identities, riddled by the past and confused by the future. If only these perceptions and narratives changed— or so the story goes— perhaps a new sustainable bi-communal state can rise from the ashes of ethnic conflict and a common future can be established. But, then, separating analysis from emotion, history comes calling and its calling is not very sweet.

Enter history and the obvious becomes inescapable. Conflict in Cyprus has always been less of an ethnic and more of a political affair, reflecting power politics in the region. Historically-wise, who ruled the region ruled Cyprus, who ruled Cyprus ruled the region. Being the final yet incomplete chapter to the Eastern Question, there was undoubtedly little else to expect than the bloody mess we ended up with. With the last spoils of the late Ottoman Empire (still) open to the loot, history took its toll by repeating age-old patterns the moment the pot was stirred.

Sensing the danger of colonial instability sweeping the island in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the British proceeded to divide and rule Cyprus, as they pretty much did elsewhere; first enlisting the local ‘Muhammadans’, as they called them, to poise themselves against the raging Greeks and then, as a last resort, inviting Turkey to take its pick— despite Ottoman claims having been waived by modern-day Turkey through the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. They, thus, added a regional game-changer to an otherwise ordinary, for its time, colonial struggle between peoples and empire, a struggle hitherto

chaperoned on national grounds only by Greece. Thus, the scene was set for what was to follow.

The dynamics of this power mix were only made worse, but not truly created by the two communities themselves. Yes, they might have been completely oblivious to each other's needs and concerns to which they did not pay proper heed, but this had always been the case in Cyprus. The way the two communities treated each other is deeply rooted in the island's history, as past historical paths of these communities had never borne any semblance of commonality. In Ottoman times, the Greeks were the slaves to their Turkish masters; in 1821, concurrently rising against such rule as other Greeks did elsewhere. In 1878, the very first day the British landed in Cyprus, a Greek delegation met their new rulers and petitioned enosis with Greece, while at that very same time the Turkish elites sent their own petition of fears and concerns about their new-found status on the island to the Sultan. Daily personal relationships aside, there had never been throughout the history of Cyprus a precedence of equal and rightful political co-existence of the two communities; they had been used to positioning and defining themselves against each other, had sometimes managed to survive side by side, but had never felt *of* or *with* each other. Perhaps this would not have mattered much, had Turkey not decided to take up the Turkish Cypriot cause. And take it up it did. In the way Great Powers usually do.

In fact, the history of Cyprus and the way Cyprus has been treated throughout the centuries bears witness to the fact that the Eastern Mediterranean has never been much of a post-modern civilized place. In this part of the world, disputes had rarely been settled by refined arm-twisting and diplomacy, but instead mostly taken care of by the sheer force of the sword and the bayonet. As much as Turkey does now, aspiring regional hegemony did then: given the opportunity, they claimed Cyprus, as part and parcel of establishing and sometimes restoring the balance of power in the area. For thousands of years, the tide of history has washed states and peoples away on this very same Mediterranean shores, on which 40,000 'peacekeeping' Turkish troops, aptly named after Attila the Hun, have now landed and laid claim, with Turkey still trying to administer at peace the land it has gained through war.

As steady as empires rise and fall, invaders have always come and gone to Cyprus. Missing the perennial power games in the international system and focusing only on the bi-communal proxy piece of the puzzle, as a convenient cause celebre, would be as naïve as offering the existence of a Turkish Cypriot minority as the reason and not the excuse for Turkey permanently stationing itself in Cyprus, as short-sighted as explaining the shipping of illegal settlers on the island as a humanitarian act of concern and not a strategic move to change the demography of the place- in the same manner this was done in Alexandretta (Hatay) and is now done in Afrin. In fact, history bears testimony

to the cause of many similar military interventions in the name of 'justice'- they have been as old as humankind. Power is as power does.

So, power politics lessons aside, why else does history matter? Blaming only the grand scheme of things offers no amends to the past and no hope for the future. Even if not the whole story, it is necessary, albeit not sufficient, to examine and understand community dynamics on the island. Glancing through history, on the one hand, the Greek Cypriots saw themselves as the rightful owners and heirs of the state structure which, although if initially for most of them was the means to another ultimate end, still was and is the direct product of their very own proud and rather painful struggle against the British Crown with whom, in fact, the Turkish Cypriots had sided early on. It was quite an affront to every sense of justice that the Turkish Cypriots had won, through Turkish patronage, disproportionate representation in a state for which they had never fought and to whose emergence had, in fact, placed immense obstacles. Simultaneously, the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, had no sympathy for the Greek Cypriot Enosis attempt, majority or no majority- that is to formally establish Cyprus as a bastion of Greekness. Their only hope in the face of such calamity (their second fall from grace in the space of a less than a century) was the guiding hand of Turkey, which they, too, made sure they forced, on a number of occasions. As cliché as it may sound, you cannot understand evolving future dynamics unless you are able to understand what has preceded them in the past.

Thus, history matters because you can rarely escape from it. Trying to sweep history under the carpet, without at least first trying to understand it, creates a backlash at best or a time-bomb at worst. Keeping the ruthless exercise of power by Turkey in the area and its predominantly growing importance steadfastly out of a community-based historical narrative will not exorcise Turkish presence in any way. Akinci or no Akinci, no one bites the hand that feeds him and Turkish Cypriot leaders have only felt this too well through their decades of climbing up the slippery ladder of hierarchy in their community – a ladder that is steadily guaranteed by the presence of the Turkish army and held in place by Turkish funds and Turkish endorsement and can be as easily removed as it was once placed from under someone's feet.

Moreover, even if reconstruction of revised historical community-based narratives and perceptions could sometimes help remold memories of experience, it can rarely help reshape or change existing experience based on hard reality itself. It is no coincidence that attempts for rapprochement between the two communities, have through the decades remained elitist, exclusive and have failed to trickle down or convince grass roots on either side, their perceived high-handedness and intentional ignorance of history often blocking rather than helping any possible intra-community multiplying effect. Turkish troops stationed in Cyprus are no perception. Properties

defiantly occupied by illegal settlers are no perception. The refugees, the murdered, the missing, the raped, are products of no one's imagination.

So, what is, then, the way forward? Even putting the 1974 violent experience behind them (to which the Turkish Cypriots will quickly juxtapose the 1963 bi-communal troubles), for many Greek Cypriots, the 1990s lynching of Tasos Isaak by a manic mob, supervised by 'police' authorities, under the gaze of the UN, and the cold-blooded murder of Solakis Solomou which followed (by someone, nonetheless, who still finds himself rooted in the upper echelons of Turkish Cypriot power structures, despite being on Interpol's wanted list) act as strong reminders of the anarchy of lawlessness on the other side, only made worse by the absence of true democracy and the rule of law- an anathema to any citizen. For many decades, the two communities in Cyprus have trodden down increasingly divergent historical paths of social, economic and political development. Janus-faced as they have become, one is rooted in traditions of the West, the other fast headed towards traditions of the East. Any future discussions of a possible solution should bear this in mind. As much as the presence of army guarantees for one's civic liberties in a state may seem acceptable to the mind forced to be comfortable with such a notion, the more preposterous this idea would seem to the other. At the moment, the dictatorial Mr. Erdogan is no easy bed-fellow and certainly no guarantor of civil rights and liberties for his own citizens, let alone others. No Greek Cypriot in their right mind would ever accept that he is. History is a stern teacher.

## THE LEFT, THE CAPITALIST STATE AND POLITICAL SCIENCE FIFTY YEARS AFTER 1968



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Fifty years after the '1968 moment' or more broadly the 1960s and 1970s 'new left', what orientations lay within today's radical spaces as concerns the capitalist state? And how do they compare to fifty years before? Several imaginaries, arguments and perspectives exist concerning the teleology of the socialism or prefigurative practices beyond the state. There also exists incongruity on the tools, potentials and processes of changing or transforming state structures. As much as there is a tendency on the contemporary radical left to envision 'state capture', or at least to spend political time and resources to institutional battles there is still much theoretical work to be done before legitimating across this political family a common set of indicators as concerns socialist strategy towards the state in the current phase of retrenchment; not to say before homogenizing, if ever possible, such a strategy.

Ideological fragmentation, in the 1960s as in today, means that there is nothing close to a 'universal' answer to a number of key questions about the neoliberal state: If it can be transformed from within or must be uprooted and dissolved through mass, revolutionary action so as to dismantle its apparatuses and replace them with non-state forms of human association? What would a transformation of the capitalist state rooted in class actually entail? How is state transformation, best conceptualized in sequential terms and in context-specific ways? What are the micro level factors – from elite psychology to the psychology of voting – and macro level currents – from linked financial institutions to the inter-dependencies of neo-imperialism – that lock the system inside itself and gradualise radical change? Why has the left, as Ralph Miliband's theory of a 'state system' had pointed out five decades ago, acceded to governmental power at various points in the twentieth century but has not been able to conquer state power in its diverse forms and places?<sup>1</sup> Is this conquest less or more plausible today during the era of neoliberal crisis, a different epoch from the 1960s and 1970s crisis of profitability and welfare state erosion?

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<sup>1</sup> For the theory behind this empirical comment, see Miliband, R. (1969). *The State in Capitalist Society*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

As social movements from below claimed new modes of doing politics outside of the liberal format in the past two decades or so and simultaneously state policy became subsumed into the managerial and technocratic or expert policy prescriptions of several regional and international organizations linked to private capital, state theory became increasingly marginal to the shifting political environment and its corresponding academic fashion<sup>2</sup>. In a way the radical left's political efficacy about the capitalist state has gradually diminished; and the onset of the crisis has not reversed the trend. Several signs of theoretico-ideological weakness and division may partly be the result of most work on how parties link citizens to the state, clientelistic and patronage practices, elections and electoral behavior, public administration and the formal and socio-legal aspects of the policy process, being undertaken by non-radical scholars. Marxist or class-analytic approaches anchor the analysis of the state in terms of its structural relationship to the capitalist system of class relations but often stop short of envisioning how the oppressive features of capitalism can be neutralized within the context of a socialist state and more generally in what ways liberal constitutionalism offers both things to avoid in constructing socialism and procedures or rules to mimic and build upon.

The argument and plea here draws from Antonio Gramsci's observation that 'If political science means science of the State, and the State is the entire complex of practical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules, then it is obvious that all the essential questions of sociology are nothing other than the questions of political science'<sup>3</sup>. Taking Gramsci's point a step further socialist strategy as a question of sociology has a lot to gain from the empirical as well as theoretical questions being dealt with by today's (non-Marxist) political scientists. Not to repeat past mistakes of 'dogmatic' social science, one must acknowledge that the liberal tradition has generated research with a firm grasp on how the state, its institutions and its public arenas function. But this is often not appropriately discussed, critiqued and utilized by radical scholars and collective actors seeking state transformation, on account of its liberal, pro-capitalist intellectual origins.

If the left is to manage the state or contribute to policy-making favouring 'revolutionary reforms' and to transcend Keynesianism as the most suitable formula for running the capitalist state, then it is key to consider the long-term experience of radical left actors (communist, social-democratic or other) in relation to office across time and space, and capture the alternating sequences of de- and then re-'ideologizing' toward which the liberal tradition is pointing. Such a perspective on the state would illuminate the latter's

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<sup>2</sup> This argument is succinctly elaborated by Aaronowitz, S. and Bratsis, P. (eds.) *State theory Reconsidered: Paradigm Lost*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, introduction.

<sup>3</sup> As cited in Panitch, L. (1999). 'The impoverishment of state theory', *Socialism and Democracy*, 13 (2): 20-21.

mechanisms and structures that are conducive to retreat, de-mobilization or compromise by radical left forces. Even if the objective is to wholly substitute the capitalist state it would be useful to draw insights from the formal nuances of the political process so as to modify, envision or deconstruct them in socialist terms. As the radical left is pushing away from a neoliberal or capitalist model of production, re-molding existing public structures and managing the commons that are being privatized can draw on organizational theory cutting across all types of collective action, in order to refine strategy and crystallize vision.

If the purpose is to counter cooptation by the norms of capitalist and neoliberal democracy then a step forward in socialist strategy can arise out of the study of certain types of political actors at large – parties, party leaders, politicians, interest groups, parliamentary groups –, which follow general patterns that do not leave the radical left and more broadly the question of socialism unaffected. If one agrees that the combination of state and non-state radical activity needs to be constantly and reflexively fine-tuned by those aspiring for a better future, then one must keep alert to the nuances of bureaucracies, both state and non-state, and the efforts to reform them in defense of capitalism. Finally, if the objective, following Bob Jessop's writings, is not to seek a determinate theory of the capitalist state but rather to embrace the search for institutional, historical and strategic specificity<sup>4</sup>, then comparative politics underpins every attempt at such a search.

Fifty years after 1968, when Marxist state theory thrived and attracted attention within centre-stage academia in Europe as well as across the Atlantic, socialist theory is once again devoid of a political appetite keen to connect regimes of accumulation and consumption to the micro-level, intersecting political developments within and around the capitalist state. In the midst of political fluidity and the recent global wave for democracy, it is now more pertinent than ever before to integrate the political science mainstream into the Marxist treatments of the state, equalizing the core of political sociology towards the political dimension, while at the same time not forfeiting class analysis.

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<sup>4</sup> See Hay, C. (1999) 'Marxism and the state', in A. Gamble, M. Marsh and T. Tant (Eds.), *Marxism and Social Science*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 1633-114.



## THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN COUNTER-TERRORISM



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Terrorist organizations have a long preparation time for a short-lived action with all the surprise elements. Intelligence and security agencies have the duty and the jurisdiction to apply secretive methods and use resources to uncover the key players of those secretive preparations and actions that could pose a threat to the security system of a state.

The British Author Robert Moss states, “All the skills in the fight against terrorism comes from deep inside the intelligence service. People with the assignment to threaten and uncover political extremists must understand their motives and their mindset in order to predict their possible moves and steps”. This is how intelligence and security services operate. By applying methods and resources, they should uncover the indicators for the possibility of a terrorist organization emerging in the country of internal terrorism and, with their knowledge, prevent an eventual influx of terrorist groups with a transnational character to the country. In addition, they should cooperate with foreign security services for a more efficient exchange of information and timely deliver certain intelligence to the political structures of a state and counter-terrorism units.

It is very important that the Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Security Systems play a complementary role in relation to the diplomatic function of a state. The security intelligence activity in the fight against modern terrorism manifests through the public and secretive components.

Terrorists aim to show that a certain type of government is unable to protect people and property. The collection of intelligence data and their analysis is therefore a key to solving the problem of terrorism.

Intelligence services cannot function under broad daylight, their work is secretive and continuous, while their methods are specific and unavailable to the public. This is the only way to glimpse into the secret lairs of the terrorist maze.

Social sciences often contribute to the normal and effective functioning of intelligence actions in the fight against terrorism. They study and uncover different aspects of terrorist activity, their behavior and characteristics. This is a special field of interest for intelligence services. In addition, the fundamental work of intelligence services has been using and applying the methods of social sciences successfully for a long time.

The basic phases in the working cycle of each intelligence service, independent from the differences regarding their character, are planning and gathering of information about a terrorist group; gathering intelligence about the group; processing, evaluation and presentation of intelligence data about a terrorist organization. Therefore, the final work product of an intelligence service about a terrorist organization is delivered to the political bodies. In general, the working nature of intelligence is very dynamic and presents a mutually dependent process, in which all the elements within one chain must have a causative consequential connection. The first step in gathering facts is the possession of raw intelligence material about terrorist organizations.<sup>1</sup>

The actions of intelligence services in this process are very widespread and do not know any boundaries in regards to both, the matter and the sources. The data is not collected randomly, but by following a previously determined plan. This is why this kind of work is a vital function of many intelligence services in certain countries.

During the entire collection process, it is of utmost importance to find a complete answer to the posed question. Modern intelligence services hire many secret agents who are spread across many countries (in cases of many big countries) to collect intelligence data. Their classic intelligence work is still highly appreciated. Great attention is also given to hiring experts and scientists who conduct work in favor of intelligence services during their primary day-to-day jobs. They create the framework of diverse data collected from several parts of the world, provided by various sources.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> D. Tomić, M. Mijalkovski, P. Marić, E. Šaljić, 2012, *Terrorism and Organized Crime*, p. 225.

<sup>2</sup> L. Fargo, *War of Wits*, New York, 1954, p. 10.

Even though different indicators say that intelligence services collect a great amount of data about terrorism in masses through legal actions, one cannot underestimate the importance of secretive methods and observations in the collection of data about a certain terrorist organization. The agency's intelligence operations are necessarily conducted in secrecy, and the research of this area is objectively difficult. During the intelligence process, the agency's operations have a very important role.

The work of the agency is a part of the governmental intelligence system. This can be conducted from abroad or from a targeted country for intelligence attacks in the process of uncovering terrorist organizations and groups inside its territory. This kind of work is strongly classified to avoid disturbances in foreign relations like observed in prior practices. This work has the goal to uncover the most important classified and secured data about a terrorist organization, and it can cause a lot of harm for those who directly work in this area.

Some countries formed special security services to combat internal terrorism ("Internal Intelligence Services"). An example for this is the Central Order for General Investigations and Specialized Operations (UCI-GOS) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Italy. In 1981, they were reformed into the Central Directive of Preventive Police (DCPP) and include the Special Service for Counter-Terrorism with three departments and units of NOCS. The example of France is also important, given that combating terrorism in this country is based on the division principal of intelligence research against repressive actions. The bodies of French Court Police have a mainly repressive role, but they also participate in gathering intelligence, just like other polygraphic formations and other state services.

The US has passed the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act in 1995. This Act punishes criminal acts and terrorism forms heavily.

At last, the cross-agency Intelligence Community's Counter Terrorist Center – CTC is assigned to the police intelligence aspect in counter terrorism. Since 1986, they coordinate CIA, DIA, NSA, FBI and other service activities within the "Intelligence Community" of the USA. Important operations are also being conducted in police intelligence of other countries.

The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995 punishes general crime and special forms of terrorism harder. In connection with that, the organizational structure of the FBI change, forming a special center for fighting internal terrorism, the Domestic Counterterrorism Center, assigned to prevent, investigate and prosecute terrorist activities on federal soil. This center has been founded after the Oklahoma City Bombing on April 19, 1995, where 169 people died. In addition to that, a special Bureau of Coordinators for Counterterrorism Actions within the State Department was formed,

consequently to the fact that fighting terrorism outside the USA is the jurisdiction of the US State Department.

At last, the cross-agency Intelligence Community's Counter Terrorist Center – CTC is assigned to the police intelligence aspect in counter terrorism. Since 1986, they coordinate CIA, DIA, NSA, FBI and other service activities within the "Intelligence Community" of the USA. Important operations are also being conducted in police intelligence of other countries.

The British Intelligence Service MI5 took a more important role in counterterrorism after the Security Service Act of 1989. According to this Act, 70% of MI5's resources are used in counterterrorism, further divided into 26% for international and 44% for "Irish and other forms of domestic terrorism". In the meantime, the importance of fighting terrorism, especially foreign terrorism has gained priority in their function.

This is a consequence of following events: in 1992, this service took the lead role in counterterrorism of Irish separatists, a position previously operated on by Scotland Yard. From the aspect of counterterrorism in intelligence, international cooperation has been strongly appreciated, especially in the European community (Trevi, Europol). France has been supporting the foundation of many institutionalized cooperation forms in the security and intelligence services of many different countries, such as the USA and Great Britain.<sup>3</sup>

The "Mediterranean club" or the "Midi club" was founded in Rome in 1998, with the aim to fight Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and organized crime. It includes France, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. In the last couple of years, there have been many summits exclusively on the topic of counterterrorism, where intelligence services have played a key role. For example, Crisis Management Days is an annual conference held by the University of Velika Gorica, Croatia. The faculty for Criminology and Security in Sarajevo organized a conference about terrorism in September 2016. The military academy and the School of National Defense, as well as the Institute for Strategic Studies of the Serbian Military have annual conferences regarding the same matter. The Faculty for Security and Criminology in Maribor, Slovenia, have organized a thematic conference about security challenges in 2014. The methods of cooperation, especially the institutionalized cooperation between intelligence services in different intelligence and security systems (the intelligence security systems in two or more different countries), such as the cooperation between the intelligence services of Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have become especially important in regard to the form of modern intelligence services in counterterrorism on the national and global level.

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<sup>3</sup> E. Saljic, Role of Anti-terrorist units against terrorism, p. 227.

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## THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY SECURITY IN CHINA: THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT



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China has to maintain its economic growth, in order to remain a global economic power. However, the crucial point for achieving this goal is to secure its energy capabilities, since its economic mobility counts on energy. According to Yao and Chang (2014:602), "*strong economic growth requires a large amount of energy-intensive raw materials and infrastructure*". Therefore, the question is to measure China's energy security. China is the world's second-largest economy who worries about its energy security, since its demanding in Primary Commercial Energy Consumption (PEC) amount to 3066.5 million ton of coal equivalent (Leung, 2011). In addition, apart from coal, China's vulnerability is its continuous dependence on oil imports. According to the Table 1, China's production of crude oil decreased. More specifically, from 2010 to 2015 the production of coal and crude oil decreased by 4,1% and 0,8% respectively. On the other hand, the production of the natural gas as percentage of the total energy production increased by 0,8%.

**Table 1.** Total Production\* of Energy and its Composition

YEAR	(% OF TOTAL ENERGY PRODUCTION)			
	TOTAL ENERGY PRODUCTION (10.000 tons of SCE)**	COAL	CRUDE OIL	NATURAL GAS
<b>2010</b>	312125	76,2	9,3	4,1
<b>2011</b>	340178	77,8	8,5	4,1
<b>2012</b>	351041	76,2	8,5	4,1
<b>2013</b>	358784	75,4	8,4	4,4
<b>2014</b>	361866	73,6	8,4	4,7
<b>2015</b>	362000	72,1	8,5	4,9

\* Total Energy Production refers to the total production of primary energy by all energy producing enterprises in the country in a given period of time.

\*\* The coefficient for conversion of electric power into SCE (Standard Coal Equivalent) is calculated on the basis of the data on average coal consumption in generating electric power in the same year.

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2016

However, crude oil production and consumption seem to be disproportional in China. According to the Table 2, the consumption of crude oil increased from 2010 to 2015 by 0,7% while its production decreased. On the other hand, the percentages of coal and natural gas production remained higher than those of consumption. It is also important to compare the oil consumption with net imports in order to measure China's dependence on energy.

**Table 2.** Total Consumption\* of Energy and its Composition

YEAR	(%) OF TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION			
	TOTAL ENERGY PRODUCTION (10.000 tons of SCE)**	COAL	CRUDE OIL	NATURAL GAS
2010	360648	69,2	17,4	4,0
2011	387043	70,2	16,8	4,6
2012	402138	68,5	17,0	4,8
2013	416913	67,4	17,1	5,3
2014	425806	65,6	17,4	5,7
2015	430000	64,0	18,1	5,9

\* Total Energy Consumption refers to the total consumption of energy of various kinds by the production sectors of the economy and the households in a given period of time.

\*\* The coefficient for conversion of electric power into SCE (Standard Coal Equivalent) is calculated on the basis of the data on average coal consumption in generating electric power in the same year.

Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2016

Regarding the imports, China is the largest importer of crude oil, and the second largest importer in the world. More specifically, the value of imports for China was 116 billion USD, while the value for the USA and Japan was 108 and 60,7 billion USD, respectively.

**Table 3.** Oil Importers and Exporters

Top oil importers in Billion USD	
China	116
United States of America	108
India	60,7
Japan	50,8
South Korea	44,3


Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (1), 2018

<b>Top Exports and Imports (products and value)</b>			
Product	Value (Billion USD)	Product	Value (Billion USD)
Imports		Exports	
Integrated Circuits	128	Computers	136
<b>Crude Petroleum</b>	<b>116</b>	Broadcasting Equipment	115
Gold	62,6	Telephones	84,3
Iron Ore	58	Integrated Circuits	54,8
Cars	44	Light Fixtures	29,7

Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2), 2018

It is also of high significance to focus on the oil and coal rents as percentage of the GDP. Oil rents show in what degree the economy is dependent on oil. According to the Figure 1, from 2010 to 2011 both oil and coal rents as percentages of the Chinese GDP are increasing. From 2010 to 2015 China's oil and coal revenue was in high levels but not that high compared to other countries. For example, oil-producer countries, such as Kuwait or Iraq had in 2015 38,4% and 28,61% oil revenue of GDP, respectively (The Global Economy, 2018).

**Figure 1. Oil and Coal Rent (%) GDP**




Source: World Bank (1), (2), 2018

Coal consumption is correlated with economic growth because the later depends on the manufacturing and the industrial sector. Therefore, the use of coal in this sector is highly associated with the coal consumption (Li and Leung, 2012). According to the Figure 2, coal is mainly used in industry while oil in transportation.



**Figure 2.** Consumption by Sector, 2015



Economic growth and energy consumption were proportional the years between 2000-2007 (Zhang et al., 2013) as well as the years between 1986 and 1990 (Li and Leung, 2012). More specifically, from 2010 to 2015 economic growth and coal consumption decreases, since coal has the highest percentage of total energy consumption, compared with crude oil and natural gas. According to the Table 4 in 2010 China’s GDP growth was 10,6% and in 2015 decreased by 3,7%, reaching the 6,9%. The energy consumption regarding coal also decreased by 5,2%, reaching in 2015 the 64% of total energy consumption. On the contrary, the consumption of crude oil and natural gas slightly increase, by 0,7% and 1,9% respectively.

**Table 4.** GDP Growth and Total Energy Consumption

YEAR	(% OF TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION)			
	GDP Growth (annual %)	COAL	CRUDE OIL	NATURAL GAS
<b>2010</b>	10,6	69,2	17,4	4,0
<b>2011</b>	9,5	70,2	16,8	4,6
<b>2012</b>	7,8	68,5	17,0	4,8
<b>2013</b>	7,7	67,4	17,1	5,3
<b>2014</b>	7,2	65,6	17,4	5,7
<b>2015</b>	6,9	64,0	18,1	5,9

Source: World Bank (3), 2018

### Conclusions

As Lanteigne mentions "First, the rise in Chinese military spending can be seen as a natural outcome of China’s overall economic growth and the need to maintain modern armed forces". (Lanteigne, 2010:77). It is vital for China to keep the levels of its economic growth and secure its energy resources. If not, inevitably, it will seek for new sources in order to maintain its economic rise as well as its military capabilities and, therefore, its national security.

However, China is still dependent on coal and oil and has not developed yet an economy based on renewable sources. According to the “Global Carbon Project” predictions, “carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and industry will rise 2% this year” (Financial Times 13/11/2017), while in 2016 China had the highest percentage of global emissions 28% while the USA had 15% (Global Carbon Project, 2018). Under these circumstances, it would be difficult for China to adopt new policies in order to achieve less carbon emissions and maintain its economic growth.

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## CYPRIOT LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND EUROPEAN FUNDING: 2000-2006 AND 2007-2013



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This work uses the first two post-accession programmatic periods to assess Cypriot local government's attempts to secure European funding. It presents the results of these efforts and the possible explanatory factors that justify the observed differences. This work is based on a wider empirical research completed in 2015 and on consequent publications (Kirlappos, 2017).

### Local Government's Differentiated Capacities

#### ***Population Size and Financial Features***

The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) is divided into six districts, 39 municipalities and 484 communities (2018)<sup>1</sup>. The average population of a municipality is 19,950 and the average population of a community is 645 (Kirlappos, 2017). Table 1, categorizes Cypriot local government actors indicating crucial differences in their financial capacities.

**Table 1: Financial Characteristics of the Municipalities and Communities**

<b>Actors (2008-2012)</b>	<b>Own resources min €</b>	<b>Own resources max €</b>	<b>State grants min €</b>	<b>State grants max €</b>
Urban Municipalities	10,094,114	29,206,703	3,978,261	17,850,948
Suburban Municipalities	1,401,433	14,805,288	1,548,522	10,846,000
Rural Municipalities	52,500	6,752,000	853,788	2,732,000
Displaced Municipalities	24,586	67,937	80,909	1,766,274
Communities	10,000	1,688,850	9,000	477,500
Displaced Communities	0	500	1,000	1,000

Source: Kirlappos, 2017.

\* The title of his Ph.D. Dissertation was *Europeanization of the Cypriot Local Government*.

<sup>1</sup> A significant part (37%) of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus has been occupied by Turkish troops since the military intervention of Turkey in 1974.

### ***Specialized Personnel***

Table 2 summarizes the extreme differences in terms of specialized personnel. The oldest urban municipalities (Nicosia, Limassol, Paphos and Larnaca) are town planning authorities and have larger numbers of specialized personnel. Conversely, just 19 per cent of the communities of the sample had specialized personnel.

**Table 2: Specialized Personnel**

<b>Actors (2008-2012)</b>	<b>Specialized personnel min-max</b>
Urban municipalities	16-82
Suburban municipalities	4-47
Rural municipalities	2-27
Displaced municipalities	1-4

Source: Kirlappos, 2017.

### ***Local Politicians' Profile***

Mayors had tertiary education (88 per cent), while the community council presidents (75 per cent) only had secondary education. Compared to the community council presidents (four per cent), mayors had greater party influence and higher party positions (e.g. members of senior party bodies, 53 per cent).

### **European programmes and Cypriot Local Government: 2000-2006 and 2007-2013**

#### ***European programmes besides regional policy***

The findings indicated that bigger local actors with increased resources in terms of their financial capacities and personnel were able to secure participation in more European programmes. On average urban and suburban municipalities secured three and two and a half programmes respectively, while rural municipalities secured one and a half programmes. Just two displaced municipalities secured such participation and less than half of the communities of our sample (42 per cent) secured at least one European programme. When asked about their communities' inability to secure European funding, the community council presidents (75 per cent) highlighted the greater ability of the mayors' to access the system, especially if they belonged to the ruling party. This explanatory factor in securing programmes was stressed in the case of Italian local government (Zerbinati, 2004). Yet, it had to coincide with sufficient infrastructure, personnel and financial capacities (ibid).

### **Regional Policy programmes**

The ROC took part in the final stages of the 2000-2006 programming period. Central state structures were the final beneficiaries carrying out projects in eight municipalities and communities of our sample, thereby blocking local initiative. Yet, a small rural community (Kalopanayiotis) revealed a differentiated response, since its community council president, focused on the EU to solve local problems. Instead of relying on the slow state processes, he paid foreign experts to prepare the necessary plans. These plans were embraced by the government, who were at the time (2003) running the risk of losing substantial parts of the allocations. Kalopanayiotis took innovative initiatives, securing three significant projects worth a total of €5,400,000 (Kirlappos, 2017).

Limited changes were noticed regarding the following programmatic period (2007-2013). According to table 3, only the urban municipalities managed to change their policies, practices, and preferences (Marshall, 2005), developing the necessary tracking and implementing mechanisms. On the other hand, there were important variations as to the secured funding by these municipalities. These variations were explained by the activities of their mayors. Just like in the case of Kalopanayiotis, the mayors of Nicosia and Limassol adopted a more strategically-minded and entrepreneurial profile (Zerbinati, 2012) by focusing a considerable part of their municipalities' resources on preparing projects based on to the specific conditions of the regional policy programmes.

**Table 3: Regional Policy Projects Effected During the 2007-2013 Programming Period**

<b>Special priority targets</b>	<b>Nicosia municipality</b>	<b>Limassol municipality</b>	<b>Larnaca municipality</b>	<b>Paphos municipality</b>
Special target 1	€37,520,173	€42,195,049	€18,496,120	€8,078,515
Special target 2	-	€6,995,254	-	-
Special target 3	€13,903,613	-	-	-
Number of programmes	5	4	2	1

Source: Kirlappos, 2017.

The remaining municipalities and communities were unable to secure regional policy funding. These had a more inactive behaviour and joined as partners not as beneficiaries, mostly in infrastructure enhancing programmes. To make matters worse, the Cypriot central state structures exhibited a firm gatekeeping role reproducing the pre-existing balance of power between central and local levels. This gave the central state structures a dominant role in all the processes of the EU's regional policy, allowing just a few local actors to enter a programme as final beneficiaries. Yet, as the cases of Nicosia,

Limassol, and especially Kalopanayiotis demonstrated, local political leadership may successfully adapt to Europeanization's challenges (Borraz and John, 2004).

### **Conclusions**

Cypriot local government's success in securing European funding via the 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 programmatic periods was restricted. The explanatory factors that clarify this limited success include the variations among local government actors with regard to size, financial capacities and personnel and the initiatives of local politicians. The challenge now is to enhance these aspects of local government so as to increase its capacity to secure European programmes. This, however, is expected to seriously challenge central state structures' dominant role in the processes of the EU regional policy.

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