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The Cyprus Problem: A Dissenting View

Panayiotis Papadopoulos



**CYPRUS CENTER FOR
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I. INTRODUCTION

2023 will be the year of elections, mostly in Europe (in four countries, Finland, Spain, Poland and Greece) and Turkey. I shall resist the temptation to make any predictions, lest future events overtake my prophesy and prove me wrong. The 1948 presidential election in the United States (President Truman holding the Chicago Tribune in an exuberant mood, where the front page had it that he was losing to the challenger, Thomas Dewey) still captivates my memory. Or the June election in 1970 in the United Kingdom, the unexpected result of which prompted Harold Wilson's famous remark, that "a week is too long a period in politics." Both are cases in point to confirm my attitude.

To the five previously-mentioned cases, one may add Cyprus, as well, which-as these lines are written-has already chosen its next president. Verbal attacks, innuendos and occasional low blows, even attempts at character assassination (welcome to politics of throwing dirt, vilifying opponents and employing negative tactics), which were exchanged during the campaign, notwithstanding, one thing is striking: perhaps for the first time since its independence in 1960, the national problem does not seem to occupy the mind of the majority of the Cypriot people. Not that they are not interested in the current affairs and the future of their own country, forcibly partitioned since 1974. Far from it. Tired of promises, seeing no progress in any prospect for a solution in sight, despite the many and painful concessions that were made decades ago, within the context of a necessary and historic compromise, plagued by agony and anguish over the prospect of no solution in sight (one which prolongs the *status quo* that was accomplished via the force of arms), they focus on other priorities instead. Priorities as equally important to their existence, like the economy, the Covid 19 virus and illegal immigration, to name the most pressing. Their sour feeling is still made worse, their tenacity and resilience tested by the many more *faits accomplis* they are confronted with, like the opening of the city of Famagusta (in breach of all the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions) and the violation of the status of the buffer zone by the Turkish occupation troops.

There is, however, one particular aspect of the campaign, which-at least to me-was revealing. Many, but not all, of the candidates for the presidency, emphasized religiously their adherence to the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as a model for a solution to our national problem. In doing so, they invoked history, based on what took place forty six years ago, on 12th February 1977 to be precise.¹ That was the occasion when the then President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios III, met with Rauf Denktaş, the leader of the Cypriot Turkish community, with the then United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. The result, a four point agreement that

¹ The text of the Agreement can be found in the website of the Press and Information Office (PIO) of the Republic of Cyprus.

makes reference to bi-communal federation as the desired solution, with other important factors to be taken into consideration.

What I propose to do in this article is to describe, beyond any reasonable doubt, I believe (to use a standardized phrase lawyers and other legal experts employ, as they argue before a court of law), the antecedents and the circumstances that surrounded the 1977 Agreement, within the regional (Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean) and the global milieu (the Cold War and détente), of the international political scene. All this, to warrant the title of my article and prove that however genuine Makarios' intentions were at the time, due to the tragic results of the Turkish invasion in July 1974, this should no longer apply. In other words, we need not become prisoners of bi-zonality and bi-communalism, making them sacrosanct, thus rendering Cyprus a hostage of historical conditions, conditions that, I dare say, no longer apply. This said, I am fully prepared to present my case, so that my argument, bold and quite provocative at it is, is proven correct, or so I hope.

It is neither the first time, nor of course the last, when history is employed to justify future actions, even though what was actually agreed is in dispute. What took place forty six years ago, the Meeting between the two, that is, in the presence of the UN Secretary General, is not. Other parameters need to be carefully examined, so that the historian may render his verdict, when the fog of war is finally lifted, to quote Clausewitz. What exactly possessed the Archbishop in his *volte face*? Was it tactics, a change in strategy? Was there any message to be conveyed, and if so, to whom? What and whom did he have in mind to influence? The event in itself has been the subject of endless debate and different interpretations. It should be stressed that none of the presidents who succeeded Makarios deviated from the letter and the spirit of the Agreement, however different its interpretation, even to this day.

II. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO 1977

What needs to occupy our attention is the rationale behind President Makarios' decision. *Mutatis mutandis*, the event was not far from the interview he gave to Barbara Castle (an important personality of the British Labor Party, and a champion of anti-colonialism and very much against apartheid) in early September 1958, when he made public his preference for independence.² His declaration, so to say, did not arrive out of the blue, as he came face to face with some harsh and bitter realities in Cyprus. Brutal dilemmas the Archbishop was confronted with needed urgent action. Above all, an internecine inter-communal conflict, occasionally intra-communal strife as well, which threatened to engulf the entire population and create a false impression that was way off the mark of what was really at stake. The communal confrontation, which escalated into an open war, was both within each community and between them.³ Among the Cypriot Greeks, it was the left versus the right and accusations of collaboration against indiscriminate killings and political assassinations. As for the Cypriot Turks, it became excessively difficult to offer any disagreement, let alone one's voice of dissent to be tolerated, as paramilitary groups (like Volkan and later on TMT) reigned supreme and called the shots. In both cases, polarization became the name of the game, in an atmosphere of total war, in its twin dimensions, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla warfare. The absurdity of the situation, which established itself as the new reality, however fraudulent? From an anti-colonial war, via guerrilla warfare, the colonial power managed to create and present an entirely different picture that had nothing to do with historical reality: two ethnic communities fighting each other, with London the honest broker.

To make things infinitely worse, Turkey entered the picture in a determined and aggressive mood with the worst of intentions. Employing a variety of arguments (geographic contiguity, the threat of physical annihilation of the Cypriot Turks, the right for separate self-determination, balance of power

² Two books tell the story of this period from the British and the US view. Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) and Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974. Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Manheim: Bibliopolis, 2001).

For a general overview, William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History* (London, I. B. Tauris, 2005) and William Mallinson, *Cyprus. Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theory in International Relations* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010).

³ The history of the anti-colonial war, via guerrilla warfare in Cyprus, its parameters and complexities (military, political), and the wider geo-political and geo-strategic ramifications, is yet to be written. This becomes more imperative, especially from the angle of comparative international history, i.e., from what took place in similar cases in the Middle East, and especially Asia, like Korea and Vietnam.

Caroline Elkins, *Legacy of Violence. A History of the British Empire* (London: Penguin, Random House, 2022) deals with Cyprus as well, 599-611, from the point of view of the systematic use of violence, i.e., torture against the armed resistance.

David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-59* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) gives the account from the British point of view. A word of caution. Counter-insurgency (or coin during the Kennedy Administration) is not the correct term to use. Anti-guerrilla warfare is far more appropriate.

and strategic considerations), Ankara not only became an interested party (via the existence of the Cypriot-Turkish community for whom Ankara presented itself as the guardian), but sought to exploit to the hilt its geographic position as well. First, in the Eastern Mediterranean as a member to NATO (in 1952), and second, in the Middle East, by joining the Baghdad Pact (in 1955).⁴ In doing so, Turkey exerted considerable (and successful, by and large) pressure against its two main allies, Britain and the US. Turkey's strategy, pursued assertively with no prisoners taken, bore fruits and paid dividends in both the short and long run, as it gave the Cyprus problem another sinister dimension and a new twist, namely, that of a Greek-Turkish dispute, much to the detriment of the interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole. In a bizarre distortion of historical truths, completely unwarranted, but not historically unprecedented, anti-colonialism became entangled in the jungle and the labyrinth of the Cold War, not for the first time, let it be emphasized. Similar cases in Asia claimed the privilege (Korea and Vietnam, to cite perhaps the most salient), with any possibility of a successful extrication from the abyss becoming more remote for Cyprus than ever before.

The Archbishop, in exile between March 1956-April 1957 and based in Athens following his return from the Seychelles after he was released, was no fool. He realized, perhaps a bit too late, the dramatic and drastic changing of circumstances of the whole problem. Anti-colonialism and the demand for self-determination (a euphemism for irredentism and the union or *enosis* with Greece) was shockingly and brutally brushed aside, as communalism became ascendant and ruled the day, in all its ugly and nefarious aspects. Worse still, intra-communal conflict began to take its toll and innocent lives were lost, gratuitously so. The left versus the right had finally caught up with the Cypriot society, as it had already happened in places like China, Korea and Vietnam in Asia, Greece and Spain in Europe.

What were some of those harsh new realities? Union with Greece, a distant dream, highly questionable its accomplishment in the first place for a number of crucial factors that eluded the attention, let alone the serious study of many, was rapidly vanishing. The Cypriot-Greek leadership became entangled with it; in fact, they were made its virtual prisoners, in terms of politics and psychology. As it was, the prospect of union becoming an unfilled dream blinded many, who could not simply observe what lay directly in front of them. Worse, no viable alternatives were sought, if for nothing else, to completely neutralize the British and Turkish narratives. Instead, any thought, let alone action, that deviated from union or partition later on, was tantamount to treason, with devastating consequences to their authors. No wonder a psychological dilemma was thus created, which proved an insuperable obstacle later on in early 1959, as the Zurich-London

⁴ On the Baghdad Pact, Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism. The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 38. Also, Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 186-237, on the wider repercussions for the region of the Middle East, especially Syria.

settlement was announced: union would be replaced by what? By whose authority and whose right?

These questions became rampant in both communities, for different reasons, as *enosis*' ideological opponent was *taksim* (partition), the latter pursued with much zest and vigor by the Cypriot Turkish leadership. With Turkey becoming an interested party, regardless of legal approaches (Article 20 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, via which Turkey abandoned all and any claims on Cyprus) and legalistic arguments (sole emphasis on self-determination, but being oblivious of geopolitics and its negative interpretation, let alone of imperial revenge, as in the case of South Asia and Palestine, both in 1947), the vision of *enosis* was derailed for all intents and purposes.⁵ The bitter truth became more and more difficult to accept, the more so, as no viable alternative or Plan B was put forward. Ankara became the new force to be reckoned with; its strategic planning and long term vision, perspicacious as they were, were not only acknowledged, but taken into serious consideration, as they challenged directly, not just irredentism, but the overall one-dimensional strategy of the Cypriot-Greek leadership and the Greek government.

The very foundations of this strategy were shaken. Ankara meant business with London happy to go along, as both found themselves in the same camp fighting the one and the common enemy: the Cypriot-Greek demand for self-determination. Who else realized this better than Makarios himself as early as April 1957, immediately after his release from exile and his return to Athens? Who else was better prepared to confront the new situation than George Seferis (the poet and eventual Nobel laureate), then serving in the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who-because of his background, having survived the Asia Minor Catastrophe-knew firsthand the opposition? He confided his fears to one of the Archbishop's closest advisers, Nikos Kranidiotis, in April 1957. In no uncertain terms, Seferis' message was unambiguously clear: Turkey demands much, in fact too much, which cannot be reconciled with the legitimate interests of the majority in Cyprus.

The rest of the story that led to the Zurich and London settlement in February 1959 is well known; there is no need to repeat it. What was accomplished in 1959 was by and large the squaring of the circle. A seemingly impossible problem was solved, Greeks and Turks residing and functioning together, members of the same state, despite all the

⁵ For 1947 and Palestine, Eugene Rogan, *The Arabs: A Modern History* (London: Penguin, 2017), 219-65, 313-50, remains indispensable. From the new Israeli historians (the revisionist school, that is), Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (London: Penguin, 2014), Ilan Pappé, ed., *The Israel/Palestine Question* (London: Routledge, 2003) and Ilan Pappé, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine* (London: Oxford: One World, 2006). Also, Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-1998* (London: John Murray, 2000). The last author changed substantially his views recently, identifying himself mostly with the orthodox school. For South Asia, among the many works, Ramachandra Guha, *Gandhi: The Years That Changed the World, 1918-1948* (London: Allen Lane Penguin, 2018).

Cassandras preaching their gospel of doom and despair to the contrary. What of course is missing from such an analysis was that Zurich and London constituted a triumph for communalism, much to the loss of self-determination (leading to genuine independence) and popular sovereignty. Living together and separately, as an old Greek saying has it, may have its merits in cases of married couples, where the wisdom of family cohesion is very much challenged and put to the test by the trials of everyday life. It could not simply apply in the case of Cyprus, following its independence on 16th August 1960. Not because of different ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds of the indigenous people, which rendered peaceful cohabitation impossible by definition. Such conclusions are toxic and quite dangerous and should not be used, *ab initio*, as they constitute an affront and an insult to human nature.

Instead, Cyprus was bedeviled by other demons, not least of which dealt with accusations against those who had signed the Agreements at Lancaster House (on 19th February 1959), primarily Archbishop Makarios. Victory has many fathers, defeat is an orphan as an old saying has it. For Cyprus and Makarios it applied to perfection, as he found himself alone, in the political wilderness. He was condemned into carrying the burden of the settlement, of betraying *enosis*, the stigma of his signature and the incubus of the overall responsibility for what had already taken place and what would take place, even though in the latter case for the wrong reasons. This story would continue until the catastrophe in 1974. To these demons one had to add some other nightmares that haunted the country's recent past during the anti-colonial war. Too much took place, especially intra and inter-communal conflict, with the colonial power employing collaboration in both instances and thus turning one community against the other and against themselves. A lot of blood was also shed, many people were killed, mostly innocent, unnecessarily so. Accusations and counter-accusations of collaboration, treason, victimization and political persecution claimed their toll; the price was a stiff one. Nightmares thus created still reverberate and haunt the memory of the people of Cyprus.

The settlement could neither heal the wound that was opened, widely so, nor could it remove a permanent scar that was created, indelibly so. One cannot demand from human nature to write off an excruciating past and erase it from memory, especially when human lives, mostly innocent, were lost. This said, equally so and perhaps more forcefully expressed, the historical past cannot in any way be allowed to hold memory and human existence their prisoner. Such an eventuality causes intense alarm, when the motives of those seeking to manipulate history, for the ultimate purpose of controlling human beings, are sinister. In Cyprus in 1960, from the very first day of its independence, matters could not proceed right ahead, business as usual, as if the past, regardless of how one chose to interpret and understand it, unfolded and occurred. The leaders play their own role, especially in the newly-independent states, when their timely intervention, both necessary and imperative, should be used to control and extinguish

passions, promote reconciliation and act as an exceptionally strong barrier against forces that aim to create problems and cause chaos.⁶

Neither President Makarios nor the leadership of the Cypriot Turkish community proved equal to the task, as they became prisoners to a unique situation, willingly, or unwillingly, consciously or unconsciously, from which any escape was unthinkable, let alone difficult by definition. To have dared come out in the open and utter the truth for what had happened in the island since 1950 would have been courageous and laudable, but highly risky, as their status as leaders and very existence as human beings were at stake. Dark forces, always acting maliciously, are always lurking around, seeking to gain revenge and extract their price for sins they attribute to political leaders. John Wilkes Booth is not alone in this category. Makarios' sin was the betrayal of enosis. Quite a few never forgave him for that. Rauf Denktash's, on the other hand, was of a different variety, for his vision as a Turkish nationalist (he admitted this much one time too many) was not exactly fulfilled. Undoubtedly, a huge step forward was taken, Turkish nationalism in Cyprus could neither be ignored nor could it be disregarded, let alone underestimated. TMT became its vehicle, dynamically and forcibly so, but it was a long way off from the real thing: reversion of the island to the complete control of Turkey. Very few political leaders are willing to take the risk and challenge head on popular beliefs, especially among those who voted them into power. WWII in occupied Europe and Asia can be employed as a parallelism to Cyprus; colonialism more forcefully so. In the case of Cyprus, a just settlement entailing genuine independence, first foremost and above everything else, would have gone a long way towards addressing and satisfying the concerns and fears of both communities. Time could serve as a good doctor to take care of the rest.

The 1960 constitution, *une constitution octroyee*, imposed in other words, for all intents and purposes, never put to popular test via a referendum, was communal in character and divisive in nature. Certainly very far away from its characterization as the ninth symphony, as Marcel Bridel (the Swiss constitutional expert, and Chair of Constitutional Law at the University of Lausanne) called it.⁷ One has to take this into consideration to realize how the Cypriot society was summoned to rise to the occasion within a framework just described, and overcome whatever difficulties may arise, in the spirit of peaceful coexistence. Quite a task! To all this, one has to consider ideologically opposite forces, who participated actively, in different camps and for different reasons (EOKA and TMT, that is), during 1955-59, in the anti-colonial struggle. The result did not exactly fulfill their expectations, neither union nor partition. Because of the settlement, they

⁶ This explains Jomo Kenyatta's belief that Kenyans should not become prisoners of the past, so that they can smoothly proceed ahead. There is much wisdom in his words, not so much in an effort to forget history or erase it from memory, but rather provide the necessary incentives to human nature to go ahead and thus prevent history, however one chooses to remember or interpret it, from acting as a stumbling block to our existence.

⁷ Bridel participated in the deliberations of the Constitutional Committee as an adviser to draft the constitution of the Republic.

found themselves on the side lines (not directly involved in the political scene, even though the overwhelming majority was employed in the government service). They were not autonomous, as they attached themselves to their leaders, i.e., members of the two paramilitary organizations, who by now had acquired prominence. Their ideological coherence was quite formidable and sufficiently tenacious; the past accounted for that, even though their loyalty (Cyprus, the President or Vice President, or their leaders) would always remain in question. Some never disbanded, for they found themselves employed in law enforcement (police and gendarmerie) and the armed forces of the Republic. One may even detect something sinister in them: a common denominator, both intra and inter-communally, "whoever is not with us is against us." Gradually, they were getting ready for a future showdown, always reinforced in terms of ideological indoctrination by employing the other side or the other community as the reason for their existence and operation. Their time would come and in fact it did, though not in the way they envisioned, under entirely different circumstances and definitely not quite those they were looking for to justify their actions.

Makarios' famous thirteen points were submitted (on 30th November 1963) to make the constitution more functional.⁸ Claims that people were caught completely unaware were simply not true, as he made his intentions well known as early as June of the same year to the US Ambassador, Fraser Wilkins.⁹ How much of his overall thinking on this particular issue and future actions he revealed is a matter of speculation. Equally so, precisely what the US Ambassador understood through his conversations with the Cypriot President remains unknown, by and large. Did he realize the gravity of the situation, i.e., the consequences of Makarios' actions in the sense of unleashing forces the latter was unable to control? If that was the case, did it ever occur to him he should have strongly discouraged Makarios, for future events in a worst case scenario would hold complete control of the situation? In any case, what exactly did he inform his superiors about, for he himself and those at the State Department and the White House (the National Security Adviser) held diametrically opposite views and assessments?¹⁰ All these legitimate questions, posed *bona fide*, await their answers. Fraser Wilkins' superiors in Washington thought he was carried away, when he should have known better and acted accordingly to deter Makarios. In any case, in July, he seemed enthusiastic on the prospect of a constitutional revision, a fact that accounts for his will and determination to assist Makarios in any way possible.

⁸ On the thirteen points and a history of what took place, with special emphasis on 1956-64, Stella Souliotis, *Fettered Independence: Cyprus, 1878-1964* Vols. I and II (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

⁹ Nicolet, *op. cit.*, 178.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, as the author makes it abundantly clear.

The US Ambassador, on the other hand, was not aware of the contingency planning that was done by both communities (the infamous Akritas Plan drafted by Cypriot-Greeks, member of the former EOKA and similar ones by the Cypriot-Turkish leadership and TMT), should worst come to the worst.¹¹ Otherwise, he could have been far more reserved and would have surely warned his superiors in Washington. Was it naivety on his part? Did he underestimate Makarios, by giving too much credit to the Cypriot President? How much did he think of the Cypriot-Turkish community, their leadership and overall role?

Was Makarios aware of the contingency planning his lieutenants carried out, and if yes, did he subscribe to their rationale, irrespective of the many interpretations that have been given as regards the latter? For somebody like him, who wanted to know and control everything, it is very hard to believe otherwise, as regards his knowledge of the first part. As for the second, I find it very hard to believe that he aimed for an all out war against the Cypriot-Turkish community, in theory, let alone in practice, so that he could prevail and thus declare union. Confront all, in other words, with a *fait accompli*. In theory, i.e., intentions, such thinking is fallacious, for even in the worst case it is quite doubtful whether Makarios held such beliefs. As for capabilities, events speak for themselves, following the outbreak of violence; events, that is, that revealed the poverty and the bankruptcy of all those who were entrusted with the contingency planning, both in the draft and its execution. One is on safer ground to assume that such planning was intended for purely self-defense, in case something went wrong. Whether his lieutenants and their subordinates would prove equal to the task was entirely different.

What about the other side and Denktash's lieutenants? What kind of planning did they carry out and how did they envisage the future course of action? Not much is known about their activities, for much was done in complete secrecy. One, though, can safely take for granted that the Cypriot-Turkish leadership and its executive organ (TMT) were far superior in terms of organization and actual execution, arms and ammunition that is. As it turned out, these people around the Cypriot-Greek leadership, not only misread the entire situation, misjudging and completely underestimating the opposition; they bungled the course of action as well, creating the false impression on Makarios and the Cypriot-Greeks aims. In no uncertain terms, the accusation was leveled that the Cypriot President wanted the physical extermination of the other side. The latter employ the term genocide to justify their claim. As for the other side, inevitably the incident of 21st December war trivial in its nature; how was it interpreted, however? Could they stand idle and hand the initiative to the enemy, especially when the latter's intentions were not known, but in times of war, one assumes

¹¹ Souliotis claims she knows the identity of the author of the Akriats Plan. In the case of the Cypriot-Turkish leadership, much has been made of documents secured from the vault of the then Minister of Agriculture, Fadil Plumer, in December 1963, in which information as regards the future action since August 1960 is very much provided in some detail.

the worst? It became a question of who was to make the first move, so that the adversary could invoke self-defense. The present author believes that after the incident, TMT decided to take the initiative, based on past calculations, but also of emergency realities harshly exposed, while awaiting and pushing for Ankara's response. Their action was not spontaneous, but rather based on well-planned calculations that had been analyzed long before, since 1959. The reader and the historian are confronted by the reality of two forces moving towards a collision course, albeit because of different ideological background and different aims and purposes. That the incident was quite unexpected deducts nothing from their intensive preparations, viewing each other as the enemy in a zero sum game. The victims? The ordinary people of Cyprus, who were caught in the crossfire and paid dearly in terms of blood and innocent lives.

Many observers have pointed that the Cypriot President's efforts amounted to curtailing rights and privileges granted to the Cypriot Turks. Should one analyze the attempt within the narrow perspective of communal balance, where nothing could be done to upset its delicacy, then they are probably correct. The thirteen points though, may be viewed within a wider perspective, aiming at the overall functioning of the state, the latter running the risk of paralysis. Divisive elements had already been allowed to infiltrate the political life of the country, like the quotas, separate municipalities and separate voting on crucial issues (such as income tax collection). Or so Makarios hoped for his initiative, for Turkey had other ideas, rushing to reject any proposal that, in their opinion, would alter the delicate balance of power established in February 1959 and curtail, as they saw it, the rights of the Cypriot Turks (on 7th December). At other times, and within a far different milieu than the one of confrontation prevailing under these circumstances, perhaps the Cypriot President's initiative would have met a better understanding. In Cyprus, however, where an atmosphere of mutual mistrust and suspicion prevailed and communalism was the name of the game in a zero sum game, any move or initiative, regardless of its motive and ultimate goal, was destined to run afoul of extremism and intolerance.

Contrary to what has been written and widely believed, Makarios did not act alone. The then British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clark, played a significant role in the drafting of the thirteen points, when at an official level, London tried to keep clear.¹² Much has been made of the fact that Sir Arthur acted on his own initiative and did not keep the British Government in London fully informed.¹³ This is highly unlikely, in the annals of diplomacy,

¹² This much is alleged by Mrs Souliotis in her book, where she claims that she saw the original draft of the thirteen points and all the remarks and notes made by the then British High Commissioner in it. Souliotis, *ibid.* Nicolet puts late October 1963 as the time of Clark's active involvement. *Op. cit.*, 182.

As for Britain, their Embassy in Washington said so to the State Department. Mediation was not part of their game. Nicolet, *Ibid.*, 181.

¹³ Nicolet, *Ibid.*, 184 claims the opposite, that most probably he acted on his own initiative. He kept London of what was going on, as late as 6th December 1963, in a letter to Duncan Sandys of the same date.

for an Ambassador accredited to a foreign country to undertake such a task of monumental proportions, without bothering to inform his superiors. It is one hell of a responsibility and simply put, rarely, if ever, would one, and a professional diplomat at that, risk his career taking such a huge gamble.¹⁴ Being aware of developments is one thing, encouragement quite another. Did London encourage Sir Arthur Clark in his endeavor? Most probably not, as the British government adopted a rather wait-and-see attitude. Does this mean they did not know of the military preparations both sides became engaged in? They did, as they were quite well informed by their intelligence community.

Sir David Hunt, who was accredited as High Commissioner to Cyprus (1965-67) informs in his memoirs that nothing was ever traced in the files of the British High Commission in Nicosia, immediately after he took over, connecting and implicating Sir Arthur Clark with the famous thirteen points. That may well have been. No trace of Secretary of State George Marshall's speech to the members of Congress (February 1947, immediately before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine) has been found as well. Does that mean the speech never existed? Sir Arthur Clark had his own reasons for erasing all traces implicating him with Makarios' initiative, covering his tracks, as it was, not least of which was the probability of being accused of complicity in case things could go wrong, as they did, and the fighting that ensued, even though the two were never connected. Posterity and the thirty-year rule in the archives could show otherwise in due course. For the time being though, the present prevailed. To David Hunt's credit, one may quote him directly, from a telegram he sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1966. "Makarios has the intellectual abilities, which would enable him to make his mark in a country of a hundred times the population. His mind is clear and agile. He is a good psychologist[....] I do not believe he ever told me a deliberate lie."¹⁵

Neither Washington nor London were caught unaware of the unfolding developments. In fact, according to Nicolet, two plans were hanging in the air. The American, calling on Makarios first, to give his consent to issues like separate municipalities (within the wider framework of the Zurich-London Agreements and the constitution) and then to bring all aboard in an effort to achieve consensus. The British action plan's purpose was more modest, as it aimed to convince Turkey on the merit and the wisdom in accepting Makarios' proposals.¹⁶ Athens was not left in the dark either. Five days after the 3d November 1963 elections in Greece, with George Papandreou (of the Center Union Party) becoming Prime Minister of a minority government, Makarios informed him of his intentions. The same was done with the Greek Foreign Minister, Sofoklis Venizelos (son of the

¹⁴ The Foreign Office in London pretended its ignorance of what was happening in Nicosia. The US Ambassador, however, David Bruce, ever suspicious, was not convinced. *Ibid.*, 183.

¹⁵ FO/371/18560, file 1015/16. I am indebted to William Mallinson for bringing this document to my attention.

¹⁶ Nicolet, *op. cit.*, 181-182.

prominent statesman, Eleftherios Venizelos). Both showed their understanding. None opposed Makarios' initiative in any way, before or after the thirteen points were submitted. In fact, historical accounts have it that Venizelos participated in a meeting in Paris with his Turkish counterpart, Feridun Cemal Erkin (in the presence of the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Spyros Kyprianou).¹⁷ The purpose was to instruct Ankara to assist the Vice President of the Republic, Dr Fazil Kuchuk, into entering negotiations with Makarios and hammer out any differences, within a spirit of conciliation, following the submission of the thirteen points.¹⁸ Unfortunately, the fighting that broke out in the early hours of 21st December cancelled everything.

If the accuracy of the above information cannot be disputed, what went wrong? If the intentions of all those involved in the three countries (Cyprus, Greece and Turkey) were genuine, and they proved them by being in Paris, what explains the bloody December? Who and what were to be blamed? Even in retrospect, almost sixty years after the tragic events in December 1963, with many details yet to surface, I believe it is safe to assume that many read the situation quite wrongly and completely underestimated other parameters and details, which, ultimately, proved crucial. Not so much in regard to Makarios' willingness and determination to surge ahead, but miscalculating on the outcome of a possible failure of his effort.¹⁹ In this

¹⁷ That was the time Erkin requested the US' intervention, only for Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State, to decline. Washington did not want to get itself involved in any way with Cyprus. *Ibid.*, 186.

Perhaps the US Secretary of State realized the seriousness of the situation and what was at stake. Besides, not too long ago, the Eisenhower Administration had to step in, in a problem that involved three of Washington's allies, one of them being a colonial power, the others none other than the two naughty boys of the NATO alliance.

¹⁸ Details in Nikos Kranidiotis, *Anohyroti Politeia: Kypros 1960-1974. Vols. I and II* (Indefensible State: Cyprus 1960-1974). Athens: Hestia, 1985) from a personality in the thin and thick of things (1955-59) and then as the first Ambassador of the Republic in Greece.

¹⁹ In this respect, many authors still believe that Makarios wanted to abolish the 1959 Agreements and declare union with Greece. This is not true. Abominable as the settlement was (for the reasons already analyzed), the more so since it was imposed, he also found himself under intense criticism for having buried union, after signing the Agreements. Makarios, though, was not naïve. True, he never fell in love with the Zurich-London Agreements. Equally so, he did not want to acquiesce in extremism either, or succumb to the temptation by agreeing with their arguments. Sensitive to such criticism he was, for entirely different reasons, historical truth being perhaps the primary one. As President, he had to rise to the occasion and meet directly the many challenges, criticism being one of them.

Nor would he risk an all out war against the Cypriot-Turks, with an unknown outcome, so that grandiose dreams could be fulfilled. Greece would never go along with such a strategy. Aside from this, one had to take into consideration his capability in waging an all out war. On this issue, especially self-defense, as it turned out, his lieutenants failed him.

If for nothing else, the tragic events in December 1963 proved beyond any reasonable doubt how unprepared, especially in terms of weapons and ammunition, the Cypriot-Greeks were, a damning legacy and a serious challenge to arguments who accuse their leadership of going for a total war.

Nicolet, *Ibid.*, 179-180, mentions the infamous Akritas Plan as proof of Makarios' intention to achieve union. This is a gross exaggeration, as his willingness to amend the constitution in no way was tantamount to declaring *enosis*. Perhaps many were entertaining fantasies

sense, they failed to take into consideration extremism, with the latter prevailing. Regardless of how all those involved approached the subject of the Agreements, the constitution and the coexistence of the two communities, the presence of armed groups on both sides complicated things significantly.

The leadership of the two communities became their prisoners, perhaps deluding themselves they could control them, or even making these paramilitary groups subservient to the larger and wider cause. They could not do either. It was a quid pro quo relationship, to be sure, but then people preaching extremist ideology were always in the thin and thick of things, as they always are. Because of the 1959 settlement, with all the negative ramifications and parameters that it entailed (which were fully exploited, in more senses than one by many), and the presence of many people in positions of vital importance, tensions that existed long before, be of ethnic, religious, political or ideological aspect, were aggravated and exacerbated. If for anything, such tensions and the prevailing climate made them far worse, for the ideology of the same people (during 1955-59, acting clandestinely, now fully involved, as they were summoned to the conflict) pushed things to the extreme. Finally, word should be made of the drafting of contingency plans on both sides. Irrespective of the rationale behind their existence and the ultimate goals they set to accomplish, they set the framework within which any trivial incident could be interpreted and used as a fuse to blow the entire structure. And in fact, it did. True, indeed, the incident in the early hours of 21st December was trivial, comical, amusing, in the words of John Foster Dulles, one week before the outbreak of the Korean War.²⁰ The consequences, on the other hand, were devastating.

1977 was in many respects similar to 1957 and 1958, only far worse. The Turkish invasion of July 1974 and the military occupation of 37% of the Republic of Cyprus' territory was the practical implementation of Ankara's vision of the 1950's. Could it be ignored? Far from it. Was it unique in international affairs? No, simply because the Middle East claimed the prize since 1917. The invasion altered radically the situation in Cyprus. Turkey was in the country to stay, forcing everybody to come to terms with its presence.

It was a reality nobody could overlook or ignore, much less underestimate. What next was the immediate thought that occupied everybody's mind. A return to the status quo ante would be an ideal remedy, the grave consequences notwithstanding. Turkey, however, rejected all suggestions

in achieving the noble dream, probably among those who drafted the plan in the first place. How many thought of another eventuality, however: Greek-Turkish war?

²⁰ His remarks were made while he visited the 38th parallel in the Korean Peninsula (18th June 1950), with many interpreting his presence as a provocation to Kim Il-sung. The words comical and amusing were his, to describe the entire climate his visit created, reacting to comments that were made after the war.

While visiting Seoul, President Syngman Rhee tried to enlist his help towards launching war in the north, a request for which Dulles was negative.

that aimed at the restoration of the 1960 framework, even though Makarios had specifically requested it through the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, in his capacity as the Acting President, Glafcos Clerides. The need for a dialogue in search of a solution was more imperative than ever before. Unfortunately, the new facts on the ground that the invasion created had to be taken into consideration.

III. HENRY KISSINGER-PRESIDENT MAKARIOS MEETING (2 OCTOBER 1974)

Terms, words and the nomenclature in general have their importance, especially in cases of armed conflict, lest any misinterpretations arise. Conquered territory, settlers, refugees, in general all the evils that accompany war become quite relevant and occupy their place in its vocabulary. What took place next door to Cyprus in the Middle East, ten years earlier (the June or Six Day War in 1967), applied, by and large, to the Republic as well. In Fall 1974, a new term arose and took its place in the terminology as a solution to the problem: bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. By all accounts, the then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was the author of the new, proposed solution. What it meant was the creation of two zones, each of which would be occupied by the two communities, connected to a central government. At least in theory, with all the necessary details to be worked out.

Details like the composition of the population in each zone, their authority versus that of the central government, properties, refugees and the right to move and settle were left vague. Precisely who knew what and when of Kissinger's idea is still hotly disputed. His idea did not come out of the blue, but was rather the product of the Turkish invasion, which transformed radically the entire situation in Cyprus. The Secretary of State had a lot to answer for, and still does, for his precise role, before, during and after the dramatic events in the island in the Summer 1974. For his part, Makarios was unquestionably aware of it. Accounts have him being informed of Kissinger's initiative in early October. A meeting between the two took place on 2d of the same month, the first one having been on 19th July. Let us see what the record from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) tells us about their meeting.²¹ Initially, the encounter started well, for, as Makarios put it, "If you and I agree on a solution, it will contribute to a solution." Kissinger, though, was not that optimistic. As he saw it, "if events here continue as they are doing, I will not be able to contribute. If these amendments pass, I cannot continue. This doesn't affect you directly."

The US Secretary of State was referring to the talk for an arms embargo against Turkey, which the US Congress was then discussing with a view of imposing it. "A threat to cut off aid is a weapon; an actual cut-off is not. It will be impossible to conduct the negotiations under these circumstances. Suppose we get the Turks to withdraw 10 kilometers and release 10,000 refugees, and then we restore aid? What do we do two months from now? Cut it off again? It will be on and off like a yo-yo. It can't be done with fixed deadlines."

²¹ Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus, Turkey, 1973-1976. Document 154, October 2, 1974, pdf, edition.

Makarios' initial comment did not arrive out of the blue. He was well aware whom he was talking to, of what had just taken place in the Middle East with shuttle diplomacy and the man in the thin and thick of things. On 18th January 1974, the Sinai I Agreement was signed, while on 7th May 1974 in Nicosia, Kissinger met with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, so that the corresponding one between Israel-Syria on the Golan Heights would be signed and the establishment of UNDOF would take place.²² The US found itself under tremendous pressure by both the Egyptian President and Saudi Arabia (the oil embargo imposed by the Arabs was still in effect). Hence, Henry Kissinger went into action. So, why not do some serious business in Cyprus as well with him? Kissinger occupied both the posts of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, the first time in contemporary US history this happened, since then adoption of the National Security Act of 1947 via which, among other provisions, the new post of the National Security Adviser was created, along with the creation of the Department of Defense. James Forrestal became the first Secretary of Defense.

There was also another serious reason, as equally important: the lack of any viable alternative. 1974 was not 1964, where in conjunction with the Johnson Letter of June (regardless of how one is interpreting it and the reaction it caused in Turkey), there was also Nikita Khrushchev's threat in early August of the same year against Ankara (following the air strikes by the Turkish air force against targets in the north-western part of Cyprus). Turkey did not have any landing crafts as well.²³ If one wants to draw parallels, then surely we may cite Moscow's action on the eve of the October War in 1973, when they withdrew their personnel in Cairo and Damascus, a sure sign for many, especially in Israel, that war was imminent (regardless of the tug of war between Military Intelligence and the Mossad, which continues to the present day).

Turkey, as it was, became isolated politically in 1964. Cyprus had plenty of room within which to maneuver, much to Washington's disdain. In contradistinction to 1964, however, 1974 was far different. For one thing, Turkey established itself firmly inside Cyprus, in military terms. Then, given the island was not a client of the Soviet Union, or anybody else's for that matter, the latter did not lift a finger to render any practical assistance, a damning tribute to the bipolar nature of the international political system and a curse, in particular, to neutrality. Thucydides and the Melian Dialogue coming alive, even though in a different rehearsal. The spirit of the exchanges between the Athenian Generals and the inhabitants of Melos remaining immortal and providing invaluable lessons eternally for all of us, especially as regards power politics. Turkish diplomacy had a lot to do with the misery, as for the past ten years Ankara pursued actively a

²² The Disengagement Agreement on the Golan Heights was signed in Geneva on 31st May 1974.

²³ Charles Foley, *Legacy of Strife. Cyprus from Rebellion to Civil War* (London: Penguin, 1964), 182.

rapprochement with Moscow. As for Kissinger, he despised the role Congress assumed, as he perceived a manifest attempt to corner him and restrict his freedom of movement.

According to him, "My skill is to get the other party to do what needs to be done. It can't be done with threats. My ability is to get them to do it. So this is violently against Cypriot interests. The art is to get the process started. The process is more important than the conclusions. The art is to get the Turks thinking of withdrawal, and this is easier without precision on final solutions. If I withdraw from this, you will get double enosis. The Turks won't yield to visible pressure. The Turks will yield to pressure with a silk glove that looks like they are yielding on their own initiative."

Next, he informed that his trip to Ankara was cancelled. He refused to go there under such circumstances and expressed his readiness to "withdraw from the negotiations." As he saw it, "...the result will be double enosis." Mixing humor with reality, "Your Beatitude will be a Greek political leader! They have reason to be afraid of you."

Makarios expressed openly his fears. "I don't want any solution that allows for a mass transfer of the population. The Turks are insisting on a separate jurisdiction, because they want to safeguard Turkish autonomy. We are prepared to consider ways to do this, this autonomy, but not with transfer of populations. The Turks won't allow our people back to their homes—perhaps only a limited number. The problem is a serious problem for us." And he continued. "The area occupied by the Turks is the most productive area. We accept federation, but on a communal basis. I don't care whether you call them cantons, but these areas don't entail the transfer of many thousands. If there are only two big areas, one under Turkish Cypriot and one under the Greek Cypriot administration, this solution would pave, in my view, the way to partition. Even now, there are Cypriots who say federation is better than double enosis. I think for Turkey to say they are not in favor of double enosis, it is sincere."

Kissinger doubted Makarios' assessment. In any case, the latter adopted a wait and see attitude. "Turkey is not so eager for this but some Cypriots say it is better. Many areas are better than two big areas." To Kissinger's remark that in August five were proposed, Makarios said "I would prefer more than five. Say ten." The Secretary of State then attacked the Greek Delegation in Geneva for mismanagement. In his words, "They could have a delay, which would have averted these operations. But the British got morally outraged at the Turks—which one can never afford in a negotiation—and the Greeks were afraid of Papandreou." In concluding his observation, "my feeling is this solution is unobtainable."

Makarios then wondered why "we didn't accept this at Geneva," i.e., Turkey insisting on two areas? To which, Kissinger observed that "at Geneva, you could have gotten a settlement on 70% and negotiations later on the rest."

It would be better than now." He then commented on the 40% of the territory of the Republic occupied by Turkey, saying "that is too much." Makarios then speculated. "Say Turkey agrees to reduce up to 28%. So the question is what is better for us: To legalize a de facto situation or not to legalize it and insist on 28%?" Replying to Kissinger's inquiry as regards his view, Makarios said, "My personal view is not to accept it."

Continuing, he made reference to the refugee problem, which is related. "If the area is reduced to 28 percent, then the people will go back to the areas given back to us. But most of the refugees will not go back to their homes. We will have lost a lot. I don't know if it's better to legalize getting back ten or twelve per cent." To Kissinger's observation that "then Turkey will annex the part and make it a Turkish province," Makarios replied he could not exclude it. On the other hand, "...there are hopes that one day, after many years, we will come to an agreement which is better for the future of Cyprus."

Kissinger then stressed the fact of his absence from any negotiations, "because I understand the useful role I'm playing now in Greek domestic politics by being the focal point for criticism." His preference "was a cantonal solution," without knowing the exact number of the cantons. He also made clear the fact that "we should have got agreement on a cantonal solution." "Now I think there will be either no solution, as Your Beatitude proposes, or a bi-zonal solution. The question now is how to arrange it so a bi-zonal solution doesn't become a façade for double enosis. So my feeling is that the federal government should be given substantial powers, say over emigration, and the Turkish portion should be consider ably reduced."

He had no objection in asking the Turks to go back to five cantons, but if "the Greeks are going out on the streets of America calling me a killer, I have no interest." To which Makarios reminded the interest of the US in peace in the area, a country which Kissinger was its Secretary of State. With the latter replying, "The interests of the United Sates are its relations with Greece, with Cyprus, and with Turkey. There is also the problem of peace. But the peace of the world will not be threatened. Who would threaten it? The Soviet Union? We will not allow it, for different reasons, including our whole Middle East position. But our relations with Greece, and with Cyprus- and because we believe Turkey acted excessively-for all these reasons we have an interest."

And he continued: "There are a lot of heroes who don't know how to get one percent of their territory back. Maybe it will become like the Arab refugee problem. Maybe Turkey will leave NATO; maybe it will become an issue here." "So our reward is somehow in our relations with Greece and with Cyprus. And of course our interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey. And it is also in the interest of a final solution. Because if Turkey feels it's being violated, it will look for ways to undo it. Then we are back where we started." He also acknowledged the importance of American

influence. "Then it depends on our ability and our willingness to do it. Peace will be maintained anyway; a just one, not necessarily."

"The realistic objectives-with tremendous effort, and my active personal participation-would be: a reduction of the area, a solution of the refugee problem. But we can't have these interviews in Le Monde calling me a killer." Kissinger then proceeded to excuse himself of any responsibility leading to the 15th July coup. And he proceeded: "Once the Turks were on the island, Your Beatitude understood it better than I. You urged me to get the Turks off. I expected the next negotiation to succeed. If I knew it would fail I would have done it more differently. The British were sure it would work. I was heavily preoccupied with the President."

Kissinger emphasized how indispensable Makarios was for a realistic solution. As he put it, "We are not anti-Makarios. If we become the villain to your story, we'll be forced to turn against you. Clerides we have to support now but we've done nothing final." Turning to Makarios, he told him how essential he was for a "final solution." "But we have to support Clerides now; otherwise there will be a total deadlock."

He also pointed to his not minding proposing cantons initially, and see what happens. Kissinger said he did not want to mislead Makarios, only the restrictive amendments make things more difficult. "We are definitely not anti-Makarios. Nor do we insist that be pro-American. We were perfectly happy with the situation before the coup. The best solution was to leave Cyprus alone. Had I known about the coup, I would have stopped it..." "We had no conceivable American interest. We had nothing against Makarios." He then asked Makarios for his strengthening of Clerides for the negotiations.

Makarios then took his distance from any rumors that there was any US involvement in the coup against him. Only rumors. Hence the misunderstanding in the interview he gave to Eric Rouleau of Le Monde. As for the solution, his personal view was, "as for federation on a geographic basis, it should be more than five areas." According to him, the US could influence Turkey to accept this solution. "There is no strong reason for them not to accept this solution. They occupy forty percent, and they say they will give 10 to 15 percent back. If they had fifty percent, they'd appear more generous and give 20 percent back." Should Kissinger agree with this, Makarios held the impression the Secretary of State would succeed.

There was a catch, however. "We can't say to the Turks that we accept a federation on a geographic basis." "If from the beginning we gave up the principle, we'd be in a difficult position. If they insist on two areas-and on the transfer of population, which is most difficult-we won't accept it. Of course I care about the consequences but I personally can't accept. If there are more areas, it reduces the danger of partition and double enosis."

Upon Makarios' comment on learning more during his trip to Ankara, Kissinger informed of the possibility of this being cancelled. The Cypriot President pointed out that in case of failure, a Turkish gesture on the city of Famagusta, its return that is, since "from a military point of view, they have nothing to lose. And we'll accommodate."

Kissinger pointed to the difficulty. "There are two problems. How to get any concession at any one point, and second, how to get the process started. The problem now is to get it started. I don't know how I could get Famagusta without any idea of what they get in return. I haven't studied it."

Makarios expressed his full backing of Clerides despite the latter's rendering his resignation, and some differences they had in the past, notwithstanding. As a last round before concluding the conversation, Makarios said, "if Turkey insists on only two areas, we won't accept it. I don't know if Mr Clerides will accept it or the Greek Government. If they think it's the only solution, I won't create difficulties for the Greek Government. But they shouldn't expect me to say I agree." To which Kissinger said he would study it, if he would go to Ankara. He also warned on the impossibility of such a task, should the restrictive amendments pass.

Makarios also mentioned Sadat's remarks to him, namely, "...the key is in Washington; it is in the hands of Dr Kissinger." The allusion was obvious: the US Secretary of State had the power to make things happen with the leverage he could exert on Turkey.

What can one deduce from their meeting (it was only the two of them, plus Mr, Peter W. Rodman of the NSC Staff). Bi-zonality was the preferred solution for Henry Kissinger, against Makarios' objections. The Cypriot President was in favor of federation, made of cantons, but not with two zones, and not one entailing ethnic purification. Kissinger wanted Makarios to exert his influence on Congress to stop the legislation cutting military aid and imposing an arms embargo on Turkey. Then, in a nutshell the Secretary of State specified the aims: peace in the region and stability. After all, these two were the registered trademarks of his sacred belief in the equilibrium, in the peace that the Congress of Vienna restored in 1815 and lasted for a century. It was also the title of his doctoral dissertation that was published into a book with the same title. The Soviet Union could not disturb peace. Why would they? *Détente* (with Nixon's trip to Moscow in May 1972 and his visiting Beijing in February of the same year, with which he had inaugurated the triangular diplomacy, overdue by twenty years, since 1949 and Dean Acheson) had a lot to do with it.²⁴ Hanoi had already paid the price in April

²⁴ Dean Acheson waited for the dust to settle down and try and win over China from the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State could not imagine a country with as rich a civilization as China to be allied with the Soviet Union. Revolutionary nationalism eluded Acheson's attention.

In any case, Acheson found himself very much under scurrilous attacks by Senator Joseph McCarthy, for having lost China, especially after the White Paper was published in 1949.

1972, when they launched an offensive near Quang Tri (at the 17th parallel) and later in December, during the Christmas air blitz. Neither Moscow nor Beijing gave them any assistance. In fact, they both encouraged them to make peace with the US and sign the Paris Accords. Cyprus was not Syria, not a client of the Soviet Union, or anybody else's for that matter. One last thing is worth mentioning. On 7th May 1974, a meeting took place in Nicosia between Makarios and Kissinger. According to the footnotes of the Report (of the October's meeting), no record of that meeting was located in Kissinger's papers.

The so-called China hands of the State Department (John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies and John Stuart Service) paid dearly, as their careers were destroyed.

IV. THE HISTORY OF US INVOLVEMENT IN CYPRUS

US policy vis-à-vis Cyprus did not of course arrive out of the blue. Before we plunge deeply into the history of its involvement, we need to remind ourselves that the US had no legal right to get itself involved with Cyprus. Yet, it was pulling all the strings, a tribute to its superpower status, for a country that found itself indirectly involved, and still was forced to move decisively. Why this was the case? Simply because, three of its allies became involved in a colonial matter, within the context of the Cold War, and the Atlantic alliance was threatened. The Soviet Union stood to gain, or so the rationale in Washington went. The US was confronted with a dilemma in the mid-1950's, when first it abstained in 1954, after the first attempt was made by Greece to have the issue on the agenda of UNGA. Next year it sided with the British voting against it.²⁵ Gradually though, the Eisenhower Administration realized the dire situation it found itself into. Support anti-colonialism and self-determination, a policy that the US would never run away from, but one which this time was directed against an ally (Britain), a repeat-more or less-of a similar case with the Arab world? Or ally with London, as Washington did in Indochina from 1945 supporting France, even though in terms of strategic location, Cyprus was in nowhere any near to Indochina?

The Cyprus problem became more complicated for many other reasons. Two of the US allies, Greece and Turkey, became involved in a tussle with no end in sight, the first reluctantly, the other more determined to create problems and impose more or less its vision. Ankara exploited to the hilt its geographic and overall strategic position, both within the Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East, with devastating consequences against Cyprus.²⁶ Both Athens and Nicosia were quite late in realizing the depth, the seriousness and the gravity of Turkey's direct involvement, let alone recognizing the consequences of these unfortunate realities to their strategy, and even slower to react, and quite feebly at that.

Based on documents cited by the Czech historian Jan Kaura (of Prince Charles University in Prague, Center for Cold War Studies), the Greek Government of Konstantinos Karamanlis protested vehemently to the US against this bias in favor of Turkey.²⁷ Such a negative approach on the part of Washington, however, was not new, as Britain held similar ideas against Greece in the mid-1930's, especially after the restoration of the monarchy, via the fraudulent referendum of November 1935. Having in mind probably

²⁵ Details in Nicolet, *op. cit.*

²⁶ This was most profoundly expressed by Britain and its stand on Cyprus, with the declaration in Parliament by the then Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox Boyd, on 19th December 1956 on the separate right for self-determination for the Cypriot-Turks.

As for the US, they realized the pivotal role Turkey was playing in the Middle East, especially after the enunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In practical terms, no solution would be worked out for Cyprus, which could run contrary to Ankara's interests.

²⁷ Jan Kaura, *Partitioned Island: The Cold War and the Cyprus Problem During the Period 1960-1974* (Athens: Alexandria, 2021), 49. The text in Greek has been translated from the original in the Czech language.

what the Greek monarchy did in WWI, not so much because of their belief in genuine neutrality (being hesitant in joining the war on the side of the Entente), but because they believed in the victory of the Central Powers, King George's return may have restored the tranquility, but suspicions remained. The Greek monarch was counted upon to control Ioannis Metaxas and any ideas of his in any attempt to lean towards Italy. Metaxas' historical record, being a member of the evil cabal of King Constantine, 1914-17, advising, cajoling, conspiring and threatening, left much to be desired. The short man with the stick of the golden handle did not exactly inspire confidence. King George's presence, on the other hand, ensured that the Prime Minister (via the coup of 4th August 1936) would not cross the line and double cross London again.

Turkey was viewed by London a far more reliable and trustworthy friend (not quite an ally, for the past during WWI and later during the Asia Minor expedition on the part of Athens, created an enormous gap between Ankara and London) than Greece. An additional reason dealt with internal politics in both countries. The Greek state, with the right in power since the November 1952 elections, owed its existence literally to the massive and active intervention, first by Britain, originally in an exercise of early containment since Spring 1944, or containment *de facto*, and later in (March 1947) to the US, via containment *de jure* (the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine).

Regardless of the validity of such an intervention (in the opinion of the present author, it was not justified for either Britain or the US to do so), other factors became involved as well, quite indispensable for us to get a fuller picture of the entire atmosphere that began to be created, artificially so, and the political and ideological interpretations that emanated from it. British strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean for one, and its deep anti-communism, which would never allow any other political force inside or outside Greece to hold on to the country, a force that London considered alien to its interests, such as the left, goes a very long way in explaining Winston Churchill's obsession with Greece.²⁸ Because of the outcome of the Greek Civil War, a completely unnecessary war, whose outcome saw the country enervated and reduced to a third rate power (not so its eastern neighbor, a paradox, just like Japan after the end of the Korean War), ensured that the Greek state became a virtual prisoner of its two saviors and held hostage to their wider interests. An independent foreign policy and a truly independent and sovereign state under such circumstances were unthinkable. A strange and bitter harvest, quite a reward, for a country that dealt with the Axis single-handed and paid dearly for its stand. In fact, in the 1950's, the euphemism used to label any US intervention in the domestic affairs of Greece (like the adoption of the winner take all system of the November 1952 general elections, following much pressure by the then US Ambassador, John Peurifoy) was called the "American factor."

²⁸ Anne Deighton, ed., *Britain and the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

This was not the case with Turkey. Ankara owned neither Britain nor the US the way Greece did (the right, that is). Its record during WWII, dubious as it was, and highly questionable in regard to its neutrality, Turkey had other ideas by 1945.²⁹ According to the assessment by the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill (expressed during the Yalta Conference), Ankara planned to maneuver between the two superpowers and perhaps seek to gain benefits or extract any advantages. Only this time, it was not 1914. Moscow, and Joseph Stalin in particular, could neither forgive, nor could they forget Turkey's vacillating during WWII. Neutrality in name only as one might label the country's attitude may explain the latter's refusal to renew in March 1945 the Treaty of Friendship (signed in 1925). I also believe Vyacheslav Molotov's bitter encounter with Selim Sarper, the Turkish Ambassador, in early June in Moscow can be interpreted within the same rationale. Much has been made of the possibility of the country joining the Allies in 1943, as was the wish by Churchill and, why not, Stalin. Precisely when and where, and under what conditions and circumstances for such an eventuality to take place still remains unclear, despite the vehement opposition of the Ismet Inonu government.³⁰ When all is said and done though, one must also acknowledge Turkey's role in frustrating many of Nazi Germany's schemes in the Middle East, especially towards the Arabs.³¹

Regardless of how one wants to interpret Soviet policy vis-à-vis Turkey during 1945-47, gradually the country fitted into the climate that began to prevail in Washington. Ankara arrived in the western camp, a welcome addition, partly thanks to the efforts of the US Ambassador in Ankara, Edwin Wilson (as early as June 1945), ready to fit and be incorporated into the global anti-communist containment scheme and strategy that were gradually enunciated in the US. Many authors see Soviet policy quite aggressive, in the Straits and the eastern provinces of the country since Spring-early Summer 1945, which culminated in August 1946. On his part, the present author believes many other factors played their role, not least the atmosphere that was created in 1946. The rift between President Truman and his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, George Kennan's long telegram in February, the Iranian crisis shortly thereafter and finally, the Straits crisis in August of the same year.³² All these events, did not occur

²⁹ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War. An "Active" Neutrality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

³⁰ Geoffrey Roberts, "Ideology, calculation and improvisation: spheres of influence and Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-1945." *Review of International Studies*. Vol. 25 (1999), 655-673, pdf edition.

³¹ Point well made by Frank Weber, *The Evasive Neutral: Germany, Britain and the Quest for a Turkish Alliance in the Second World War* (Columbia, Mo: The University of Missouri Press, 1979).

³² Robert Messer, *The End of the Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman and the Origins of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011). For George Kennan's Long telegram, John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 19. On the prevailing climate in 1946 and the Truman Doctrine later on, Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) and Arnold

out of nowhere; they rather took place within the framework of a climate of deep distrust and animosity against the Soviet Union and were interpreted as such. Turkey was used as an example of a victim of continuous Soviet pressure, Kennan's mechanical car metaphor, where the line had to be drawn somewhere. Turkish politicians sought to capitalize on the new climate prevailing, seeking to prove their allegiance by demonstrating they were *plus royaliste que le rois*. The country's participation in the Korean War (1950-53) is a case in point.

Ankara's maximalist aims and an assertive strategy in Cyprus paid dividends in the long run, as it became more actively involved, not an exaggeration to call it in the thin and thick of things. Simply and bluntly put, it could never be excluded from any settlement in Cyprus. Worse still, their extremist rhetoric forced the issue to such an extent, so that it was channeled into Cyprus, adding fuel to the fire, becoming the banner under which the Cypriot-Turkish leadership waged their campaign: *taksim ya olum* (partition or death). The idea of an independent Cyprus, and a guaranteed independence at that, had Washington's blessing. The system of government that resulted bore Ankara's trademark, especially the country's Foreign Minister, Fatin Rustu Zorlu. Makarios realized, perhaps a bit too late, the new realities he had to cope with. Hence, his *volte face* in early September 1958 in favor of independence. Oceans of ink have been spilled in regard to who signed the London Agreements at Lancaster House (19th February 1959), so that all the blame be thrust to him. This, though, was the wrong question to be posed, not the issue that really mattered, a repeat, *mutatis mutandis*, of the stab in the back controversy with the German Army in 1918, before the Armistice was signed on 11th November. How the Cyprus problem degenerated from anti-colonialism and self-determination, to inter-communal conflict and finally, a Greek-Turkish affair never really seemed to occupy the attention of anybody, when it should have.

An independent Cyprus established in 1960, did not spell the end of the travails for the island. True, the majority of the indigenous population welcomed the settlement, despite the communal poison that had permeated society. Genuine independence they did not get, never mind those harboring union and partition. Compromise was the name of the game, but the settlement hid many traps, while its provisions meant one thing, and one thing only: peaceful coexistence became synonymous to communalism. Those extremist forces, who battled each other, both intra and inter-communally, and were now fully armed, thought otherwise, as they entertained other ideas. Their expectations were not fulfilled (union or partition), their hopes were dashed, true. But then, as things moved along and the first clouds appeared in the horizon, no prophet of doom was needed to predict a possible outcome, precisely a situation in which all this people would find a role reserved for them, and a special one at that. They did not operate in a vacuum; their existence was widely known. For now,

Offner, Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).

they were standing by, ready to be summoned to the cause, should the circumstances demand it.

The outbreak of the inter-communal conflict (in December 1963), was the product of a climate of deep suspicion and hostility, the result of a trivial incident, true, but in reality, the end game of a strategy of perceptions and misperceptions and certainly of miscalculations. Which side would move first, so that self-defense would be invoked by the other was the name of the game. Unfortunately, the incident could not be isolated from the suffocating climate of common animosity that was prevalent. Hence, both sides were trapped in their own calculations and mutual fears, ones, moreover, that threatened to derail their plans. This was the time that saw the active involvement of all the paramilitary groups. It also brought as well the US hastily into the picture. Britain was there (after all, it was General Young and his drawing the famous green line that separated Nicosia, which earned its place in the English vocabulary), but in essence both Greece and Turkey became once more involved. This time though, things seemed to be getting out of control, with Ankara threatening direct military intervention (via Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, irrespective of its many interpretations) and Athens ready to respond. An attempt by first, Britain and then the US (via the visit to Cyprus of the then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, George Ball in February 1964) came to naught. President Makarios was not ready to acquiesce in the sending of NATO troops, as he preferred the UN to undertake such a role (they did, via UNSC Resolution 186, of 4th March 1964). His encounter with George Ball was not pleasant; it left a bitter feeling on the part of the US Statesman, who henceforth held Makarios responsible and blamed him for all the problems in the island. Another reason, perhaps more serious entered the Undersecretary's mind: the Cold War and the possibility of Makarios turning to the Soviet Union and maneuvering between the two superpowers. Above all, Washington wanted to avert a Greek-Turkish war, a theme that would be repeated in the next ten years, and would surely have benefited Moscow, much in favor of the genuine interests of the people of Cyprus.³³

In a bizarre twist, Washington acknowledged the feelings of the Cypriot Greeks and union, in the face of none other than the then US Ambassador in Nicosia Taylor Belcher (1964-69). Well acquainted with the country

³³ This explains the famous Johnson letter, the US President set to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ismet Inonu, on 5th June 1964. A similar letter was sent to the Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou. Since war had to be avoided at all costs, arising from any unilateral actions from which only the Soviet Union could profit, a meeting of the three could be arranged in Washington, as it was.

In the case of Turkey, the letter created too much fuss, but little action. For Ankara to leave NATO was unthinkable. Latest research has it that Inonu played a communications game, for the sake of the Turkish audience. He knew his options were limited, the more so since he could not resort to war, primarily for two reasons. First, Greece would fight, and second, Turkey possessed no landing craft of any value to carry out the invasion it was threatening.

For an alternative interpretation of the letter, Suha Bolukabasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited." *Middle Eastern Studies*. Vol. 29, No. 3 (July 1993), 505-525.

(having served in Nicosia since 1957 and between 1958-60 as Consul General), he became sympathetic to the feelings of the Cypriot people. True enough, his reports strongly recommended such a policy to be adopted, only for his superiors in the US to have other ideas, since they were looking at the whole (Belcher only at the parts). Union with Greece would have been the ideal solution, but it would surely have brought the intense and violent opposition of Turkey. A middle road was chosen instead, with Dean Acheson, the former Secretary of State, getting his instructions from President Lyndon Johnson to go to Geneva and sort things out. Both Greece and Turkey sent representatives in Geneva, not so Cyprus, as it was excluded from the deliberations. Union with Greece, which occupied everybody's mind as a preferred solution, did not come cheaply, as Turkey demanded a sovereign military base to the north of the country, a price Makarios was not willing to pay. After his efforts failed, Acheson gave up. What conclusions many drew from the encounter proved decisive for the future.

For many inside Cyprus, Acheson's efforts provided a unique opportunity to accomplish the centuries-old and noble dream of union with Greece, only for some to have sabotaged it (Prime Minister George Stephanopoulos' remarks in 1966 of devilish forces having sabotaged *enosis* are indicative). Others felt relieved, for Acheson's plans spelled disaster. For George Papandreou, the Greek Prime Minister, initially in favor of the second Acheson Plan, Makarios was a loose cannon and, in any case, not much of a trustworthy partner. No wonder, the letter he sent to him, in which-in no uncertain terms-he spelled his disagreement, "we agree on matters, yet your actions show you are doing otherwise." As for Turkey, it was business as usual. True, the whole crisis may have proved the isolation of the country worldwide. Ankara, on the other hand, was not willing to surrender, nor would it be prepared to give up an inch. Its response in August 1964, when it dispatched the air force and bombed the north-western part of Cyprus, in a show of force and an act of support to the Cypriot-Turks, who found themselves surrounded in the village of Kokkina, proved that it meant business. For the sake of historical truth and objectivity, Turkey, through TMT and other paramilitary groups, attempted to establish a bridgehead in that particular part of the country, only for the reaction of the Government of Cyprus, which was swift and effective.

The coup carried out by the Greek military (21st April 1967) inserted uncertainty and fear into the equation, especially in the domestic affairs of Cyprus. How much Washington knew of the Colonels' plans to take over is debatable. The triumvirate in Athens, however, was not unknown to the Americans, since many of their people (mainly from the CIA) dealt with them from the early 1960's onwards. The Colonels did not appear out of nowhere. They were rather the product of the post-civil war era (from 1949), when the Greek armed forces reigned supreme, rising from that date as young officers (many of them members of the secret organization IDEA (Sacred Bond of Greek Officers), implicated in the attempted coup of 31st

May 1951 (and eventually pardoned by the Nikolaos Plastiras government) along with the ascendancy of the right. One way or another, their ideological credentials established, they were guaranteed promotions, rising fast in the hierarchy, managing to secure crucial places within the military establishment, occasionally calling the shots in sensitive matters like transfers. In fact, George Papadopoulos enjoyed the reputation of being another Nassir, a tribute to the Egyptian leader. In perhaps one of the ironies of contemporary Greek history, many of the Generals in the armed forces of the country deluded themselves, thinking that these junior officers (from the rank of major to colonel) were subservient to their future plans, believing they could control them, or even use them in the future, should the need arise, in case of any showdown with the politicians.

Many of them had already served in Cyprus as well, starting in 1960, when the Greek contingent (ELDYK), as provided in the 1959 settlement, arrived in August. They became acquainted with the country and its people, especially those sharing similar ideas like union. They were also instrumental in training the members of the paramilitary groups that came into existence in early 1962, even though the main role for this enterprise was undertaken by military officers who arrived from Greece (from the General Staff of the Hellenic Armed Forces). Unfortunately, Makarios was well aware of the existence of these groups, and probably of the contingency plans that were drafted (the Akritas Plan), himself becoming prisoner to information as regards TMT and its strategy for extensive military action throughout the country. Their existence carried positive aspects as well. Gradually, as it became apparent that the constitution was proving to be divisive and corrosive and Makarios contemplated taking the crucial step to propose amendments (what eventually came to be called the 13 points), these groups could be used for self-defense, should things get out of hand. Or so his thoughts were, perhaps. All the information as regards TMT activities could simply not be dismissed out of hand. The past testified to that, hence the fact that no provocations could be excluded. Lest the President was caught by surprise, he assented to their existence; or at least, he did not demand and obtained their dissolution. What reality would prove, if worst came to the worst, would be an entirely different story.

Not surprisingly, a similar effort was undertaken by the leadership of the Cypriot-Turks, from 1959 onwards. This was not surprising, given what preceded the settlement. Due to a combination of British colonial policy, ingenuity (on the part of their leadership) and perhaps perspicacity, they came out of obscurity, making themselves more useful to the British, all to prove their argument and establish their case. Separate self-determination did not arrive from nothing, nor did fall in a vacuum. On the contrary, it was well planned and found fertile ground and a receptive audience, ready to demand and fight for it, by all means necessary. Weapons and other arms were imported illegally from Turkey (one of the ships was stopped and searched on 18th October 1959 and found to carry military cargo), even manufactured in Cyprus. Through TMT, the paramilitary organization that

came into being in August 1957, and invoking self-defense, they posed as the defenders of the community in the face of what they claimed would be physical annihilation, when in reality their aims were different. Regional ethnic purification (they accomplished this in May 1956, in the northern suburbs of Nicosia, when-through their efforts of intimidation-the Cypriot Greeks inhabitants were forced to leave) became the name of the game, with national geographic separation of the two communities the long-term vision. That the 1959 settlement did not accomplish this was irrelevant, as preparations for another round and perhaps the ultimate showdown with the enemy were well under way.

How naïve the Colonels' regime was manifested itself in November 1967. Under considerable provocation from the Cypriot Turks, let it be said and stressed, they used a sledgehammer to kill a flea, incurring Turkey's wrath as it was and this time threatening action. 1967 was not 1964, for the Greek military were not ready for war against Turkey. Ankara may well have been well served by the presence of George Grivas (since June 1964) and the Greek army (since March 1964, to defend Cyprus in the face of Turkish threats to invade), since these two elements could be counted on to keep Makarios on line (and not to accomplish *enosis* with Greece, as many were led to believe), lest he attempted any deviation. The Meeting in September however, (at Kesan and Alexandroupolis) between the two governments, convinced Suleiman Demirel, the Turkish Prime Minister (in power since 1965), that the Greeks had never really written off union, and even worse, perhaps they would be willing to engage in future adventurism. Whether Demirel was implicated in the November 1967 provocation in Cyprus is open to question. Most probably, he was confronted with a *fait accompli* on the part of the armed forces and the Cypriot-Turkish leadership acting in collusion with each other. In any case, his fears became realized, but this time no favors were granted, i.e., Turkey standing by and just watching idly. Through Cyprus Vance, President Johnson's Special Envoy, the harsh conditions set by Ankara were met, the only exception being the dissolution of the armed forces of the Republic. President Makarios' only mistake was that he failed to insert into the armed forces Cypriot officers, definitely people immune from any deleterious influences from the military regime in Athens, the latter employing cold war terminology (communists versus nationally-minded), ones moreover completely trustworthy and reliable.

Between 1967-74 a tug of war ensued between Nicosia and the military regime in Athens. What occurred in August 1964 through the Acheson Plans and three years later in November 1967 convinced some of the Cypriot Greeks that their leadership was very much anti-*enosis*. Makarios message (in February 1968) on the impossibility of achieving union with Greece was well timed and well understood, not, however, appreciated by everybody. This explains the violent campaign that was undertaken against him by former members of the Organization (initially, through the National Front, and then the formation of EOKA B). Both relied on the interpretation of the recent past and the betrayal of union by many. Ideological polarization was

complete, as these two paramilitary organizations stirred national passions, accusing all those who disagreed with them of treason, applying in practice the ancient dictum "whoever is not with us is against us." Assassination became also part of their game; their actions could neither be ignored nor could they be overlooked. The Greek military in Athens did not stand idle, as they sought to exploit the rift and even make it larger. Things came to a direct confrontation with the assassination attempt against President Makarios (8th March 1970), in which the former Minister of the Interior was involved (the Cypriot J. Edgar Hoover, as I label him), along with many of his associates. Almost two years later, the US was urged by Nicosia to draw the line against Athens and their proxy (Grivas), via a coup, to stop them dead on their tracks, which they did.

This is not the place to examine in detail the US policy vis-à-vis the military regime in Greece. Suffice is to say that Washington, especially the Nixon Administration, was well satisfied with their existence and sought to furnish them with arms and other military supplies, as Greece was a member of NATO. Violations of fundamental freedoms and other curtailing of personal liberties mattered little. That the Vice President, Spero Agnew, was of Greek descent was a plus. There were voices to the contrary, like the courageous Greek reporter Mr Elias Demitracopoulos, but his voice was a lonely one in the wilderness.³⁴ The military regime may have chosen to depart from the Council of Europe (in late 1969), overwhelmed with evidence of torture against any individual arrested, be by the police or the military police, but these were minor inconveniences. Going one step further, the military regime acquiesced in home porting for the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

From early 1972 though, the information of possible moves against Makarios through a coup, aided and abetted by the Greek military, were more than speculation. Who knew what and when is always what historians are asking, and the present author is not the exception. The new US Ambassador in Athens (1969-74), Henry Tasca, did not cut well with the regime. How much of a leverage he actually exerted against the Greek military is debatable, for others carried more weight in the Embassy, like the military attaches and the CIA station chief. By his own admission, he never had any contacts with Dimitrios Ioannides, the strongman in Athens, running the show from the sidelines after the November 1973 counter-coup against George Papadopoulos, and the head of the military police. The US though, had other means at its disposal to elicit information, be by their military attaches or the CIA. It is next to impossible for these people not to have realized what Ioannides was up to, especially in the first months of 1974. The State Department's Cyprus Desk realized this much early enough to issue several warnings and sound the tocsin. Henry Kissinger, on his part, being National Security Adviser from the beginning of the Nixon Administration and then from September 1973 Secretary of State as well,

³⁴ James Barron, *The Greek Connection: The Life of Elias Demetracopoulos and the Untold Story of Watergate* (New York: Melville House, 2019).

was really in the thin and thick of things. By the process of elimination, he was well aware of the junta's machinations in Athens. How much attention he paid to them and what kind of action he took is another story. Once the coup took place, Kissinger pretended his ignorance on the man who took over, Nicholas Sampson, a huge surprise, if one considers that the last-choice to take over after the coup (once Makarios was known to be alive, the coup perpetrators became desperate) was known to the Americans long before. He also distanced himself from any knowledge prior to the coup with a statement that information was not just lying in the streets.

The Turkish reaction was to be expected, irrespective of the legality of its anticipated enterprise. Joseph Sisco's mission to Ankara was doomed to failure for many reasons. Ankara was determined to accomplish what it felt it had been denied to twice in the past and no force would stop it from doing just that. Cynics have pointed out that if Kissinger wanted to prevent the invasion from taking place, or at least exercise any leverage on Turkey, he could have visited Ankara himself, regardless of his chances of success.

V. 1974-1977 AND CLARK CLIFFORD'S VISIT (FEBRUARY 1977)

So much for the historical record. Other issues equally pressing occupied Makarios' mind, like his return to Cyprus. A conference in Athens at the end of November came face to face with the unpalatable reality: a dialogue had to be resumed as soon as possible, for time was of the essence. The facts on the ground could not be overlooked and they imposed themselves another reality that had to be taken into consideration during any future negotiations. Concessions had to be made; an overall compromise was the name of the game. What kind of compromise though? Turkey's military presence, which reminded the Cypriot people a fact to be reckoned and live with, not far from what has been going on since 1945 in the Korean Peninsula, cast a dark shadow over the country. Bi-zonality, Kissinger's preferred option, was anathema to Makarios. Ethnic purification and geographic separation would very much be Turkey's recipe.

In this respect, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 365 (13th December 1974) was of substantial assistance, as it endorsed UN General Assembly Resolution 3212 (1st November 1974) as it "calls for its implementation as soon as possible." The UNGA resolution was perhaps the most important after Resolution 186 of the UN Security Council (4th March 1964), and it employed the same language. It was adopted unanimously (117 votes in favor), with nobody voting against it and no abstentions. Rauf Denktash, whatever else may be said of him (the Konrad Henlein of Cyprus, if parallels are to be drawn between Cyprus and Czechoslovakia), his reputation in creating many *faits accomplis* immediately after the invasion until his death in January 2012 has remained unassailable. This explains the announcement for the creation of the so-called "Federated Turkish State" (13th February 1975), a fact that necessitated UNSC Resolution 367, upon recourse to the Body the Government of the Republic. The new resolution reaffirmed UNSC 186, not by specifically referring to it, but rather by its language as regards the Republic of Cyprus. It also regretted the decision by the Cypriot-Turkish leadership of 13th February, which "tends to compromise the continuation between the representatives of the two communities on an equal footing, the objective of which must continue to be to reach freely a solution providing for a political settlement and the establishment of a mutually acceptable constitutional arrangement..."

Having failed to accomplish anything tangible under the Ford Administration (the imposition of the arms embargo by the US Congress in early 1975 was very much opposed by the same Administration), fully aware that with Henry Kissinger in charge at the State Department things were getting nowhere, President Makarios sensed an opportunity to break new ground. In fact, the Cyprus problem became entangled in the US-Turkey strategic relationship, which went back all the way in March 1947 with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, and created serious problems. One of which was the decision by Ankara to shut down the operation of US military bases in the country. A tug of war ensued between the Administration and the Congress, with the latter prevailing. The opportunity for Makarios arose

with the change of the guard, following the result of the presidential election of November 1976 in the US. Jimmy Carter, the newly-elected president (former Governor of Georgia) made heavy use of human rights. Why not include Cyprus in the new agenda as well?

Soon after the new President took over, the Cypriot President signaled his willingness to change course. Jimmy Carter responded promptly with Clark Clifford becoming a personal emissary. Clifford was not an unknown entity. In September 1946 he co-authored with George Elsey a report authorized by President Harry Truman. In the words of historian Daniel Yergin, "the Clifford memo,...much of it written by Elsey, was a compendium of the new foreign policy wisdom. The Riga axioms and the new doctrine of national security had come together to form the distinctive postwar outlook of American foreign policy leaders. All questions of international relations had to be evaluated against the overriding issue of the Soviet threat. The question was not the nature of Stalin's terror."³⁵ An adviser to the President, he supported Truman in May 1948 in his determination to recognize Israel, over the strenuous objections of many of his associates, like the Secretary of State, George Marshall and Loy Henderson, Director of the Division of Near Eastern and African Affairs within the Department of State.³⁶

Henderson, had already served in the US Consulate at Riga and later on in Moscow, with two prominent Sovietologists: George Kennan and Charles Bohlen. Having experienced the Stalin's terror, as a result of the Moscow trials (1936-38), Henderson created a very narrow idea about the Soviet Union and its leader, i.e., world domination. Because of his beliefs and the position he occupied, he was able to influence policy. In positive terms, he was the force with Dean Acheson (the then Undersecretary of State) behind the drafting of the Truman Doctrine. Negatively, he found himself very much in opposition against President Truman's proposed recognition of Israel (he was afraid of Arab alienation, which Moscow could take full advantage of), for which he was sent to India, as Ambassador.³⁷ Clifford was a committed and dedicated Democrat. In the 1960's, he found himself supporting the venture in Indochina under Lyndon Johnson. In early 1968 (mid-January), he succeeded Robert McNamara in the Department of Defense. The latter's wizardry in the Ford Motor Corporation and all his efforts with the military bore no fruit in Vietnam. The Tet Offensive launched on 30th January of the same year shattered many illusions in Washington and the entire country, irrespective of the fact that the Offensive was a military disaster for Hanoi. A man of the establishment, he was one of the most influential in Washington. Even though many within the entourage of

³⁵ Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace. The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Penguin, 1990), 241-45.

³⁶ H. W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

³⁷ In 1953, he found himself in Tehran, very much advocating the overthrow of Muhammad Mossadeq, an eventuality that took place in August 1953 through Operation Ajax. For the latest details on this issue, David Painter and Gregory Brew, *The Struggle for Iran. Oil, Autocracy and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2023).

the newly-elected President in 1976 tried to distance themselves from him (because of Vietnam), Carter sought his advice.

The opportunity arose when Makarios signaled his readiness to break the deadlock. As it was shown earlier, President Makarios had already signaled his readiness to accept a settlement (as early as October 1974), if Turkey would acquiesce in a 25% of territory, which would be administered by the Cypriot-Turks. Turkey however, rejected it. Through FRUS (the Foreign Relations of the United States, the State Department's official publication) we can appreciate much better what precisely was exchanged between the two in Nicosia (23d, 24th and 25th February 1977). Makarios' will and determination to deviate from what was hitherto understood as the parameters of a settlement cannot be disputed, because of *force majeure*. What did he have in mind? A tactical maneuver seems to be the most plausible explanation. Moving away from rigidity, he wanted to demonstrate flexibility, enlist Washington's support and exert enough pressure on the occupying power to reach such a settlement. His thinking and strategy were not unreasonable. After all, Cyprus could not solve its national problem on its own. The US was the force it needed, being an ally of both Greece and Turkey. The US Congress very much opposed the Turkish invasion for a number of reasons, not least of which was Kissinger's role in Indochina as a precedent. Foreign policy fell within the parameters of the president's powers, according to the Constitution; not however, to be exercised in an untrammled and rampant way. The War Powers Act (of August 1973), enacted over President Nixon's veto is a case in point. A solution reached in Cyprus, the arms embargo that was imposed by the US Congress after the Turkish invasion could also be lifted. A win win situation for all, should one decide to employ games theory, pioneered by John Von Neumann.

The 1977 Agreement made up of guiding principles cannot in any way be classified as a binding Treaty or a Convention, at least under the 1969 UN Treaty Convention. I call it Agreement for lack of a better name; it cannot, however, under any circumstances be classified as such, i.e., a bilateral agreement (between whom? The Republic and an illegal entity, the product of a foreign invasion?), or between the two communities (the legality of the government of the Republic being the sole representative of the Republic being disputed?) and the United Nations. It was never signed by either of the two protagonists, never deposited at the UN Headquarters in New York under Article 102 of the International Organization's Charter. This was understandable. Neither of the two personalities who were directly involved wanted to go that far and commit themselves. A wait and see attitude was the best course offered under the circumstances, albeit for different reasons for each of the two.

Clark Clifford to be sure was given an onerous and unenviable task, one that involved not just the two communities in Cyprus, but also Greece and Turkey. What took place in the Summer 1974 created a climate of bitter hostility and mistrust, especially in Nicosia, for the US had failed to do

anything concrete to stop the coup and the invasion, for which its two allies bore heavy responsibility. In the case of Greece, the military regime, in power since the coup of 21st April 1967, did everything possible to undermine the government net of President Makarios with Washington supporting the Greek military regime, by providing plenty of military assistance. The case with Turkey was different, for the recent past had left an indelible negative legacy in Ankara. Turkey resented the arms embargo that the US Congress imposed (officially on 10th February 1975), remembering 1964 and 1967, when Washington's active political intervention prevented Turkey's intervening militarily in Cyprus, much to Ankara's chagrin and disappointment. That Turkey based its claims for military intervention on dubious and flimsy pretexts, based on highly questionable legal arguments that emanated from its reading and interpreting the notorious Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, aside from the fact that in both the aforementioned years it had no landing craft to carry out its threat, eluded the attention of Turkish politicians.

After all, both Athens and Ankara were Washington's allies since their entry into NATO in 1952, only for Cyprus to poison their delicate relationship. One may even call it a challenge, in both personal and national terms, not far from what the former US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall undertook in October 1945, a personal envoy of President Truman to China. The General of the Army was given the task of the mediator between the KMT and the CCP in order to avert a civil war.³⁸ For different reasons, both Greece and Turkey blamed the US, while in Cyprus the people were fuming against the former Secretary of State. Newly-elected president Carter sensed the danger all this posed to the US interests and decided to intervene. From Clifford's Report found in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), the following details are made available.³⁹ Clifford understood he was given four assignments, namely, to gather the facts of the problem in the Eastern Mediterranean, begin making a preliminary effort to lessen the tensions between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean, search for ways to improve the bilateral relations, between US-Greece, US-Turkey and finally, ascertain what contribution, if any, the US could make toward obtaining progress of the solution of the bitter dispute in Cyprus.

Clifford took pains to emphasize how much his team learned, during the meetings they had in the three countries, while stressing also that personal relations were developed, while pointing to the fact that the talks became franker and more forthright. As regards the second assignment, he received a clear impression that the dispute between Greece and Turkey could result in an incident leading to confrontation or even war. His visit of course took place several months after a crisis threatened to escalate in August 1976, when Turkey decided to send into the Aegean an exploration ship, with

³⁸ Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, *The China Mission. George Marshall's Unfinished War, 1945-1947* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2018).

³⁹ FRUS, 1977-1980. Vol. XXI, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece. Document 8, 1st March 1977, pdf edition.

Greece threatening to retaliate. Clifford took the opportunity to persuade both sides to negotiate more seriously during the forthcoming round of continental shelf in Paris. He emphasized the US' concern over unilateral research in the Aegean. Turkey was made aware of the US deep concern about difficulties in the Aegean. Moreover, should hostilities break out between the two countries, this would mean an immediate cessation of US arms flow in the area. As a result, Clifford encouraged both sides to substantive negotiations and avoid unfortunate incidents.

The appointment of Cyrus Vance as the new Secretary of State was well received, since he had ample knowledge of the area (having already been sent by President Lyndon Johnson as a special envoy in November 1967 in Cyprus, following the incidents in Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros villages, which escalated into an armed clash). Clifford also sensed the dissatisfaction both Greece and Turkey felt with the US, a fact that explains the opportunity he gave them to air all their grievances. In the case of Greece, Clifford pressed them to set a date for the resumption of the talks leading to the conclusion of a new DCA (Defense and Cooperation Agreement), and the date was arranged for mid-March of the same year. In addition, emphasis was laid on the US-Greece NATO relationship, particularly the fundamental support for a gradual reintegration in NATO's military wing, even though, as he put it, this will proceed slowly until the Cyprus and Aegean issues are closer to solutions.

He underlined what was an open secret, namely that as regards the US-Turkey relationship, Turkish leaders now understand as never before that improved relations depend on movement in Cyprus. On this point, he emphasized privately and publicly the US desire for close relations and the importance it attaches to Turkey's contribution to NATO.

Referring to Cyprus, Clifford called it the "toughest nut of them to crack." Why was that? Because the parties operate within a framework of a long history of bitterness, recrimination and inter-communal violence. In his own words, our strategy began in Turkey. The Turkish officials were told that there was no chance for the US Congress to pass the DCA with the Turkish government, "until substantial continuing progress was made in Cyprus." To this, Turkey objected, as they objected any linking of the DCA with Cyprus. Moreover, they "felt they had been treated very unfairly by the US Congress and in fact had been humiliated by the imposition of the embargo." They also "believe they have a strong legal case and a strong moral case for their intervention in Cyprus." Realism, however, prevailed among the Turkish officials. "The Turks were finally convinced that it did them no good to rail at the Congress, but that if they wished to improve their position with the US in the defense field, they would have to make a substantial contribution to the solution of the Cyprus question." Thus, in the last day of Clifford's visit in Ankara, the Turkish government informed that instructions were given to the Turkish Cypriot negotiator to place on the table on 31st March a concrete and reasonable proposal for the

constitutional structure of a new government in Cyprus. They also agreed to serious and substantial negotiations in the future.

How did Clark Clifford interpret all the above? "We consider this Turkish commitment to be an important step forward. The parties have talked intermittently at each other for some time, but each has refused to make written proposals or to talk seriously about substance." On its part, Clifford felt that no reciprocal US commitment in response to this decision other than to say that the Turkish action would have a favorable impact upon our policy review and that we would seek to obtain a reciprocal territorial proposal from Archbishop Makarios.

Clifford wanted to "ascertain what the pressure points are." In addition, "what leverage do we have on the various points that we can properly utilize to persuade them to make a contribution toward peace in the area." Moreover, "if the question of the settlement of the Cyprus question were left solely to the two Cypriot communities, there was virtually no chance that progress would be made." What took place during his visits in Athens and Ankara is conveyed through his comments, which are revealing enough. Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis was fuming against all the violations in the Greek airspace and the Aegean, while the announcement of the formation of another army opposite the Greek islands aggravated the tension considerably. We shall deal with the Turkish response and arguments a bit later. The climate of deep distrust between Greece and Turkey became worse every day and the possibility of an incident in the Aegean could not be excluded.

Let us focus on Cyprus. Prior to his visiting Cyprus, Clifford met in Vienna with Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary General (on 17th February 1977). The date of the Meeting's Report is 18th February 1977. According to Clifford, Waldheim saw the meeting in Nicosia (of the 12th February) positively, even though no solution was to be expected soon. On the other hand, things were moving again and a new spirit was available in Cyprus. Both Makarios and Denktash seemed interested in making progress and were now prepared to discuss substantive issues in a way that had been impossible before. As he put it, "Makarios in particular seemed anxious to negotiate," although the verbal exchange between him and Denktash had been extremely tough...

The UN Secretary General reviewed then in some detail the background of the four principles, which had been agreed upon, "principles which he described as 'sufficiently clear' to offer a basis for subsequent negotiations." According to Waldheim, the key word in the first principle was "bicomunal." "Use of this word allowed Makarios to keep his options open, although Waldheim conceded that Denktash had made it adamantly clear that no solution other than a bi-zonal one was possible."

Referring to the second principle, he informed of an endless discussion, which dealt with territory. Turkey repeated their earlier figure of 32.8% or 20%. "Waldheim said it was his personal feeling on the basis of this and earlier discussions that an eventual settlement somewhere between 25 and 27 percent was obtainable." On the third principle, "...Denktash had made it clear that 'freedom of settlement' could be no more than a statement of principle." In addition, "the phrase 'certain practical difficulties' in this principle was short hand for Turkish security consideration." As to the fourth, "there had been general agreement in discussion that foreign affairs, defense and finance would be among those powers reserved to the central government."

Waldheim further said "he hoped this next round would last four to five weeks, and that a final solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved before the end of 1977." He also offered two reasons for the "breakthrough," which resulted in agreement to resume the inter-communal talks. First, the Greek understanding that support by the international community, as expressed through a succession of US [UN] resolutions, had provided no real basis for movement toward Cyprus settlement. Second, Turkish recognition that despite the power on the ground, no international recognition for the new Turkish status on Cyprus was possible without a negotiated settlement. He also referred to another dimension. The Turkish desire to have the US approve the US-Turkey base agreement, which had also played an important role in getting Ankara to be more flexible. It is worth mentioning here (as the paper by Ilter Turan has it) that all US bases and other military installations were shut down and taken over by the armed forces of Turkey.

The US Secretary General expressed appreciation for an offer of US assistance and stressed that the US and the UN effort could and should be complementary. As he put it, "the territorial issue was central for the Greek Cypriots, and US influence would be most welcome in getting the Turks to show flexibility in this area." Flexibility though, could not come from direct US pressure, since the Turks resisted any form of direct linkage of their DCA (Defense and Cooperation Agreement) to Cyprus.

Prior to his visiting Nicosia, Clifford visited Athens (20.2.) and Ankara (21-22.2.). The Greek Prime Minister expressed his outrage at Turkey's actions, especially in the Aegean, as was described previously. When in Turkey, Clifford emphasized the strong US-Turkey relationship, the strengthening of the NATO relationship and of the DCA that had been signed. He took pains to underline that the attitude of the US Congress was largely unchanged; a discernible improvement in the Cyprus situation was necessary if the DCA was to be pushed to enactment by the administration. He made no public mention of any Cyprus-DCA link and seldom referred publicly to Cyprus as well.

Turkish reaction was understandable, as the officials viewed their concerns over the arms embargo and the DCA. They also referred to the long history of Cyprus which has no clear rights or wrongs. In private, however, the Turks seemed to accept that Cyprus and the DCA are in reality linked at least in the eyes of the Congress. As to the Aegean, the Turkish officials referred to the militarization of islands off the coast, in clear contravention of provisions of the treaties by which Greece had acquired them, including the Treaty of Paris, to which the US was a contracting party. They also wondered why an arms embargo was not imposed against Greece, citing for this the history of Athens supplying US made arms to the Greek Cypriots (they referred to December 1963 and afterwards). They denied being an expansionist power. Finally, they believed that Greece viewed the Aegean as an exclusive Greek sea.

In Nicosia, he met with President Makarios and his Foreign Minister. He indicated it was the best possible time to reach a settlement, "because US and world opinion was presently sympathetic to the problem of Cyprus." Such a sympathy though, could change, if the Cypriots did not make any progress in the discussions. In his own words, "Makarios was told that if a settlement in Cyprus was not reached during this year, he could expect the United States interest to decline to the point where his bargaining posture would deteriorate substantially." Clifford then proceeded to tell a stark truth, that the US-Turkey rift over Cyprus had impaired our defensive relationships and that a time would come when we would have to remedy that situation. As it was, "Clifford implied that if the negotiations were prolonged, especially by unrealistic Greek Cypriot demands, our sympathy might dissipate." "In addition, we told Makarios that our concern over our bilateral relationship with Turkey and the condition of the NATO alliance was such that we could not endanger these relationships much longer by using whatever leverage we had to obtain the cooperation of other nations in working toward a settlement in Cyprus."

Furthermore, "noting the great importance of the territorial issue to the Greek Cypriots, we suggested that the most valuable contribution that Makarios could make would be for him to agree to place upon the table a specific proposal covering the division of territory." The impact of the particular argument on Makarios was profound. "At our second meeting, he was more forthcoming and stated that he had reached the decision to place upon the table in Vienna on March 31 a map which would recognize the principle of bi-zonality (a principle he has never before made directly to the Turks), and would provide for a 20% Turkish zone." "Such a proposal would form the basis of the negotiations over the territorial division in a federal state between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots." "Makarios and his Foreign Minister promised to engage in sustained negotiations and indicated they would welcome continued help from the United States." Finally for Makarios, "his agreement to table a bi-zonal map, referred to above, is an important step."

Referring to the Turkish Cypriots, Clifford described the conference with their leader, Mr Denktash, "the most difficult of all because he resented the pressure toward a settlement he was receiving from the Turks and further resented the fact that there was nothing he could do about it." They were also unhappy about US involvement. Denktash made it clear that a solution could be reached if the US and the European nations left the Turkish Cypriots and the mainland Turks alone to deal with the Greek Cypriots. According to him, Western intervention was always manipulated by Makarios. He also informed that his negotiators would present a written memorandum about the allocation of authority between the central government and the two bizonal states at the March 31 meetings. Denktash also agreed that "serious and sustained negotiations would be undertaken." The impression of Clifford? He believed that Mr Denktash's negative attitude is primarily a result of his aggravation over being pressed from Ankara.

Many valuable lessons and safe conclusions can be extracted from the Report Clark Clifford submitted on 1st March 1977 and its parts, 18th February with the UN Secretary General, 20th February the Athens Report, 24th February the Ankara Report and 26th February the Nicosia Report. The Carter Administration realized too well the quandary it found itself into, because of the Cyprus problem. However one interpreted Washington's role in the Cyprus tragedy (the history of its involvement was not spontaneous as it went back decades), the whole affair ran the risk of alienating the US from its two allies and threatening NATO's south-eastern flank. How much the US President felt for the people of Cyprus is difficult to say. Was Cyprus his top priority within the context of the Eastern Mediterranean? I very much doubt it. Then, there was the Congress, which had already drawn the line with the previous administration. US arms were used for the invasion of an independent, sovereign state; this would not be tolerated. Jimmy Carter emphasized heavily human rights. These, though, had to be applied universally, and not on a selective basis. There was another possibility: why not employ the Cyprus issue in such a way so as to improve relations between the US and its two estranged allies? Makarios' initiative provided a unique opportunity, not so much because the new US administration fell in love with Cyprus and its people, but mostly for other far more important considerations.

The UN, especially its Secretary General, was "eager for our assistance and support," as he knew the difficulties and complexities involved. "Now that the parties are committed to submit concrete responsible proposals (the Turks on constitutional arrangements and the Greeks on territorial division), and to negotiate responsibly, a supportive role in encouraging further progress seems appropriate for the United States." Clifford informed that he had discussed the Cyprus part of his mission with the British Foreign Secretary, David Owen. As for Britain, "the British are guarantors, along with Greece and Turkey, of the 1960 Cyprus constitution and also retain two sovereign bases on the island, which we believe to be of great value to the US and Western Europe and the present delicate stability of Cyprus."

On information about London's considering the reduction of their commitment to Cyprus, he noted the US concern. As he informed, the subject would be discussed during Prime Minister Callaghan's visit to Washington next week.

Both sides involved requested specifically no other European countries to be involved at this time. Clifford however, issued a warning: no one can guarantee once negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots actually begin in Vienna, the parties will act in good faith. "Each has however, been given the clear impression that if the proposal each presents is merely formal, or is plainly unreasonable, and if substantive negotiations do not ensue, that fact will not be lost upon us." On the other hand, "the only way that Makarios and Denktash can reach agreement will be under the continued leverage that has now been introduced and that must be continued during the balance of this year." This leverage can be successful "because both leaders now understand they have more to gain from making a serious effort to seek a solution through the creation of a unitary, bi-zonal, federal state on Cyprus than to remain intransigent and inflexible and risk US displeasure."

As Clifford put it, "we have a delicate task in the future to relax certain restrictions regarding Turkey, to strengthen relationships with Greece without incurring Turkish displeasure, at the same time to maintain sufficient leverage to obtain their continued interest in assisting in the settlement of the Cyprus question." To sum things up, it is worth undertaking the task "to further the important interests of the US in strengthening the southern flank of NATO, in restoring solid relationships with two old friends and in resolving a problem of great humanitarian concern on Cyprus."

In its recommendations, Clifford proposed endorsing at an early date the US-Greece DCA, and enact legislation for fiscal year 1978 to permit foreign military sales to Turkey. Also, to request to selected NATO allies to provide additional military equipment, which Turkey needs to fulfill NATO commitments. The US must continue to play an active role in the Cyprus negotiating process, ensure that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot proposals on territory and a future constitution respectively be sufficiently realistic and constructive as to form the basis for sustained negotiations. Ask Congress to appropriate assistance funds to be made available once the two Cyprus communities reach a settlement and a strong effort toward Britain to persuade them to "retain their two important sovereign bases areas on Cyprus." Resume talks with Greece to conclude the Greece-US DCA, work for the reintroduction of Greece into the military wing of NATO.

Clifford labeled the Aegean controversy, as he put it, the most explosive dispute. He, therefore, proposed for a comprehensive study of Aegean issues to be undertaken under the leadership of the Secretary of State. Once firm conclusions are rendered, both Greece and Turkey to be

counseled as to the US conclusions and asked whether Washington can be of further assistance in resolving the Aegean dispute. Until the study is completed, the recommendation was for the US to steer an even-handed course and "refrain from giving the Greek Government the type of written security guarantee that it is seeking from us."

Following his return to Washington, after he submitted his Report, Clifford met with the Secretary of State, with a number of other people being present (among them, Philip Habib, Matthew Nimetz, James Lowenstein, Nelson Ledsky and Robert Hopper).⁴⁰ Clifford main conclusion was that the two communities "will never reach agreement if left to themselves." He also "reported his team's conclusion that progress on Cyprus necessitated effective leverage on Denktash, and the Turkish Cypriots. This leverage had to come from Turkey." As for Turkey, he repeated his evaluation found on the Report, i.e., they consider the embargo unfair and humiliating. In his view, "They also suffer from a national inferiority complex and feel isolated and unappreciated."

During the second meeting with Makarios, the latter "evidenced a concern that the Turkish constitutional proposal would be a charade." To which "Clifford assured him that the Turkish Foreign Minister clearly understood the need for a serious Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposal which would provide a reasonable basis for negotiations." He also "described the Archbishop's complaint about dividing Cyprus into two local governments. Makarios expressed his concern about such federal arrangements. Clifford responded that the United States had no problem whatsoever with such a solution since we had made a federal government work for over two hundred years."

In Turkey, even though Bulent Ecevit expressed strongly his will for a solution, Prime Minister Demirel "expressed to Clifford his fear that Ecevit is really waiting in the wings to accuse Demirel on caving in to United States pressures on Cyprus." To Habib's question on Demirel's partner (Necmettin Erbakan), Clifford responded that "coalition problems must have been seriously considered before the Turkish Government decided to instruct Denktash the constitutional proposal." To Secretary Vance's enquiry on Ecevit's sabotaging the constitutional proposal, Clifford said probably not. Ecevit, on the other hand, according to Nimetz, is a hardliner in the Aegean. "Secretary Vance told of Ecevit's comment to him four months ago that he would settle for a percentage of the oil in the Aegean, but felt the sovereignty problems would be much more difficult to resolve."

Both Secretary Vance and Clifford agreed that Denktash "would not be totally intransigent." Economic and military realities made him a servant of Ankara. Clifford also felt that the "Turkish area of Cyprus had appeared strikingly poorer than the Greek section." They were feeling the

⁴⁰ FRUS, 1977-1980, Vol. XXI, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece, Document 9, pdf edition.

economic pressure “and the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey may have decided it was time to settle.”

As regards bi-zonality, Clifford answered in the affirmative to Vance’s question on the Makarios’ commitment. He also mentioned the map the Archbishop showed to him “which had had included a Turkish zone which was very small but was clearly bi-zonal. Clifford concluded that he had asked the Archbishop if he now accepted bi-zonality and the answer was yes. The same impression was created by Nimetz and Ledsky, when they met with the Cypriot Foreign Affairs Minister, as the latter “clearly understood and accepted the necessity for proposing a bi-zonal system with a dividing line providing the Turks with at least twenty percent of the Republic.”

What else can be said of the February Agreement? In contradistinction to the Zurich and London Agreements, which were legally binding, having been negotiated by Greece and Turkey (in the absence of the Cypriot people, let it be underlined) and signed by all the interested parties, and deposited by Turkey at the UN in New York, this was definitely not the case with the one in 1977. It rather provided the framework within which a future settlement would be reached, with the four parameters described as the guide. An important document, which was unearthed from the British National Archives (TNA, formerly the Public Record Office, PRO) by the Cypriot-Greek investigative reporter, Mrs Fanoulla Argyrou (who resides in London), corroborates the above, and this is none other than the report filed by the then British High Commissioner in Nicosia, Donald Gordon. Having met with the UN Secretary General two days after the Makarios-Denktaş Meeting, he sought to clarify the atmosphere and set the record straight. In his report to the Foreign Office in London, he made perfectly clear that “no document has been signed, but the minutes of the meeting taken by the UN included the points on the basis of which the negotiations would work. It had been agreed in principle that Cyprus would be a federal, unitary, bi-communal, independent and non-aligned.”⁴¹

International history is replete with the convening of peace conferences, where agreements are signed that are binding, legally and politically, between those participating. The Versailles Peace Conference in January 1919, which led to the Peace Treaty of the same year (28th June), the Locarno Pact (October 1925), the Geneva Peace Conference (March-July 1954), which deliberated the future of Indochina (following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu), the Agreement on Laotian Neutrality (signed on 23d July 1962) are cases in point, in multilateral terms. The 1972 and 1979 SALT I and SALT II Treaties respectively were agreed upon and signed bilaterally between the US and the Soviet Union. The US Senate never ratified the latter, because of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, while Washington, under President George W. Bush, gave notice of its exiting the ABM Treaty of 1972 (13th December 2001). What

⁴¹ Published on 16th October 2015 in the Simerini newspaper.

was agreed in the aforementioned conferences was legally binding on all the participants. An anomaly was observed in 1954 with the US, which, although it participated in the deliberations, was not a contracting party to what was agreed and signed. It also never felt bound by the results of the Conference.

The occupying power had other ideas. Controlling events on the ground, being very much aggrieved because of the arms embargo, the principle of *uti possidetis* applying to perfection, Turkey had the luxury to allow the weaker party to make the first move and then decide accordingly on its next steps. It is no secret that in the international system the stronger party has the upper hand to impose its will and coerce the adversary. Not because of any legality that allows such behavior to take place, but due to the nature of the system itself (anarchical is the term employed), much to the delight of the realist school of international relations theory. The system does not quite reward aggression; it does little, on the other hand, to prevent or even punish it. The case of Israel was glaring, after the 1967 War. To set the historical record straight, it took tremendous amount of US and Soviet pressure against the countries that initiated the hostilities against Egypt in November 1956 and thus forced their withdrawal.⁴² France, Britain and Israel became politically isolated. Moscow saw its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stock rising, much to the chagrin of the Eisenhower Administration. The US President realized too well how the Western prestige had plummeted. His action did not come and cannot be explained because of his love for the Arabs. In blunt terms, what the three did was flagrant aggression, completely unjustified, and as such Washington had to oppose it. Eisenhower did not stay idle, as in January 1957 he enunciated his doctrine, aiming to assist all those interested in stopping communism from gaining a foothold in the Middle East.⁴³ Bipolarity and ideological polarization within the framework of the Cold War in the region of the Middle East demanded that he acted in such a way.

There was another reason for Turkey to adopt this particular attitude. Ankara knew too well how much importance the US attached to their friendship and cooperation. This was nothing new and went back decades. In fact, Washington valued Ankara much more than it did with Athens, much to the bitterness of the latter in the mid-1950's, as we saw earlier, during the anti-colonial war in Cyprus. True, US-Turkey relationship had gone sour, but the establishment in Washington was very much in its favor, especially the military (the US military bases and other installations, plus the new DCA Agreement had a lot to do with it). The State Department may have realized the delicate balance, but at no time did all this implied that Cyprus was to be treated favorably, for the strategic interests of the US were at stake.

⁴² In the case of Israel, mention should be made of the declaration by the US on 25th February 1957, which was tantamount to a commitment on the part of Washington to support Israel. Details in William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions. American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1977).

⁴³ Salim Yaqub, *op. cit.*

This well explains Clark Clifford's exerting considerable pressure on both Makarios and Denktash, for different reasons of course, but the denominator was one the same: no strategic interests of the US would be sacrificed or even jeopardized. The US could not be held hostage over Cyprus, even though the previous administration had a lot to answer for. For many reasons that are beyond the scope of this article, Turkish diplomacy managed to convince quite a few it acted in 1974 in self-defense. Makarios' reputation in certain political circles of having been more than a friend of the Soviets in the early 1960's (even though nothing could be further from the historical truth) did not exactly help Cyprus. The Cold War exacted a heavy toll from Cyprus; the country paid dearly for its neutrality.

Moreover, Turkey never publicly became a party to any negotiations for a settlement. Acting deviously, always controlling events from the sidelines, Ankara at all times referred any well-intentioned people to the Cypriot-Turkish leadership, as if Turkey was not involved in the thin and thick of things to begin with. To be sure, it was more than obvious which party was calling the shots, because of its occupying of territory that belonged to an independent-sovereign state, in violation of international law and the UN Charter. How much pressure Ankara could exert on Denktash is also debatable, for the latter saw to his advantage the formation of a special relationship with the Turkish military, much to perhaps the annoyance and the embarrassment of politicians in Ankara. There was little room to maneuver; besides, the issue of Cyprus had acquired national importance and could easily be exploited by the opposition against the government in power. Regrettably, the international system proved inadequate, watching helplessly as the drama of Cyprus and its people unfolded in 1974. No power in the world could coerce Turkey to withdraw its troops from the island. This much, Ankara was well aware of and was fully ready to capitalize on.

Turkey's strategy of procrastination, a wait and see attitude, while creating more *faits accomplis* that the other side was forced to be confronted with had many parallels with what Israel was doing after the June War of 1967.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) for the latest historical background of the events leading to the war, despite its weaknesses and deficiencies in its historiographical approach.

All the countries and personalities involved, were not exactly sleepers, walking into the abyss, without realizing the consequences of their actions. Too much can be traced since 1956, the year of Suez and the lessons everybody learned. Rhetoric was one thing, thus explaining one's becoming its hostage and prisoner; whether it could be backed by and transformed into actual action was something entirely different, as was the case with Egypt.

A war over waters was perhaps the root of the problem (the Jordan, Banyas and the Hazbani rivers), at least since the early 1960's, which threatened to engulf the entire region. All things considered, I do believe that Nassir was caught in his own rhetoric, perhaps thinking he could score a cheap victory with words. After all, being the leader of pan-Arabism carried a stiff price with it. Other Arab states of the front line thought that should worst come to the worst, it would be a pushover against Israel, as numbers could carry the day. Not so Israel, which went for a full-scale war (not a preemptive strike), lest 1956 repeated itself, or a variation of it.

Because of the gravity of the situation (the two superpowers became involved by proxy, while passivity and idleness threatened with escalation the crisis that was already created), both the US and the Soviet Union along with Great Britain and France became directly involved. In terms of international relations theory, there was much competition for influence in global bipolarity, with deep polarization carrying the day.

The drafting of the language of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (22d November 1967) has a long history behind it, not least of which dealt with the conflicting interests of all those involved: Israel and the Arabs, the two superpowers, Great Britain and France and the non-Aligned. The period of more than five months that elapsed between the cease fire of the June War and the resolution's adoption by the UNSC in November accounts for the different issues involved and the priorities attached to them by the interested parties. A pertinent question that was posed dealt with the heart of the matter: which was to come first? Full Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories and then a comprehensive dialogue with the Arab states, aiming to establish full peace, or *vice versa*?

The interpretations by many, particularly those who authored and drafted the language of the resolution, leave much to be desired.⁴⁵ *Prima facie*, one is left with the impression that the said resolution leaves no room for ambiguity, the omission of the definite article in the English version notwithstanding, as the idea of land for peace is clearly established. In the words of William Quandt, "In brief, the resolution fell just short of calling on Israel to withdraw from all territories and on the Arabs to make 'full peace' with Israel. Much of the diplomacy of the subsequent years revolved around efforts to make more precise and binding the deliberately vague language of Resolution 242."⁴⁶ On the positive side, the preamble makes no mistake as to an inalienable principle: the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war, while in the main text there is reference to the right of Israel to live in secure and internationally-recognized boundaries. There is no direct reference to Palestinian refugees and their right to return, though. Only "a just settlement of the refugee problem."

The US could have done more to prevent war, but it did not, while the UN, especially its Secretary General, U Thant, should have never acquiesced in UNEF's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Much could have been averted.

As it was, the war changed everything, fully fulfilling Heraclitus' dictum: war is the father of all things. We live with that war every day.

For a good critique of the book, William Quandt, *Journal of Cold War Studies*. Vol. 6, No. 3 (2004), 145-148.

⁴⁵ According to Quandt, the said Resolution is very much depended on Lyndon Johnson's five principles that he articulated after the June War. These were, the recognized right to national life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, limits on the arms race and political independence and territorial integrity for all. Quandt, *op. cit.*, 64.

UNSC 242 is ambiguous on purpose, according to the same author, especially in regard to the omission of the definite article in the English language. *Ibid.*, 65.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 65.

Where different interpretations can be detected was to the versions two of the resolution's authors gave as regards original intentions. For the main force, Lord Caradon (formerly Sir Hugh Foote, the last British Governor of Cyprus, 1957-60), and the United Kingdom's Permanent Representative at the UN (1964-70), while acknowledging the ambiguity of the omission of the definite article, later pointed out to the fact that this was done on purpose, lest the 1967 boundaries acquired permanence. There could be no ambiguity over the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war," while permanent "secure and recognized" boundaries could best be accomplished by the setting up of a Boundary Commission. The then US Permanent Representative Arthur Goldberg, saw things differently, as he insisted that Israel was not obliged to withdraw from all the territories it occupied. As to remedying ambiguity, Goldberg proposed direct negotiations between all the parties involved.

Gunnar Jarring's mission (inaugurated the very next day the said resolution was passed) came to naught after more than three years. With Richard Nixon becoming the new president, the State Department tried to apply a policy of "even handed, i.e., ...neither overtly pro-Arab nor openly pro-Israeli."⁴⁷ President Richard Nixon approached the region of the Middle East originally in a positive mood, i.e., understanding fully the dangers involved and the wider consequences to peace. Hence, his determination to work closely with the Soviet Union. For the time being, the initiative was left to Gunnar Jarring within the milieu of the Cold War and other geopolitical calculations.⁴⁸

An attempt by William Rodgers, the new US Secretary of State (undertaken on 9th December 1969), to implement his ten-point plan ran afoul of Israel (they rejected it the very next day). The Egyptian President did so as well, because, in the words of William Quandt, the Plan was not tied to an overall Arab-Israeli agreement.⁴⁹ The Rodgers Plan was quite ambitious, as it envisioned a repeat of what took place in 1949 in Rhodes, when Ralph Bunche negotiated the armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states. It was also naïve, "...to assume that the United States would be able to separate the Soviet Union from Egypt during the process of negotiations." Moreover, "the justification for the two-power talks had been that the United States and the Soviet Union would find it easier to reach agreement on principles than Israel and Egypt, and that they could both use their influence constructively to moderate the positions of their 'clients.'⁵⁰ The overall supervision was under Gunnar Jarring; the US was not that heavily involved, perhaps a big mistake on Washington's part and Richard Nixon in particular. Gradually, the US President and Kissinger's (his National Security Adviser) strategy demanded full and relentless political and military support

⁴⁷ Ibid., 80.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 81-83.

⁴⁹ William Quandt's interview with Ibrahim al-Sakhawi of al-Ahram, 7th September 2019, on line, pdf edition.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 92.

for Israel, thus prevailing over the State Department's even-handed policy. Such an approach became imperative in their eyes, as the Soviet Union kept up the ante with its support of the Arab world, Egypt and Syria in particular. The so-called war of attrition at the Suez Canal (1969-70) provided ample justification for their policy.

Thus, a seemingly *quid pro quo*, withdrawal to the lines of 4th June 1967 in exchange for recognition of Israel ran afoul of many insuperable problems. Israel demanded secure boundaries; how one defined security was open to interpretation. Resolution 242 made no explicit reference to the Palestinians refugees, an acute problem since 1948. Their presence though was ubiquitous, constituting a financial and political burden for many Arab countries. They could not be ignored. The many initiatives undertaken by the new Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (having succeeded Gamal Abd-al Nassir, after the latter's death in September 1970) were rebuffed, adding insult to injury for Arab pride. Neither Washington nor Jerusalem seemed to take him seriously. Yet, he meant business, and the writing was on the wall, through his expelling the Soviet advisors in July 1972, while in the Spring 1973 he warned Washington on the real possibility of Egypt going to war. The October War of 1973 restored Arab pride considerably, forcing the US to actively intervene and Henry Kissinger, having become the new Secretary of State, inaugurated what was labeled as shuttle diplomacy.⁵¹ Following the end of the Paris negotiations over Vietnam (in January 1973), Kissinger could now fully devote his attention to the Middle East. Egypt suddenly became the pivot country, where the possibility for a wedge to be inserted between the Soviet Union and the Arab world became a reality.

That Cyprus could not overturn the scales against it was more than manifestly clear. No superpower or any other regional power stood behind it, as in the case of the Arab world. The Republic's non-alignment carried a stiff price with it. The Cold War and all the thinking that came to dominate its existence however, mostly negative, made things infinitely more difficult. Regardless of the veracity of what circulated in the early 1960's in Washington, labeling Cyprus the Cuba of the Mediterranean, such baseless and noxious assertions were very much exploited and manipulated by Ankara. Turkey, took full advantage of the Cold War polarization, seeking to cash in its geographic position and strategic role, aside from the special relationship with the US since March 1947. Furthermore, one had to add the geopolitical dimension and its distorting international relations theory. In simple and blunt terms, no foreign power, except possibly one affiliated with the West, could be allowed to dominate the country or even gain the upper hand in it. The idea of an independent, sovereign and non-aligned Cyprus eluded the interpretations of many, with catastrophic consequences.

⁵¹ For the latest account, Martin Indyk, *Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 2021).

Also, Martin Indyk's interview with Isaac Chotiner of the *New Republic*, 29th November 2021, pdf edition.

The military solution excluded, not for legal reasons, but rather practical, what was left? Clearly, diplomacy, and negotiations, the main weapons of the weak, in the words of historian James Scott. It is within such a framework that President Makarios' initiative should be viewed. His move, constituting a painful but necessary compromise (from a unitary state to a federation, with bi-communalism its *raison d'être*), was not reciprocated. On 31st March 1977 the two negotiators representing the two communities met in Vienna. From the Cypriot-Greek side, a map was submitted in which the administrative boundaries of the newly-proposed settlement were demarcated. Here, one must add that in a nutshell, bi-zonality was established, even though it was not included in the 1977 Agreement. The Cypriot-Turks presented their idea of a federal solution, which was rejected outright, being incompatible with the letter and the spirit of the February Agreement.

What proved unwise subsequently was the decision by all the governments of the Republic in Nicosia to make the February 1977 Agreement sacrosanct, from which no deviation would be allowed.⁵² For the sake of historical truth, in setting the record straight (to quote Judge John Sirica's book in 1979), let it be said that reference to the two Agreements (of 1977 and 1979, of 19th May) was made in the UNSC resolutions that followed. Nowhere, however, was any mentioning of bi-zonality and bi-communalism as the two indispensable elements, the prerequisite for the settlement of the Cyprus problem, that is. Perhaps the best explanation lies in the fact that the government in Nicosia was not willing to take the extra step, in the face of the Cypriot Turkish leadership dragging its feet and beating round the bush. Enough commitments were made; a bitter experience in January 1985 with the then UN Secretary General (where bitter recriminations were exchanged and innuendos were left hanging in the air as regards impartiality and objectivity on the part of the International Organization) demonstrated that the red line could not be crossed. Enough was enough. A federal solution was not the panacea, aside from the fact that both sides invoked it as the basis for a settlement. Their interpretation of a federal system, however, was miles apart.

⁵² This said, let it be emphasized that no President of the Republic acquiesced in bi-zonality. A proof of this was a document from the TNA of Britain, dated 1st November 1983, signed by Mrs Angela Gillon of the Atlantic Region Research Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which the author makes perfectly clear that President Spyros Kyprianou is very much against bi-zonality.

The document was traced by the same investigative reporter, Mrs Fanoulla Argyrou.

VI. 1988 AND BEYOND

With the changing of the guard in Nicosia in 1988 a lot changed. UNSC Resolution 649 (12th March 1990) was one of them. For the first time, the International Organization defined the parameters of a settlement, bi-communal in its constitutional aspect and bi-zonal in its territorial. The same resolution also called on both communities to cooperate with the UN Secretary General "on an equal footing," repeating resolution 367 on this particular aspect.

In the personal opinion of this author, resolution 649 was redundant. The parameters of any future settlement were already laid down in 1977 and 1979, which were encompassed in the four original guidelines. One may call them vague or even constructively ambiguous. There was a reason for the framework to be general, for the landscape would only clear as the negotiations progressed towards the end. There no progress however, and if for anything else, the entire political landscape. Cyprus changed dramatically with the unilateral declaration of independence (udi) on the part of the Cypriot Turkish leadership (15th November 1983), in essence declaring secession. The UNSC through its two resolutions of paramount importance, 541 (18th November 1983) and 550 (11th May 1984) condemned the action, calling the udi legally invalid, while not recognizing any other government as the legal one of the Republic than the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The 15th November udi provided a unique opportunity to denounce the 1977 and 1979 Agreements, for the other side not only failed to honor its obligations, but even worse, it sought to create new *faits accomplis*, acting *mala fide*, in the most flagrantly illegal way imaginable.

If the rationale behind resolution 649 was to restrain Turkey and prohibit any other ideas from appearing on its part, ideas that threatened to derail the entire process, clearly it did not succeed. Ankara had its own rationale on bi-communalism and bi-zonality. The idea of bringing the stronger party among all those involved, and hold it accountable for its actions via legal restrictions simply could not work. Ideally yes, but not in actual practice. It should also be born in mind that Turkey is not named as the invading and occupying power in any UN resolution, be by the Security Council of the General Assembly, a recognition of some harsh realities that reflect the international system, which in their turn influence directly and decisively the International Organization. There is, however, reference to the term "occupied territory" in Resolution 550.

What was manifestly overlooked was the Middle East, where in no UNSC resolution was any mention of the type of a settlement between Israel and the Arab world. What was rather mentioned in both 242 and 338 (22d October 1973) was a number of conditions that had to be fulfilled, like the return of all the occupied territories, the freedom of navigation and the right of refugees to return. Resolution 338 called for negotiations between Israel and the Arabs for the first time. Perhaps in their zeal to tie Turkey up,

politicians and statesmen in Nicosia overlooked a simple but stunning truth: Turkish diplomacy, having the reputation of maneuverability, could not feel constrained, let alone be restrained in any course of action it wanted to pursue.

One and a half years later, another UNSC resolution was adopted, 716 (11th October 1991), which introduced another term in the long list of nomenclature: political equality of the two communities. Redundancy and ambiguity aside, the term created and still does much confusion, and a dangerous one at that. Equality is employed to convey a clear and unambiguous message: all human beings are created equal by nature and are equal before the law. This is found in documents like the American Declaration of Independence (1776), the Declaration for the Rights of Man and Citizen (1791) in France after the Revolution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted by the UNGA in Paris on 10th December 1948), the three pillars of equality (not as regards gender, however) and the inherent by nature rights of human beings. To the three, one must add the UN Charter as well, particularly Article 2, paragraph 1, which, in no uncertain terms, states that, "The Organization is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its Members." In theory at least, this sounds fine, for it is translated into practical reality in the UN General Assembly as one state one vote. But not so, in the Security Council, where the five permanent members enjoy the power of the veto.

In our case, one is tempted to interpret political equality as the equality of the two sides that make the federation. This applies in the case of the US with the thirteen original states, now fifty. What caused innumerable problems, however, was the size and the composition of the population of each state, two elements that threatened to bring the entire structure down. Hence, the Great Compromise during the Constitutional Convention (in 1787), which originated from the state of Connecticut. It is still called compromise for good reason, given that entirely different proposals (and diametrically opposed to each other at that) were put forward. The Virginia Plan (backed by Pennsylvania) called for representation in the national legislature based on population, while the New Jersey Plan (supported by Delaware) called for equal representation for each state. Far worse, was another danger looming over the Convention: slavery. Delegates from the southern states threatened to leave the Convention, should slavery and the slave trade were to be declared illegal. What of the compromise itself? Equality of the states was manifested in equal representation in the Senate, whereas in the House of Representatives "representation would be apportioned on the basis of the state's free population plus three-fifths of its enslaved population."⁵³

⁵³ Richard R. Beeman, "The Constitutional Convention of 1787: A Revolution in Government." National Constitution Center, pdf edition.

If the rationale behind Resolution 716 was the safeguard the equality of the two sides making the future federation, it was corrosive, missing the mark completely. First, it allows communalism to run rampant (as it is the distinctive element in both parts of the proposed federal solution). Second, it overlooks popular sovereignty, and third, it equates two numerically unequal communities with each other. This scheme cannot in any way even remotely be invoked as resembling the US model. Not to mention the clear undermining of the central federal government, its authority and power, a fact that reminds of the Articles of Confederation, its failure being the reason for convening the 1787 Convention in the first place. In none of the original thirteen states was there any ethnic community ubiquitous, constituting the majority, that is. Even though the UN Secretary General tried to clarify any confusion (via his Report on the Good Offices Mission he was providing, dated 8th March 1990), his explanations are hardly convincing.

How did the UNSG define political equality? In his own words, in Annex I of the above Report, in the Opening Statement, delivered on 26th February 1990 (following a meeting between himself, President George Vasileiou and Rauf Denktash), "While political equality does not mean equal numerical participation in all federal government branches and administration, it should be reflected inter alia in various ways: in the requirement that the federal constitution of the State of Cyprus be approved or amended with the concurrence of both communities; in the effective participation of both communities in all organs and decisions of the federal Government; in safeguards to ensure that the federal Government will not be empowered to adopt any measures against the interests of one community; and in the equality and identical powers and functions of the two federated States."

Furthermore, "the bi-zonality of the federation should be clearly brought out by the fact that each federated State will be administered by one community which will be firmly guaranteed a clear majority of the population and of the land ownership in its area. It will also be clear that from the fact that the federal Government will not be permitted to encroach upon the powers and functions of the federated States."

One may state in good faith that the clarifications offered for political equality can be observed within the spirit of the US Constitution, where no state exists at the expense of any other, member of the union. Approval of the constitution is a *condition sine qua non* for any new state to enter the union, amending it requires a three fourths majority, i.e., thirty eight states, as things stand right now. This may well be; on the other hand, no state in the US is exclusively composed in terms of population of ethnicity, language or religion, precisely what sets the proposed federalism of Cyprus apart. All of the thirteen original states voted to approve the constitution, true. None of those original thirteen, however, may be remotely compared to any of the two parts that will compose a federal Cyprus, the issue of slavery notwithstanding. While unanimity may be required for approving a federal

constitution for Cyprus, what about amending it? Would unanimity still be required?

The UNSG's mentioning of the federal government not adopting any measures that are directed against "the interests of one community" may be interpreted or misinterpreted in many ways. At the bare minimum, what draws the red line between the two? Where do the interests of one community end and those of the federal government begin, and *vice versa*? Moreover, the mentioning of a "guaranteed clear majority of the population and of the land ownership in its area," effectively ensures the prevailing of centrifugal forces and tendencies at the expense of the central authority, i.e., the federal government. This much guaranteed, one legitimately wonders, why would or should any of the two members of the federation really care about the business of the federal government? No system of government can be automatically applied as it is; it is rather an evolutionary process, which takes time, much understanding and concessions, and painful ones at that, all for the good of the country. The same applies in the case of a constitution, whose interpretation is very much open to the courts, the legislature and popular will. For Cyprus, this may not be case within the strict framework provided. Wouldn't secession be the natural outcome of such an arrangement, as indeed was the case with the former Soviet Union, where Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 stipulated that "every union republic shall retain the right of free secession from the USSR"? Secession, even if that actual act may be explicitly prohibited for Cyprus (as indeed it was in the 1960 Constitution, Article 185).

The case with Yugoslavia was a bit different, even though much has been said and pointed out on Article 1 of the 1946 Constitution, which made specific and direct reference to self-determination and secession. In particular, Article 1 stipulated: "The Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal peoples' state, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of their right to self-determination, including the right of secession, have expressed their will to live together in a federative state." This provision was removed by the 1953 Constitutional Law.⁵⁴

In the case of the US, the US Supreme Court decided in *Texas v White* (1869) that the USA was "an indestructible Union composed of indestructible States." The Court though acknowledged that secession could come about "through consent of the States." Even though this particular issue may be academic in the case of the US, simply because no state today thinks of secession, the entire matter is far from resolved. In countries where ethno-nationalism still rules the day at the expense of the national government, secession is more than just a rallying cry. Spain is confronted with the nightmare in the case of Catalonia.

⁵⁴ William Radan, "The Yugoslav Constitution of 1946". The Tasmania Law Review, Vol.20, No. 2, 2001, 181-204, pdf edition.

Historical necessity was henceforth cited to justify any future course that was chartered. Occasionally, history was employed, albeit in a false manner and selective citation, to give grounds for the course that was followed. This accounts for invoking the Makarios' initiative as the pioneer of bi-zonality and bi-communalism. Many seem to forget that bi-zonality is nowhere to be detected in the 1977 Agreement (only appearing in the map the Cypriot Greeks presented, as a gesture of good will and acting under the duress of necessity). The rationale was clear and unmistakable: since Turkey was proving to be the immovable object and no irresistible force, if one ever existed, was willing to undertake such a task, the only available alternative was for the weaker party to salvage whatever it could through negotiations.

Negotiating under such circumstances is never easy. In fact, it amounts to blackmail, since in no uncertain terms one negotiates at gun point (the presence of 40,000 troops of occupation is ample proof of that). To President Makarios' credit, he became aware quite soon of the dilemma he was facing: true enough, one refuses to acquiesce in realities and *faits accomplis* created through armed force. If such a refusal goes on indefinitely, without any real power or prospect changing the status quo, what comes next? An entirely new situation is created, which one way or another becomes permanent. The Middle East provided many examples full of important lessons to ponder over, study in detail and draw valuable lessons from. From the Balfour Declaration (November 1917), the Anglo-French claiming the former lands of the Ottoman Empire in the Arab world and governing them via the mandate system (the euphemism for colonialism), the partition plans for Palestine (in 1937 and in 1947, the latter under the auspices of the UN General Assembly and Resolution 181 of 29th November 1947), the Suez Operation in November 1956, when flagrant aggression was not rewarded, and finally, the June War of 1967. The Arab world suffered crushing military defeats and endured enormous humiliations. As for the Palestinians, they ended with the worst possible deal: their land was lost, they became refugees and not many seemed to care about their plight and future.

If one decides to cross the rubicon and enter into negotiations, what is the strategy? What price would one pay for doing so, given let it be stressed it is the weaker party? Makarios was also smart enough to perceive that his concessions, rational as they were and painful by definition, within an overall framework of the necessity of a historic compromise, were leading nowhere. The leadership of the Cypriot-Turkish community, smelling blood, always demanding more, always finding problems to any solutions proposed.

The 1977 Agreement proved a quicksand, should one decide to enter it, at his own risk—for the lack of any other alternative—but with no extrication plan or exit strategy. In the latter case, the odds were clearly against Makarios and the Cypriot Greeks. A chain reaction accompanied the 1977 Agreement, in many and all respects, encompassing all the parameters of

the problem. One is tempted to draw parallels with Egypt after 1967 and the occupation of Sinai, the 1973 October War and then President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem (on 18th November 1977), with a new government installed in Israel (the Likud Bloc of Menachim Begin), since the elections of the previous May. Wasn't Cairo successful? If by success one refers to the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the answer is definitely yes. After all, this was Sadat's original aim, i.e., the return of the entire Sinai Peninsula and then launching Egypt-US on a new basis.⁵⁵

Of course, in contradistinction to Turkey, as regards Cyprus, Israel had no ambitions or any plans to hold on to the Sinai Peninsula, as the latter offered no practical value (only to use it to obtain substantial US economic aid, as it eventually did). The strategy was to use it as a bargaining chip for the future. This, however, was not the case (and still is not) with the Golan Heights and the West Bank. On his part, the Egyptian President wanted to achieve with the US what Israel had already accomplished, i.e., a strong and healthy strategic relationship. A lot was at stake, not least of which was Sadat's personal prestige. According to William Quandt, if Camp David had been a failure, the setback for Sadat and Carter would have been great, much to Begin's joy. He also informed of a comprehensive plan on the part of Egypt, but the Israeli Prime Minister would never accept it.⁵⁶ Egypt on its part occupied a pivotal place in the area and acted as the center of Arabism. The US realized the uniqueness of the opportunity to bring Cairo into the American orbit, one more reason for the stakes to be so high.

It was never easy; in fact, according to William Quandt, the US attempted to use UNSC Resolution 242 in order to halt Israeli settlements in the West Bank, but to no avail. We are also informed of Sadat's getting ready to depart in September 1978, only for President Carter's personal intervention to save the day.⁵⁷ On the other hand, the US President's direct and active involvement produced other unexpected results, according to Quandt. Believing he had secured a verbal agreement with the Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin, on the freezing of settlements in the West Bank, Carter thus persuaded Sadat to sign the Agreement. Other reasons, like Egypt's size, its strong affiliation with the Soviet Union and the opportunity to see it detached from Moscow and join the US, accounted for Washington's supporting any Egyptian initiative in that direction, as early as November 1973, much of course to Henry Kissinger's delight. The latter's reluctance to allow Israel to proceed further in October 1973 falls within his thinking, which had to take Sadat's *volte face* into consideration. Egypt of course paid a heavy price, as its ambition to play a strong role in the settlement of the outstanding issues in the region, especially the Palestinian problem, the establishment of an independent state, the refugees and the settlers, was severely called into question and very much curtailed.

⁵⁵ William Quandt saying so in his interview. Op. cit.

⁵⁶ William Quandt's interview. Op. cit.

⁵⁷ William Quandt, Camp David (Washington DC:Brookings Institution, 1986).

Other events, like the 1978 incursion into Lebanon and the establishment of the so-called security zone, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and all the carnage and catastrophe it created, along with the Islamic Revolution in Iran (February 1979) and the Iran-Iraq War (beginning in September 1980) created an entirely new picture in the area. Egypt, however, decided to follow its own course, parting the waters and steering from the rest of the Arab world. If no agreement had been reached at Camp David, would there had been war? Quandt believes not. When all is said and done, how should one label what has been accomplished between Egypt and Israel? Can it be called genuine peace? The Camp David Accords have withstood the test of time, because, as Quandt puts it, "it serves the core interests of both parties."⁵⁸ He calls them solid, but not perfect.

On my part, I call them cold peace, as I believe it is a preferable term to use. There has not been so far any war between the two, and, equally so, it is highly unlikely to improbable for one to break out in the future, barring anything unpredictable. The US has become the provider of the two, in terms of economic assistance and military aid; no other antagonist is visible in the horizon to compete with the US, displace Washington and assume the mantle for influence in the area. China has replaced the Soviet Union in many respects, but I doubt whether Beijing really wants to play such a role in the Middle East.⁵⁹ Why employ the term cold peace? Simply because, the Palestinian issue remains unresolved and poisons the peaceful coexistence, the normal evolution and growth of their bilateral relationship. As it is, the question of Palestine, with all its intricacies and complexities that accompany it for more than a century, goes on, without any prospect for its resolution in sight. The 1947 earthquake and its side effects create tremors and shocks, and they do affect, considerably so, the bilateral relationship between Egypt and Israel. Not so much to undo all that has been accomplished, but to create enough troubles that make the climate of their coexistence chilly.

To what has just been observed and analyzed, what can be said of Cyprus? The island was no Egypt, the leverage it could exert on the US government was limited, even though the Greek-American lobby proved a formidable force. Like the Palestinians, for which Kissinger had no sympathy, Cyprus'

⁵⁸ William Quandt, in interview, Ibid.

⁵⁹ The recent agreement restoring the diplomatic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (signed on 10th March 2023 in Beijing), brokered by the People's Republic of China is a notable exception. As such, it is a remarkable accomplishment on the part of Beijing, as it fully establishes its credentials as an honest broker and a rising power to be. Needless to stress, the agreement is a setback for US diplomacy, for obvious reasons.

A legitimate question begs to be asked: Is this the prelude for more on the part of the People's Republic? Possibly yes, since we live in an international environment that is constantly changing. Does that mean that Beijing will go as far as to undo all that the US has accomplished in the region of the Middle East, so as to establish its own presence, as an extension of a drive for hegemony? This is highly improbable, I believe. China, on the other hand, would very much like to safeguard its position in Africa, where-for the time being-is very well placed, and ensure it is not displaced from there in the future.

partition was a tragedy for its people, but then the larger picture had to prevail for Washington. Order, stability and equilibrium in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly between Greece and Turkey, lest a war broke out and could threaten everything, prevailed in the mind of Kissinger and the US.

VII. FEDERALISM: THE US *SUIS GENERIS* EXAMPLE AND CYPRUS

Cyprus had on its side only international law and the UN Charter and a number of UN Security Council resolutions. Were these enough? The answer was an emphatic no, and it still is. What of the so-called bi-communal and bi-zonal aspects of the federation itself? Without entering the jargon of constitutional law, federalism and a federal solution envision devolution of power to the component states, and not the other way around. This distinction is both imperative and crucial. The states, which the union is made of, were and still are sovereign in the sense of managing their own affairs and not in any way as sovereign states according to international law. The federal government, however, takes care of business on the national level (security, foreign affairs, national economy), representing one and indivisible entity. This much though, was clarified after the Civil War, where the article it was employed for the US, replacing they, which was hitherto used. As we saw previously in our analysis, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia (May-September 1787) took some crucial decisions, where painful compromises were made. The power of the big versus that of the smaller states remained perhaps the main issue, with slavery following suit, necessitating a compromise. These decisions addressed the precise authority of the central government and that of the states. It has been a never-ending process and an evolutionary one at that, an ongoing debate for more than two centuries. Federalism, its actual application and the interpretation of the constitution are still going on for many and apparent reasons, as they affect the functioning of the government and the daily lives of the American people.

A constitution, a written document as it is, is not a self-executing document.⁶⁰ Without pulverizing the point, suffice is to point to the remarks by the late Potter Stewart in 1983, former Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court, who admitted this self-evident truth, during a panel debate under the auspices of Columbia University School of Journalism, Mr Fred Friendly acting as the moderator. It is not just the courts, in this case the Supreme Court, that are involved in its interpretation and the smooth functioning of the federal system in general. The national legislature (the Congress), state and local governments and, above all, the sovereign people through their vote, not to mention the many interest groups as well, become part of the process.

Personally, I consider the US system of government as the mother of the federal system, certainly not the panacea by any means, as any form of government, parliamentary or presidential, should be adapted to the unique circumstances of the country it is applicable. In other words, no system of government in the world can be copied word for word and then applied indiscriminately elsewhere. What can be rather said and pointed out is the fact that good elements can be identified and detected, which can then be

⁶⁰ For what is probably the best analysis of the US Constitution, Edward S. Corwin, *The Constitution and what it Means Today* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

applied within the political, economic and cultural environment of another country. The bill of rights, i.e., the first ten amendments to the constitution (with the possible exception of the second amendment) and many landmark decisions of the US Supreme Court may be cited as constituting those good elements worth considering and borrowing.

What evidently is missing from the document (the US Constitution) is the concept of communalism, ubiquitous in the case of Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to name some of the many cases in the world. What it means in theory and in practice is the subordination of the national concept, the country itself, the state as a whole, to the communal rights, needs and demands of a particular group. A group that is, which is characterized and distinguished by its ethnic, religious and linguistic background. By this definition, I do not mean that the interests of the state *bona fide* should be interpreted in such a way so as to extinguish and destroy those inalienable rights of any individual or group, which want and seek to be identified as such. The imagined community in action, to put it differently. Far from it. Pluralism, which I define as the freedom and the right of dissent (strengthening Giovanni Sartori's definition), remains the best means in recognizing and making those rights more robust, within democracy, the process and the institutions associated with it.⁶¹

In the case of Cyprus, bi-communalism provides the notion of ethnic exclusivity in the two geographic parts that will be created and form the foundation of any future solution based on federalism. It moves a couple of steps further from the communalism, which was ubiquitous in the 1959 settlement, and the constitution that is based on it. Only this time, it applies to geographic separation. One should add that communalism will not just be restrained in the numerical composition of the federation, i.e., 50 states for the US, 28 for India and 16 in the case of Germany, etc. Communalism moves far beyond such an interpretation to give the notion of exclusivity in the composition of the component states. In other words, a Turkish north and a Greek south, identified via both ethno-national *raison d'être* and territory. This is of course the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina, via the Dayton (November 1995) and Paris (December 1995) Agreements, the Quebec Province in Canada and the Tamil Nadu state in India. It was also the case with former Yugoslavia. In the final two examples, though, this characteristic prevails in just one province or state out of so many others that the entire country is made of. For Cyprus, it is one of the two. To this, one must add the other twin brother, i.e., bi-zonality. In practice, the latter concept is tantamount to geographic separation. What gives a bizarre and noxious twist to bi-communalism and bi-zonality is the argument for majorities in each part to be based on ethnic background, religious affiliation and native language. One has to mention another element that enters the overall equation: centrifugal tendencies that are created and

⁶¹ Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 13-18.

strengthened because of bi-communalism and bi-zonality, surely and inevitably, at the expense of the central government.

In a nutshell then, perhaps in a bit of simplification, bi-communalism and bi-zonality are articulated, the two sides of the same coin. In practical terms, how is theory translated into a settlement? Two communities, living separately, but side by side (*yan yana*, in turkish), sharing power equally (*yari yari*, again in turkish). Comparing this proposed mode of a settlement and future government with the Zurich and London Agreements of February 1959, one clearly chooses the latter as the lesser of two evils, let it be emphasized. The objective, however, is not to choose the better option among very bad deals. Furthermore, the 1959 settlement was imposed on Cyprus and its people, via the rationale of necessity as a product of new realities. Realities, though, that were created artificially, and aimed to serve sinister purposes, none other than the impossibility of peaceful coexistence, because of different ethnic backgrounds of the indigenous people. History, even in a variation, does not need to repeat itself in a new settlement, as the lesson of the past, one hopes, has been learned. Other details aside, presidential council, alternate presidencies, etc. I do believe that what has been in the forerunner is nothing short of racialism and discrimination, a repeat-*mutatis mutandis*-of apartheid in South Africa, as it existed before 1994.

When all is said and done, one big question begs to be answered: can such a political system function properly? I believe not, but lest I am accused of presumptuousness and perhaps prejudice, even bias, we may recall the period between 1820, when the Missouri compromise was adopted by the US Congress and 1861, when the first shots were fired against Fort Sumter in South Carolina, inaugurating the Civil War, or the Revolution of 1861, as Princeton historian James McPherson labels it.⁶² What was at stake was the power of the central government in Washington versus that of the states, with slavery becoming the main issue that added fuel to the fire and poisoning the atmosphere in the entire country.

The legendary debates between Senators Daniel Webster of Massachusetts and Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina (January 1830) over the famous tariff of abominations (as the southerners called the tariff legislations of 1828 and 1832) and the nullification controversy that surrounded it captured the spirit and the tragedy of the times. There were of course deeper issues involved, as the root of the problem lay elsewhere: the very essence of the country, the definition of the union itself, the foundations of the US as a new state in 1789. Which part was legally justified in its views? Was it the central government in Washington, where all the states making the union as agreed in Philadelphia in 1787 were represented, with President Andrew Jackson threatening to descend south and carry everything before him in 1830? Or were the states, sovereign by definition,

⁶² James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

so the argument went, which were the constituent parts of the union, having by extension then the inherent right to depart and secede, at their own free will, at their own time of choosing?

Powerful personalities, like President Andrew Jackson and the big triumvirate of Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun and Henry Clay shaped national policy, leaving their footprints indelibly. One had to add people like Chief Justice John Marshall as well, who strengthened federalism via a number of decisions of paramount importance during the early years of the Republic. The presence of these towering figures notwithstanding, the breach between north and south or free and slave holders was getting wider. To the many, who strove to hold the union together, others as equally determined, sought to champion nullification and finally secession.⁶³ The southern narrative and idea of freedom and slavery and its effort to plant it not just in the Gulf of Mexico (the result of the Mexican-American War of 1848) divided the nation. Forces that were held at bay, gradually began to assert themselves, finally gaining ascendancy and emerging triumphant. Among the many issues that tested the unity of the nation mention should be made of the fugitive slave law. One time too many, this legislation, which was enacted as early as in 1793, saw southerners determined to claim their property before the courts and northerners as equally determined to resist what they called the evil institution of slavery. A decision by the US Supreme Court (*Prigg v Pennsylvania*, in 1842) complicated things.⁶⁴

Compromise merely prolonged what seemed like a self-fulfilling prophecy and an anguish in 1850 and in 1854 (the Kansas-Nebraska Act). The *Dred Scott* case of 1857 was the last nail in the coffin, with James Brown's raid at Harpers Ferry (in 1859) the preliminary shot of what followed. Abraham Lincoln's words during the campaign for the presidential election of 1860, "a house divided against itself cannot stand," conveyed the agony of the times. A dire warning against the gathering storm, a storm that threatened the very foundations of the nation. A nation, whose fortunes the young statesman from Illinois was summoned to preside over some months later. The civil war that ensued was the most catastrophic in US history. Indicative of this was the fact that all the casualties sustained in all the wars the US fought until 1991 never equaled those of the Civil War.

Worse followed, during the reconstruction era, especially after the presidential election of 1876 and what followed.⁶⁵ In a number of decisions, the US Supreme Court in essence denied the enfranchisement of African Americans (the *Civil Rights* cases of 1883), while abstaining from standing

⁶³ William F. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion: Volume I: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) and William F. Freehling, *The Road to Disunion: Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁶⁴ McPherson, *op.cit.*, 78-79.

⁶⁵ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877* (New York: Harper, 1988), 586-87, for the best history on the subject.

as a powerful block against racial discrimination.⁶⁶ Hopes that “the federal government would provide legal protection of the rights of citizenship” were cruelly dashed.⁶⁷ In this respect, “the Court held, first, that the Fourteenth Amendment protects against interference with rights held by citizens only if perpetrated by instrumentalities of the state.”⁶⁸ In the opinion of Associate Justice Joseph P. Bradley: “individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.”⁶⁹ Needless to emphasize, his thinking still reverberates and acts as a rude awakening of judicial restraint. It is worth quoting parts of his opinion. Among other this, according to Justice Bradley, the constitution did not “authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights.” In no uncertain terms, he interpreted the Thirteen and Fourteen Amendments of the Constitution in such a way, so that he denied the notion of “any individual invasion of individual rights being the subject-matter of the Fourteen Amendment. It nullifies and makes void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws...” The Fourteen Amendment, therefore, “...does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of state legislation, or state action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive to the fundamental rights specified in the Amendment.” All in all, “the Court found that the right to freedom established by the Thirteenth Amendment did not include ‘the social rights of men and races in the community.’”⁷⁰

Associate Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented vigorously. The majority of the Supreme Court’s rationale continued and culminated in the *Plessy v Ferguson* decision of 1896 in the separate but equal clause to justify racial discrimination. Justice Harlan dissented vigorously again in the latter case, a lonely voice. It would take almost a century after the end of the Civil War to address again the gross and manifest injustice. Moreover, reconstruction (1865-77) failed to remedy what was occurring during that specific period, and prolonged an injustice that should have never taken place, let alone firmly establish itself.

⁶⁶ The US Supreme Court, in an 8-1 majority opinion, struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was enacted by the Congress. Details in, Marianne L Engelman Lado, “A Question of Justice: African-American Legal Perspectives on the 1883 Civil Rights Cases-Freedom: Constitutional Law.” Chicago-Kent Law Review. Vol. 70, Issue 3, Article 9 (April 1995), 1123-1195, pdf edition.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 1123.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 1126.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

One may legitimately wonder what the connection is between the two aforementioned cases and Cyprus. And yet there is. In the US, following the 1876 presidential election and the concessions that were made for Rutherford Hayes to be elected president, the Afro-American citizens were sacrificed in the south. The revolution, which was inaugurated via the Emancipation Proclamation by Abraham Lincoln was left unfulfilled; the same applied in the case of reconstruction, where the status quo ante would not be restored under any circumstances. The withdrawal of the federal troops though, collateral casualty to the 1876 compromise, meant one thing and one thing only: the whites in the south could do as they pleased. A federal republic, in the case of Cyprus, would not quite constitute a revolution, even though it should go a long way towards remedying the injustices of the past, certainly those of the 1959 settlement. Human wisdom, learning from the past through the accumulation of knowledge and by employing historical consciousness, should go a long way in assisting the endeavor. Should federalism, however, entail injustices similar to those the Afro-Americans had to endure for one century after 1865, and still do, any individual, citizen of the Federal Republic of Cyprus, may challenge its legality in the courts. One can only hope that the same individual would not receive results as those the African-Americans did in 1883 and in 1896.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Cyprus does not need a civil war to prove that its system of government, originally imposed, simply does not function to anybody's interest, above all, the country's and its people. Nor of course should things come to a standstill, with the country ending as two local governments (as President Makarios put it to Clark Clifford), or where any individual would challenge such a system before the courts, with an uncertain outcome. Bosnia and Herzegovina are experiencing what Cyprus has been experiencing since 1960, with ethnicity reigning supreme, religion and language acting as reinforcing elements, much against the unity, the coherence, the stability, the functioning and the viability of the country. What the people of Cyprus demanded was freedom from colonialism, national independence and human dignity. The existence of different communities in the country should not have been seen, nor should have been interpreted as anything less than diversity, a fact that the world is replete of, one moreover that enriches life. No country is homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, religion, language and culture. The same applies more forcefully for political and ideological cleavage, the spice of life. *Aeterna Cypria*, Eternal Cyprus, is the motto in the entrance of the House of Representatives in Nicosia. The country's long history of thousands of years testifies to that. One country, unified and indivisible accompanies eternity.

Any form of government should take into serious consideration these bedrock truths. A federal solution for Cyprus in no way assumes (or should assume) geographic separation and racial discrimination, because of theories that people of different ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds cannot coexist. For these reasons, what was proposed forty six years ago *bona fide* and degenerated into bi-communalism and bi-zonality should apply no more. What took place with Yugoslavia after 1945 until 1991 must act as a dire warning against ethnicity gaining the upper hand (the 1946 constitution of the country, for which, interpretations allowed its provinces to secede) at the expense of the sovereign country. In the case of Cyprus, as politics is the art of compromise (to cite a very old dictum), serious concessions were made for a painful compromise to be accomplished, all in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, to be sure, as necessity dictated such a course to be followed. Coexistence though, in a unitary state, even within the framework of genuine federalism, and not of beliefs that have been proved obsolete and defunct, for time has simply overtaken them, proving their anachronism.

Bi-communalism and bi-zonality, therefore, are ideas in the quicksand. Another reason as equally important may be offered. Any idea, or proposal, even a contract to be honored and hold valid means that all the interested parties associated with it, must do so faithfully, for the good of the country and its people. As far as Cyprus is concerned, Turkey has demonstrated time and again its capacity to act as the boogeyman and create problems. What it has accomplished through its active involvement in Cyprus may be labeled as a tribute to its diplomacy, but then nothing short of a national

catastrophe for Cyprus. This is not to suggest that Ankara was the sole culprit for the travails that took place and bedevil Cyprus ever since, for many others can claim that role, internally and externally. Furthermore, Turkey has forfeited the right to lecture, demand, dictate and impose by virtue of its invading Cyprus, irrespective of the arguments it has been advancing to justify its actions ever since. Makarios' compromise and the concessions he made must be analyzed and perceived through the lens of a weak country under occupation, which has the right to exist, but realizes that the interests of the occupying power are non-negotiable, deleterious as they are. In today's world, the best and the worst of times, where we all live in dangerous and confused times, the last thing the people of Cyprus deserve is any reward to their tormentor, their northern neighbor across the Mediterranean. A neighbor who always manages to ally with everybody, being a friend of nobody, seeking to have the national interest triumph and prevail at the expense of the rest. The case with Ukraine proves the point, making one wonder which side is really Turkey with.

The twin foundations for a solution, which have been proposed have not withstood the test of time. Quite the opposite. Experience informs us that the two sides of the same coin are nothing short of a national disaster that should be avoided at all costs. For a country that has suffered immensely, a fresh start and a new beginning are needed; experiments that threaten its very existence the people of Cyprus can do without. First and foremost, however, historical self-knowledge and consciousness must be developed and be on top of the agenda, to understand the past, devoid of any political preferences and ideological prejudices, with an open and clear mind. Bury once and for all the ghost of divisiveness and intolerance, the hatchet of bigotry, the scourge of animosity and confrontation and strive for national reconciliation.

Inevitably, many and uncomfortable truths, occasionally quite excruciating, will surface through historical research. This is natural; democracy can take it, provided that all those involved in its existence and smooth functioning will rise to the occasion and prove their worth as statesmen and sovereign people. 30th January of this year marked the 90th anniversary of Adolf Hitler's rise to power and the death of the Weimar Republic. One only hopes that humanity has learned its lesson, albeit the harsh and tragic way, and this as a tribute to the memory of more than sixty million people who perished during WWII. Intra and inter-communal discord and conflict should be a thing of the past for Cyprus, for they proved their validity through the huge loss of innocent lives in the island. A unitary state should be the ideal solution for Cyprus, genuine federation as second best, where its citizens will and should enjoy fundamental freedoms and basic human rights without any discrimination. They deserve nothing less. One man one vote must always prevail. Where, moreover, all its officials may stand for election to serve the people, based on merit, academic credentials, honesty, integrity of character and transparency, to name the most important virtues, and not

on exclusive and artificial privileges based on ethnicity, religion and language.

DEDICATION

The article is dedicated to the memory of Paul Angelides. A graduate of the Ohio State University, Department of Political Science and a member of the Hellenic American Institute, he provided much needed aid and support to Cyprus during its years of desperation, following the tragic events in 1974.

Lakis, as we all affectionately called him, for those who had the privilege to be acquainted with him, the present author not being the exception, proved his commitment and dedication to values and principles and virtues, very much missing today.

His premature loss deducts nothing from his forceful personality. He taught a lot to those around him and led through his exemplary scholarship. His spirit lives on as a necessary reminder, especially for us in Cyprus, on the very minimum we owe to people like him, who stood next to us in times of need. A friend in need is a friend indeed may be redundant to convey our feelings towards him, but so necessary in the times we live in.

May he rest in peace.

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