THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic
and Political Issues

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ARTICLES

AKEL and the Turkish Cypriots (1941–1955)

Sotos Ktoris

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the political relations between AKEL and the Turkish Cypriot community during the period 1941–1955. AKEL's post-1974 policies towards the Turkish Cypriots had led to a political misconception concerning its political relations with the Turkish Cypriot community for the period that preceded 1955. Undeniably, AKEL's attitude to the Turkish Cypriots had diachronically been much more liberal and tolerant than the approach expressed by many nationalist – Right-wing politicians. However, AKEL's attempt to employ 'class rhetoric' in order to allure the minority into the 'Greek Cypriot national liberation struggle' had little effect upon the Turkish Cypriot masses. Contrary to the ideological and social divisions that cut across the Greek Cypriot community, the fear of enosis within the Turkish Cypriot community dominated political and ideological discussions. The political elite of the Turkish Cypriot community perceived AKEL not only as a 'national' threat but as an ideological menace as well.

Keywords: AKEL, PEO, KTMBP, KTIBK, communism, enosis, contempt, Turkish Cypriots, nationalism, anti-communism

Introduction

The exploration of the relations between the Greek Cypriot Left and the Turkish Cypriot community is essential in order to elucidate the political and ideological framework within which the Turkish Cypriot political demands were developed and articulated. Over the years, AKEL's 'influence' on the Turkish Cypriot masses has become a popular fallacy in the Greek Cypriot community. This belief, mainly received its 'legitimacy' from the mass participation of Turkish Cypriots in the Left-wing trade unions of PSE [Pagkypria Syntonistiki Epitropi] and its successor PEO [Pagkypria Ergatiki Omospondia], especially during the 1940s. It is a perception that became predominant among Greek Cypriots after 1974, when AKEL ['Progressive Party of the Working People'], contrary to other political parties, made a systematic effort to promote rapprochement between the two communities, whilst also advocating a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. This belief was further embedded among Greek Cypriots when the Left-wing party established a close political co-operation with its Turkish Cypriot ideological counterpart, the Republican Turkish Party CTP [Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi]. Inevitably, AKEL's post-1974 policy, towards the Turkish Cypriots, created a political misconception among the Greek Cypriot community in regard to its political relations with the 'minority' in the pre-1960 period.

In reality, the relations between the Turkish Cypriot political elite and the Cypriot communist movement were characterised earlier on by political and ideological cleavages. As early as 1931 the newspaper *Söz*, commenting on news that some Turkish Cypriots became members of the Cyprus Communist Party, reported that:

> 'We regret to learn that some unknown Turks have been enlisted as communists. We blame their action, as they have done something which is contrary to the public opinion of the Turks of Cyprus and may put the community in a difficult position. We have professors and teachers none of whom is a communist, whom they ought to have consulted before hand. The proverb says: The stray lambs are seized by the wolves.'[1]

By the end of the 1930s, nationalism in 'motherland' Turkey had embodied anti-communism as its principal ideological banner. It had been rightly pointed out that for the Turks, 'communism was identified with imperialist Russia the greatest enemy of Turkey since the time of Peter the Great'.[2] Therefore, the internalisation of the official ideology of the Turkish state by the Turks of Cyprus meant that the latter had embodied the nationalist, anti-communism principles of Kemalism.[3] By the mid-1940s the Turkish Cypriot community was already characterised by political homogeneity, as the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriot organisations had a nationalist and anti-*enosist* orientation.[4] The emergence of an ecumenical reaction against *enosis*, among the Turkish Cypriot community, was described vividly by *Vatan* newspaper, which stated that: 'from the farmer of the most remote village to the government doctor, the lawyer and the journalist […] they all fight for one purpose and one idea', and that is to prevent *enosis*.[5] Having become the principal exponent of the enosist movement by the mid-1940s, AKEL was perceived by the political elite of the Turkish Cypriot community, not only as a 'national' threat but as an ideological menace as well.

Local Government: The Political Terrainn

Contrary to this perception however, it has been argued that AKEL succeeded in establishing

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1   *Söz*, 13 August 1931, in SA 1/517/26.
2   CO 926/183. Cited in S. Ktoris (2013) *Τουρκοκύπριοι: Από το περιθώριο στο συνεταιρισμό (1923–1960)* [Turkish Cypriots: From Marginalisation to Partnership 1923–1960], Athens: Παπαζήση, p. 212.
3   S. Anagnostopoulou (2004) *Τουρκικός εκσυγχρονισμός: Ισλάμ και Τουρκοκύπριοι στη δαιδαλώδη διαδρομή του κεμαλισμού* [Turkish Modernity: Islam and Turkish Cypriots on the Tortuous Path of Kemalism], Athens, Βιβλιόραμα, p. 180. For a comprehensive overview of Kemalism see N. Κızılyürek (2006) *Κεμαλισμός: Η γένεση και η εξέλιξη της επίσημης ιδεολογίας της σύγχρονης Τουρκίας* [Kemalism: The Birth and Evolution of the Official Ideology of Modern Turkey], Athens: Μεσόγειος. Altay Nevzat has exhaustively presented in his doctoral thesis, how, by the end of the 1930s, nationalism has been extensively embodied by the Turkish Cypriots. A. Nevzat (2005) *Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, Doctoral Thesis, University of Oulu, published by Oulu University Press, Finland.
4   D.S. Wosgian (1963) 'Turks and British Rule in Cyprus', unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, p. 135.
5   An article by *Vatan*, newspaper as republished in *Efimeris*, 15 January 1949.

close co-operation with the Turkish Cypriot notables at least at the local government level.[6] Nevertheless, such an alliance was not feasible since the electorate was split into Greek Cypriot ('non-Mohamedans') and Turkish Cypriot ('Mohamedans'). As a result, politicians and organised political groups from both communities addressed issues along strict ethnic lines, and were thus 'accountable' only to their own community. The separateness of the electoral basis made it impossible to establish electoral co-operation between politicians or parties of either community, on the basis of a common political or ideological platform. Even at the Municipal level it was almost unthinkable, particularly after 1946, for the Turkish Cypriots to support a Greek Cypriot candidate for the positions of Mayor and Deputy Mayor. The political stance of the Greek Cypriot political elite was even more rigid, as it systematically excluded Turkish Cypriots from the mayoral posts. For example, none of the Greek Cypriot politicians would even consider that the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of Nicosia, who in the early 1900s represented almost 40%[7] of the town's population, were entitled to voice legitimate complaints regarding their *de facto* exclusion from the positions of Mayor and Deputy Mayor. Unsurprisingly, in 1911, the Greek Cypriot Archbishop became involved in the opponent Greek Cypriot political parties with the explicit purpose of deterring the possibility of any Turkish Cypriot assuming the Mayoral office, as happened in 1908 due to a dispute between Greek Cypriot politicians.[8]

The Secretary General of AKEL, Ploutis Servas, regularly attempted to utilise the 'sympathy' directed at his candidature by Turkish Cypriot councillors in the Municipality of Limassol, in order to propagate a theoretical but politically unsubstantiated influence exerted by the party over the Turkish Cypriots.[9] In spite of claims by Servas, the Turkish Cypriots have not displayed any preferential sympathy towards the Left. As the Turkish Cypriot councillors were the minority and inevitably had to 'choose' either Right- or Left-wing (Greek) candidates, it was not uncommon for them to vote for those they assessed as being closer to their communal or personal interests. This attitude only changed dramatically after World War Two when the Turkish Cypriot leadership, terrified by the radicalisation of Greek Cypriot nationalism, declared the negation of *enosis* to be its supreme national task and thereby refrained from 'supporting' any Greek Cypriot candidates. Nonetheless, the behaviour of Turkish Cypriot councillors during electoral procedures in the early 1940s demonstrates that there was no exclusive preference towards Left-wing candidates. After the 1943 elections the Turkish Cypriot councillors supported the Right-wing candidates, Demetrios Demetriou and Christodoulos Galatopoulos, in Larnaca and Paphos respectively. In the

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6   R. Katsiaounis (1997) *Η Διασκεπτική: 1946–1948 (Με Ανασκόπηση της Περιόδου 1878–1945)* [The Consultative Assembly: 1946–1948 (With a review of the period 1878–1945)], Nicosia: Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών, p. 141.

7   SA 1/384/1908, 18 March 1908.

8   *Foni tis Kiprou*, 26 March 1911.

9   P. Servas (1997) *Κοινή πατρίδα* [Common Homeland], Athens: Πρόοδος, pp. 141–144. Also see, Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

Municipalities of Limassol and Famagusta they voted in favour of the Leftists, Ploutis Servas and Adam Adamantos.[10] In Nicosia, where discussions within the Municipality's Council have always been more politicised, the Turkish Cypriot councillors supported the candidature of a Turkish Cypriot politician, Fazıl Küçük.[11] In the 1946 elections the Turkish Cypriot party of KTMBP ['Kıbrıs Türk Milli Birlik Partisi'] – arguing on the grounds that the Greek Cypriot majority was using the Municipalities as stepping stones to promote enosis – decided to boycott the electoral procedure. The decision, however, was only implemented in Nicosia because in other cities the independent candidates and members of the Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus, known as KATAK ['Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlık Kurumu'], took part in the electoral procedures.[12] In those municipalities the elected Turkish Cypriots voted for Servas in Limassol, Galatopoulos in Paphos, Adamantos in Famagusta and Santamas, also a Leftist candidate, in Larnaca.[13]

In 1947, AKEL's rhetoric for self-government – *enosis* – failed to widen the party's influence among Turkish Cypriots. The demand for self-government was equally abhorrent to Turkish Cypriots as was the call of the Greek Cypriot Right for 'immediate *enosis*'. The Turkish Cypriot negative stance towards AKEL's national policy was foreseeable, as *enosis* remained the ultimate goal of the party's national claims and because self-government and autonomy were diachronically incorporated in the Turkish Cypriot collective consciousness as the precursors of *enosis*.[14] When, in the summer of 1946, the issue of a more liberal constitution was brought to the fore by the British government, the Turkish Cypriot political parties of KATAK and KTMBP hastily reacted by adopting a rigid stance against self-government.[15] Numerous reports in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot press confirmed the strong Turkish Cypriot response against any solutions based on autonomy or self-government. Küçük, in September 1946, stated that 'either with *enosis* or with autonomy [our] death is inevitable'.[16] In December 1946, *Halkın Sesi* reaffirmed the Turkish Cypriot stance against any processes that might lead either to *enosis* or to self-government.[17] In a memorandum submitted to the Governor in April 1947 from the major Turkish Cypriot organisations (the political parties of KATAK and KTMBP, the Trade Unions and the Farmers

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10   Municipality Council Minutes, 1 June 1953, Minutes Book (18 December 1946–22 September 1953), Municipality of Larnaca. Also, Municipality Council Minutes, 1 June 1949, Minutes Book (25 October 1946–11 August 1949), Municipality of Limassol, and Municipality Council Minutes, 1 June 1949, Minutes Book (April 1943–April 1950), Municipality of Nicosia, and Municipality Council Minutes, 1 June 1949, Minutes Book (1 June 1949–29 March 1956), Municipality of Paphos.
11   Municipality Council Minutes, 1 April 1943, Minutes Book (April 1943–April 1950), Municipality of Nicosia.
12   *Cyprus Mail*, 21 May 1946.
13   *Eleftheria*, 2 June 1946.
14   *Eleftheria*, (Athens), 21 January 1948.
15   *Cyprus Mail*, 24 November 1946.
16   *Halkın Sesi*, 5 September 1946.
17   *Neos Kypriakos Fylax*, 19 December 1946.

Union), it was stressed that Turkish Cypriots were against 'any form of self-government' because such a development might have led to abandoning to fate the vital interests and rights of the Turkish community, leaving them entirely at the mercy of the Greek Cypriot majority.[18] It was, further, claimed that in such a case, there would be painful consequences for the minorities as self-government could be used as a stepping stone towards *enosis*.[19]

With the collapse, in 1948, of the Consultative Assembly and the subsequent deterioration of bi-communal relations, the Turkish Cypriots abstained from procedures to formulate the councils' bodies in the 1949 elections.[20] The same policy was applied after the 1953 elections with the exception of Paphos, where Turkish Cypriots under the leadership of Dr İhsan Ali supported the Right-wing candidate, Iakovides.[21]

Regardless of any political sympathies among members of AKEL and Turkish Cypriots at the local level, it cannot be asserted that these constituted an 'unprecedented phenomenon in the history of intercommunal relations'[22] or that the electoral victory of AKEL in Limassol, in 1943, led to any common celebrations of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.[23] And indeed, the Left-wing newspaper *Anexartitos* ['Ανεξάρτητος], when referring to the aftermath of Servas' election in Limassol, on 25 March 1943, made a laconic reference to the two Turkish Cypriot councillors who attended the party's celebrations.[24] The facts could not have been more different. Immediately after the elections, AKEL's persistence on *enosis* was once again reiterated by Servas, who emphasised that the most significant aspiration of the newly elected municipal council was the 'vindication of the national aspirations' of the people – meaning *enosis*. That said, the Leftist leader suggested that together with the Greek flag at the Town Hall, a Turkish flag should also be raised and he called upon the colonial government to respect the national identity of not only the Greek inhabitants of the island but of the Turks as well.[25] Undeniably, AKEL's attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots had been more liberal and tolerant than the approach expressed by many nationalist Right-wing politicians.[26] The latter had employed a far more contemptuous rhetoric; one that considered Turkish Cypriots to be the remnants of the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus, and who had no right to raise legitimate demands in relation to the island's future. The Turkish Cypriots were given no acknowledgement as a constituent element of Cyprus but were merely looked on as either a

18   *Cyprus Mail*, 21 April 1947.
19   *Ibid*.
20   Council Minutes, Municipalities of Larnaka, Limassol Paphos and Nicosia, *op. cit*.
21   *Ibid*.
22   Katsiaounis, *op. cit*., p. 179.
23   P. Servas (1975) *Πως τα καταφέραμε και φτάσαμε στο μηδέν* [How Did We Manage to Reach Point Zero], Athens: Διάλογος, p. 26.
24   *Anexartitos*, 25 March 1943.
25   *Anexartitos*, 2 April 1943.
26   Ktoris, *op. cit*., pp. 191–211.

'foreign minority' or as 'non-native inhabitants of Cyprus' who were 'obliged' to respect the national aspirations of the Greek majority.[27] Yet AKEL still failed to capitalise on any influence between the Turkish Cypriot masses, let alone any sympathies among their political elite.[28] The leading Turkish Cypriot newspaper, *Halkın Sesi*, systematically criticised AKEL's attempt to infiltrate the community and called upon the Turkish Cypriots to marginalise any 'left germs' among them.[29]

The Participation of Turkish Cypriots in PSE–PEO

Confidence in AKEL's influence on the Turkish Cypriots surfaced fundamentally through the latter's significant presence within the Left-wing trade unions of PSE and its successor PEO.[30] It was even suggested that this development might gradually lead to the de-Turkification of the community and thus curtail the guiding power exercised by the Turkish Cypriot leadership on the Turkish masses and especially on Turkish workers.[31] It was also argued that the rationale behind Fazıl Küçük's opposition to the presence of Turkish Cypriots in PEO was his concern that such co-operation might lead to the acceptance of Greek authority by his fellow countrymen.[32] Such views, however, cannot be substantiated given the historical context within which Turkish Cypriot nationalism was institutionalised. The reaction of the Turkish Cypriot political elite towards the Greek Cypriot Left reflected the anti-communist sentiment of Turkish nationalism, rather than giving credence to an imaginary influence that PEO and AKEL enjoyed among the Turkish Cypriots. The possibility of AKEL gaining mass appeal in the Turkish Cypriot community was actually doomed to fail because in order to exert influence over the broad masses of the Greek Cypriots, it had to endorse the political demand of enosis. In the 1940s the party's approach in relation to the Turkish Cypriots was:

> 'The happiness of our fellow Turks is safeguarded not by becoming involuntary instruments in the hands of imperialism that is the master of *divide and conquer*. Happiness is found in the unconditional recognition of the majority's rights and the support of the national liberation struggle of the Cypriot people.'[33]

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27 *Eleftheria*, 21 August 1944.
28 ΑΣΚΙ: Archive of the Communist Party of Greece, KKE, Box. 371 F. 20/21/21, «Έκθεση δράσης της Κ.Ε. ΑΚΕΛ» [Action report by the Central Committee of AKEL], September, 1947–May 1949 (N. Savvides).
29 *Halkın Sesi*, 4 June 1943.
30 PEO was established in March 1946 after PSE was proscribed by the colonial government. . *Ιστορία ΠΣΕ–ΠΕΟ*, [History of PSE–PEO] (1991) Nicosia: PEO, p. 102.
31 Anagnostopoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 182.
32 Katsiaounis, *op. cit.*, p. 417.
33 *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, 20 April 1947.

Besides, in the early 1940s the political control exercised by AKEL upon the 'national' policy of the Leftist trade unions (PSE–PEO) was the principal reason which led to the establishment of separate Turkish trade unions. Initially, 12 carpenters headed by Niyazi Dağli formed the first Turkish Cypriot union[34] at the end of December 1942. As stated in the monthly report of the colonial government in November 1942:

> '[...] the subservience of the trade unions to the political doctrines and policy of AKEL has developed a secessionist movement among Turkish Cypriot workers in Nicosia who would also like to have separate Turkish trade unions or to form Turkish branches of existing unions which would be housed in separate premises. This movement may be expected to receive some support from Turkish nationalistic sources.'[35]

The newly established Turkish Unions expanded their authority over the Turks of Cyprus, particularly after 1943 due to the inflexible nationalist rhetoric of AKEL and PSE which steered a further defection of Turkish Cypriot workers away from PSE. More specifically, in August of 1944, when Greek Cypriot workers staged pro-*enosis* demonstrations during a visit to Cyprus by the British Colonial Secretary, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, 120 Turkish Cypriots, under the leadership of Hassan Şaşmaz, defected from PSE. Şaşmaz, in an address to the Turkish Cypriots workers, declared:

> 'Friends! As of today, our roads part. We will establish an independent and free Union of Turkish Cypriot Workers Associations that is ours alone and separate from the Greeks. We are now obliged to do this. We ourselves are not the ones who have imposed this obligation on ourselves. It is the Turkish Cypriot people who wish for this. We are obliged to respond to their voice.'[37]

In 1944 PSE argued that the 'leak' of the politically 'ignorant and uneducated' Turkish Cypriot workers was due to the propagation of the reactionary leadership of the minority.[38] The Leftist union highlighted the necessity for the Turkish Cypriot workers to be 'enlightened' on the advantages they would enjoy 'under a Greek People's Republic', once *enosis* was utilised.[39] Despite PSE's concerted efforts to prevent the division of the labour movement, the various Turkish guilds merged in 1945, under an umbrella organisation known as the 'Association of Turkish Cypriot Workers Unions' ['Kıbrıs Türk Isçi Birlikleri Kurumu' (KTIBK)], which was politically

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34   An, A. (2002) 'An Overview of the Past and Present of the Turkish Cypriot Left'. Available as pdf on p. 2 at [http://www.kibrisim.org/dosya/Ahmet], accessed on 3 December 2013.

35   CO 67/314/12, 'Political report on the situation in Cyprus in November 1942'.

36   An, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

37   Cited in N. Kızılyürek (2002) *Milliyetçilik Kıskacında Kıbrıs* [Cyprus in the Grip of Nationalism], İstanbul: Iletişim Yayınları, p. 259.

38   Minutes of the 3rd Pancyprian Trade Union Conference of PSE, 24 and 25 September 1944, Nicosia: Library of Archbishopric of Cyprus.

39   *Ibid.*

controlled by the Turkish Cypriot National Union Party, KTMBP.[40] During the 4th Conference of PEO in late March 1946, when a handful of Turkish Cypriot delegates raised their concerns as regards the federation's 'national' policy, they received a staunch response as follows:

> 'the majority of the population of Cyprus is Greek, and in accordance with the principle of democracy and declarations of war our own people should join the nation in which it belongs'.[41]

The policy of PEO even caused reactions among the most progressive Turkish Cypriots. Such was the case of Derviş Ali Kavazoğlou who, in the early 1940s, was very critical towards the *enosist* policy of the Left. In an article published in *Halkın Sesi* on 13 June 1944, Kavazoğlou analysed in detail the reasons behind the 'imposed' establishment of separate Turkish Cypriot unions. Kavazoğlou accused PEO of advocating *enosis* and at the same time ignoring the national feelings and sentiments of the Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, he claimed that PEO's recently established 'Turkish branch' was nothing but a tool employed to prevent a Turkish Cypriot reaction to the organisation's *enosist* designs.[42] Such beliefs were gradually consolidated between the Turkish Cypriot masses, when AKEL's 'Turkish branch' launched a campaign which urged Turkish Cypriot 'labourers who live, work, and suffer together with the Greek Cypriot labourers to enter the struggle at the same front with other people of the island' in order to support 'the just demand of people of Cyprus for self-determination'.[43]

In December 1954 AKEL admitted that the defection of the Turkish Cypriots from PEO and the establishment of separate Turkish Cypriot trade unions occurred when 'the few Turkish workers' left the party 'during the rise of our national struggle'.[44] Pantelis Varnava, the veteran trade unionist of PEO, confirms that the joint union efforts of Greek and Turkish Cypriots 'have been affected to a large degree [during] the period of 1944–1945 by the intensity of the struggle of the Greek Cypriots for *enosis*'.[45] Similar views were expressed by the historical leader of PEO, Andreas Ziartidis, who recognised that the rise of the *enosis* movement increased 'the distrust among the Turkish Cypriots'.[46] Ziartidis noted that the division of the trade union movement was inevitable, once AKEL had adopted the policy of *enosis*.[47] Identical views were voiced by the Greek Consul

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40   *Ιστορία ΠΣΕ–ΠΕΟ* [History of PSE–PEO] (1991) Nicosia: PEO, p. 253.

41   Minutes of the 4th Pancyprian Trade Union Conference of PEO, 30 and 31 March 1946, Nicosia: Library of Archbishopric of Cyprus.

42   *Halkın Sesi*, 13 June 1944.

43   *Halkın Sesi*, 20 October 1954. Cited in An, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–3.

44   *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, December 1954.

45   P. Varnava (2004) *Κοινοί εργατικοί αγώνες Ελληνοκυπρίων και Τουρκοκυπρίων (γεγονότα μέσα από την Ιστορία)* [The Common Labour Struggles of Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Events through History)], Nicosia: ΠΕΟ, p. 16.

46   P. Paionides (1995) *Ανδρέας Ζιαρτίδης: Χωρίς φόβο και πάθος* [Andreas Ziartides: Without Fear and Passion], Nicosia: Privately printed, p. 51.

47   *Ibid.*

in Cyprus, who attributed the 'separatist' tendencies in the trade union movement to the *enosist* policy of AKEL.[48]

Even the 'legendary' joint strike of Greek and Turkish Cypriot workers in the Mining Industry at Mavrovouni in 1948, which is often employed to exemplify the 'grand manifestation of national unity of the two components of workers in Cyprus';[49] and the transcending of 'religion and nationalism' barriers,[50] became possible when PEO adopted a cautious rhetoric on the issue of *enosis*.[51] Moreover, the leader of the Turkish strikers, Hassan Şaşmaz, was a prominent nationalist and a close associate of Fazıl Küçük.[52] When the Mayor of Limassol and representative of the Left, Ploutis Servas, supported the annexation of Cyprus by Greece during the discussions held within the Consultative Assembly [*Diaskeptiki Sineleusi*], Hassan Şaşmaz swiftly clarified that:

> '[…] it should be borne in mind that his fatherland is not our fatherland. If there is a Greece he [Servas] longs for there is a Turkey we long for. He is Greek and we are Turks […] if the British Government agrees to hand over the administration of the island to their hands then we demand it be returned to its old owner, Turkey which is our national homeland.'[53]

Inevitably, when PEO adopted *enosis* as its national goal in the dawn of 1940s, it turned a significant number of Turkish Cypriots away from the Leftist labour movement. The majority that chose to remain, did so only because PEO as the largest federation, could secure better terms and conditions of employment[54] for its members. Moreover, it was unavoidable for the majority of Turkish Cypriots to remain within PEO because industries such as artisanship, business and commerce were almost exclusively in the hands of Greek Cypriots.[55] The Turkish Cypriot political elite systematically claimed that the reason for the weighty presence of Turkish Cypriots in PEO was the latter's policy of excluding the participation of the Turkish Cypriot guilds in many Greek Cypriot owned firms [closed shop agreements]; a policy they considered as 'persecution based on

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48   ΔΙΑΥΕ [Diplomatic and Historic Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1945, 38.6, Kountouriotis, Consul of Greece to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 1944.

49   N. Psirouki (1965) *Το Κυπριακό. Το οξύτερο εθνικό μας πρόβλημα* [The Cyprus Issue: Our Most Politically Acute Problem], Athens, «Εργασία», p. 85.

50   M. Michaelides (2010) 'The Turkish Cypriot Working Class and the Cyprus Labour Movement 1920–1963', in E. Solomou and H. Faustmann (eds), *Colonial Cyprus 1878–1960, Selective Readings from The Cyprus Review*, Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press, pp. 124–125.

51   Varnava, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

52   Ktoris, *op. cit.*, pp. 271–273.

53   CO 537/4036, Meeting of the Consultative Assembly, 21 May 1948.

54   By 1945 the trade union of the Left had 12,984 members, organised in 91 guilds. L. Kakkoulis (1990) *Η αριστερά και οι Τουρκοκύπριοι: Το κυπριακό από μια άλλη σκοπιά* [The Left and the Turkish Cypriots: The Cyprus Problem from another Point of View], Nicosia: Τυπογραφεία Κασουλίδη, p. 36.

55   Ktoris, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

racial criteria'.[56] By 1947, the rivalry between AKEL and the KTMBP escalated and as a result a growing number of Turkish Cypriots defected from PEO and joined KTIBK.[57] The KTMBP intensified its efforts to establish distinct, ethnic-based, institutions and, with the purpose of boosting the recruitment process of KTIBK, it adopted an intimidation campaign based on the notion that Turkish Cypriots, who participated in PEO, were 'strengthening' the Greek nationalist movement. A leading member of the Left, Andreas Fantis, concerned by the anti-communist campaign of KTMBP and KTIBK accused their leadership that they:

> '[...] shoot against their Turkish colleagues who are members in our unions. They even reached the point of committing to paper that the Turkish members have become Rum, lost their ethnic identity and are not carriers of Turkish blood. [...] The leaders of the Turkish guilds inflame racial passions by exploiting our differences on the national question.'[58]

 The confrontation between the two sides did not prevent attempts at rapprochement and co-operation as regards labour issues, especially as the fulfilment of Turkish workers' demands could not be realised if they were not included in a wider trade union forum. In 1945 the colonial administration 'encouraged' the Turkish Cypriot leadership to seek co-operation in this direction with the respective Greek Cypriot trade unions, on the single condition that the latter would explicitly abandon *enosis*.[59] Pantelis Varnava vividly describes how he was almost lynched during this period by Turkish Cypriot nationalists in the village of Lefka, which was predominantly inhabited by Turks, when he refused to renounce *enosis*.[60] Additionally, the Turkish Cypriot unionists demanded that in order to participate in common labour events with PEO, the latter should also renounce the right to register Turkish Cypriots as its members, whether they 'belonged to the Turkish trade unions or were unorganized'.[61] PEO rejected this 'request' since its political aspiration was to expand its influence among the 'minority'. Nonetheless, the 'concern' of the Turkish Cypriot political elite that the association of many of their national compatriots with PEO might have led to the gradual de-Turkification of the community, was clearly unsubstantiated. Although the number of Turkish Cypriots who enrolled with KTIBK was reduced by the end of the 1940s,[62] the Turkish Cypriot leadership still succeeded in mobilising the whole community against the *enosis* agitation over the course of this period.[63] The inability of KTIBK unionists to enlist the majority of Turkish Cypriots as members was basically linked with PEO's admirable efficacy of securing labour rights for all Cypriot workers, in a time when the latter

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56   SA 1/658/1943/1, 11 September 1945.

57   *Ιστορία ΠΣΕ–ΠΕΟ* [History of PSE–PEO], *op. cit.*, p. 253.

58   *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, 10 January 1947.

59   SA 1/658/1943/1, 11 September 1945.

60   An interview conducted by Xenofon Kallis and Makarios Drousiotis with Pantelis Varnava.

61   *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, 10 January 1947.

62   Republic of Cyprus, Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance for the Year 1968, Nicosia, 1969, p. 108.

faced gruelling economic conditions. It is worth noting that, in 1948, the Leftist federation launched its medical scheme to provide an opportunity for its Greek and Turkish members to benefit from free treatment in various medical units established throughout the island.[64] Eventually, an agreement was signed between PEO and KTIBK, on 8 January 1948.[65] However, only one year later, the Leftist Union was acknowledging its disappointment because typical unity with the Turkish Cypriot unionists did not imply an essential unity with the thousands of Turkish Cypriot workers.[66]

AKEL and the Turkish Cypriots – A Conflicting Relationship

AKEL was formed in 1941 by leading members of the proscribed Communist Party of Cyprus along with personalities of the Greek Cypriot middle class.[67] None of the founding members[68] of the party were Turkish Cypriot; nor did any Turkish Cypriot become a member of the partisan institutional structure and its decision-making apparatus during the period under consideration (1941–1955).[69] Even so, the establishment of AKEL constituted a radical political development. For the first time a political formation became accessible, at least theoretically, to all Cypriots regardless of their ethnic or religious origin. The party's initial constitution explicitly stated that any resident of Cyprus could become a member of AKEL 'irrespective of race, religion and sex as long as he accepts the program and the constitution of the party'.[70]

Despite the above, and irrespective of the large number of Turkish Cypriot workers who were enrolled as members of PEO, the political party of the Left (AKEL) had little influence over the 'minority'. This view is confirmed by AKEL's leadership who acknowledged the marginal hold which the party had with the Turkish Cypriot masses. In its correspondence with the Greek Communist Party ['Kommounistiko Komma Elladas' (KKE)], the leader of AKEL, Fifis Ioannou disclosed:

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63 *Hür Söz*, 6 December 1949, *Ateş*, 12 December 1949, *Halkın Sesi* 13 December 1949 and *Dimokratis* 13 December 1949.

64 Michaelides, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

65 *Ιστορία ΠΣΕ-ΠΕΟ* [History of PSE-PEO], *op. cit.*, p. 251.

66 *Πρακτικά Στ' Παγκύπριας Συντεχνιακής Συνδιάσκεψης της ΠΕΟ* [Minutes of the 6th Pancyprian Trade Union Conference of PEO], 1 and 2 May 1949, Nicosia: Archbishopric of Cyprus Library.

67 V. Protopapas (2012) *Εκλογική Ιστορία της Κύπρου: πολιτευτές, κόμματα και εκλογές στην Αγγλοκρατία (1878–1960)* [The Electoral History of Cyprus: Politicians, Parties and Elections during the British Colonial Period (1878–1960), Athens: Θεμέλιο, pp. 353–361.

68 *Ιστορία του ΚΚΚ–ΑΚΕΛ, Από τις αρχές του 20ου αιώνα μέχρι το 1981* [History of the Communist Party of Cyprus–AKEL], unpublished document of the Central Committee of AKEL, Vol. II, p. 3.

69 *Ibid*, Vols. II and III.

70 *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 21.

'In fact our work within the minorities is seriously delayed. The Turkish leadership, which prefers either the British to protect their interests, or a union with Turkey, is still brainwashing the masses of the minority and thus keeping them away from the Greek (Cypriot) popular movement.'[71]

Analogous to the above was the assessment expressed by another party official, Nicos Savvides, whose report to the 'national' communist party was also quite revealing:

'Minorities: no appreciable effort. The Turkish element is still under the influence of the Turkish reaction. The effort to establish a Democratic Political Organization of the Turks sank because we failed to find any respected Turks who would lead to its establishment.'[72]

The situation could not have been different given AKEL's determination to promote as a 'strategic necessity' the understanding by Turkish Cypriots that:

'[...] The union with Greece not only solves the national problem of the Greeks of Cyprus, but also the problem of the Turkish minority from a national interest point of view. The Turkish workers and employees need to understand this. They can understand it and they should understand it. This is also one of the major tasks of our party.'[73]

As anticipated, the reaction of the Turkish Cypriot elite against AKEL was even harsher in comparison to its stance *vis-à-vis* the Greek Cypriot Right. Unlike the latter that blatantly ignored the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community, the leadership of AKEL attempted to propagate its *enosist* policy amongst the Turkish Cypriots. Principally, under the leadership of Ezekias Papaioannou, the party made a systematic effort to persuade the Turkish Cypriots to 'understand' its policy for *enosis*. The policy of embracing the Turkish Cypriots was further materialised after the VI Congress of AKEL, in August 1949, when the party readopted '*enosis* and only *enosis*' as its national goal. The congress acknowledged the minimal effect that AKEL had upon the Turkish Cypriots and decided on a course of action to address the specific 'deficiency'. Amid others, it was recommended that the party should proceed with the formation of local organisations ['Topikes Organosis'] exclusively comprised of Turkish Cypriots, to explore closer co-operation with KITBK, and to proceed with the issuance of brochures and bulletins in the Turkish language with a view to elucidate its political programme to the Turks of Cyprus.[74] But, AKEL's endeavour to sway the 'minority' did not result in any substantial change. For the Turkish Cypriot masses,

71   ΑΣΚΙ [Archive of Contemporary Social History – ASKI] Archive KKE, Box. 371 F. 20/21/14, «Μια συνοπτική έκθεση πάνω στην κυπριακή κατάσταση και το ΑΚΕΛ» [A brief report on the situation in Cyprus and AKEL], F. Ioannou, Free Greece, November 1948.

72   ΑΣΚΙ [Archive of Contemporary Social History – ASKI] Archive KKE, Box. 371 F. 20/21/21, «Έκθεση δράσης της Κ.Ε. ΑΚΕΛ» [Action report by the Central Committee of AKEL], September, 1947–May 1949 (N. Savvides).

73   *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, 10 January 1947.

74   *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, August 1949.

beyond the abhorrent, nature of the party's chief political aim [*enosis*], the circumstances it triggered were deeply affected by political and ethnic cleavages. The collapse of the Consultative Assembly in 1948 and the aggressive competition between the Left and the Right for the domination of the Greek Cypriot national movement led to a nationalistic hysteria among the Greeks of Cyprus. The developments excited the Turkish Cypriots, and contributed further to the climax of a nationalist frenzy within their community. Under such conditions, Turkish Cypriots elevated their activity and aimed at their political unification under the 'Federation of Turkish Cypriot Associations' on 8 September 1949.[75] Fazıl Küçük, the leader of KTMBP and leading proponent of anti-communism, stated in January 1949 that 'Cyprus is Turkish and will remain Turkish. Communism is the greatest enemy of Turkey and a struggle needs to be done against communism'.[76] Given the anti-communist sentiments of Turkish Cypriots, the relations between AKEL and KTMBP led to an enduring political confrontation. In parallel the *enosist* agitation of the 'communist' Greeks of Cyprus contributed to the further escalation of anti-communist hysteria in Turkey. At a time when the Cold War representations determined the principal ideological elements of Turkish foreign policy, the annexation of a 'communist' Cyprus by Greece was conceived in panturkist circles as a step towards the Sovietisation of Greece itself.[77] The British embassy in Ankara confirmed the existence of anti-communist hysteria in the Turkish press. Nonetheless, it also stated that the attitude of the Turkish government had remained unaltered in view of the British reassurances regarding the preservation of the *status quo*.[78] Contrary to the Americans, the British were more concerned in tackling the *enosis* agitation rather than dealing with the communist 'threat'. The importance attached by the British to a *divide and rule* policy is reflected in their decision to reject the recommendation by the US Consul, in which the latter encouraged the co-operation between the Greek Cypriot Right and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, with the aim to marginalise the communist influence on the island. According to the Greek Consul in Nicosia, the Ethnarchy, dazzled by the anti-communist climate of the Greek Civil War, appeared to have been positive towards the idea, but the British Colonial Office rejected the recommendation since it anticipated that an American involvement in Cyprus, could gap the bridge between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.[79] The decision of the British government to use the Turkish Cypriots as a distraction to negate *enosis*, did not allow such political manoeuvres: particularly, after 1948, when the colonial administration encouraged the communal and political institutionalisation of the Turkish Cypriots as a political entity and, heading in this direction, it

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75   *Halkın Sesi*, 10 September 1949.

76   *Hür Söz*, 7 January 1949.

77   Ktoris, *op. cit.*, pp. 352–358.

78   CO 67/342/2, British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, 1 December 1948.

79   ΔΙΑΥΕ, [Diplomatic and Historic Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 1949, File 69, Subfile 2, Consul Liapis to Ministry to Foreign Affairs, Secret, 20 April 1949.

proceeded with the formation of the 'Turkish Affairs Committee'.[80] AKEL, having always shown interest in Turkish Cypriot affairs, commented on the growing British interest in the Turkish Cypriot community by noting that:

> 'The Cyprus Government shows lately a particular interest in Turkish affairs and has established a "Turkish Affairs Committee" which advises government on all affairs affecting Cyprus Turkish community [...] This Government interest in Turkish affairs, far from improving the position of the Cypriot Turks, aims at using them as tools for the British imperialist plans in Cyprus and the Middle East.'[81]

At variance with AKEL's analysis, the Turkish Cypriot opposition to *enosis* was not engineered by the British but it was the reaction of a minority that felt genuinely threatened by the Greek Cypriots' political aspirations. The Turkish Cypriots viewed with apprehension the political support by the Left to *enosis*, which gave a new impetus to the majority's national demand. AKEL's party newspaper *Dimokratis* had rightly claimed that *enosis* became the undisputed political objective of the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots.[82] The Turkish Cypriots, concerned by the developments in the Greek Cypriot community, decided to demonstrate their objection to *enosis* by organising open multitudinous meetings.[83] In 'response' to a large rally organised by AKEL in favour of 'Self-Government-Enosis', and a voluminous rally by the Ethnarchy in favour of 'immediate' *enosis*, the Turkish Cypriots organised a rally against *enosis* and self-government in Nicosia on 28 November 1948. The enormity of the demonstration reaffirmed that the vast majority of the Turkish Cypriots had embraced the anti-*enosist* and anti-communist perceptions of their political leadership.[84] AKEL underestimated the developments within the 'minority', particularly the political messages disclosed by the rallies of 28 November 1948 and 12 December 1949, together with the nationalist anti-communist demonstrations of the 'Turkish Student Unions' in Istanbul and Ankara. Turkish Cypriot mobilisation aimed at bringing to the fore the reaction of the Turkish Cypriots against any solution that could lead to *enosis* or self-government, as well as to condemn the 'repulsive' ideology of communism. The prominent speakers at the rallies anathematised the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots and verbally assaulted those Turkish Cypriots who, as a consequence of their participation in PEO and AKEL, were supporting communism.[85] Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş's speeches were infused with anti-Greek and anti-communist references. AKEL's leadership attributed the demonstrations to the

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80   CO 537/4041, 'Political Report on the Situation in Cyprus in June 1948'.
81   CO 537/6235, 'AKEL Information Leaflet, August 1950'.
82   *Dimokratis*, 13 December 1949.
83   *Ethnos*, 2 December 1948 and *Cyprus Mail*, 15 December 1949.
84   *Ethnos*, 30 November 1948, and *Cyprus Mail*, 30 November 1948.
85   CO 67/342/1, Acting Governor to the Minister of Colonies, 30 November 1948. The speakers referred to specific Turkish Cypriot members of PEO such as Mehmed Alkan, Hassan Hassan, and Ahmed Djahid.

'Turkish ağas and the British incitement'[86] and claimed that the feeling of anxiety among the Turks of Cyprus 'about their fate in the event of *enosis*' was largely encouraged by Britain whose aim was to provoke ill feeling between the two communities on the island.[87] Again the Greek Cypriot political elite, including AKEL had miserably failed to adequately evaluate the messages disclosed by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot reactions and thus, their stance remained unaltered and inflexible.

The Greek Cypriots, having decided in December 1949 to proceed with the materialisation of a plebiscite in support of *enosis*, totally neglected the Turkish reactions. The Greek plebiscite of January 1950 was of decisive political importance. It led to the radicalisation of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus and alarmed the Turkish government. Hereafter, Turkey would gradually publicise its objections toward the possible alteration of the island's *status quo*.[88] The Greek Cypriot political elite critically missed the mark by neglecting to acknowledge that a message of political exclusion of non-Greek Cypriots was a consequence of such *enosist* activities. By itself the organisation of the plebiscite inside the churches 'delegitimised' the political presence of Turkish Cypriots, and thereby signalled that the political future of the island lay exclusively within the political will of the Greek and Christian Orthodox majority.[89] In the Greek press of that time, an unsuccessful attempt was made to propagate the *enosist* plebiscite as reflecting the interests of all Cypriots. There were widespread reports that several hundreds of Turkish Cypriots had 'signed' in

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86   *Dimokratis*, 13 December 1949.

87   The Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), News Bulletin, Vol. I. No. 4/49, August 1949.

88   FO 371/87716, British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, 25 January 1950 and FO 371/95133, British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, 25 April 1951.

89   The element of contempt towards the Turkish Cypriots had always infiltrated the Greek Cypriot analysis. A newspaper of the Right, *Eleftheria* ['Ελευθερία'], 'amazed' by the growing demands of the Turkish Cypriots criticised the latter's anti-*enosis* demonstrations of 1944 by indicating that 'The Turkish minority is in Cyprus only because of an imperialistic war of Turkey. Thereby the Turks are not native inhabitants of Cyprus' (*Eleftheria*, 21 August 1944). Another local newspaper of the Right *I Foni tis Kyprou* ['Η Φωνή της Κύπρου'], having adopted an even more contemptuous rhetoric characterised the Turkish Cypriots as 'guests' in Cyprus who had to 'show the obliged respect to their hosts', and demanded a 'more lucid political spirit, a deeper knowledge of history, a greater respect to the sacred and just national demands of Greek Cyprus' (*Foni tis Kiprou*, 17 December 1949 and 4 December 1948).

A prominent member of AKEL in the 1940s and chief editor of *Dimokratis* newspaper ['*Δημοκράτης*'] Minos Perdios noted with discontent that, among the main reasons for the reduced influence of the Leftist movement among the Turkish Cypriots, was 'the regular contempt of the Turkish Cypriots and the negligence of their municipal and communal issues'. M. Perdios, 'Δοκίμιο Ιστορίας ΚΚΚ' [Essay of the History of KKK], Volumes I–III, unpublished document, p. 118.

A mainstream perception among the Greek Cypriot community described the Turkish Cypriots as lazy persons 'rohatlides' who could only be 'Butchers, mahalepitzides, xalouvatzides, kattimeritzides and shiamisiarides, koupatzides, paplomatades, Kebabtzides'. *Neos Kipriakos Fylax* ['*Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ*'], 26 March 1936.

favour of *enosis*.[90] However, historical data reveals that only 42 Turkish Cypriots might have voted in support of *enosis*.[91] Within the entire community of Cypriot Turks this number is too insignificant to be taken as a persuasive and credible claim that the dominant nationalist orientation of Turkish Cypriots was ever seriously challenged.

In view of the plebiscite for *enosis*, AKEL issued, on 12 January 1950, a declaration in Turkish with the intention of communicating its position to the 'minority'. AKEL urged the Turkish Cypriots not to obstruct the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots. The declaration which was mainly addressed to 'the Turkish workers, Turkish peasants and poor working Turkish people', is of particular interest, as it disclosed AKEL's main political stance *vis-à-vis* the political and social dynamics within the Turkish Cypriot community:

> '[...] The Greek Cypriots have decided to hold a peaceful referendum in order to shake off the British yoke and live freely. [...] We Greeks agree to respect the national rights and interests of minorities and especially the Turkish minority. For you the Turks it is a duty to respect the claims of your Greek countrymen who in the long term will defend your national rights.'[92]

AKEL determined that the political initiative towards the decolonisation of the island lay exclusively with the Greek Cypriots. According to the declaration, Turkish Cypriots must discard their objections and concerns and respect the political 'demands' of the majority. AKEL contended that the British and the Turkish Cypriot plutocracy were the main culprits for the animosity created between the two communities:

> '[...] The British came to Cyprus against the will of our people, who oppress both the Greeks and the Turks on an ethnic and political basis, are trying through some rich Turks to insert among you fear and to pander rivalry with the Greeks of Cyprus. [...] Even if some

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90 *Eleftheria*, 19 January 1950, *Efimerida ton Hiton*, 19 December 1949, *Eleftheria*, (Athens), 18 January 1950, *Empros*, 17 January 1950.

91 It should be acknowledged that the possibility of some names to have fraudulently been added to the lists by Greek Cypriots cannot be excluded. It is also possible that a few more Turkish Cypriots might have voted in favour of *enosis* but their names could not have been retrieved among several hundred unintelligible names. The Turkish Cypriots who signed in favour of *enosis* were, Moustafa Emir Osman (Lempa); Kasim Salih, Seker Ali (Akoursos); Liazie Emir, Aziz Ahmet, Emine Aziz, Arif Mehmet (Ktima); Tervis Houseyin Ali, Hasan Huseyin Kondo Mustafa, Abel Emib (Larnaca); Irfan Moustafa, Bayram Suleyman, Zouftou Mehmet Emir Ali, Suleyman Suleyman Ballo, Ali Salih, Bahit Camil, Ahmet R. Ali Subru, Moustafa Halil Kazim, Ahmet Ali (Limassol Agia Napa District); Unidentified, Cemal Arif (Dali); Rasit Souleyman, Osman Emizade, Huseyin Osman, Rifat Yarafus (Morfou); Moustafa Suleyman, Serif Hasan, Fezile Osman (Famagusta); Moustafa Huseyin, Houseyin Ahmet, Salih Mohammad, Ervan Houseyin, Unidentified (Limassol Agia Triada District); Ahmet Filaverti (Ayia Eirini); Arif Salih, Hasan (Pano Lefkara); Naci Houseyin (Limassol Agia Zoni Disrict); Osman Yurup (Colossi); Ali Amdah Alaz (Bogazi); Mohammad Ibrahim (Zakaki). *National Museum for EOKA Struggle*. Nicosia.

92 FO 371/87716, 'Message of the Central Committee of AKEL to the Turkish Cypriots', 12 January 1950.

Turks, especially the rich class, work with the British against the demands of the Greeks of the island this is not a reason to be resentful and annihilate each other.'[93]

The Left-wing party overestimated the impact of 'class rhetoric' upon the 'liberation' of the Turkish Cypriot masses. AKEL's tendency was to believe that the latter were simply 'prey' in the hands of their community's political and economic elite and, therefore, politically guided. However, compelling evidence demonstrates that contrary to the ideological and social divisions that cut across the Greek Cypriot community, the fear of enosis within the Turkish Cypriot community has created widespread political insecurity among them and has consequently dominated political and ideological discussions.[94] According to Wosgian the vast majority of the community's organisations – political, cultural and athletic – expressed a unified nationalist political discourse.[95] For that reason, AKEL's 'class rhetoric' was ineffective and did not have any political affinity among the Turkish Cypriots. It ignored the influence exerted by Turkish nationalism and underestimated the anxieties heaped on the Turkish Cypriot masses by the possibility of the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. Paradoxically, only a few months earlier, the extensive influence of Turkish nationalism was acknowledged by AKEL itself which noted that 'the Turkish population is in the vast majority under the influence of personified chauvinist parties'.[96] AKEL intensified its organisational efforts in order to embrace the Turkish Cypriot community, even though the element of political naiveté characterised most of the party's policies on this matter. AKEL seemed to believe that the propagation of *enosis* – being of benefit to all Cypriots – would at least convince Turkish Cypriot workers to follow a common path. In June 1951, in its correspondence with the Greek Communist Party, AKEL explained that:

'In the struggle for bread, our Party must convince the Turkish poor farmers and workers that only the national liberation is the fundamental solution of their problems, for a prosperous and free life, in a free and independent from imperialism Greece.'[97]

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93   *Ibid.*

94   *Halkın Sesi,* 5 September 1946.

95   Wosgian, *op. cit.,* p. 135. See also C. Francois (2011) *Η Κυπριακή Διένεξη 1946–1959, Τόμος Α΄* [The Cyprus Conflict 1946–1959, Vol. Α΄]. Athens: Μορφωτικό Ίδρυμα Εθνικής Τράπεζας, p. 159.
It is quite revealing, for example, that during 1948–1953, none of the Turkish Cypriot football teams participated in the AKEL controlled football association of KEPO [Kypriaki Erasitehniki Omospondia Podosfairou]. Contrariwise they chose to remain in the ranks of KOP, the federation which had adopted anti-communism as its main political banner. The division of Cypriot football occurred in the spring of 1948 due to the escalation of the ideological cleavages between AKEL and the Greek Cypriot Right. As a result the footballers with leftist political beliefs defected from KOP, and proceeded to establish a separate football association, (KEPO). Sotos Ktoris, October 2013, 'Το τουρκοκυπριακό ποδόσφαιρο στην αποικιακή περίοδο (1910–1960)' [Turkish Cypriot Football in the Colonial Period, 1910–1960], a document presented in the conference Όψεις και πτυχές της ιστορίας του ποδοσφαίρου στην Ελλάδα και στην Κύπρο' [The Facets and Parameters of the History of Football in Greece and Cyprus], Nicosia, unpublished document.

96   *Theoritikos Dimokratis,* August 1949.

97   ΑΣΚΙ [Archive of Contemporary Social History], Archive KKE, Box. 371 F. 20/21/22, «Θέσεις πάνω στο εθνικό ζήτημα» [Position on the national issue], 7 June 1951.

It is most striking for a party such as AKEL, which upheld its political predominance on the rational and pragmatic assessment of both social and political realities, to persistently degrade the developments within the Turkish Cypriot community. This raises questions about the party's belief that it could allure, with a literally utopian approach, the Turkish Cypriots. This political illusion might, to some extent, have been the result of the inconsistent 'guidance' from the 'glorious' Communist Party of Greece, which, even in 1954, reminded its Cypriot comrades that:

> 'Our position on the issue of enosis did not change [...] when the Communist Party of Greece says "a free Cyprus in a free Greece" it takes a positive position on the issue of *enosis* in the current circumstances. Besides on this issue we have talked many times with you and you know our line [...] as we have previously discussed, one of your most serious duties is your work among the Turkish community. Make a mass organization among the Turkish minority and you have nothing to fear.'[98]

AKEL, having illustrated at length its position through an article by its organisational secretary, Pavlakis Georgiou, urged its members to 'digest' 'the article by the Communist Party comrades', and in a simplified way expose to 'the Turkish party members and the Turkish people in general' the benefits they would enjoy from the party's *enosist* policy. The party's new leadership, under Ezekias Papaioannou, declared that, naturally, thousands of Turkish Cypriots should have supported the party's policies through their participation in the Leftist organisations. Furthermore, the leadership of AKEL went on to claim that the main reasons which alienated the party from the Turkish Cypriots, were framed in the wrong policies of the Communist Party of Cyprus 'which spoke of an independent republic in a Soviet Cyprus' and in the confusion created by AKEL's policies during the Consultative Assembly era.[99] AKEL called on every 'Greek, Turk and Armenian who loves Cyprus, its family and children and who wants to live free' to support the party's programme for 'enosis unconditionally and without [any] consideration' adding that the 'prize for the liberation of Cyprus for [our] brothers the Turks and the other minorities would be to pave a life without oppression or racial discrimination'.[100]

As erratic as it might sound, AKEL evoked as reasons for its reduced influence among the Turkish Cypriot community the brief adoption of self-government during the 1947–1948 period, together with the opposition of the Communist Party of Cyprus to *enosis* in the 1920s. In its findings with regard to the influence it exerted upon the Turkish Cypriots, the party showed greater pragmatism acknowledging that in general:

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98 AΣΚΙ [Archive of Contemporary Social History], Archive KKE, Box. 372 F. 20/21/6, KKE to Κ.Ε. ΑΚΕΛ, [Greek Communist Party to Central Committee of AKEL], 27 May 1954.

99 *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, December 1954.

100 ΑΚΕΛ, Μίνιμουμ Πρόγραμμα, «Η Ένωση της Κύπρου με την Ελλάδα. Χωρίς όρους χωρίς ανταλλάγματα» [Minimum Programme, The Union of Cyprus with Greece. Unconditional], Nicosia, 28 June 1952, p. 61.

'[...] The Turkish minority was still under the chauvinistic influence. [...] we have done very few things to distract the Turks from that influence. So the Turkish minority is now used as a stumbling block in our national liberation struggle.'[101]

AKEL's minimal influence over the Turkish Cypriots was an indisputable reality. The colonial government, in 1954, reported the failed attempt of the 'Turkish and Progressive Patriotic Front' – a satellite organisation of AKEL – to collect funds for the circulation of a newspaper in Turkish. The author of the report, clearly influenced by the realities of the time, wondered how 'an organization of AKEL can have any support among the Turks of Cyprus'.[102]

In the post-1950 period, the Turkish Cypriots employed the existence of a strong communist party in Cyprus as their most persuasive argument in order to upset the *enosist* aspirations of their Greek compatriots. Soon after the implementation of the plebiscite for *enosis* the Greek Cypriots launched a campaign to acquaint the international community with their political claims.[103] The Turkish Cypriots, excited by the developments, submitted a petition to the United Nations against the majority's desire for union with Greece. In their petition which was signed by the community's most prominent members it was stated, among others, that:

'[...] we further contend that Union with Greece would most likely bring to the island financial ruin, racial and social disorders, and even an ideological civil war as in the case of Greece. The ground is well prepared for such probabilities because one half of the Greeks of Cyprus are Communists [...] the Greek politicians of Cyprus are not sincere in their desire for union with Greece. The real object of the Communists is to have a union with a Communist State. Their appeal for union with the present democratic Greece is surely based upon their aim to strengthen Communism in Greece. Indeed, no one can rely upon the sincerity of such people who keep in places of honour the photographs of the personalities of communism and not those of Greece.'[104]

In 1954 the Papagos government brought the issue of *enosis* before the United Nations demanding self-determination for the people of Cyprus. Thereafter, with the encouragement and abundant support of the British, the Turkish Cypriots who were feeling increasingly threatened by Greek Cypriot political aspirations, engaged in an international campaign in order to frustrate the latter's *enosist* ambitions.[105] In meetings held in London and New York in the autumn of 1954, a Turkish Cypriot delegation comprising of Faiz Kaymak, Midhat Berberoğlu and Ahmet Zaim highlighted the fact that the *enosist* movement had gained a new momentum and become more

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101   *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, December 1954.
102   CO 926/209, 'Political report on the Situation in Cyprus in September 1954'.
103   *Ethnos*, 7 March 1950 and *Neos Dimokratis*, 16 March 1950.
104   'Turks of Cyprus Protest against the Desire of Union with Greece'. A Counter Appeal to the United Nations (1950) Nicosia: Bozkurt Press.
105   CO 926/309, The Activities of the Cypriot Turkish Delegation as from the 23 September, 8 October 1954.

violent since AKEL 'complied' with the '*enosis* and only *enosis*' policy.[106] In their view this development was inevitable as communists in Cyprus constituted 60% of the Greek population.[107] The intention of the delegation to utilise anti-communism in order to propagate opinion contrary to *enosis* was evident. The adoption of an unbending and rigid anti-communist rhetoric is gleaned from the realisation that this constituted an effective argument for mobilising western governments against Greek Cypriot national aims. In their contacts in New York they re-emphasised their positions that, unlike Greek Cypriots, Turks 'have not been affected by communism'.[108] In their memorandum presented in September 1954 they stated:

> '[...] Today it can safely be said that about 60% of the Cypriot Greeks have fallen under the influence of the Communists. This fact was proved at the Municipal and Co-operative and other village committee elections recently held, where the Communist defeated the Greek National Party with an overwhelming majority [...] The party whose policy was to oppose *enosis* and to secure self-government in Cyprus (the anti-enosis movement of the communists was so strong that in 1945 in some villages the communist supporters tore down the Greek flag and hoisted the red flag instead), in 1952 all of a sudden started to support the *enosis* movement and recently formed a common front with the National Party. It is not difficult to see that there are hidden aims behind this change of policy which no doubt was dictated from Moscow.'[109]

The British Embassy in Ankara, commenting on the results of the delegation's visit to New York, noted with satisfaction that the Turkish Cypriots 'had a successful press conference in which their statement that 60% of Greeks in Cyprus are Communists provoked enough interest'.[110] At a time when anti-communism hysteria among Turkish Cypriots culminated, AKEL continued its effort to 'pull the masses of the minorities in the national liberation struggle'.[111] The Turkish Cypriot leader, Fazıl Küçük, annoyed by the fact that the majority of Turkish Cypriot workers remained within PEO, determined, as a priority, the need to strengthen the national trade unions in order 'to limit the spread of communism among the Turkish Cypriots'.[112] Hence, a mission from Turkey

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106 CO 926/309, Representations to the UK and UN by a Turkish Delegation on a new Constitution for Cyprus, 28 September 1954. Also see FO 371/112868, 5 October 1954.

107 FO 371/112865, From the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer administering the Government of Cyprus, 20 September 1954.
   The reference to AKEL's political influence within the Greek Cypriot community was completely fallacious. The influence of the Left was further reduced during the period 1949–1953, as shown by the municipal election results of 1953. Protopapas, *op. cit.*, pp. 605–612.

108 CO 926/309, Representations to the UK and UN by a Turkish Delegation on a new Constitution for Cyprus, 28 September 1954.

109 CO 926/309, The Cypriot Turks Point of View on the Cyprus Question, 28 September 1954.

110 FO 371/112868, British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, 4 October 1954.

111 *Theoritikos Dimokratis*, August 1949.

112 CO 926/209, 'Political Report on the Situation in Cyprus in December 1954'.

under unionist leader, Nuri Beser, arrived in Cyprus to lend assistance in this direction.[113] The interference of the Turkish Cypriot political elite had an immediate and noticeable effect, since the number of Turkish Cypriot members of KTIBK rose from 470 in 1953 to 740 in 1954.[114] Soon after the outbreak of EOKA's revolt more than 1,500 Turkish Cypriots joined KTIBK which raised the total membership of the latter to 2,214.[115] EOKA's revolt was conceived by the Turkish Cypriots as irrefutable 'proof' of the irredentist nature of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement. Unsurprisingly, over the next four years, nationalist and anti-communist frenzy among the Turkish Cypriots reached its zenith and the political leadership of the community systematically declared that if *enosis* were to happen, the Communists (AKEL) would deliver Cyprus to Russia.[116]

In conclusion, the Leftist movement in Cyprus inadequately comprehended the inter-communal dynamics on the island. Contrariwise, the methodical pursuit of AKEL to attract the Turkish Cypriots into the 'Greek Cypriot national liberation struggle' provoked a strong reaction on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot political elite. The latter, having perceived both the communist 'menace' and the *enosist* agitation as paramount threats for the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community, regarded AKEL as an ideological and national opponent. As a result, AKEL's weak support from the Turkish Cypriot masses was the inevitable political outcome of its *enosist* policy and concurrently an anticipated consequence of the anti-communist dimension of Turkish Cypriot nationalism. Both of these aspects prevented any serious interaction between the Left and the Turkish Cypriot community and thus AKEL failed to acknowledge the Turkish Cypriot arguments and concerns in the formation of its 'national policy'. AKEL, despite its concerted yet unrealistic attempts to 'pull' the masses of the 'minority' under its political guidance, had no success in gaining influence within the Turkish Cypriot community. In essence, AKEL has given primacy to its systemic political preservation among the Greek Cypriots, rather than be reviewed as a hegemonic Cypriot political force that transcended pecuniary interests in both communities. In that matter AKEL was developed as a national popular Greek Cypriot party and not a party of the working people of Cyprus as a whole.

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The National Council of Cyprus

Yiannos Katsourides

Abstract

In 1975, in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion in Cyprus, President Makarios established the National Council (NC). This was a body intended to function in an advisory capacity to the President, with regard to negotiations on the Cyprus problem. Throughout most of its 40 years the Council has enjoyed the respect of the media as well as the Cypriot citizenry. However, in recent times the reason for the Council's continued existence has been questioned, with some claiming it has become redundant. Many argue that the Council has lost its legitimacy either directly – or indirectly through its constituent parts – insofar as it has failed to contribute to a solution to the Cyprus problem. This article aims to explain the NC's failure as a result of both internal politics and the overall declining public trust in political institutions in general and the NC in particular. It will examine the Council's interaction with other political institutions in the Republic of Cyprus and critically evaluate the changing context within which the Council operates. The analysis is based on a framework that integrates the recent changes that Cyprus has experienced, including EU accession.

Keywords: Cyprus, National Council (NC), legitimacy, political parties, presidents

Introduction

The study of Cyprus politics is usually related to the Cyprus problem – and not without good reason. The Cyprus problem has existed since before the *de facto* division of the island in 1974, influencing every aspect of the country's social and political life. There have been numerous strategies and measures aimed at solving the Cyprus problem, and the establishment of the National Council (NC) represents one such Greek Cypriot measure. The Council was founded in 1975 by President Makarios to advise the President in the negotiations related to the Cyprus problem after the Turkish invasion in 1974. It was also conceived as a tool to promote Greek Cypriot unity after the catastrophic effects of the 1971–1974 internecine disputes (Ker-Lindsay, 2008b).

There has been little research devoted to study of the NC, its purpose, and its status as an informal or *de facto* institution. With some notable exceptions (namely, Ker-Lindsay, 2008b) most scholarly works on the Cyprus problem usually focus on the personal (i.e. the Presidents) rather than the institutional aspects. Furthermore, most analyses concentrate on personalities, dramatic situations and controversial decisions as well as extraordinary events like the

London–Zurich agreements, the invasion, the Annan plan, etc. This article will place these types of events and information within the context of Cypriot political institutions and the interaction between the two; in such an analysis the legitimacy of political institutions is a crucial issue (e.g. Lipset, 1963). Political institutions as well as political actors can deliver as long as they enjoy the trust of their constituents. The NC derives most of its legitimacy indirectly from two sources: the political actors who represent its membership and the prominence (or not) of the theme that necessitated its foundation, that is to say, the Cyprus problem.

This article will examine the Council in terms of its mandate and whether it has been achieved. The hypothesis is that the NC has in fact failed to achieve its goals; the argument put forth is that this is largely the result of declining levels of public trust in political institutions in general and the NC in particular. The NC likely has a greater legitimacy than its constituent parts and especially political parties; moreover, it has never been linked to tangible effects directly related to the citizens, for instance, clientelistic benefits from governing, unlike the executive office and the parties. The Council's interactions with the Presidents and political parties will be scrutinised, and the changing context within which the Council functions will be evaluated critically. The framework for analysis will consider and integrate the changes that Cyprus has experienced in recent years. Intentionally the focus is on internal politics variables rather than external stakeholders' policies and influences such as Turkey's and Britain's policy.

The reason for the present analysis can be simply stated: the decisions of political institutions and executives affect our lives for good or ill (Rhodes, 2008, p. 339). In general terms, it is important to know what political actors do, why, how, and with what consequences; in this particular case study, it is critical: the NC is tasked with determining the (Greek Cypriot) strategy regarding solution of the Cyprus problem. And although the Council's status appears informal, it is the NC that brings together the two most powerful political actors in Cyprus: the President and the parties. Because of these key players, the NC – and in our hypothesis, its performance – reflects patterns of trust exhibited towards the political system. Over and above that, the Cyprus problem critically affects the lives of the citizens in many ways and a solution will certainly result in considerable changes in and for the island.

The article relies both on secondary and primary sources of information. Primary sources include interviews with the majority of the former Presidents of Cyprus and the party officials who participate in the Council. The interviews conducted were based on a semi-structured questionnaire with open-ended questions targeting a wide range of issues involving the Council. The article comprises six sections. The first section introduces briefly the concept of legitimacy of political institutions and explains the analytical framework. The second section places the NC in a historical perspective, while section three discusses the structure and mandate of the Council and section four presents the findings of the interviews. Section five analyses the developments/ variables that affect the legitimacy of the NC and section six deliberates the necessity of the Council in contemporary times.

The Need for Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a theoretically rich concept and one that is widely invoked by political scientists. In his classic work, *Political Man*, Lipset (1963) emphasised the long-term, historical process by which regimes overcome crises and evolve into political systems whose legitimacy is broadly accepted and infrequently challenged, except by fringe groups or after protracted crises of performance. Lipset (*ibid.*) maintains that people in consolidated democracies have never questioned the right to rule. Yet in most of the western world in recent decades many indicators – surveys, rise of abstention, new forms of political participation, etc. – show that the legitimacy of representative (democratic) institutions has eroded markedly.

Legitimacy refers to the belief that the established political order is right. There are two basic meanings of the concept of legitimacy: the first tests actions against rules; the second questions whether the rules are accepted as binding by the participants of a social system (Morris and Walker, 1998, p. 322). In a similar vein Thomassen and Schmitt (1999, p. 9) note that there are two ways to assess the legitimacy of a political system: the first is the normative criterion, i.e. to what extent does it conform to certain normative criteria? The second is to determine the extent to which the political system is right in the eyes of the relevant beholders, the members of the particular political system. Accordingly, legitimacy can be judged on two criteria: whether the majority of the population accepts that the institution has the right to exist and broadly fulfils its functions (positive legitimacy); and whether they see viable alternatives to that specific institution (negative legitimacy) (Matveeva, 1999, p. 23). Linz (1990, p. 147) argues that most people support the democratic formula for legitimation of authority. Elections and political participation illustrate this point.

In the context of Cyprus and especially in relation to the NC, the legitimacy of the Council has been gradually undermined by its inability: (a) to build a consensus among the Greek Cypriot political forces regarding the form of the desired solution and the method to achieve it; (b) to exercise effective pressures on Turkey and other powerful countries in the direction of promoting a solution to the Cyprus problem – the actual goal and *raison d'être* of the Council throughout its 38 years of existence. It has also been weakened, especially in recent years, by a negative spill-over effect from the two institutions that comprise the NC: the political parties and the presidency, both of which suffer low public esteem. This essay will use an analytical framework to scrutinise and assess various aspects that relate to the Council's legitimacy.

Analytical Framework

The analytical framework of the current investigation considers both external parameters that influence the Council, and the internal workings of the Council as each impact on its legitimacy. The framework is built around the much-debated topic of the legitimisation crisis of political parties as carriers of democracy, representation and government (Daalder, 1992; Mair, 2005). Those who criticise current political practice call for greater and more authentic citizen

participation in the political process (Scaff, 1975, p. 447), while directing their strongest criticism at the political parties. Party crisis is not new, and is related to concrete social, economic and political changes occurring on national and international levels; at the same time, it is also reflected in changes to the institution of political parties *per se* (Daalder, 1992). The present analysis will look at changes in the party system, since the political parties are one of the two key components of the Council.

Europeanisation comprises the second factor in analysing the wider context within which the NC operates. This variable, which describes a process of transformation at the national as well as the EU level, will be examined because of the way in which it affects national political structures in EU member states – which is the focus of most of the literature on the subject (e.g. Radaelli, 2000). Considering the effect of Europeanisation reveals the political actors' adaptive responses to a changed or changing environment. This factor affects member countries differently, depending on the existing national cleavage structures, the political and administrative cultures and institutions, party organisational structures, size of the country and so on. The small size of Cyprus renders the country more vulnerable in this process. An inevitable consequence of Europeanisation is the reduced power of national governments in terms of creating policy, thus affecting both the President's and parties' impact.

A third important factor is the new media environment, especially the rise in social media. In combination with the traditionally powerful role of television, the new media has an even stronger impact on the political environment. The media have (and have always had) their own agenda on the Cyprus issue, which often conflicts with the NC or some of its members. This enlarged media has placed added pressure on the political parties and the NC to deliver efficiently and forces politicians to accept the notion of political accountability.

Developments regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem *per se* are a fourth factor that influences both the performance of, and the perceptions about, the NC. Given the primacy of the Cyprus problem in the public and party-political agenda for decades, as well as the fact that it is the sole mandate of the NC, it is tautological to say that the credibility and the viability of the Council depend on the state of negotiations. When negotiations are in an active phase the NC and its potential influence will come to the fore; the opposite will occur in periods of inaction. Moreover, if the people's expectations for a solution (or a good solution) are not met, this will reflect negatively on the NC's credibility and necessity.

The dynamics of party competition are also an important variable, given the parties' role in the Council and the fact that parties are the major power players in Cyprus. Party dynamics refer to the way party competition takes place, the electoral campaigns, public sentiment on various aspects of the Cyprus problem, changing political alliances; all these have the potential to affect the workings of the Council. Political parties also represent the most critical variable that can exercise some form of check and balance on the President's authority (Ker-Lindsay, 2008a).

Finally, in the Cypriot governmental system, there is enormous power vested in the presidential office, placing the elected President at the heart of the political system. Therefore, the

relationship between a President and the NC will critically affect the way in which the Council performs. The relationship between the presidential office and other institutions is equally important.

The Council in Historical Perspective

Any analysis of a country's political institutions must include an examination of the country's national traditions (Von Beyme, 2008, p. 750). Finding a solution to the Cyprus question/ problem/issue has been the most predominant preoccupation of Cypriot political actors since the 1878 British occupation of Cyprus – hence, it is quite a long-standing tradition. There have been many and varied outlooks on the Cyprus question throughout the twentieth century, with union with Greece (*enosis*) being dominant for the greater part of this time. The historical roots of the Council can be traced to certain Greek Cypriot organisations promoting *enosis* in the 1920s (Georghallides, 1979; Katsourides, 2013a). The hegemony of *enosis* was institutionally crystallised in the form of the various ethnic organisations within which the Church of Cyprus and a number of nationalist, lay politicians had a pivotal role.

The term National Council initially emerged in 1921, at which time it referred to the most respected and influential organ of one of these ethnic organisations, the *Political Organisation of Cyprus* (*Eleftheria*, 1921, p. 4). The National Council was the heart of this organisation, which was chaired by the Archbishop and included *ex officio* the four higher Prelates and another 40 lay members appointed through indirect elections from the six districts of Cyprus. The NC was delegated comprehensive powers and was exclusively responsible for directing and coordinating the *enosis* struggle. The violent insurrection of October 1931 terminated all political activities in Cyprus for almost a decade. When political activity re-emerged in the 1940s, the game had changed: now there were strong left and right groups that were ideologically opposed (Christophorou, 2006). It was no longer possible to successfully coordinate a common stance against the British, and the EOKA armed struggle in 1955–1959 only further aggravated the tension between left and right.

With Cyprus' independence in 1960, the political system of the country was radically reconstructed. The Constitution as it was drawn up provided for a clear separation of powers: executive power is exercised by the President, who appoints the cabinet and is not held accountable to the Parliament, which plays a secondary role within the political system compared to the executive. The role of the President became even more empowered after the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriots from the governing institutions in 1964. Cyprus entered an era of turbulence and violence between the two communities and between left and right – a friction that was encouraged and nourished by western countries and the two 'mother lands'. Ultimately this led to the Greek junta-led *coup d' état* and the subsequent Turkish invasion in July 1974.

The National Council re-emerged in 1975 in the aftermath of the Turkish invasion as a forum for bringing together Greek Cypriot political forces. President Makarios established the Council as

a presidential advisory body with the purpose of facilitating a common stance on the Cyprus problem within the Greek Cypriot community and as a means for Makarios to be aware of the parties' positions and their possible reactions in different situations (Lyssarides interview). The first meeting of the NC took place on 21 January 1975 and participants included all political parties represented in the Parliament at the time. It also served another function: it aimed to build national unity among the Greek Cypriots after years of fierce intra-ethnic fighting (Ker-Lindsay, 2008b, p. 125). The NC has no constitutional or legal foundation because it was intended that way (Christofias interview).

During the Makarios era the Council held joint meetings with the Cabinet on several occasions. According to the former president of EDEK, V. Lyssarides (interview), Makarios' intention was not to have more people supporting his views; he did not need that. Rather, he wanted to hear more opinions and ideas regarding the handling of the negotiations and also wanted to involve the cabinet in political affairs. Lyssarides believes that this was a correct decision by Makarios because the Cabinet is not a technocratic body and is inevitably involved in political affairs, especially when the ministers travel abroad and are obliged to present the Cyprus case to foreign officials. Regardless, this practice was abolished after Makarios death.

Structure and Mandate of the Council

The NC is structured around political parties and RoC presidents, those serving in addition to former presidents. In terms of the political parties, their participation in the Council is dependent upon their representation in the House of Representatives. Unlike similar institutions that comprise a strong executive representation, for instance, the USA's National Security Council, the NC is more party political in nature. Because the Council is an informal institution, it has neither administrative personnel nor financial resources.

Prior to 1988 the NC operated under a set of unwritten, and as such, inconsistently applied, rules. When G. Vassiliou was elected President in 1988, he convened the body in an effort to revitalise it, as it had been practically non-functioning due to intense conflict between the former president, S. Kyprianou, and the political parties AKEL and DISY. Vassiliou aimed to instil an ethos of collectivity and consensus into the workings of the NC not least because he did not have the backing of a strong power base (only AKEL). The Council agreed to the following: the reactivation of the NC with the participation of the party leaders whose parties were represented in the House of Representatives; the participation of those parties that polled at least 5% in the most recent parliamentary or presidential elections (the threshold at the time was 8%); regular monthly meetings (Vassiliou interview).

These terms have remained in effect ever since with some minor adjustments. As an example, during Vassiliou's presidency even the parties without the minimum threshold were allowed to attend the meetings. Further, it was decided during the Clerides presidency that one person could accompany the leader of each party to the sessions. It was also agreed that several additional officers

would be allowed to sit in on meetings as observers in an effort to capitalise on collective wisdom; these included former Presidents of the Republic, the President of the House of Representatives, the General Attorney, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Government Spokesman and the Secretary to the President (Clerides, 2001).

At a 2001 meeting under Clerides, it was reaffirmed that the Council would convene monthly, although the President had the right to call more frequent meetings. While the agenda is set by the President, NC members may request inclusion of any issue which, if agreed by a majority, will be incorporated. The structure of discussions does not allow dialogue among the members of the body. Council meetings are held behind closed doors, shrouded in secrecy and confidentiality. The body has the authority to refer any issue to supporting committees for consideration and advice.

Council interaction with other major political institutions is largely a function of its powers, both formal and informal. It also depends on its scope of activities – which as we have stated, are strictly confined to the Cyprus problem. The NC has no formal authority over the President of the Republic; it functions solely in an advisory capacity. It is the President who has sole responsibility for negotiations and strategy related to the Cyprus problem; and it is the President who determines the workings of the NC and the weight attributed to its decisions.

After Kyprianou's assumption of the presidency, the NC underwent various phases including its *de facto* neutralisation in between 1985–1988 due to intense party struggle. Kyprianou handled the negotiations personally and dismissed the negotiator at the time (T. Papadopoulos), also making it clear that he would not be bound by the majority views in the Council (Ker-Lindsay, 2008b, p. 127). After Vassiliou's election in 1988, it was decided that the President would have to abide by any NC decisions that were agreed unanimously (Vassiliou interview). However, it was also established that the President could call a referendum if he strongly disagreed with the result. That said, the principle of unanimity allows the President considerable room for manoeuvre given that he is always supported by at least one party. When Clerides assumed office he further stipulated: 'since there is no constitutional provision for the existence of the NC, the commitment of the president to implement unanimous decisions is not legally binding, but bears with it significant moral and political weight' (Clerides, 2001).

The 1988 agreement also provided that 'in the absence of unanimity the president will take seriously into consideration the opinion held by the majority of the parties' (Vassiliou interview). Clerides (2001) interpreted the term majority to refer to the vote share of the parties rather than their arithmetic aggregation. Therefore, he declared that he would earnestly consider the opinion of those parties in the Council whose vote share exceeded 50% on aggregate. The NC continued to operate under the same set of informal rules until very recently, when President Anastasiades proposed the following amendments, which were agreed: the appointment of a negotiator to handle the talks with the Turkish Cypriot side instead of the President, thus revitalising a Makarios practice of the 1970s; the President will be obliged to abide by those decisions taken by parties that represent 75% of the electorate, consequently striking the unanimity precondition (he

maintains the right to call a referendum); the establishment of a permanent secretariat of the Council staffed by an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Papadopoulos, 2013a; *Haravgi*, 2013). Previously, Christofias (interview) had created a number of working groups to facilitate the process of negotiation: government and sharing of power, European Union, finances, territorial settlement, properties, and safety.

The NC has only ever had indirect powers, and these invariably depend on the will and ability of the political parties to exercise pressure on the President. Unanimity and efficiency of the Council are both difficult considering its size and the varying viewpoints of its members. After all, the Cyprus problem is a political problem, which by definition renders consensus a testing mission. Besides, the dynamics underlying party competition, especially in campaign periods, further impede efforts to achieve consensus. Throughout the years the NC has been most productive in fulfilling its role when members accompanied the President abroad during negotiations (Lyssarides interview). Beyond these occasions the Council's track does not seem hopeful: the NC managed to reach almost unanimity only in the late 1970s when they concurred on the bi-communal, bi-zonal federation and in 1989 when they agreed to a framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Subsequent agreement was usually related to procedural issues, in abstract principles and in 'quiet periods' than on contentious and substantive issues and in turbulent times.

The following section presents the data from interviews with former Presidents of Cyprus and party leaders in an effort to identify their stances on the various issues that affect the performance of the Council as well as its future.

Findings

The information submitted in this section is based on personal interviews conducted on the basis of a semi-structured questionnaire. The questions focus on how the two most eminent political actors in Cyprus (presidents and parties) view their participation in, and the workings of, the NC. The findings are offered without comments in this section. If a reference is not quoted, it indicates that all respondents gave the same answer.

The presidents

- Party competition heavily influences NC functioning, usually in a negative way
- The NC is an important institution (except Vassiliou)
- The NC remains a necessary institution if working properly
- At present, the NC does not work effectively
- Most NC work must continue under cover of secrecy
- The President always works in cooperation with the governing party, and this is critical (except Vassiliou)
- The Council should have technical support in the form of *ad-hoc* committees and expert knowledge

- Each president considers his term as the most productive
- The NC must continue to deal exclusively with the Cyprus problem
- Leakage of documents and information inhibits the workings of the Council

The political parties

- Party competition heavily influences the workings of the NC, usually in a negative way – especially true during electoral campaigns
- Unanimity is difficult to achieve
- The NC is an important institution
- The NC remains a necessary institution if working properly
- At present, the NC does not work effectively. The way the meetings are held only allows monologues, which is counterproductive
- It is important that the Council has technical support in the form of *ad-hoc* committees and expert knowledge
- The NC needs permanent scientific, technocratic and administrative support (Garoyian, Syllouris and Perdikis)
- The NC needs to become a legalised institution with its own economic and human resources (Perdikis)
- Beyond unanimity, those decisions taken with enhanced majority (i.e. parties that represent more than 75% of the electorate) must be binding for the president (Garoyian, Neophytou)
- Intra-party preparations and coordination take place before NC sessions
- Parties are only bound by NC decisions with which they agree
- There were no important disagreements with their 'own' president
- Most NC work must continue to be governed by secrecy
- The NC must continue to deal exclusively with the Cyprus problem (except Perdikis)

The Council in Context: Legitimacy Revisited

The NC does not operate in a vacuum, and while in the past the Council enjoyed positive attention and deference this is no longer the case. In an increasingly volatile political setting, various signs suggest that change is afoot. These changes are considered below, based on the analytical framework described earlier and the interview findings. These suggest diminished levels of legitimacy for political institutions and personnel.

Party Crisis

In Cyprus the political parties are at the centre of the entire political structure, playing a crucial role in every aspect of political life (for a more detailed discussion on the role of parties in recruiting the political elite in Cyprus, see Katsourides, 2012). Their stranglehold in society has been

undisputed for years. Nevertheless, in recent times the Cypriot political system has experienced a crisis of legitimacy and, quite naturally, the party system is at the heart of this crisis. As the literature on political apathy has argued, in the last three decades, growing numbers of EU citizens feel negatively about the main institutions of their national democratic system (Betz 1993, p. 413). The same trends have been apparent in Cyprus too in the years following the country's accession to the EU. The current economic calamity has further aggravated the problem.

Prior to EU accession Cypriot society was characterised by high politicisation and party loyalty, which were likely related to the unresolved national problem of Cyprus and obligatory voting (CIVICUS, 2005). But today, there are strong indications of party dealignment. Cyprus' accession to the EU has made obligatory voting essentially redundant and the voter has been free to change his/her traditional voting behaviour. The 2008 European Social Survey (ESS) revealed that 37% felt no party affiliation. Abstention rates reached a record 41% in the European elections of 2009, 21.3% in the latest national elections in May 2011 and 18.42% in the recent presidential elections of February 2013 – an extremely unusual phenomenon in Cyprus politics. The public's trust in political, social and representative institutions and politicians is at an historic low (table 1). The Eurobarometers also verify this trend. Moreover, political parties are seen as nests of corruption: in a recent survey of the Transparency International Cyprus branch, an astonishing 99% believe that the parties are corrupt (Orphanidou, 2013).

Table 1: Levels of Trust in Political Institutions in Cyprus (scale 0-10)

	2008	2010	2012
Trust in country's parliament	5.44	4.59	3.14
Trust in the legal system	6.24	5.63	4.04
Trust in the politicians	4.38	3.59	5.10
Trust in political parties	4.26	3.52	2.69

Source: ESS Surveys 2008, 2010 and 2012

These developments, compounded by a highly volatile and divisive political terrain, reflect on the NC's levels of trust. Indicatively, a survey conducted for the CyBC during the electoral campaign for the 2011 parliamentary elections revealed that from 1996 to 2011 (15 years) trust in the Council fell from 93% to 73%.[1] It is not only in public opinion surveys that the lack of respect for the Council is evident; the actors themselves state that within the NC itself there is a lack of respect for the Council and opposing party members. In the interviews undertaken for this

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1   CyBC 1 Poll, 17 April 2011.

analysis, all political parties and Presidents identified the ill-mannered way that the members treat the workings of the Council as the most important deficit. Of course, each party blamed the other. This situation of disrespect is, in turn, communicated to the people and reflected in public opinion surveys. Thereupon, a vicious circle of disappointment in the political system is created, nourished by the politicians themselves and the media.

Europeanisation

Cyprus, as a very small island, is extremely vulnerable to EU pressures. There are three major areas where the effects of Europeanisation impact on the NC: (a) the loss of state sovereignty, which undermines government and party authority, consequently compromising their legitimation; (b) EU promotion of civil society/citizen action, which is slowly transforming the island's political culture; (c) European involvement in negotiations around the Cyprus problem. Although the NC has no direct involvement with the EU, the sum of the above factors points to a new political culture in which the once distinguished and powerful institutions (i.e. political parties, executives) are losing power to new, less conventional political actors such as civil society organisations and the media, as well as EU-empowered mechanisms.

The Maastricht Treaty has accelerated a process whereby state sovereignty is constantly reduced – voluntarily or not – in the name of 'more Europe' (Ladrech, 2010, p. 133; Bale, 2008, p. 40). The scope and organisation of the public sector have been contested; in turn, this has reduced the potential for political parties and politicians to implement meaningful policies since it deprives them of their traditional tools. The strengthening of supranational organisations like the EU weakens political party influence as well as their power (Bosco and Verney, 2012, p. 132). Loss of state sovereignty directly affects the parties, especially as they are increasingly connected and dependent on the state (see the cartel thesis of Katz and Mair, 1995). As party and executive competencies are progressively more removed or reduced through EU legislation, these institutions become less viable and reliable – citizens lose trust in them because they no longer can fulfil their promises.

Thus far, politics and especially the unresolved Cyprus problem have dominated all aspects of the social and institutional life of Cyprus (CIVICUS, 2011, p. 28). Over-politicisation in a country with an unresolved ethnic problem is thought to lead to a relative atrophy of civil society and a prominence of political parties (Mavratsas, 2003, p. 121). Yet, this is changing (see for example Taki and Officer, 2008). The EU actively encourages citizen participation and engagement through civil society and other forms of interest group representation as an alternative to political parties; the result is the undermining of conventional partisan channels (Beyers and Kerremans, 2004). Parties are thus left with little opportunity to act authoritatively and their role diminishes compared to other actors.

In Cyprus, party crisis and Europeanisation have led to the transformation of the island's political culture from a system of institutionalised to individualised pluralism. Under institutionalised pluralism, 'political elites, and for the most part only elites, matter' (Kernell, 1997, p. 12). These elites include political parties, the Church, the trade and employers unions and other

powerful economic elites. Individualised pluralism, however, has led to the devolution of power and the weakening of parties, thus resulting to a growth in interest groups, which has greatly expanded the number of political actors. The new individualisation has brought with it a cultural shift in the way Cypriots place their demands. The earlier collective and organised mobilisation through the mediation of political parties and trade unions seems to have been replaced by distaste for collective forms of action and conventional politics (for the changed nature of Cypriot politics see Faustmann, 2008; Katsourides, 2013b).

The most significant political development attributed to the Europeanisation process is the bringing together of the two main ethnic communities of the island to work towards a common vision and purpose – that of EU membership. Indeed, the prospect of Cyprus' accession to the EU acted both as leverage towards promoting a solution but also a means to reunite the two communities. All political parties and presidents stress the EU's huge influence on finding a solution to the Cyprus problem. The EU has actively promoted bi-communal co-operation and exercised pressures for the solution of the problem: for instance through financial help pacts.

Even so, developments in the post-referendum era have questioned EU influence and reduced Greek Cypriot optimism for a possible solution. Discontent was intense because certain EU officials (namely the Commissioner for Enlargement at the time, Gunter Verheugen) supported the Annan plan, which they believed was compatible with the *acquis communautaire*. Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, perceived the Plan to be contrary to the EU's legal order. The Greek Cypriot public has been disappointed with the EU's contribution to a fair solution to the Cyprus problem and the punitive way Cyprus was treated in the aftermath of the referendum. Therefore, the negotiations slated for autumn 2013 and EU participation in these will be very critically assessed by a sceptic Cypriot public.

Party Competition

All party leaders identified inter-party competition as crucial to party dealings with the Council. In fact, George Perdikis, MP and acting leader of the Greens, believes that the NC serves as little more than a forum for political parties to score points against each other, going so far as to compare the Council to a chicken coop. What is more, the general consensus among political actors is that the parties' use of the NC for their own purposes renders the Council practically illegitimate; certainly it commands no respect in the eyes of the public. Party politicking also undermines any chance of agreed strategies between the parties and the President. As a case in point, DISY withdrew from the NC in February 2006 (Pantelides interview) arguing that its function and usefulness should be reconsidered. Some of the interviewees, however, believe that DISY used the NC as a campaign strategy for the presidential elections of 2008 in its effort to delegitimise President Papadopoulos (Kyprianou, Christofias, Pantelides interviews). Christofias went even further, suggesting that during the second half of his tenure most parties (excluding AKEL) plotted against him during NC meetings in order to discredit his proposals, his party and himself. Recently, President Anastasiades and most political parties refused to allow G. Lillikas' newly formed Citizens Alliance

to participate in the NC on grounds that it had not taken part in elections (*Simerini*, 2013). The party itself argued that the real reason for its exclusion lies in the threat posed to other parties by its presence in the Council (Papadopoulos, 2013b). All those interviewed recognised that manipulation of the NC is strongest during electoral campaign periods.

Changing political alliances are also a factor influencing the Council's operations. Because not one party can command sufficient public support to elect a President, the political parties must forge alliances. All presidents since Makarios have been elected in some alliance and lost the support of the parties that contributed to their election at some point of their tenure – reflected in relation to all aspects of their administration, the Cyprus problem not excluded. Furthermore, the Cyprus problem was at times the primary reason for the break-up of their alliances. Usually coalition partners support the President to whose election they contributed, albeit in varying degrees (Christofias, Kyprianou interviews). As a result, the fact that in Cyprus governments are always coalition in nature, and because the Council's make-up is political, its functioning will always be subject to the drive for executive power. Consequently, it is anticipated that a significant degree of fluidity will be constantly present.

The Cyprus Problem

Subsequent to the 2004 referendum on the Annan plan, the dynamics surrounding the Cyprus problem have radically altered; this has had repercussion on the NC in two ways that have lessened its credibility and increased the perception that it is redundant. First, the Annan plan served to divide Cypriot society in a way that has left a mark on political attitudes and behaviours, changing the way citizens view the political parties' and the President's authority on the issue. The referendum allowed the citizens, for the first time, to have a direct say on a solution to the Cyprus problem, which ultimately meant that they could dissociate themselves from their traditional attachment to a particular political party and/or President. Cypriots realised they could and should take a personal stance on the issue because it was far too consequential to let someone else decide. This concurs with the picture of individualism analysed above.

Second, in the aftermath of the failed referendum on the Annan plan, there is the widespread belief that the Cyprus problem cannot be solved and an increased pessimism over the situation. This residual pessimism questions the NC right to have sole authority to decide on the issue. Besides, the Council's inability to reach a solution only encourages disrespect and questions regarding its legitimacy. Moreover, the time distance from the 1974 events combined with the false expectations for a solution have reduced the importance of the Cyprus problem on the political agenda. A number of recent surveys have confirmed a shift in focus – for the first time in the electoral history of Cyprus – on the economy instead of the Cyprus problem. The marginalisation of the Cyprus problem is also linked to the ongoing economic crisis. The 2012 Spring Eurobarometer (EB 79) reveals that Cypriots consider the economic situation (75%) and unemployment (72%) as the two most crucial issues their country faces today. Given that the Cyprus problem has taken a backstage position it creates conditions for the NC's further marginalisation.

Media and Accountability

The media is directly related to the accountability of political institutions and politicians. Mulgan (2003, p. 113) has documented that accountability is seriously compromised when the executive is over-dominant – as this can easily lead to a situation where the President is above public scrutiny. This is also a situation that many believe describes Cyprus. Popular demand for accountability of public officials has never been higher, and the media has as a result become increasingly significant. A recent survey investigating patterns of elite recruitment and career paths in Cyprus indicated that tenure rates are diminishing – a reflection of changing values *vis-à-vis* governing (Katsourides, 2012). On the one hand, public expectations are considerably higher now; on the other, politicians' personal and professional careers are scrutinised by a number of institutions that only recently came into being – the mass (and social) media in particular. Both factors render accountability an increasingly critical value. Politicians are today more easily expendable: mistakes and/or bad judgments are difficult to hide and may easily result in a politician's loss of position and/or reputation.

Until quite recently, the media in Cyprus was restricted to a few television networks and the newspapers; now there is a highly competitive and diffuse media environment that includes the progressively popular social media. The contemporary media has made it more difficult for the Council to keep their workings secret and for the President and parties to rally the public behind a chosen cause. Additionally, the various media each has their own agenda, especially with regard to the Cyprus problem. Most newspapers and television stations are clearly right or left in their stance, for or against the governing party and their politics. This means that the media has the potential to create/promote an environment that is unfavourable to the President's positions (Christofias interview). But the opposite is also true: a supportive media can bias listeners in favour of the President's position. At the same time, the President and party representatives can use the media to their advantage, purposively leaking documents or Council dialogues in order to serve specific goals, for example, discredit opponents. Tassos Papadopoulos was very critical of the National Council complaining that any confidential document was immediately leaked (Pantelides interview). The new setting in the media after the outbreak of the private/commercial media in the post-1990 era and the new social media in the post-2000 period has increased the volume of information made public. In turn, this has resulted in the need for politicians to find ways to link with the media in order to attract visibility. Leaking documents and decisions from the Council is a convenient way to do this. At the same time this practice creates a paradox which puts into question the usefulness of the body: the talks about the Cyprus problem require confidentiality which the Council seems impossible to provide, thus the body becomes an obstacle to the goal it was created for.

Although Council meetings are supposed to be confidential and closed to the press and the public, for many years now the debates have been out in the open, which reduces the use of meetings (Ker-Lindsay, 2008b, p. 132). The growing power of the media has encouraged and facilitated this situation, with politicians offering journalists information in a mutually beneficial relationship. All the same, leaking confidential information only serves to further weaken the NC's

influence over the public and makes NC members more cautious – especially with regard to written statements (Kyprianou, Neophytou interviews). However, neither the parties nor the Presidents interviewed believe that Council meetings should be totally transparent: the issues discussed are extremely sensitive and if strategies were made public then Turkey could easily gain the upper hand in negotiations. Despite the conviction of all interviewees that NC members must be informed in detail of everything that is related to the Cyprus problem, this is not always the case. In April 2013, President Anastasiades admitted that he had kept a document secret from the NC because he feared that it would be made public.

As the changing context in which the NC operates is determined by the rise of the various media and the increased demand for accountability, it means that decisions regarding the Cyprus problem are no longer veiled in secrecy or sacredness. On the contrary, they are under constant scrutiny and open to discussion.

Presidential Authority and the NC

The Cyprus constitution gives the President of the Republic enormous power: the President serves as head of both the state and the government, and has been likened to an 'elected absolute monarch' (Ker-Lindsay, 2008a, p. 107). Presidential authority has been almost impossible to challenge despite certain signs of change in recent years. The fact that the President also has sole responsibility (since the death of Makarios) for negotiating the solution to the Cyprus problem adds substantial moral weight to the office. For this reason, NC operations will be dependent on the specific President and his attitude to the Council. Ker-Lindsay (2008b, pp. 128–132) argues that Vassiliou and Clerides treated the NC with greater respect than Kyprianou and Papadopoulos, albeit for different reasons, but not all interviewees agreed with this assessment (Pantelides, Christofias, Garoyian interviews). When the Presidents and the parties were asked to rate the presidencies they all ranked their own candidates/parties highest. Lyssarides (interview) believes that the Council operated more effectively under Makarios because he was the only president who had no insecurities and he enjoyed almost total public support.

Deference towards the serving President has been changing in recent times, although this has been a feature of Greek Cypriot political culture for decades (at its apex in the Makarios era). Today, the presidency is treated with less respect by the political parties as well as the public. The Mari incident[2] and the public response are highly illustrative of this changed mentality. In that period and since, issues of transparency and accountable government came to the fore – unrelated to the Cyprus problem *per se*. Come what may, because the authority of political institutions and personnel has been called into question, public trust in the President's ability to handle the Cyprus problem as well will be affected.

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2   The incident concerned the explosion of a confiscated cargo of (Russian) ammunition destined for Syria, which caused many deaths as well as the destruction of the island's main electric power station.

In another vein, the President is under no obligation to accept NC recommendations, even if he stands alone in his position (Ker-Lindsay, 2008b, p. 133). A prime example is former President S. Kyprianou's unrelenting stance in 1985 on the Cyprus problem. A President who is too authoritarian, who is seen as stubborn and unreceptive to criticism and ideas different from his own, risks losing the public's trust and respect. But, a certain degree of pressure can be exercised on the President as was evident during Christofias administration. Christofias' proposals during the negotiations – that is to say, the provision for a system of a rotating presidency between the two communities and a mixed voting system between Greeks and Turks – were severely criticised by all parties apart from AKEL. The majority of political parties demanded that these proposals be withdrawn.

Traditional means to effectively exert pressure on the President include the mobilisation of public opinion and parliamentary voting on issues not necessarily linked to the Cyprus problem. The political parties claimed more power in the post-1974 era, and in recent years they have been able to utilise both mechanisms effectively to pressure the President. During Christofias' term for the first time ever the Parliament intervened in the President's exercise of power. This could represent the beginning of a change in the relationship between the two institutions (executive and legislature). The Cyprus constitution stipulates that the President and the Parliament derive their authority independently of one another and that the President is the highest authority. In such a system, both branches of government have incentives to bargain in order to produce legislation and to govern (Shugart, 2008, p. 346). It remains to be seen whether the balance of power will continue to shift or be restored to the President. This will be inextricably linked with political alliances.

A final remark on the President's authority in relation to the Council: President Anastasiades has declared that he will be bound by any NC decision that is backed by political parties representing at least 75% of the electorate. While Anastasiades will benefit from the safety net that DISY always polls more than 25%, subsequent Presidents whose backing parties are smaller may have trouble. Moreover, the appointment of a negotiator to handle the negotiations could further compromise presidential authority. These actions leave many grey areas and, some journalists have wondered who would be the ultimate decision-maker, whose voice would carry the final authority (Dionysiou, 2013, p. 4).

Is the National Council a Redundant Institution?

The preceding examination of the National Council brings to the fore the issue of the NC's usefulness in the current political environment in Cyprus. Although an academic analysis cannot provide all the answers, it can review the situation and make recommendations. It is ultimately the politicians who will decide the future of the NC.

As stated at the outset, the Council was established primarily to formulate state policy regarding the Cyprus problem and to inform the Presidents on the various party stances. As long as the Cyprus problem remains unsolved and continues to enjoy priority in the political agenda,

the preconditions exist for the NC to play an active and respected role. But for all that, the economic crisis that has spread throughout the European Union and more recently and very dramatically in Cyprus, has taken centre stage, side-lining the Cyprus problem. On top of that, for reasons explained earlier, the public has become less trusting in the authority and role of the Council, the President and the political parties. In view of these developments, the public views the NC as almost redundant.

In stark contrast, the political actors involved believe that the NC is a very significant institution and that there is still a place for the Council. This could be seen as a self-serving argument since the body gives the party leaders additional significance and media exposure. However, for the Council to exist in any meaningful way, legitimacy is crucial: the Council must have a fair degree of either direct or indirect legitimacy. Therefore, the NC must successfully address issues of accountability, commitment to promises, and show an ability to reach a minimum consensus among political forces. The political parties and the President must guide the NC in its bid for greater legitimacy, especially in view of the forthcoming negotiations in autumn 2013. This means that the Council must adapt to the changing environment, especially in the way it performs. By way of illustration it must become more efficient in terms of arriving at a consensus on the Greek Cypriot stance in relation to the Cyprus problem; a very hard to achieve task. This was identified by all actors as the one factor that will make the Council more responsible, more accountable and more trusted by the public.

The majority of those interviewed complained that NC meetings produce little more than a repetition of standard party positions, and all concurred that a substantive dialogue was imperative. Because political authority in the Cyprus system is fragmented among political actors, compromise is key to NC effectiveness. For the NC to operate more efficiently, those involved must reverse the rationale underpinning its current operation: turn the Council from an end in itself to a means to an end. Here, the end is the policy mandate on a Cyprus solution; the Council is in fact the means to achieve the end.

All actors were of the same opinion that Council meetings required better coordination and preparation, as well as expert technical knowledge. Where they did not agree is whether this support should be formal and permanent (Perdikis, Garoyian, Syllouris, Lyssarides) or more *ad-hoc* in nature (Christofias, Kyprianou, Pantelides). Many suggested that certain issues should be subcontracted to scientific/scholarly institutions either created precisely for the NC or hired for specific purposes. However, the political nature of the Cyprus problem must be considered, since ultimately the Cyprus problem is a political issue, which suggests that technocrats alone cannot substitute political decisions. Yet, how will consensus occur when Cyprus holds elections at least every two years and the Cyprus problem is always high on all party platforms? All those involved in negotiating a solution are competing for political power; and uniting them behind a common stance is no easy task. Efficiency implies the dissociation of political motives from the workings of the Council; this is easier said than done.

Conclusions

The National Council of Cyprus, like the majority of political institutions today, suffers from a loss of legitimacy and public trust. Also, the once prominent Cyprus problem – the Council's focus and *raison d'être* – has recently taken a back seat to the economic crisis sweeping through Europe. The Council must regain a substantial measure of legitimacy if it is to continue to operate effectively and with the public's support and trust. The recent shift in the political focus away from the Cyprus problem might actually serve to help the NC redesign the way it operates – which is crucial in light of the forthcoming (re)start of the negotiations (for a Cyprus solution) in autumn 2013. In fact, the Council has begun to make efforts in this direction, although it is the legitimacy of the political actors that is the most critical variable in terms of the Council's authority and legitimacy.

Historical institutionalism has demonstrated that institutional traditions are not easy to change (Von Beyme, 2008, p. 752). They can adopt new purposes and methods of work and continue to exist. The reorganisation does not necessarily mean that the NC will or must completely break with the practices and methods of the past; it is more likely that the Council will enact adaptive measures that suit the needs of a changing environment. There is a clear need for scientific and technocratic support, collectivity in decision making and increased accountability of its constituent parts. All internal changes must be grounded in institutional changes, and must also reflect a change in the Council's relationship with other institutions within the political system. Council members themselves proposed several ideas for better functioning of the body: organisation that is innovative; setting up supportive mechanisms, and; ensuring the Council's greater accountability to the public. Nonetheless, should all these processes be implemented, the most vital measure relates to the political actors' willingness to find a solution to the Cyprus problem – and to stop using the NC as a tool to perpetuate it.

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To Vote or Not to Vote?
Declining Voter Turnout in the Republic of Cyprus

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Abstract

Both the 2011 parliamentary election and the 2013 presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus produced the lowest levels of voter turnout. This obliges the researchers concerned with democratic legitimacy to dig into the political psychology literature and combine it with empirical analysis to understand who votes in the Republic of Cyprus, who does not, and why. Only then can we expound on the possible explanations for declining voter turnout. The results in this paper show that party identification is an important determinant of voter turnout. The author argues that the recent decline in party identification might be the main cause of falling voter turnout. Results also suggest that younger people's abstention rates are increasing over time. It is debated here that surveys should be repeated periodically and panel data should be gathered in order to overcome the problem with spurious relationships and explain why voter turnout is dwindling.

Keywords: electoral participation, generational change, party identification, Republic of Cyprus, voter turnout

Introduction

In the Republic of Cyprus the parliamentary election of 2011 and the presidential election of 2013 produced the lowest levels of voter turnout. As it is a crucial indicator of democratic legitimacy, an attempt should be made to understand the reasons behind the declining number of voters. In the first part of this paper the author explains who does and does not vote in the Republic of Cyprus and the whys and wherefores for doing so. In the second part, plausible hypotheses are generated in order to throw light on the causes for the deterioration in voter turnout. The results indicate that party identification is an important determinant of voter turnout. Having this in mind, party identification data from 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010 suggest that the declining number of party identifiers could be the main reason for the waning voter attendance. Also, results show that younger people are abstaining more frequently with time. Therefore, generational change may be

contributing to this decline. So far, there is very limited literature on political participation in the Republic of Cyprus. The results in this paper aim to provide a step towards overcoming the sizeable knowledge gap apropos the electoral participation tendencies of the Greek Cypriot citizens.

Voter Turnout in Historical Perspective

Voting in the Republic of Cyprus is compulsory even if the enforcement of this law is not strictly upheld. The average voter turnout in the parliamentary elections creates optimism compared with the very low figures recorded in many other European Union member-states. However, the decreasing number of people participating in the act of voting might suggest that the Republic of Cyprus is not aloof from the malaise that has been threatening Europe. A virtually monotonic graph is observed in the case of both parliamentary and presidential elections. Voter turnout was as high as 94.31% in the 1991 parliamentary election whereas it was only 78.7% in 2011. Similarly, turnout in the 1993 presidential election was 93.27% but it was only 81.58% in 2013. What may also be worthy of mention is the sharp drop in voter turnout in the second European Parliament election. Indeed, it might be the case that the cause of the 72.5% turnout was the temporary enthusiasm of the Greek Cypriot citizens as the Republic of Cyprus had recently joined the European Union. It may be plausible to expect to see numbers in the future European Parliament elections resembling the 2009 election where turnout was just 59.4%.

Figure 1:
Voter Turnout in Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Cyprus


Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Figure 2:
Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

Figure 3:
Voter Turnout in the European Parliament Elections in the Republic of Cyprus

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

What Determines the Act of Voting?

Voter turnout literature illustrates that those who identify themselves with a political party are more likely to turn out to vote (Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, p. 288; Wattenberg, 2002; Heath *et al.*, 1985; Clarke *et al.*, 2004). People who feel an attachment to a political party probably care more about getting out and voting for that party than someone who does not feel emotionally involved with any specific party. One of the expectations in this paper is that the effect of partisanship in the Republic of Cyprus concerning the choice of whether to vote or not should be very strong. It is known that the number of individuals who are attached to a political party is not only high but equally those who are attached are also committed to that political party in a passionate way. Partisanship deeply influences almost all social relations (Dunphy and Bale, 2007, p. 300; Charalambous, 2007, p. 444; Vasilara and Piaton, 2007, p. 117).

Some scholars argue that people with higher socioeconomic status, measured with variables such as age or income, are more likely to vote as the integration of the people to society increases the level of commitment to that society (Stein *et al.*, 2005, p. 3; Martikainen *et al.*, 2005; Hout and Knoke, 1975; Rose, 1974; Pattie and Johnston, 1998, p. 265; Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, pp. 284 and 288; Bratton *et al.*, 2010, p. 108). Even though there is no consensus as to how its effect comes to take place, the literature also suggests that a high level of formal education and better access to information have a positive effect on turnout (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Crewe, 1981; Verba *et al.*, 1995; Nie *et al.*, 1996; Freedman *et al.*, 2004; Lassen, 2005; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Other scholars have found that religiosity is positively correlated with voter turnout (Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, p. 284). Bratton, Chu and Lagos (2010, p. 116) assert that men are more likely to vote than women. Nevertheless, the impact of gender on turnout is not completely clear (Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, p. 288; Van Der Eijk and Oppenhuis, 1990). Additionally, married people are expected to turn out to vote more than singles (Lipset, 1981).

Civic engagement can be influential in facilitating access to political information and creating a sense of civic duty to vote (Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, p. 284; Stein *et al.*, 2005, p. 4; Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba and Nie, 1972; Teixeira, 1992). Furthermore, trade union membership could increase turnout by making information available and creating a feeling of civic duty (Van Egmond, 2003, p. 2; Delaney *et al.*, 1988; Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, p. 285). Likewise, being a member of a political party may also strengthen people's psychological bonding with their group identity and elections (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Dawson, 1994; Shingles, 1981; Uhlaner, 1989). However, the impact of civic engagement is not uncontested so further exploration is needed to test its effect (Miller, 1980; Miller, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). What is more, research shows that a high level of interpersonal trust is associated with greater civic activism, and consequently it may lead to higher turnout (Cox, 2003, p. 62). Political interest may also have a causal effect on voter turnout. It is reasonable to argue that an individual would care less to go out to vote if s/he has no interest in politics (Van Egmond *et al.*, 1998, p. 284). People who trust the system and sense that their vote will have an effect on the outcome are more likely

to turn out to vote (Campbell *et al.*, 1960; Ragsdale and Rusk, 1993; Crewe *et al.*, 1977; Sabucedo and Cramer, 1991; Narud and Valens, 1996; Almond and Verba, 1963; Verba and Nie, 1972). Moreover, individuals who view the government positively would be more optimistic about what the government can do for them (Stein *et al.*, 2005, p. 4), but this argument does not always fit reality. Various analyses suggest that there is no relationship or even a negative relationship (Citrin, 1974; Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Shaffer, 1981; Miller *et al.*, 1979; Timpone, 1998). Other scholars included not only trust in government but also trust in all public institutions into their analysis (Cox, 2003).

Data Analysis and Results

Cumulative European Social Survey dataset (2006; 2008; 2010) is used to make the statistical analysis. Income is excluded from the analysis since it is measured in a different way for the three waves (2006, 2008 and 2010) of the European Social Survey. The author abstained from selecting the subjective household income as a substitute. Due to issues with multicolliniarity, creating a trust in institutions and politicians index is preferable to analysing trust in different institutions and politicians separately. Since there is no measure of trust in government in the dataset, only trust in politicians, trust in parliament and trust in political parties are included in the index. The Greek Cypriots who say that they voted in the last national election are coded as 1 and those who say they did not vote are coded as 0 (**Voter Turnout**). The Greek Cypriots who feel close to a political party are coded as 1 and those who do not are coded as 0 (**Party Identification**). Years of education received is an interval variable (**Education**). The age of the respondents is also an interval variable (**Age**). On an 11-point religiosity scale, subjective religiosity of the respondents increases from 'not at all religious' (0) to 'very religious' (10) (**Religiosity**). Males are coded as 1 and females are coded as 0 (**Gender**). Married people are coded as 1 and singles are coded as 0 (**Marital Status**). Respondents who are members of a trade union are coded as 1 and those who are not are coded as 0 (**Trade Union Membership**). Party members are coded as 1 and non-members are coded as 0 (**Party Membership**). Interpersonal trust is measured on an 11-point scale where 10 is the score for the respondents who think that most people can be trusted and 0 is the score for the people who think that you cannot be too careful when dealing with others (**Interpersonal Trust**). Trust in politicians, political parties and the parliament is measured with a single 11-point scale where 0 is no trust and 10 is complete trust (**Trust in Institutions and Politicians**). People who are very interested in politics are coded as 3, people who are quite interested in politics are coded as 2, people who are hardly interested in politics are coded as 1 and people who are not at all interested in politics are coded as 0 (**Political Interest**).

> *Logit (Voter Turnout) = (Party Identification) + (Education) + (Age) + (Religiosity) + (Gender) + (Marital Status) + (Trade Union Membership) + (Party Membership) + (Interpersonal Trust) + (Trust in Institutions and Politicians) + (Political Interest) + e*

P-values are calculated as two-tailed due to the preliminary stage of voting behaviour analysis in Cyprus. The model can explain up to 31% of the variance if we rely on the Nagerlkerke's R-squared. All variables except years of education received are significant with differing confidence levels with odds ratios reported accordingly (see table 1).

<div align="center">Table 1: Determinants of Voter Turnout</div>

	Odds Ratios	P-values
Party Identification	5.62	0.01***
Years of Education	1.02	0.47
Age	1.04	0.01***
Religiosity	0.93	0.06*
Gender	0.54	0.01***
Marital Status	1.49	0.01***
Trade Union Membership	1.58	0.01***
Party Membership	2.8	0.03**
Trust in People	0.95	0.05**
Trust in Institutions and Politicians	1.07	0.03**
Political Interest	1.47	0.01***
Model Fit		
N	2863	
McFadden's R-squared	0.25	
Nagelkerke's R-squared	0.31	
Log-Likelihood	-663	

Note: * significant at p<0.1 level, ** significant at p<0.05 level, *** significant at p<0.01 level (two-tailed)

How Can We Explain the Declining Voter Turnout?

The predominant explanation for the declining voter turnout in the literature is the generational change hypothesis (Pammett and LeDuc, 2003; Levine and Lopez, 2002; Lopez *et al.*, 2005; Phelps, 2004, 2006; Gidengil *et al.*, 2003; Lyons and Alexander, 2000; Konzelmann *et al.*, 2012; Johnston *et al.*, 2007; Boyd, 1981; Gallego, 2009; Smets, 2012). The first variant of this explanation argues that young people are voting less and less in time because of delayed transitions to adulthood. Currently, young people face more burdens in the sense of more years of education, finding a partner at a later age and not being able to establish a steady career or risk the move to another country. They are therefore unable to settle down, grow attachment to civic life and have knowledge and interest in politics (Smets, 2012; Jankowski and Strate, 1995; Strate *et al.*, 1989; Blais *et al.*, 2004; Blais, 2006; Kimberlee, 2002, p. 87). The second variant of this hypothesis suggests that young people are much more likely to vote when elections are competitive but recently, competition is less fierce in advanced democracies. As voting is a habitual practice, young people tend to abstain in upcoming elections (Franklin, 2004; Franklin *et al.*, 2004). The second argument fared worse when confronted with data compared to the value change argument (Blais and Rubenson, 2013).

If the generational change hypothesis is true, then we should observe the effect of younger age on the abstention rate increasing in time. Initial analysis indicates that this may be the case as is shown by correlations between age and voting in 2006, 2008 and 2010 which are respectively 0.19, 0.23 and 0.32. Yet, we should note that the generational change hypothesis is more appropriate to explain long-term change in voter turnout. The recent drastic drop in turnout levels in the Republic of Cyprus may not be effectively explained by theories that refer to long-term change.

Another group of scholars point to the declining partisanship levels for explaining the diminishing voter turnout (Abramson and Aldrich, 1982; Shaffer, 1981; Kleppner, 1982, p. 130; Vowles, 2002; Heath, 2007). The number of party identifiers has sharply declined over the years (Wattenberg, 2000, 2002; Dalton, 2000). Cognitive mobilisation argument claims that as people become more educated and competent in acquiring independent information and making independent and learned choices, dependence on parties and party identification decreases (Dalton, 1984; Shively, 1979). Political competition argument on the other hand debates that polarisation of the party system is positively correlated with party identification. The more differences there are between the parties, the more likely the people are to be partisans. As party polarisation is decreasing over the years, less people may be identifying with political parties (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995).

Figure 4 shows that there is a sharp decline in party identification in the Republic of Cyprus. Bearing in mind that party identification is an important determinant of voter turnout in the Republic of Cyprus (see table 1), figure 4 may suggest that the decline in party identification could be the main reason for the dip in voter turnout. Figure 4, however, does not say anything about why party identification is dropping. It may be the case that dissatisfaction with politics, mistrust

in political institutions and politicians and a waning interest in political matters are responsible for why party identification is falling: In which case party identification might be treated as a mediator rather than an antecedent of turnout. It may also be the case that the relationship between party identification and voter turnout is simply spurious. Dissatisfaction, mistrust and declining interest may be responsible for both declining party identification as well as voter turnout, and party identification may not have any effect on turnout in time-series analysis. Figure 5, which measures averages of trust in institutions and politicians on an 11-point scale in time, figure 6, which measures averages of political interest on a 4-point ordered scale in time, and figure 7, which measures averages of satisfaction with the way democracy works on an 11-point scale in time suggest that both of these explanations might be possible. In order to increase our confidence in relation to the causes of declining voter turnout, we should begin to gather panel data or repeat surveys that are comparable in time. Only then can we run the appropriate time-series analyses that can shed light upon the true causes of falling voter turnout.

Figure 4:
**Declining Party Identification in the Republic of Cyprus**

Source: International Social Survey Programme and European Social Survey

Figure 5:
Trust in Institutions and Politicians in Time

Source: European Social Survey

Figure 6:
Interest in Politics

Source: International Social Survey Programme and European Social Survey

Figure 7:
Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works

Source: International Social Survey Programme and European Social Survey

Conclusion

Voter turnout is a crucial indicator of democratic legitimacy. Voting is an act that among other things demonstrates that the citizens are willing to solve the social, economic and political problems within the realm of the political system. The author of this paper has shown that declining party identification in the Republic of Cyprus may be responsible for the declining voter turnout. Data constraints, however, do not allow us to put this hypothesis to a robust time-series test. Party identification may be an antecedent, a mediator or may even have a spurious relationship with voter turnout. Dissatisfaction with politics, mistrust in institutions and politicians and falling interest in politics may be responsible for both the reduction in party identification as well as the decline in voter turnout. Also, generational change hypothesis may have some relevance in the context of Cyprus. We see that younger people are abstaining more than ever in time. Nonetheless, we need to observe this relationship in the long term before coming to any conclusions. Conducting surveys, which are comparable in time as well as collecting panel data, are indispensable tools for understanding why voter turnout is declining and researchers should get their hands dirty in order to realise these goals.

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Multiparty Mediation in Cyprus in 1963–1965

Joana Amaral

Abstract

A consensus of opinion has emerged in mediation literature which places multiparty mediation as the 'key' to successful mediation. In principle, multiparty mediation combines facilitation strategies as practiced by neutral actors, with the more directive and intrusive strategies played by powerful States capable of exerting pressure on local stakeholders reluctant to reach a peace settlement. This article aims to demonstrate that the mediation initiatives conducted in Cyprus in 1963–1965 by the United States of America and the United Nations had an ideal multiparty potential that was not recognised and was, indeed, rebuffed by these actors. In conclusion, this study infers that multiparty mediation might have substantially benefited the peace process had the United States of America united its capacity to leverage all parties to align with the United Nations' willingness to facilitate a settlement locally.

Introduction

The intensity and multiplication of intrastate conflictuality in the post-Cold War era called for a growing involvement of the international community in *peacekeeping* and *peacemaking* operations. Gradually, mediation processes were applied to managing and resolving these conflicts. They multiplied and diversified, and mediation grew to become an ever-more sophisticated and increasingly important instrument of *peacemaking*. However, the effectiveness of mediation initiatives in generating agreements in the complex and intractable intrastate conflict contexts has been low. As a consequence, in the debate on how mediation might better serve a peace process, the consensus regarding the 'key' to successful mediation outcomes pointed to exercising a combination of mediation strategies to be initiated by differently resourced mediators. *Multiparty* mediation supporters therefore realised that complex conflict situations required complex responses which necessitated the involvement of a multiplicity of mediators (Croker *et al.*, 1999; Beardsley *et al.*, 2006; Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009).

Intrastate conflicts are particularly difficult to settle and tend to become prolonged over time (Azar, 1990, pp. 7–16). The Cyprus conflict is played out on different levels which add to the conflict's intractability and self-perpetuating dynamics. At the local level, the Cypriot conflict is characterised by power, state resources access and the demographic asymmetries between a Greek Cypriot majority

and a Turkish Cypriot minority. Ethnicity has provided the polarising and segregating dividing line and fuelled conflict escalation, ethnic cleansing and total physical separation between the two communities. At the regional level, Greece and Turkey's historically difficult relations and deep mistrust have spilled over to the local level. The 'motherlands', being stakeholders in the Cyprus dispute, have vested strategic interests on the island, legitimised by their connection to the local communities. As a result, during the first mediation initiatives enacted in Cyprus between 1963 and 1965 by the United States of America (USA) and the United Nations (UN), both disputants viewed conflict and the mediation initiatives as a zero-sum game and equally searched for, and counted on, external sympathies and allies to achieve their antithetical interests and aims (UN Secretary General, 2003, para. 143): the Greek Cypriot aspiration for union with Greece or *enosis* and the Turkish Cypriot reactive *taksim*, or partition of the island's territory between Turkey and Greece.

In 1963, the USA took the initiative to mediate the Cyprus conflict due to political and strategic interests. In the Cold War milieu, the USA feared that the conflict would not only spill over to the regional level and generate a Greek–Turkish war that might result in a weakened North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), but that American influence might also be lost to the Soviets in the southern Mediterranean. When powerful states mediate, mediation can be analysed as an extension of the state's foreign policy. In such cases, the process of a *power* mediation as opposed to a *pure* mediation, is led by these states and leverage is applied by way of benefit promises or threats of punishment to push for compromise on a settlement. The aim is to guide the parties and the mediation process in order to locate a solution in line with the interests of the powerful state (Güney, 2004, p. 28). To protect its interests and pursue its goals, the USA, being both resourceful and powerful, performed mediation in Cyprus in a directive[1] style, providing incentives and issuing ultimatums to affect the parties' conflicting issue-framing and to coerce them into agreeing to its proposed settlements.

The UN, on the other hand, became involved in the Cyprus dispute in response to the Greek Cypriot call for its involvement. Being a neutral mediator, the UN performed mainly facilitative[2]

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1   *Directive* strategies are the most intrusive and powerful form of mediation by which the mediator affects the content and substance of the mediation process. A *directive* mediator aims at changing the parties' behaviour and motivation by providing incentives or issuing ultimatums that alter the way in which they frame conflicting issues with the underlying objective of inciting the parties to cooperate. To affect the parties' perspectives on the mediation process, their expectations or their issue-framing, a *directive* mediator must possess power and resources to successfully perform certain tactics such as increasing non-agreement costs, taking responsibility for concessions, rewarding party concessions, promising resources or threatening their withdrawal, or offering to observe agreement compliance (Bercovitch and Lee, 2001).

2   *Facilitative* mediation is defined as 'a set of techniques that help actors correctly identify agreements within the overlapping range of possible nonviolent outcomes', whereas the mediator serves not only as a communication channel, but also as an information provider who clarifies misconceptions the parties have over their opponent (Beardsley *et al.*, 2006, pp. 62–66).

and formulative[3] style mediation through official mediation or good offices. While UN mediation is advantageous for the parties in conflict because its involvement, as dictated by the UN Charter, holds no other interest than maintaining peace and security (Richmond, 1998b, p. 26) it has less control over the mediation process, whose existence and progress relies greatly on the parties' co-operation.

In mediation literature, while *muscled* mediators, such as powerful States, are believed to be better equipped to pressure conflict disputants with highly adversarial relationships into preferring to solve their differences through negotiations rather than continuing to fight, *neutral* mediators, such as International Organisations, are viewed to be more effective in solving the parties' commitment problems and generating trust in times of de-escalation. This article aims to demonstrate that as mediators, the USA and the UN have different resources, bargaining and legitimacy capabilities in the Cyprus peace process which might have been capitalised on through a *multiparty* mediation process. To this end, an analysis is made of the Cyprus mediators, which incorporates UN and USA mediation performances since the involvement of the USA in 1963 and the end of UN official mediation led by Galo Plaza in 1965. After a theoretical contextualisation, the referred mediation initiatives are evaluated covering the following parameters: the mediator/s and its/their interests; the parties' position at the beginning of the mediation process; the mediators' proposed solutions and their views and preferences in relation to the solutions to the conflict; and, finally, the result of the mediation initiative. This analysis aims to discuss how a *multiparty* approach could have benefitted the process and outcomes of the mediation initiatives under consideration. The findings of this study offer support to the *multiparty* mediation literature and aspire to contribute to an awareness of the vital importance of coordination between the USA and UN *peacemaking* initiatives in conflict settings elsewhere.

Power, Pure and *Multiparty* Mediation

The debate on how, when or who should mediate and to what purpose, has been evolving continuously in mediation literature in response to the complex and intractable intrastate conflict situations in which it has been steadily practiced. When there is intervention, the mediator changes the conflict's context by introducing new information or by providing incentives or sanctions which convince the parties that mediation is a preferable alternative to continued fighting and that cooperation is possible. In principle, the greater the change needed for this game transformation to occur the more resourced a mediator must be (Terris and Maoz, 2005, p. 571). But, whether a mediator should use incentives or punishments to generate cooperation between

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3   *Formulative* mediators are proposition creators and makers as well as mediation environment controllers, acting as 'coordinators' who structure the negotiations, create temporal constraints, redefine issues and create focal points and/or propose alternatives, especially when an impasse is reached at the negotiations' table (Beardsley *et al.*, 2006, pp. 62–66).

parties in a mediation process is not consensual in mediation literature. Whereas supporters of *pure* mediation consider that a mediator only assists the parties in conflict in finding an agreement (Fisher and Keashley, 1991, p. 3), supporters of *muscled* or *power* mediation stress that a mediator's capacity to influence the parties' interests can be crucial to generate the necessary compromises for a final settlement to be agreed (Bercovitch and Lee, 2001).

Historically, states have been the primary mediators since the rise of the nation-state rendered it the only legitimate actor in the international system. Until the emergence of non-state actors at the end of World War II, powerful states and coalitions guided by the *realpolitik* of interstate relations dominated the third party intervention scene (Frazier and Dixon, 2009, p. 46). Savun (2009, p. 99) argues that the states which are most likely to mediate conflict are those that possess a strong intelligence gathering apparatus, diplomatic representation in the territory of a state involved in the conflict, or alliance ties with it. What this implies is that, typically, there is a pre-existing strategic, diplomatic or historical connection between the mediation-offering state and the disputants, so that a state becomes involved in mediation when the conflict's management is relevant to its interests. Although a state's intervention as mediator is legitimised by a proclaimed conflict management objective, underlying the desire for peace, a state's motivation for becoming involved in the conflict stems from self-interest and power politics (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 446).

In the twentieth century, international organisations (IOs) have developed as crucial peaceful interaction framework providers between the diversified typology of actors that have emerged in the modern, globalised, international system. Because IOs are a product of a centralised cooperation among states, they are seen as legitimate information collectors that reduce uncertainty in the international system and, thus, continue to facilitate and foster cooperation among actors (Savun, 2009, pp. 100–101). For this reason, IOs have become active participants in *peacemaking* and conflict management activities, particularly the UN when freed from the bipolar constraints of the Cold War period.

Nonetheless, when the UN mediates a conflict, the disputants tend to have greater control over the process (than when mediation is performed by a state) because its coercive capacity is lower and, hence, the initiation of mediation is much more dependent on the disputants' interest in being mediated by the UN (Richmond, 1998b, p. 10). Although the UN is not dispossessed of leverage, its capacity to influence conflict parties stems, not from its military capacity and its relative power position in the international system as it does for states, but from its international status and reputation. Furthermore, international organisations mediate with the sole purpose of ending the conflict. As a result, they deposit a greater interest than states in the conflicts' solution (*ibid*). In sum, they possess a lower capacity to leverage the parties but are more committed than states to solving the conflict. Hence, mediation by IOs, relies far more on the parties' will to maintain a cooperative behaviour, whereas a state, understood as a more resourced and powerful mediator, tends to exert additional control over the parties due to their interest in resources which the state may offer through the course of mediation (Smith, 1994, p. 447).

The question presented at the centre of the debate between supporters of *power* and *pure* mediation is whether a given actor must be impartial to perform mediation or not and whether or not the 'triangular relationship' in a mediation process is broken when a mediator uses 'carrots and sticks' to pressure the parties to cooperate or to accept a given settlement (Zartman and Touval, 1996, p. 454). Advocates of mediation as a less intrusive exercise consider that when mediators apply intrusive strategies to leverage the parties, they become partial and lose their neutrality, ceasing to be a mediator and becoming a third party to the conflict (*ibid.*). On the other hand, *power* mediation advocates argue that impartiality is unimportant to parties who wish to be mediated and, therefore it is not a necessary precondition for mediation exercises (Bercovitch and Lee, 2001). They also consider that mediators are always interested actors who feel propelled to mediate to serve an interest and follow their conflict outcome preference. Even if the interest is in generating peace, neutrality is never fully practiced or felt by mediators (Richmond, 1998a, p. 717). Put simply, to be a mediator, if impartiality or neutrality are not required of an actor, then mediation has a wider spectrum of activity and may, therefore, be both *pure* and *muscled*.

It has been said that States have more capacity to leverage but are seen as less neutral or biased mediators, while IOs have a lower capacity to leverage but are seen as more neutral. Because of their different resource capabilities it is expected that higher involvement mediation strategies will more typically be performed by states, while IOs pursue less intrusive strategies which do not require the capacity to leverage and are not as prone to damage their neutrality. Conversely, the intrusive directive strategies performed by states are not capable of addressing the parties' more fundamental relationship-related problems and often generate short-term solutions that lead to the conflicts' re-escalation once the mediator exits the conflict's environment (Haxia, 2007, p. 593). In contrast, the less intrusive non-directive strategies performed by IOs have the capacity to reduce misconceptions and mistrust between the parties and to engender a more cooperative relationship in the long-term, despite being less effective in generating final settlements. Quinn *et al.* (2009, p. 194), find that even though facilitative and formulative mediation are less able to induce compromise between the parties as effectively as directive mediation, they are more successful in reducing tensions in the long-term and in generating commitment to what has been agreed.

In identity conflicts where discrimination, victimisation and social hatred exist, disputants are highly antagonised and unwilling to make meaningful concessions towards a demonised 'other' (Fisher, 2001, pp. 308, 321–323). Since disputants in these conflicts have highly adversarial relationships and *zero-sum* perceptions of the mediation process, their expectations regarding the mediation result becomes more sensitive, especially in the case of endurable and protracted conflicts (Croker *et al.*, 1999, pp. 40–41; Haxia, 2007, p. 593). In the literature, the comparative analysis on the short- and long-term effects of mediation strategies to address the complexity and intractability of intrastate conflict has led to support for one effective form which allows for a capitalisation of the advantages offered by the different mediation strategies and actors. *Multiparty* mediation is defined by Croker *et al.* (1999, p. 9), as 'attempts by many third parties to assist peace

negotiations in any given conflict', which may occur sequentially, one mediator at a time over the life of the conflict, or simultaneously, many different mediators at the same time performed by various actors such as intergovernmental organisations and national governments.

Most importantly, supporters of *multiparty* mediation affirm that for this potential for complementarity between the various existing mediation strategies to be fully realised, the coordinated and sequenced action between *pure* and *power* mediators, or states and international organisations, is crucial (Carment *et al.*, 2009, p. 233). Directive mediators can be useful interveners to *multiparty* mediation supporters when conflict tension escalates and a threat or a display of the use of force exists which render the parties unwilling to negotiate. By using leverage to prevent escalation and to pressure the parties into returning to the negotiating table, facilitative and formulative mediators can work with the parties on the improvement of their relationship and the development of trust (Frazier and Dixon, 2009, pp. 58–59). On the other hand, directive strategies are unlikely to work when the conflicts' intensity is low because they may well damage the de-escalated environment if parties find the mediator to be conducive and self-interested. Likewise, if the mediators' intentions or the fairness of an agreement is suspect, then disputants may refuse to negotiate or agree (Bercovitch and Gartner, 2009, p. 28).

Therefore, when conflict is at its lowest level of tension or at post-crisis moments, the authors support that non-state actors, such as international organisations, are the most effective in bringing the parties to the negotiation table – widening their perspectives on the conflicts' solution possibilities and helping tension de-escalation by exerting procedural control over the negotiations together with monitoring or facilitating agreement implementation.

Another advantage in the shift of mediator is that it offers the parties an alternative negotiation channel to restart talks or to increase support for what has already been agreed and, therefore, provides an extended opportunity to move a peace process forward (Crocker *et al.*, 1999, p. 9). Again, this sequencing of directive and non-directive strategies in moments of escalation and re-escalation is dependent on the assumption that in the sequencing of mediator action there is coordination in the approaches to the conflict. However, as the number of interveners increase, conflicting interests and positions may exist between the mediators themselves, and for that reason it is essential throughout the development and sustenance of a coordinated intervention strategy to capitalise on the different types of mediation styles advantages and their effectiveness (*ibid.* pp. 40–41).

USA and UN Mediation of the 1963 Cyprus Crisis

> 'The dire lack of a coordinated response, a sharing of resources, and a willingness to subordinate particular national or institutional goals to an overriding *peacemaking* agenda has hampered or destroyed several peace operations (...).'
>
> Crocker *et al.*, 1999, p. 57

The sequencing of USA and UN mediation initiatives in the 1963 constitutional crisis in Cyprus, with the USA mediation being effective in de-escalating the conflict and the UN offering an alternative route to the stalemated American mediated negotiations, signalled the *multiparty* potential of these combined initiatives. It is argued that although the USA and UN mediation were carried out with the same objective of brokering an agreement between the Cypriot parties, the lack of coordination, and unwillingness to do so, caused both individual initiatives to fail since one held the comparative advantage that could have benefited the other. Sequencing allowed for the comparative advantages of both mediators to capitalise, but the USA and the UN had conflicting agendas which did not allow for coordination in approaches and for leverage opportunities to be maximised.

USA Directive Mediation

The first mediation initiatives to take place in the Cyprus conflict were led by Great Britain. After the collapse of constitutional rule in 1963 and the folding of the three-year-old Republic of Cyprus, a British-sponsored Conference was organised in London in an attempt to devise a political settlement between the communities and Greece and Turkey. Britain was eager to secure assistance or, ultimately, relief to its Truce Force troops stationed in Cyprus and put forward a proposal for the creation of a *peacekeeping* force constituted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries and a voluntary population movement for the formation of a territorial divided Cyprus. Local Greek and Turkish administrative systems within a national political arrangement were viewed by the British Government as meeting half way the aspirations between the Greek Cypriot desire for union with Greece and the Turkish Cypriot demand for total separation. However, Greek Cypriot reluctance to accept this proposal brought an early end to the London Conference. To encourage a greater American involvement in formulating the agreement seemed to the British the next step towards acquiring a NATO-based alternative to provide relief to its Truce Force (Ker-Lindsay, 1997, pp. 83, 104–105).

Taking note that a British troops' departure from Cyprus would pave the way for a Turkish intervention, the USA became involved in the Cyprus crisis to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey that could undermine NATO's southern flank, alienate Turkey from the West and allow expansion of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. The Americans' first mediation attempt came from President Johnson himself, inviting Greece and Turkey for talks in Washington, but the initiative failed to ease the growing intercommunal tensions on the island. Soon after, Johnson directed his Under Secretary of State, George Ball, to mediate the search for an acceptable solution for Greece and Turkey of the Cyprus problem. Development of the Anglo-American NATO Plan began, which contemplated a NATO peacekeeping force – to expand the already stationed British forces and to observe the cease-fire – and the appointment of a mediator who could seek a settlement within the NATO framework and, therefore, within American and also Turkish interests (Coufoudakis, 1974, p. 36).

In his memoirs, Ball (1982, p. 342) described the Turkish flank positions at the time as follows: 'Turkish Cypriots demanded partition and the right to govern their own community' and 'preserving Turkey's right to intervene' as a security assurance against Greek Cypriot attacks and perceived domination intentions, a demand also emphasised by the Turkish Government. Ball also mentioned that the USA considered that Turkey would never be deterred from this perceived intervention right by a UN force, which would be viewed as a vehicle of Soviet involvement. As for the Greek Cypriot leader, Makarios, Ball stated that he 'wanted union with Greece' but, 'at least for tactical purposes, was demanding a fully independent Cyprus run by the Greek majority' where the Turkish Cypriot community would be reduced to a protected minority status, while the Greek Government 'pressed for *enosis*' as well.

Through January that year, shuttling between Ankara, Athens and Nicosia, Ball was able to gain support for the NATO Plan from Turkey, whose only precondition for acceptance was that its right of intervention in Cyprus given by the Treaty of Guarantee[4] would not be impaired. In Athens, the political scene was dim, with caretaker governments succeeding each other and probing Greece unable to sustain any position other than the one approved by Makarios (Crawford, 2003, p. 109). Makarios' acceptance then became the cornerstone for securing the NATO Plan approval. However, Makarios vehemently opposed the Plan on the grounds that it compromised Cypriot sovereignty and its non-aligned policies and put Cyprus under the orbit of Western interests (Savvides, 1998, p. 40). He further insisted that the Cyprus *problem* should only be addressed by the UN Security Council (James, 2002, p. 84). Through the UN framework, Makarios believed a Turkish intervention would be 'illegalised' and blocked (Ball, 1982, p. 345) and the Greek Cypriot sovereignty right would be recognised.[5]

Ball tried to frighten Makarios from his rigid position by suggesting that the USA and Western countries would not intervene against Turkey and he proceeded to reformulate the initial plan to exclude the necessity of Makarios' consent on the creation of a peacekeeping force. In the revised plan the peacekeeping force would be deployed not by NATO but by the three guarantor powers simultaneously, exercising their rights of intervention provided by the Treaty of Guarantee. This peacekeeping force would be set to stay in Cyprus until the UN deployed an international force. With this condition, Ball assured Turkey the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community while the UN took its time to formulate its action plan, at the same time assuring Britain of long-desired support to its troops (James, 2002, pp. 85–86).

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4   In the Treaty of Guarantee, political or economic union with another country or the partitioning of the island are forbidden and the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey are invested 'guarantor powers' of the 'independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic' (art. 2) committing themselves to consult with each other and to take concerted action if any of the provisions of the Constitution are breached.

5   This would come into being with the Security Council's issuing of resolution 186, in which the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus is recognised and within it is deposited the responsibility of restoring law and order in Cyprus.

Despite Ball's scare tactics, Makarios did not move from his previous position and Britain was now displeased with Ball's alteration of the plan which frustrated the purpose of Britain's push for USA involvement, that of divesting itself of the peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus altogether (Ball, 1982, p. 347). With the British refusal of the revised NATO plan, the USA realised the 'only available course was to work through the UN' (*ibid.*, p. 348). During debate sessions at the Security Council, the USA pressed for a UN force to be quickly deployed in Cyprus to avoid a Turkish military intervention, while successfully manoeuvring to prevent Soviet participation in the force and to the rights of intervention by the Guarantors from being nullified in a resolution.[6]

Fearing that the USA was taking over the diplomatic initiative or, at least, that he would be charged by the Soviet Union of allowing it, UN Secretary General U-Thant resisted accepting the American proposal and suggested that the meeting be held on neutral ground with a neutral UN mediator. Ball insisted that American authority was necessary if there was to be any accomplishment to what U-Thant ceded by allowing Dean Acheson, the designated American negotiator, to be present at the negotiations' site in Geneva for the parties to consult with (Savvides, 1998, p. 42). Sakari Tuomioja, the UN mediator, like the USA, viewed the Cyprus dispute as international or regional in nature, as essentially a conflict of interests between Greece and Turkey, the key actors between whom the settlement could be agreed. Nonetheless, contrary to the USA, Tuomioja could not agree on *enosis* as the course for settlement, since it would mean the dissolution of a UN member-state (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, p. 8).

Although the Geneva negotiations were conducted under UN aegis, Acheson was the one who led the talks to circumvent Tuomioja in order to keep the UN and hence, Soviet influence over Cyprus, at arm's length (Nicolet, 2010, p. 105). For that reason, although Tuomioja was the 'official' mediator at Geneva, Dean Acheson's proposals were the ones being discussed at the negotiations' table. The 'Acheson Plan' proposed a 'double *enosis*' (Ball, 1982, p. 356), meaning that Cyprus would be united with Greece and divided into ten cantons; two enclaves would be under full Turkish Cypriot control and Turkey would be granted a large and strategically important military base on the island and the Kastellorizon island (Savvides, 1998, p. 42). The Plan was rejected by both sides, but although Turkey accepted it as a basis for future negotiations, when Makarios pronounced himself against it, Greece followed suit, fearful it would allow for an increased Turkish presence on Cypriot soil. To persuade the Greek government, Acheson revised the initial plan limiting the possession of the base by Turkey to a fifty-year lease and the territorial division from cantons to prefects. But now not only the Cypriot and the Greek governments but also Turkey was against it (*ibid.*, pp. 42–43).

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6   Security Council resolution 186 was ambiguous regarding intervention rights even to the extent of allowing the parties to interpret it in opposite ways, with Makarios regarding it as an end to Turkish rights of intervention and Turkey as a preservation of those rights (Ball, 1982, p. 348).

Failing to consider what the Cypriot communities desired for Cyprus, the NATO and Acheson plans were a classic exercise of great power diplomacy and *realpolitik,* where American interests surpass all others and are blindly pursued and people become secondary to state interests (Brinkley, 1988, pp. 15–18; Nicolet, 2010, p. 100). The USA preferred to neglect the fact that Cyprus, although forged recently as a state, had not been under control of either Greece or Turkey for decades or centuries and that these actors were not at the centre but at the periphery of the Cyprus conflict. In the midst of the Cold War, USA mediation in Cyprus was devoted to preventing the conflict's internationalisation through UN involvement that could facilitate Soviet progression into the eastern Mediterranean (Savvides, 1998, p. 40). Even when it was no longer possible to maintain the UN at arm's length the USA continued the isolated pursuit of a settlement for the Cyprus conflict by marginalising the organisation's role in its own mediation initiative. Nonetheless, the USA was crucial to the avoidance of the conflict's further escalation into a Greco–Turkish war. However, guided by its own interests and solution preferences, the USA perceived the Cyprus conflict as a regional and international clash and failed to recognise its existence at the local level, from where in fact it had originated and from where its solution would need to emerge.

The UN Takes Over the Impasse

With the death of Tuomioja in August 1964, U-Thant appointed Galo Plaza to continue the UN mediation initiative. Instead of viewing the Cyprus conflict as an international or regional problem, Plaza approached it in intrastate and communal terms (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, p. 9). When the lead of the Cyprus mediation initiative was taken over by the UN the mediation target shifted from the 'motherlands' to the communities – from searching for a solution to the problem in its international and regional dimensions to its local one. In this new approach, Turkey's interest automatically became less relevant and less privileged in the proposed solution. It is argued below that this shift in the mediation approach ultimately led to Turkey's non-acceptance of Plaza's proposals and the termination of UN official mediation in Cyprus altogether.

The UN was motivated to mediate in the Cyprus conflict purely for humanitarian, conflict management and peace re-establishment concerns, though, Security Council Resolution 186 did recognise the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus and deposited in it the responsibility of restoring law and order. Notwithstanding, this was not a product of a lack of neutrality in UN intervention in the Cyprus conflict but a reflection of the organisation's perception as to how its preferred outcome could better be achieved, which at that stage centred on avoiding Turkey's military involvement (Reddaway, 1986, p. 552).

From 16 September 1964 to 26 March 1965, Plaza established headquarters in Nicosia and visited the capitals of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, performing three series of consultations. The positions of the parties remained distant through the consultation phase and each demanded unattainable preconditions to be met before entering into direct talks (para. 120),

which Plaza considered to be vital for the success of the mediation efforts.[7] Since it was not possible for the parties to reach agreement among themselves and for direct negotiations to take place under the ongoing conditions, the mediation reached an impasse. Putting forward his own proposal for agreement was, to Plaza, the next essential step in an attempt to find common ground that would 'allow the parties to go as close as the circumstances permit to their legitimate objectives' (para. 121) and the 'directions along which they should reasonably be expected to meet and try to seek an agreement' (para. 124).

Contrary to previous USA approaches, Plaza opposed the idea of dividing the island in any form, whether it was *enosis* or partition, or even the creation of a federal state. Instead, Plaza stressed the political unity of Cyprus as the basis for solution, one that should not deny the political majority their right to rule but should be able to avoid dominance of one community over the other and not jeopardise or delay indefinitely the unity of the population (para. 163). For Plaza, a sustained long-term solution for Cyprus should be found within the framework of a unitary and sovereign state capable of preventing supremacy of one community over the other while promoting the communities' integration. All parties involved should refrain from attempting to restore the 1960 Constitution, which he believed to be 'psychologically and politically impossible' (para. 129) and pursue the creation of a new independent sovereign state of majority rule where Turkish Cypriot minority rights would be protected (Coufoudakis, 1974, p. 36). For this new independence to be established – one that differed from the Greek Cypriot demand of 'unfettered independence' with the demand for self-determination – suspicion and fear would have to be countered by Greek Cypriot abandonment of the political goals of *enosis* and reciprocated by Turkish Cypriot abandonment of the pursuit of *taksim* (para. 137). In this sense, the right of self-determination would be exercised not by the communities individually but by the state, who would be in the best position to decide what was best for the well-being of its citizens as a whole and for international peace and security (para. 143). The protection of the Turkish Cypriot community would not be assured by a geographical divide and the transfer of people, but through the establishment of transitional yet 'most rigorous possible guarantees' (para. 160) of individual and minority rights 'without weakening the unity of the state' (para. 163). Cyprus would be demilitarised and the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance abrogated (para. 147), but Plaza foresaw the UN acting as the new Guarantor of Cyprus' independence to meet Turkey's security concerns (para. 168).

The Plaza Report was eventually accepted as a basis for future negotiations by the Greek Cypriots but rejected by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots who were not willing to agree on a proposal

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7   Plaza regarded the consultations phase as an important first step leading to direct multilateral talks. Plaza stated that direct talks should be held 'at the earliest possible moment' in a mediation process, however, he also found these could not be hastened, otherwise, the absence of a 'minimum common understanding' between the parties might risk 'a further deepening of the impasse' (1965, para. 89).

that would nullify the Turkish right of intervention in Cyprus. During the consultation period Turkey had expressed that it was beyond the remit of an intermediary to issue proposals on a solution. Moreover, Turkey argued that Plaza's proposals bore the moral stamp and force of the UN as they were put forward by a UN mediator, therefore constituting an arbitrator's and not a mediator's task (Plaza, 1965, p. 44). Turkey argued that in making his agreement proposals Plaza went beyond the limits of his mandate, rejected the report and called for Plaza's resignation. The Greek Cypriots responded to the Turkish stand by refusing to accept a replacement in the event of Plaza's resignation. Faced with these reactions, U-Thant decided to make his good offices available to the parties. Plaza resigned soon after but was never replaced, and the UN official mediation was abandoned altogether (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, p. 9).

Despite its repercussions, Turkey's argument that Plaza's report bore the moral stamp of the UN and his report-issuing was arbitrative is not a valid argument. The Plaza report provided for a basis for settlement proposal negotiations and not a definite solution to be implemented as it stood. Also, in an arbitration process the parties accept its binding character before any settlement plan is presented to them. By putting forward a settlement proposal, Plaza was merely performing formulative mediation and not one of an arbitrative nature. The Plaza mediation was refused not because Turkey was irrevocably bound to accept the Plaza report as the definite settlement, but because Plaza's and the UN's outcome preference was less aimed at satisfying Turkish interests than the previous American proposals. The shift from the USA's *top–down* to UN's *down–top* solution perspectives, which themselves were a product of these actors' deferring views and interest upon the Cyprus conflict, can better shed light on the causes for the breakdown of the first and only UN official mediation in Cyprus. This event reduced the Organisation's mediatory capacity for years to come, finding itself limited to performing the least intrusive mediation strategies in order to remain an acceptable intermediary to all parties under the 'Good Offices' framework.

The Missed *Multiparty* Mediation Opportunity

> 'Like cats, these independent agents rarely feel an obligation, or even a desire, to cooperate and they retain the ability to walk away from the mediation or to launch competing initiatives.'
>
> Croker *et al.*, 1999, p. 4

The mediation initiatives led by the USA and the UN after the 1963 constitutional breakdown in Cyprus had an ideal *multiparty* potential that was not recognised. Indeed it was refused by both mediators. Realisation or a willingness to recognise this potential could have provided the opportunity to avoid Plaza's full-blown failure of UN official mediation, which has limited the UN's mediation capacity in the Cyprus conflict in subsequent years and, in the course of the *peace process* in Cyprus. In mediating the Cyprus crisis, although the UN has enjoyed legitimacy power, it reaps weak reward and coercive power capabilities and, hence, a lower control of the mediation

process. On the other hand, while the USA has realised strong reward and coercive power and, therefore, control over the mediation process, once it initiates mediation due to vested interests in the conflict's context, it is viewed as *biased* by conflict parties and has lower legitimacy power. Notwithstanding, the USA and the UN had the ingredients for success set forth by *multiparty* mediation supporters. Their interventions have been sequenced accordingly – of a powerful mediator during periods of conflict escalation and of a *pure* mediator in the subsequent period of lower conflict intensity.

The USA has been successful in de-escalating the Cyprus conflict and in pressuring the parties into negotiating, nonetheless, in performing directive mediation, the USA impacted on the conflict's substance. The use of directive strategies altered the parties' balance of power and their expectations regarding the mediation outcome. The American mediation particularly affected Turkey's perspectives and expectations over the mediation process to the extent that the shift to UN mediation was perceived as a positional loss. Once the USA mediation had put Greece and Turkey at the centre of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey reacted to the (perceived) 'downgrading' conferred by Plaza, of its status from a main to a third party to the conflict.

Once Plaza approached the Cyprus conflict at its epicentre, targeting its local level and viewing it in intercommunal terms (Ker-Lindsay, 2005, p. 9), the Plaza proposal offered a solution which was routed in an entirely different direction to that suggested by the NATO and Acheson proposals. The proposal did not fully satisfy any of the parties' interests. It prevented Greece and Greek Cypriots from achieving *enosis* and Turkish Cypriots and Turkey from partitioning the island, although Turkish Cypriots would be protected from Greek Cypriot domination in the new state. Turkey, however, would lose its only asset over Cyprus – its right of intervention – and be de-linked from Cyprus' future with no compensation. As a result, the move to UN mediation meant a greater change for Turkey, with a shift from being the actor whose interests would mostly have been satisfied in US mediation, to an actor whose interests were secondary to the Cyprus solution in UN mediation.

Pushing the UN away from the solution-finding process in Cyprus thus became vital for Turkey and consequently the motive for accusing Plaza of arbitration. By using the arbitration accusation Turkey successfully transformed the mediation process into the issue in conflict that led to Plaza's mediation deadlock. This is an indicator of how little control the UN had over the mediation process; not being adept at curbing the Turkish argument or in exerting influence over the parties to prevent them from forsaking the mediation process. The Organisation was forced to abandon official mediation and adopt the provision of good offices and watch as its mediatory capacity diminished to a minimal facilitative mediator, until Waldheim assumed the good offices provision in 1972.

Advocates of *pure* and *muscled* mediation are equally correct in their reasons for judging both types of mediation performance as important. Contrarily, they fail to see that they are complementary, that directive mediation's positive impact on the probability of success of a mediation process can and

should be used to complement *pure* mediation's capacity to alter the parties' relationship; to generate trust through the use of reasoning and persuasion and the conception of alternatives to their antagonistic aims. Conversely, like *power* mediation supporters, the USA did not even consider the need for one that might address and improve the parties' adversarial relationships in order for them to remain open to making concessions towards the other side. The use of a facilitative mediation for this purpose was performed in UN mediation by Plaza. However, as a *pure* mediator, the organisation lacked control over the mediation process as well as the resources and power to pressure the parties into staying at the negotiation table. Similar to *power* and *pure* mediation supporters, the USA and the UN neither perceived nor capitalised on the complementarity between the directive USA mediation and UN facilitative mediation, which was impaired by the USA's pursuit of an agreement along lines relevant to its own interests. Had this complementarity potential been capitalised on, the USA may have constrained the parties against evading the UN's mediation process and the conflict's subsequent re-escalation might have been avoided.

In addition, the *multiparty* mediation potential could have been capitalised on the different conflict levels in which these mediators operated. On the one hand, the USA mediation failed to account for the dynamics of the conflict at the local level and did not consider the local communities' interests in the agreement proposed. Then again, the UN mediation also failed to take into account the influence of conflict dynamics at regional level on the local scene and overlooked the impact of the 'motherlands' interests on local communities. As mentioned above, while USA mediation could have benefited from Plaza's *down–top* solution perspectives and the need to target and accommodate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot antagonisms, so too could the USA have played an important role in coercing Turkey to remain at the negotiation table, perhaps preventing the complete abandonment of UN official mediation.

When a universally accepted definition of a conflict is not upheld by intervening international conflict managers, then attempts to craft a lasting solution are compromised (Masunungure and Badza, 2010, p. 229). As a result, in the first mediation attempts of the Cyprus conflict, the two mediators intervened uncooperatively and in isolation from one another. Complementarity between the directive USA mediation and UN facilitative and formulative mediation was not capitalised on either by the mediators, and was mainly impaired by the USA's pursuit of an agreement along the lines of self-interest. Had the *multiparty* potential of the USA and UN mediation initiatives after the 1963 crisis in Cyprus been successfully exploited, it is conceivable that Plaza's mediation failure could have been avoided by the USA applying pressure on Turkey to accept the Plaza proposal as a basis for future negotiations.

The above statement by Croker *et al.* refers to the involvement of third parties in a given conflict, and not particularly to mediators. Regardless, it strikingly describes the behaviours of the USA and UN mediators in between 1963–1965. During their mediation initiatives, the USA and UN disorganised 'cats' failed to recognise and take advantage of the full conflict management and resolution potential of their mutual involvement. Coordination between the USA and UN

mediation does demonstrate a potential for success, with the USA being capable of exerting pressure to prevent third parties from spoiling progress in the mediation procedure at the local level and the UN being better equipped to work through the parties' commitment problems and lack of trust. Capitalising on these opportunities may well be beneficial to the ongoing mediation process in Cyprus and in other UN-mediated conflicts where the USA may hold strategic interests.

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Conditions for a Successful Federal Model in Cyprus:
The Evaluation of the Annan Plan
and Future Prospects

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explore the possible preconditions for successful conflict management and stable federalism for a reunited Cyprus. It deals with the federal system proposed in the latest UN constitutional proposal called the Annan Plan (2002–2004) with a view to suggesting viable alternatives to the ongoing negotiations since 2008. The analysis shows that the federal model envisaged in the Plan and in the ongoing negotiations would have been unlikely to be suitable for Cyprus, because the designed federal institutions have never addressed the social, economic, political and demographic characteristics of the society. A number of changes to the proposed models for the reunification of Cyprus are needed: the normative dimension of and the institutional aspect of asymmetric federalism are needed to be examined carefully.

Keywords: federalism, ethnic conflict, Cyprus, the Annan Plan, normative theory, asymmetry, pluralism

Introduction

The Cyprus conflict remains one of the most intractable issues the international community is faced with. Since 1968 the leaderships of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have continued to negotiate under UN auspices in order to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. Their one brief attempt to live under a power-sharing constitution (1960–1963) resulted in violent ethnic conflict, prompting a Greek inspired coup d'état, Turkish military intervention, forced population transfers and the *de facto* partition of Cyprus into hostile ethnic zones. In spite of the failed power-sharing experience every attempt since then to formulate a basis for resolving the conflict has continued to be based on consociational power-sharing with federal and confederal elements. The Annan Plan was an attempt to construct such a design.

This article discusses firstly, whether the federal model envisioned in the Annan Plan would have been an adequate framework to hold Cyprus together and secondly, what kind of lessons for the ongoing negotiations could be drawn from the failed federal model under the Plan. The evaluation of the Plan is important here, not merely because it was the product of the entire set of negotiations since the 1970s, but because it still reflects the ongoing negotiations today. The problems raised here in this assessment of the Plan have been present in the negotiation drafts since

2008, and, therefore the policy recommendations proposed in this article in respect of the Plan are still valid today. In this overview of these institutions designed in the Plan the main focus is whether they would have been likely to ameliorate or exacerbate regional and ethnic cleavages. The argument is that the conditions under which federalism diminishes ethnic conflict in Cyprus depend on the interaction between federal institutions, regional inequality and ethnic diversity in a society. It seems clear that institutional arrangements alone do not provide a convincing answer. For successful institutional design, there is a need for a deep knowledge of the societies the institutions are meant to govern. It is of paramount importance to assess Cyprus' ethnic composition and the level of wealth, and the way these are reflected in the institutions envisioned in the Plan. These two factors have been chosen because they can be expected to shape the likelihood of conflict in federal societies (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). Additionally, political will based on a spirit of mutuality and reciprocity, the tradition of compromise, the need to protect diversity and developing mutual respect, a sense of shared rule and community, respect for constitutional norms and mutual benefits, a broad acceptance of the political culture and values of federalism (Burgess, 2007) are also necessary preconditions for the operation of federal institutions and, eventually, the maintenance of a federal system. These normative issues embedded in federalism give rise to the asymmetrical arrangements in highly asymmetric societies. Thus, for a successful federal model for Cyprus, both institutional and moral elements of asymmetric federalism need to be present. It is evident, however, that neither the Annan Plan nor the ongoing UN negotiations since 2008 seemed/seem to reflect or at least help to develop these important features.

Each section below deals with and explains the necessity of attaining not only the institutional but the moral dimension of asymmetric federalism for Cyprus. Asymmetric federalism is used by diverse societies for a wide variety of reasons and hence reflects specific 'values, beliefs and interests' (Burgess and Gress, 1999, p. 56). While classical liberalism imposes formal equality on all citizens, this does not take into account the very diverse consequences that equal treatment can have for different regions and different nations with respect to the implementation of government policies (Gagnon, 2010, p. 43). The quest for equal treatment should not prevent us from attaining egality at the level of results. Provincial equality, which is always insisted on by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, ignores the fact that provinces sometimes have special needs. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot leadership needs to respect diversity by acceding to special treatment and special rights for the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. If a federal Cyprus manages to establish federal traditions based on community rights and agrees to share sovereignty, the maintenance of federalism would be secure. The tragic events of the past that have marked Cyprus require that we take multi-ethnic federalism seriously and as Gagnon states we should distance ourselves from standardising models that have too often been imposed on minority nations throughout history (Gagnon, 2010, p. 122).

Federalism and Conflict Management in Cyprus
from the Theoretical Perspective

Today, the question that confronts many states is how best to bring together and maintain multi-ethnic societies. Inter-ethnic and inter-communal tensions bring federalism to centre stage as a political device for conflict management. A growing body of literature has emphasised the merits of federalism as 'peace preserving' (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006, p. 2). The theoretical attractiveness of federalism stems from its combination of shared rule and self-rule (Elazar, 1987). As Kymlicka states 'federalism can provide meaningful self-government for a national minority, guaranteeing its ability to make decisions in certain areas without being outvoted by the larger society' (Kymlicka, 1998, p. 135). Democratic multi-national/ethnic federations are characterised by a propensity to reflect deep diversity and maintain stability even though significant tensions may exist. There is an ongoing debate addressing the inability not only of traditional democratic federalism but also liberal, democratic and social rights included in constitutions to regulate an egalitarian and equitable treatment of individuals with regard to a specific citizenship (Requejo and Nagel, 2011, p. 3). It is precisely from here that the need for asymmetric federalism emerges and this can be a propitious means of managing long-term political conflicts in federal countries. Most of the work on this area concentrates on institutional aspects of establishing asymmetry in federal systems (for further information see Watts, 2002; de Villiers, 1994). On the other hand, more recent research, particularly since the end of the 1990s[1] has re-evaluated the experience of asymmetric federal systems, both regarding their moral and normative aspects in relation to multi-national democracies, and regarding the institutional and functional aspects of federations in general. The concept of federal asymmetry has provoked renewed interest and this has occurred in countries that display considerable national and/or cultural differences in the composition of their population (i.e. Canada, Belgium and Spain). Where the people who defend national and linguistic arguments are minorities, these arguments strengthen the defence of asymmetry. Where such factors are strong, decentralisation processes include asymmetry (Requejo and Nagel, 2011, p. 268).

There has been little discussion of the values and ideologies inherent in asymmetrical federalism. While material and structural interests are essential to understanding the forces involved in developing constitutional policies, a significant part of political thought has to explore various theories about what is good or valid for multi-ethnic societies. Too often, this normative dimension has been accorded secondary importance (Gagnon, 2010). The long term political stability of democratic multi-national/multi-ethnic federal regimes can be ensured as long as the regime is consistent with the three general principles which also constitute normative explanations

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1   Including Agranoff, in Burgess and Gress (1999); Watts (2005), Stepan (2004): McRoberts (1997); Requejo (2001) and Norman (1994).

of asymmetrical federalism. The communitarian principle highlights the wealth of cultures, ensures historical continuity as well as greater fairness among communities (Gagnon, 2010). According to this principle, states should be organised to protect communities requiring an asymmetrical structure in a plural state. It clearly implies a policy of recognition and rejects blanket enforcement of the federal constitution on all member states of the federation.

Another normative explanation for the establishment of asymmetrical practices is the egalitarian principle. This is the expression of equality between peoples and requires special attention to be paid to liberty, equality, and justice so as to better identify the three-way relationship among groups, individuals and the state. According to the rules by which federal systems function, the voice of the national majority cannot be considered an efficient expression of the sovereignty of the people (Gagnon, 2001). This problem has largely been resolved by federalist theory, and specialists of federalism have rapidly come to accept the legitimacy of shared sovereignty in federations. That notion of symmetrical federalism is followed by the asymmetrical federalism in its conceptualisation of citizens' equality, inspired by the unitary model of the state according to which the law treats all in the same way. However, it also accepts that differences in jurisdictions and laws are completely appropriate for member states of a federation. Federalism is a means of taking the concept of equality beyond the restrictive interpretation of equal treatment and substituting a more subtle interpretation of equal opportunity or even overall equity among national communities. In this way, various positive measures for establishing greater equality among groups have been proposed as a means of eliminating traditional obstacles.

The democratic principle is intended to guarantee accountable government, more active political participation and greater awareness of citizenship. According to this principle, federalism maximises individuals' public participation, and exists purely for the well-being of democratic life in society. Asymmetric federalism is a credible way to provide the means to fully achieve a pluralist, democratic framework. From this perspective, under federalism, individuals are more interested in and better informed about issues that specifically concern their political community, region and locality. They are more likely to understand local problems and hold elected representatives accountable for their actions. The desire to protect freedom by guaranteeing local sovereignty is entirely related to the concept of political community and makes it possible to legitimise the establishment of asymmetrical federalism. The absence of neutrality resulting from the expression of rights and dominant rules in multi-national federal states once again shows the need to implement asymmetrical federalism. As Taylor states, the challenge facing multi-national states lies in the recognition of deep diversity (Taylor, 1993). In so far as the federal principle can be established as a dynamic yet flexible force conducive to creative innovation, and consequently distant from some of the standardising features of more traditional federations, it can be a powerful tool for accommodation in multi-national democratic societies (Kymlicka, 1995).

Asymmetrical federalism and the normative principles flowing from the democratic principle bring us to the issue of legitimacy. Legitimacy in a federal society like Cyprus would depend both

on the feeling of belonging and on respect for political preferences freely expressed by the people. Moreover, both communities must find a way formally to recognise and accommodate the needs of a 'distinct society', a political community that struggles for survival, not for privileged treatment.

A multi-ethnic federation has been proposed for Cyprus, but without making a systematic analysis of the conditions tenable to ensure federalism survives and without giving any weight to asymmetric arrangements or emphasis on its moral dimension. This article suggests that a multi-ethnic federation in Cyprus would need to be decentralised, consensual and asymmetric; this might not guarantee harmony but could help resolve or regulate national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic conflicts.

The Annan Plan and Pre-conditions for Successful Federalism

At first glance, the chances for a successful federal solution to the Cyprus problem under the Annan Plan would seem to be slim, both in terms of conflict management and efficiency of the federation as a decision-making system. There are several significant issues mentioned below which should be taken into account in designing a federal model in the ongoing UN negotiations and, eventually, dealing with ethnic problems in Cyprus.

Inter-regional Inequalities versus Increased Decentralisation

First, this article states that *when inter-regional inequality is high, increased decentralisation increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict in Cyprus.* If the governmental authorities in a federation are to co-ordinate with each other in practice as well as in law, it is essential that there should be available to each of them, under its own unfettered control, financial resources sufficient for the performance of the functions assigned to it under the constitution. In addition, the more the diversity is, the greater the powers that have been assigned to the constituent states (Watts, 2002, p. 450).

There is a close inter-relation of fiscal arrangements with the delivery of social services. According to Article 2 of the Plan, the constituent states would have had greater powers and the same competences for all matters that were not explicitly assigned to the federal government.[2] As in the Plan, in most federations, responsibility for delivering the main social services such as health, education, and social security has been in regional and local hands where government is closer to the particular needs and circumstances. Nonetheless, federal financial services will be necessary once the large and ever-increasing costs of such services come into place. This issue has/had been neglected by both communities in Cyprus. In most federations, the provision of social services has been an area of co-responsibility due to that problem. However, this is not suitable in Cyprus' case

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2   This is symmetric allocation of competences. See United Nations Secretary-General (2004) Available at [http://www.cyprus-unplan.org].

and at least for a while there is a need, due to the history of the problem, to give each level of government exclusive functions as in the Plan in order to separate them from each other.

It is true that the issue of inter-governmental controversy appears when both federal and state governments face financial constraints and the need to reduce deficits, and when the federal government makes an effort to reduce financial assistance and off-load responsibilities. This form of a federal system would affect the area of inter-governmental fiscal relationships, so this issue needs to be taken into account in order to prevent any fiscal problems in a federal Cyprus. Besides, it is no good allotting too many functions, especially to the economically poor Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and devising legal safeguards so that it would be strictly limited to the performance of its respective functions, unless, at the same time, adequate provision is made so that it can afford to do its job without appealing to the central government for financial assistance. This is an important detail due to the fact that the success of federal systems depends upon the balance between co-operation and competition in its inter-governmental relations too (Elazar, 1979, pp. 193–194). For example, inter-jurisdictional competition would function properly if financial resources for the performance of the functions were available to each of the governmental authorities, especially if they are exclusive as defined in the Annan Plan.

Economic inequalities have been one of the problematic areas in Cyprus (Thorp, 2009). The economy of northern Cyprus continues to be seriously hampered by its political isolation.[3] It seems that, under the Plan, the Turkish Cypriot constituent state would have greater fiscal needs and a harder time raising revenue to meet those needs mentioned above. Although central government would be responsible for addressing deep regional inequalities through inter-regional redistribution, this would depend on the willingness of the Greek Cypriot majority. In fiscally decentralised settings, sub-national governments tend to serve as important veto players at the national level (Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). This can become problematic in the establishment of extensive redistributive policies by the national government. It is plausible that the relatively wealthy Greek Cypriot constituent state would block legislation aimed at reallocating societal resources from wealthy to poor units.[4]

Disparities in wealth among constituent units, which make it difficult for citizens to receive comparable services, can have a harmful effect on solidarity within a federation. This is the reason why many federations have sought to find some form of financial equalisation (Saunders, 1995). In every federation there is a need for financial transfers to correct the imbalances between revenue and expenditures. This can improve the capacity of poorer units, such as the Turkish Cypriot state,

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3   Turkish Cypriots believe that economics may be related to existential matters, hence their fear of economic domination by the relatively capital rich Greek Cypriots. See Interpeace and 'Cyprus 2015' Initiative (2011). Available at [http://www.interpeace.org/2011-08-08-15-19-20/latest-news/2011/87-solving-the-cyprus-problem-hopes-and-fears], accessed on 10 October 2013.

4   For more theoretical information see Bakke and Wibbels (2006), p. 17.

to provide their citizens with at least a minimum level of services (Watts, 1994, p. 18). But, there is a distinct possibility that the affluent Greek Cypriot constituent unit may grow discontented with equalisation payments to the poorer Turkish Cypriot one. The study of fiscal federalism in the Annan Plan shows that the fiscal powers which have been assigned to the constituent states, do not generate sufficient income and do not suffice to cover states' expenditure. The discrepancy between constituent states' revenue and expenditure is primarily removed with subsidies from the federal government. For their expenditure, constituent states are, therefore, strongly dependent on the federal government. This provides the federal government with an important mechanism to control the constituent states and the outcome is not favourable for an autonomous exercise of the regional powers. The autonomy of the constituent states is determined by their degree of financial autonomy, but if they cannot afford it there will be no point in having it (Markides, 2008). In order to avoid that happening, redistributive asymmetrical financial inter-governmental transfers may be employed to make the fiscal capacities of the member states more symmetrical (Watts, 2002, p. 464). If not, as extensive literature on fiscal federalism has noted, where there has been a symmetrical, constitutional allocation of taxing powers and financial resources as in the Annan Plan, sharp variations in the wealth and fiscal capacities of member states have led to significant disparities in the services they are able to provide to their citizens and this is likely to contribute to the conflict. The following list of asymmetries which highlight some variability in the scope of provincial autonomy might be seen to bring political stability in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot constituent state might be given financial concessions: it might collect its own taxes. It would then be required to pay the central government for the services it received from the state. All the same, it might benefit from national projects improving infrastructure without contributing to the financing of them. It might contribute less and less to the central government budget, but still enjoy the same services. This is the case in Spain where a system of special agreements is in place for Navarre and the Basque Country (Requejo and Nagel, 2011, p. 85). It might be opted out of various programmes with compensation. It could be allowed to assume full responsibility in certain areas that were either partly or fully funded by the federal government as in Quebec (McRoberts, 1997). Tax points might be granted to the Turkish Cypriot constituent state as compensation for opting out in certain areas where national programmes were instituted as in Quebec (Lacovino, 2010, p. 84). It could be given a right to develop some of its own plans. Under these conditions, both leaderships would have to realise the importance of equity rather than the strict equality in division of powers that has been claimed by Turkish Cypriots in division of powers, and a communitarian principle rather than a procedural liberalism that has been insisted by Greek Cypriots in their multi-ethnic society. Equality between individuals and ethnic groups in a federation would have to be considered by the two communities in accordance with their specific needs and historical development and not so much, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership believes, on the basis of an identical, interchangeable relationship with other individuals or other member states. For example, the central government might be given some functions in turn for

more financial transfers to the Turkish Cypriot constituent unit. It is feasible that the asymmetric fiscal arrangements would play a role in achieving egalitarianism and equity that would eventually improve the operation of political institutions in federal Cyprus.

Asymmetric Arrangements

Second, *a form of asymmetrical federalism may be introduced in order to deal with ethnic diversity in Cyprus.* Asymmetrical relations have been applied in some countries including Canada, Spain and Belgium, and they have been successful in terms of legitimacy and maintenance of the federal system. Between the two communities in Cyprus there are considerable *de facto* asymmetries in population, area and wealth which may easily endanger stability if they are not supported by proper institutional design. In the symmetrical federation discussed in the ongoing negotiations, and the one envisaged in the Plan with significant socio-economic as well as cultural and demographic differences, the institutions of any federal model for Cyprus might conceivably destabilise. It is the case that federations may discriminate among constituent units on grounds of population and among regions on the basis of economic conditions (McGarry, 2005). It becomes obvious that one of the aspects of the demographic structure of multi-ethnic polities seems critically important to federal stability (McRoberts, 1977). Where a single group enjoys a strong majority position, the political status of the remaining groups may be very unstable and this may become a source of dissension over the relative influence of a particular region in federal policy-making. Thus, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the symmetrical allocation of authority in the Plan might intensify ethnic conflict in deeply divided Cyprus. The United Cyprus Republic would comprise two separate 'entities', which would have equal authority and responsibilities, but also where one of them – the Turkish Cypriots – mostly desires independence. Watts states that '… there may be cases where constitutional asymmetry is the only way to resolve sharp differences when much greater impulses for non-centralisation exist in some regions than in others within a federal system' (Watts, 2001, p. 29). The large difference in size between the Greek Cypriot majority (~78%) and the Turkish Cypriot minority (~18%) appears to prevent mutual veto arrangements or general parity of representation in federal institutions too. When the balance of population numbers is so different, trying to equalise it, as seen in the Annan Plan, in such a way that the majority population are unhappy to accept a new arrangement, will immediately destroy the concept of federation (Denktaş, 2007).

The issue of asymmetrical federalism arises, invariably, in nationally diverse states (McGarry, 2005). However, this is not the case in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot leadership is bargaining for complete, equal political rights with the Greek Cypriots (Denktaş, 2007). Both leaderships need to learn more from the asymmetric federal system, otherwise Turkish Cypriot leaders will keep calling for either recognition of their nationhood or greater symmetry among the state's nations, whereas the Greek Cypriot leadership will only accept either a unitary system or a federalism based on majoritarian democracy. Asymmetry is important here because it 'ensures that the national

identity of minorities receives the same concern and respect as the majority nation' (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 105). Both communities would face obstacles because in an asymmetric society achieving a solution between groups requires that the members of different groups be accorded different rights. This accommodation of difference may impose restrictions on the members of the larger community; hence it is a burden (Kizilyürek, 2007). On the other hand, this should not be considered only as a set of extra-rights for a particular community, but also more importantly, as a process that aims to achieve a progressive political and social integration (Gianni, 2001, p. 236).

It remains possible that the number and degrees of asymmetry may matter – though how, exactly, is not clear. In an asymmetric federation, regions either differ in their powers of self-government (asymmetrical powers) but share power equally within the federal government (asymmetrical shares) or regions differ in their powers within the federal government but are treated identically in their powers of self-government. Another arrangement is that regions differ in their powers of self-government (asymmetrical powers) and share power unequally within the federal government (asymmetrical shares) (O'Leary, 2010, p. 85). A reunited federal Cyprus can only be successfully attained through a combination of asymmetrical powers and asymmetrical shares. The multiple component units might have different powers of self-government. The Turkish Cypriot state would have special rights and powers, and in compensation, the Greek Cypriots would enjoy some special powers within the federal government. In other words, it can be argued that any asymmetry in powers should be compensated for by an asymmetry in shares. Any asymmetry in the powers of regions automatically generates asymmetry in the federal legislature (O'Leary, 2010, p. 190).

The case for asymmetrical federalism would be that everyone wins and no-one loses (Whitaker, 1993, p. 108) while the reunited Cyprus would gain an effective national government not rejected by the Turkish Cypriot federated state. Yet, asymmetrical arrangements alone are not enough for the functioning of a federal system. Its moral dimension should also be available for consideration. Burgess notes that the difficulty which political scientists encounter is that they cannot quantify morality-based demand, while the case for asymmetry is often captured best by such appeals (Burgess, 2000). Respect for 'deep diversity', as the only logical 'fit' for the reconciliation of national pluralism and federalism – or remaining faithful to the perceived 'purposes' of federalism are possible necessary conditions for the successful management of ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

Allocation of Power

The Greek Cypriot leadership holds a more centralised vision, whereas the decentralised or 'loose' federation is supported by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in order to keep as much power as possible within the two constituent states and ensure that their own entity is treated as an equal founder (International Crisis Group, 2009). Being fewer in numbers, Turkish Cypriots express concerns regarding political equality in the federal state and worry that Greek Cypriots will not

accept equitable power-sharing (Interpeace and 'Cyprus 2015' Initiative, 2011). By signing a very loose federal agreement, Greek Cypriots fear that this will allow the Turkish Cypriot constituent state to make itself as independent and self-sustaining as possible and secede from the federation. Regardless, in the case of post-conflict situations as well as features of the multi-national nature of federalism, it seems that it is probably better to limit federal competences as much as possible at the outset, advocating only limited co-operation and interaction if it is necessary. This was the case in the Plan. Following a period where trust is built, some constituent state competences can be reallocated to the federal state for a more efficient operation of the system (Papapetrou, 2007).

The third factor for a more viable federal model for deeply divided Cyprus is, *when concurrent powers allocated to the levels of governments are few and clearly indicated there is less likely to be frequent blocking of decision making.* In post-conflict states, the relations between different groups are very fragile. Exclusive competencies and jurisdictional division of labour are anticipated to keep conflict low (Belgium and Canada). Regarding the efficiency of the system, the nature and number of veto players/points come to affect the procedural efficiency of the legislative process. This will also be affected by the way the power is divided. When there is a functional division of power among different levels of governments, as seen in Germany and Switzerland (co-operative federalism), the two levels of government need constant co-ordination, collaboration, co-operation and consent. This gives rise to too many veto players and is, therefore, expected to increase situations of frequent deadlock. There is the prospect of this arrangement often creating a stalemate in those countries where *de facto* asymmetry is a potential problem and where certain pre-conditions, such as trust, cross cutting cleavages and prior elite accommodation are absent. If the ethnic identity were to be added to this arrangement it would be very hard for a federal government to make even simple decisions. In co-operative systems, it is likely that the clear distinction and division of power between federal and sub-units is blurred. The formal division of competences becomes less clear-cut. This situation seems less appropriate, at least initially, for post-conflict situations or deeply divided societies like Cyprus.

The dual federalism that is seen in Canada and Belgium would seem to be a better model for Cyprus; this is the proposal in, and strength of, the Plan. The risk of frequent deadlock is probably to be reduced through exclusive competences given to sub-units (Hooghe, 2003). Separating the differences seems to deal with antagonistic relations between the two communities too (Stroschein, 2003, p. 14). In dual federal systems, the important thing for the constituent states is to have sufficient resources to exercise their competences without the financial intervention of the central government. This factor is not considered in the structure of the Plan.

A clear separation of competences is introduced in the Plan, as in the constitution of Belgium, to deal with the bi-polar nature of the two communities. The social and political purpose of federalising Cyprus is not to bring long-divided communities into closer interaction with one another, but rather to separate them further by creating large areas of competency in which they would be politically autonomous. The Plan aimed at solving the problem of distrust through the

allocation of residual powers and many policy areas to both communities. The allocation of exclusive competences aims at minimising the number of zero sum negotiations between representatives from both sides (Stroschein, 2003). Greater autonomy given to constituent units may conceivably neutralise many potentially explosive ethnic conflicts at the federal level. But, in spite of that, it perpetuated separateness of both communities by setting up structures and institutions to represent Greek and Turkish Cypriot interests (ethnicity) instead of a unified Cypriot interest, so it was/is far from attempting to bring the two communities together. When the decentralisation process is over-emphasised at the expense of national solidarity as in the Plan, it becomes dangerous for the maintenance of federalism. This rule would at the same time eliminate the chances of developing cross-cutting cleavages which might help to mitigate ethnic conflict. Having said that, in order to avoid confrontation between two antagonistic groups, it is important to have a central government with minimal scope and to allow the domain of the national government to develop incrementally and slowly (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004). The Greek Cypriot leadership's insistence on keeping functions at the centre is not only against an accepted federal norm but also against the democratic principle of self-rule (for more theoretical information, see Majeed, 2006, p. 4).

The institutional design in the Plan was set up in a way that was destined to create gridlock because there would, for example, be probable division along ethnic lines rather than ideological ones. In these situations, there is a need to establish some institutions in order to defuse ethnic confrontation too, otherwise these societies are somewhat fated to divide further. So, what is required for the ongoing negotiations is to clearly define both the concurrent and exclusive powers in order to avoid future conflicts and to construct some mechanisms involving both communities in running the system together and thus promoting mutuality, reciprocity and inter-dependence which would eventually give rise to the development of common interest.[5] The joint interests shared by the two communities, and the mutual benefits that could result from a negotiated settlement, have not been sufficiently emphasised conceptually, practically or organisationally during the inter-communal dialogue (Michael, 2007, p. 590). For that purpose, Confidence Building Measures should be introduced as soon as possible so that both communities can find an acceptable solution (Ker-Lindsay, 2005). After Confidence Building Measures have been implemented, the political institutions of the new planned state in Cyprus need to design a system in which more competences would be gradually given to the federal level and in which more financial power would be given to each constituent unit and especially the Turkish Cypriot state.

Finding a way to share power is one of the major serious obstacles to a conclusive agreement capable of bringing the two sides together and satisfying the needs and aspirations of each.[6] The

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5   It is possible that the importance of ethnicity would diminish as soon as both communities begin to co-operate with one another and start sharing many competencies, thus developing trust and confidence (Talat, 2007).

6   In the Annan Plan the executive would be rotated by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot parliamentarians elected separately by their own communities.

Plan never developed an effective formula for power-sharing in terms of being capable of providing incentives to both sides (Rotberg, 2003). Although both leaderships so far have accepted a principle that the two communities would exercise their political rights through their separate political wills, the Greek Cypriot leadership has given great importance to direct elections through cross-voting unlike the system envisaged in the Plan. This may involve one of the methods of compelling candidates for parliament to canvas for votes from both communities instead of just one. As a condition of election, each candidate for parliament would have to seek support from both Turkish and Greek speakers.[7] This method gives bi-communal issues precedence over more narrow communal interests and helps diminish communalism, and eventually state-wide parties are likely to emerge and predominate in parliament.

This is an important development in terms of commitment to a sense of unity in both communities. Without it there would be a risk of developing a system, as in Belgium, where federalism has promoted great differentiation due to the system itself which encourages inter-regional comparison and provides only limited possibilities for the development of cross-cutting cleavages. The hope was that cross-voting would bring the two communities together and would serve as a confidence-building-measure (Cyprus 2015 Initiative, 2011). This should encourage mutual desire to work together for the common benefit, plus influence political parties to seriously take into account the interests and concerns of both communities. For the most part, cross-voting tends to favour moderate candidates who have appeal beyond their ethnic communities and therefore fosters coalitions across ethnic lines (Reilly, 2001). Instead of authorising one community only to elect a federal official whose decisions would later affect both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, implementing a cross-voting system seems better and more legitimate in the eyes of Greek Cypriots (Cyprus 2015 Initiative, 2011).

Number of Federating Units

The current model for settlement as well as the one envisaged in the Plan is/was a: *'bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality … Federal Government with a single international personality, … a Turkish Cypriot Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status'.* All the same, with only two communities, it is foreseeable that the establishment of just two regions might well intensify the conflict, since the existence of two communities naturally leads to polarisation and intensification of this polarisation. The alternative of establishing more than two unit federations has never been addressed by either side or by the UN. Dividing the federation into multiple units, as is the case in Belgium and Canada can be a viable solution.[8] In bi-communal societies like Cyprus, in order to disperse polarisation, it is

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7   No-one could be elected without receiving a minimum number of votes from the other community or more votes from the other language constituency than his/her competitors.

8   The particular problems of dyadic federations have been generally recognised (Duchacek (1988), pp. 5–31; Watts

sensible to establish more than two units. The statistical record of two unit confederations and federations is wholly discouraging (O'Leary, 2010, p. 197). Moreover, the spatial distribution of ethnic groups is another aspect of the demographic structure of multi-ethnic polities important for stability in a federal system in Cyprus. The potential for secessionist movements will be much greater if a group is concentrated in a particular region and constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population of that region (McRoberts, 1977). In the model designed in the Annan Plan both aspects of demography would presage a high level of political instability. The demographic structure of Cypriot society would hardly seem feasible to provide extensive political accommodation of Turkish Cypriots and it is likely to offer the basis for attraction to a strategy of secession. So, what is important is to disperse the majority group which is Greek Cypriots and establish more than two constituent units in order to avoid concentration of the minority in one unit. It would be even more efficient if the name of ethnic communities of the constituent units were to be removed. These issues are important because, psychologically, bi-communalism itself may elevate levels of antagonism and distrust (Schmitt, 1991). It is not suggested that bi-communal societies inevitably produce political breakdown. Despite inflexibilities created through bi-communal social structure, political mechanisms such as decentralisation and a cross-voting electoral process may help two communities co-operating. Furthermore, relationships could evolve as a result of economic change in the Turkish Cypriot side and an implementation of Confidence Building Measures. But it is still an important issue to establish multi-unit federations for bi-communal societies in order to have a successful federal system.

So, fourthly it can be stated that *two unit federations with two ethnic groups are less likely to contribute to ethnic accommodation in Cyprus.* It has also been suggested that a condition important to the maintenance of a federation is that there be no one state, or two states, large enough to dominate the federation or threaten secession. To maintain federation, a sufficient number of federating units is necessary. A sufficient number minimises the possibility of an overwhelmingly dominant state. With multiple units there is less likelihood of a confrontation between the central government and all the units, and more room for bargaining and shifting coalitions of groups on different issues. Hence, federalism becomes less of a zero-sum game. Where there is a single dominant group, it may have little incentive to cede power and authority to smaller groups through federal institutions. Watts argues that those composed of only two units seem to generate sharp bi-polarising tendencies that often produce instability (Watts, 2007). Where there are substantial disparities in area and population among constituent units, these may also become sources of dissension over the relative influence of particular regions in federal policy-making. In addition to institutional arrangements and the character of a bi-national society, the two-unit

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(1999), pp. 113–114. In Canada and Belgium, with bi-national character, federation has been designed to consist of more than two constituent units. Cyprus represents most sharply the difficulties of trying to establish a bi-national federation. Michael Burgess (2007) on Cyprus draws attention to this issue.

federal system as proposed in the Annan Plan constitutes a particular problem (Tselepis, 2007). As Ronald Watts argues, two-unit federations generally have a tendency towards parity between the two units in all matters. This usually results in deadlock because of the lack of opportunity for shifting alliances and coalitions, which vary according to different issues, among the constituent units or their representatives; these processes are some of the ways in which issues are often resolved in multi-unit federations (Watts, 2007, p. 233).

In a two-unit federation every policy issue becomes a zero-sum game. Such bi-polarity leads to intractable negotiations between the two leaderships. It is plausible that this may be intensified where there is a lack of cross-cutting pressures in operation.[9] In the Cyprus case there are reinforcing rather than cross-cutting cleavages, and this is one of the important roots of the ethnic conflict. Despite four centuries of co-existence, the two communities remained separate, distinct, and self-contained ethnic groups divided along linguistic, religious, and cultural lines (Joseph, 1985, p. 33). A lack of cross-cutting ethnic, social, or political ties prevents the development of a common political culture and overarching loyalties among different groups in a society, and this is what happened among both communities in Cyprus. The federal institutions designed in the Plan conform to a strict ethnic proportionality rule on membership and voting, which aims to protect the political equality of the Turkish Cypriot community but which is anticipated to create inefficiency. What is required for the maintenance of a federal system is to establish cohesive mechanisms (i.e. political parties) which would likely give rise to a common nationality rather than engender division in many respects.

The Nature of Federal Bargaining

Fifth, *seriousness about the nature of the process of finding a solution is half way to the solution.* The skill and motivation of political leadership is essential. Political leaders are able to 'shape' a country's path. As we know from history, actors can and do break historical patterns despite the strong influence of long-term factors. Federal bargaining, the motives of political elites and agreement between elites, understanding what their bargaining is about, voluntary union, and ample qualities of political leadership to make a federal constitution work are crucial in maintaining federal systems. Success in the process of hard bargaining and negotiation that will define the substance of an agreement is expected to determine the workability of the designed system.

The last version of the Plan was shaped in a very short period of time and some issues, not agreed on by both sides, were completed by the Secretary General. This shows us that there is a high possibility that, if it were put into force, in the near future both sides would almost certainly

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9   The presence of these pressures through multiple associations can be a viable solution to ethnic disharmony in multi-ethnic societies, where group associations are not merely ethnic but pluralistic, that is, where they are voluntary, multiple and overlapping.

change provisions, and that could destroy the operation of the federal system. This is, of course, the fundamental problem of federal design – the institutions are subject to bargaining, re-negotiation and re-interpretation. If there is no institutionalised constraint in the bargaining process, many rules and institutions will be subject to negotiation and change. Political stability would be in danger when the institutional superstructure is not agreed upon. Both communities should believe that the gains from federation are fairly distributed. In the eyes of many Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots gained increased autonomy and policy-making authority with the Annan Plan, whereas in the eyes of some Turkish Cypriots the plan reduced them to a minority position. Federation was hardly a compromise between both leaderships. Each party felt a sense of loss rather than a desire to make accommodations addressing mutual needs.

Typical of most minority groups, the Turkish Cypriots were inclined to focus on communal rather than common interests. This resulted in the pursuit of autonomy and self-determination which, in the often-stated preference for confederation or loose federation, embodied a position that exacerbated Greek Cypriots' suspicions about the extent of their commitment to a unified Cyprus. So, if the Plan had been accepted, the bargaining process would have failed to achieve a resolution that preserved the federation. Indeed, it was hardly a bargaining process since neither side took it seriously, nor was it agreed upon by either leader (Palley, 2007).

One of the important elements in a successful negotiation process is the motivation of political leadership to gradually reduce the level of conflict and bring it under effective control. The political leaders in Cyprus have, however, merely pursued their separate objectives and have consistently refused to compromise. What has been witnessed in many cases in Cyprus is that the parties negotiated in order to receive indirect benefits rather than to arrive at a compromise solution (Richmond, 1999). There is much discussion on peace settlement, but not much discussion on what peace entails and what the two parties view as constituting peace. What is needed in the Cyprus case is a framework which focuses on what the two communities can share rather than what sets them apart. Both parties need to adopt a picture of what it is they are negotiating for, which will guarantee peace, stability and prosperity for the future.

For Oliver Richmond, what is significant in a conflict situation in which mediation plays a role is the perception of what both parties desire from such a process. 'It must be asked what has motivated the two sides to negotiate in the forum of the UN and if this motivation has necessarily been directed at the search for a compromise' (Richmond, 1996, pp. 99–100). The views of the two sides have evolved into a perception that it was a relatively cost free method of continuing the struggle for concessions from the opposition while avoiding making the costly concessions entailed in a possible compromise solution. The characterisation of the peacemaking process in Cyprus has being prompted by a fear of losing, and yet also containing an element of fear as regards making concessions which appear to be accurate. Negotiating out of fear, but fearing to negotiate has led to a situation in which mediation and negotiation became part of the conflict environment, resulting in the failure of significant and protracted efforts to bring peace. As Durduran points out,

none of the UN proposals were designed to enable both communities to co-operate in order to govern the island. Real negotiations, a bargaining of give and take, never took place (Durduran, 2008). The negotiating process indicates that the conflict in Cyprus is not simply a conflict of substantive issues, such as territory, refugees, etc., but mostly a conflict of mistrust, fear and suspicion. Because of these factors, maintenance of peace between the two communities might not be achieved by institutional arrangements alone. The UN has been pushing the Cypriot parties to reach a compromise as quickly as possible. Come what may, imposing any proposal on both communities is likely to risk any future solution. Considering the existence of psychological barriers between the communities, it appears that a quick solution on Cyprus is neither possible nor advantageous. As Palley states, 'had there been genuine negotiations, as opposed to imposed arrangements dressed up as negotiations, more compromises would have been made by all concerned' (Palley, 2005, p. 145). According to Michael Burgess, what is clear is that if the federal idea is to have any relevance at all to the future of Cyprus, it must be deemed workable (Burgess, 2007). The domestic dimension of the Cyprus problem suggests that ultimately there must be some form of political will strong enough to overcome the deep-seated mistrust and hostility that still exists between the two communities. A new type of federal arrangement of an unprecedented kind might be forged from an essentially fragile political will that insists upon the 'separateness' of the distinct identities rather than upon their 'unity'.

Conclusion

This article deals with normative and institutional concerns about the appropriateness and legitimacy of establishing asymmetrical federalism in Cyprus. It seems that application of plural federalism for Cyprus is destined to deal with ethnic conflicts due to the fact that political liberalism involves cultural limitations both in normative theory and in institutional practices of democracies, including federalism (Requejo, 2001, p. 110). A normative refinement of liberal democratic theory would view pluralism as a value worth protecting and not simply as a fact to be tolerated (Requejo, 2001, p. 112). The normative and institutional movement towards 'advanced democratic societies' implies, in the case of multi-national states, a superior accommodation of component national identities in the symbols and democratic institutions of the different political collectivities that individuals belong to. This suggests that a reformulation of federal agreements in multi-national societies is necessary because the 'pluralism' considered in classical theories of federalism was not even related to cultural pluralism (Requejo, 2001). That is why asymmetrical federalism has been developed to deal with cultural pluralism.

Most of the work in the study of federalism as a means of managing political conflict concentrates on institutional aspects of establishing asymmetry in democratic federal systems. Little discussion has taken place on the values and ideologies inherent in asymmetrical federalism. Its moral foundations are different from the more universal categories of liberal values and ideologies because they do not directly ask the question: 'what is good for a given society?' This

article explores some normative arguments which apply to the Cyprus case to uphold various images of asymmetrical federalism. Asymmetrical federalism is normative in that it embodies different conceptions of the good. Asymmetry can be justified here, firstly, because it provides better protection for the community in terms of language, culture, institutions and shared goals (the communitarian conception of the good). Imposition of national, uniform standards on culturally, religiously, and linguistically distinct provinces (Vipond, 1995, p. 102) may have a better chance to contribute to ethnic conflicts in Cyprus. Secondly, the notion of citizenship is further refined through support in favour of an equitable treatment (rather than equal treatment) between communities, and by extension between individuals. Equality does not necessarily imply sameness or symmetry, as the Turkish Cypriot leadership believes, and asymmetrical solutions can be found that answer to diverse needs while still maintaining a spirit of equality, thus creating stability in an otherwise unstable federation. Additionally, the Turkish Cypriot leadership supports a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal settlement which is bound up with the satisfaction of 'political equality'. The Plan established two units which are highly fragile and bi-polar and most likely to result in failure too. Thirdly, the need to secure the conditions of an enlarged democratic setting is, in all probability, to be best accomplished within well-circumscribed cultural communities. As a consequence, asymmetrical federalism can be perceived as providing the appropriate response for the full accomplishment of a plural democratic federal setting.

Aforementioned information suggests that a number of changes to the proposed models for the reunification of Cyprus are required. Firstly, the normative dimension of asymmetric federalism needs to be developed in Cyprus. Secondly, the institutional aspect of asymmetric federalism should be examined carefully. The legitimacy of the multi-ethnic polity in Cyprus would depend on the maintenance of certain pre-conditions derived from the following factors: weak central government and gradual expansion of national government authority; elite skills and motivation; cross-ethnic co-operation and co-ordination; effective regional autonomy; the existence of cross-cutting pressures to moderate political attitudes and facilitate compromise; sufficient numbers of federating units; asymmetrical arrangements; and a stable, institutionalised bargaining. Moreover, for a stable federal Cyprus the citizens of a federal state must have both 'the desire for national unity and the determination to maintain the independence of each man's separate state' (Dicey, 1950, pp. 142–143). Many Cypriots have experienced one or other of these two feelings but not both. Stability can be achieved if the two communities come to realise that the federal formula with its moral dimension as well as its institutional aspect is the only means for achieving unity. Until federalism is viewed by both communities as a political and economic expedient with almost no moral content, and is comprehended as an institutional arrangement that divides powers between national and local governments, there will be no attempt made to develop a common identity among all citizens which is essential for a stable federation. The successes and failures of federations in their delicate task of balancing 'unity' and 'diversity' could be explained by studying the contextual factors along with institutional arrangements. The extent

of centralisation can play a role in whether constituent units experience grievance that might drive the pursuit of secessionism (Anderson, 2010, p. 134). Centralisation of policy-making authority often replaces unanimity with a somewhat less inclusive decision rule. As a consequence, the costs of co-ordinating policy choices fall, but a new risk is created. The service levels and cost allocations of the central authority may make one or all participants worse off.[10] That is why the decentralised and divided model of federalism envisaged in the Annan Plan might have been the more plausible ideal to contribute to a successful federal system. Even so, it should have been supplemented by a more unified system in the central government by direct election of the executive and a cross-voting electoral system that has been on the table in the ongoing negotiations. There is a chance that a federal system may succeed when the autonomy, self-determination and powers allocated to the minority groups are counterbalanced by other forces – shared values, an integrative party system, a sense of mutual commitment and a responsive central government that binds the groups together. A problem may possibly occur if communal division does not quickly begin to wither on the vine; its entrenchment can only subject consociational arrangements to ever-greater centrifugal pressures, as in Belgium. What is necessary and lacking in the Annan Plan is a way to instil the sense that Cyprus is a multi-ethnic society which enables both communities to have a shared vision through cross-community arrangements. The design of central institutions should be constructed carefully in order to compensate for this. For example, it would be essential to encourage incentives for cross-ethnic co-operation through coalitions between different ethnic and political groups. Stability is most tenable in countries where country-wide parties dominate the political system. Cross-voting and direct election of the executive which are agreed by both communities in the ongoing negotiations can be seen as important and positive developments in terms of achieving unity in Cyprus.

Symmetric models like the one designed in the Plan make achieving real political accommodation difficult, when the pluralism of ethnic minorities constitutes a form of *de facto* asymmetry which requires that the recognition of multi-ethnicity be established using the same 'entrance requirements' of the constitutional system – requirements that additionally must regulate the ethnic self-government of the minorities. Since units vary greatly in wealth, a symmetrical system for allocating financial resources to the constituent units leads to extremely unequal results in terms of each unit's wealth and fiscal capacities. For this reason, many federations practice asymmetric financial transfers in order to redistribute and equalise wealth among its constituent units (Burgess, 2006, p. 130). This issue is in need of further attention in ongoing negotiations. If symmetry is forced upon such a federation, national minorities, whose demands for recognition or autonomy are being ignored, may feel compelled to secede (Watts, 2005, p. 6). In the case of multi-national federations it has been argued that all of them, with the

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10   Even if constrained to policy areas in which mutual advantages from centralising policy-making authority exist. See Buchanan and Tullock (1962).

exception of Switzerland, are constitutionally asymmetrical and that allocating varying linguistic, cultural and even legal capabilities to different constituent units is a necessity to keep the polity unified (Stepan, 2004).

Surely, the appropriate conditions for successful federalism mentioned above are not absolute requirements, and the prospect for success in deeply divided Cyprus is possible. There is no point in simply saying that federalism cannot be established without them (as Denktaş, 2007; Olgun, 2007; and Papadopoulos, 2005 believe); there are strong reasons for finding ways to succeed. Many of these conditions might be subject to change, whether through certain developments as in economics or through determined, effective leadership. For the time being, there is a basic need to build the conditions for a more confident use of federal structures and spirit rather than finding yet another inappropriate constitutional arrangement.

It can be concluded that a United Cyprus will function as a democracy if it combines pluralist federal and liberal consociational principles. Various consociational elements are likely to contribute to the relative harmony at the national level (Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004, p. 266). A benign scenario cannot emerge from a highly centralised federal state desired by the Greek Cypriot leadership and a symmetrical federal system insisted on by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. There is a prerequisite to examine the notion of asymmetry and a loose federal system and see how they can better serve the purposes of modern federal Cyprus.

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Remembering the Cypriot Civil War 50 Years On

Andrekos Varnava

Those interested in the reunification of Cyprus must appreciate how pivotal historical truth is and therefore the work of historians. Reunification can only begin with a scientific historical investigation into the events in Cyprus which began in December 1963, half a century ago this December. This essay is by no means a scientific investigation, but a few words on why such an investigation has not been done thus far and why it is long overdue. This is especially important because not one academic event has been arranged in the Republic of Cyprus or internationally to mark that dark month 50 years ago.

From December 1963 to August of the following year a Civil War raged in Cyprus, with mass killings and violence committed mostly by Greek and Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries on each other, resulting in the collapse of the three-year old consociational Republic of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots, refer to these events as the Turkish Cypriot 'revolt', while Turkish Cypriots refer to the events as a Greek Cypriot 'genocide' or 'ethnic cleansing' of Turkish Cypriots. Commentators have referred to the events as an 'intercommunal conflict', something that has been generally accepted, even by politicians of the island, thus watering down the significance and dual responsibility of both communities for the events, and the fact that the conflict was about a struggle over power in the island and over the political status of the island. The facts surrounding the events will be dealt with later, but it is pivotal to refer to what happened as a civil war and not an inter-communal conflict, as one leading civil war expert, who is of Greek heritage, does.[1]

At the end of 2000 I had seriously started thinking about becoming a historian and pursuing a PhD. Assured of a place in Honours (fourth-year) at Monash University I embarked upon my first trip to Cyprus since 1983 when I had been aged three. Cyprus was the island homeland I only knew from the memories of my parents and their friends. Academically, my intention was to do my 18,000 word Honours dissertation on why the Republic of Cyprus collapsed in 1963–1964 so soon after it had been created in 1960. In the end I did not pursue this project. I was driven by a series of experiences and realisations to pursue a project on the formation of the British Sovereign Base Areas within the wider contexts of British Middle East defence policy and British

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1   N. Sambanis (2000) 'Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature', *World Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 437–483, refer to Table 1; N. Sambanis, (2001) 'Do Ethnic and Non-ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?: A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 3, pp. 259–282, 267, 279; N. Sambanis (2004) 'What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition', *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6, pp. 814–858, 822.

government reluctance to decolonise Cyprus in the face of violence on the island. The entire story of this change is unimportant, with the exception of one point, and that is why and how my original idea for a project became frustrated by both the lack of accessible parliamentary and court records, and the comments of Cypriots, such as, 'why do you want to write about 1963 and 1964? It was simple, the Turks revolted'. Greek Cypriots seemed to not be interested in a scientific study on those events.

It is now 50 years on since those events and Greek Cypriots are still not ready for the facts let alone for an analysis of these by scientific historical methodology.

Meanwhile, academia has failed to properly investigate; certainly no historian has attempted to do so. Comparatively there has without doubt always been a healthy interest in the question of how UNFICYP was formed,[2] but this has not resulted in a comprehensive study on the long lead-up to its formation and the immediate aftermath that focuses on causes and effects and all the various factors and players involved. The handful of studies in the 1960s and 1970s were too close to the events and often by players,[3] largely political science studies lacking a proper historical archival basis,[4] or biased towards one side,[5] and the best is by a political geographer, whose study was only published posthumously and so we have not had the benefit of his wisdom and knowledge aside from his main study.[6] One-sided studies continue into the 1990s.[7] More recent studies have either centred on the policies of international players (Ker-Lindsay; Nicolet),[8]

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2   J.A. Stegenga (1968) *The UN Force in Cyprus*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press; A. Papadopoulos (1969) *Peace-Making and Peace-keeping by the United Nations: Cyprus a Case Study*, Nicosia [no publisher identified]; J. Ker-Lindsay (2001) 'The Origins of the UN Presence in Cyprus', in O.P. Richmond and J. Ker-Lindsay (eds), *The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 50–76.

3   E. Averoff-Tossizza (1986) *Lost Opportunities: The Cyprus Question 1950–1963*, translated by T. Cullen and S. Kyriakidis, New York: Caratzas.

4   S. Kyriakides (1968) *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; L. Ierodiakonou (1971) *The Cyprus Question*, Kristianstad, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Z. Stavrinides (1976) *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood*, Wakefield, UK: Loris Stavrinides Press (Nicosia, CYREP, 1999); P.G. Polyviou (1976) *Cyprus in Search of a Constitutional: Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals 1960–1975*, Nicosia: Nicolaou & Sons.

5   P. Oberling (1982) *The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus*, Boulder, New York: Social Science Monographs.

6   R.A. Patrick (1976) *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963–1971*, Ontario: University of Waterloo Press, Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies, Publication Series 4.

7   S.R. Sonyel (1997) *Cyprus the Destruction of a Republic: British Documents 1960–1965*, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press; H.S. Gibbons (1997) *The Genocide Files*, London: Charles Bravos.

8   C. Nicolet (2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954–1974: Removing the Greek–Turkish Bone of Contention*, Mannheim: Bibliopolis; A. James (2001) *Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis of 1963–1964*, New York: Palgrave; J. Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis, 1963–1964*, Mannheim und Möhnesee: Peleus Bibliopolis.

historical memory and history education,[9] more political science (Constantinou)[10] or, they have been biased accounts. The fullest treatment was the noteworthy effort by the journalist Makarios Droushiotis, which concentrates on exposing extremist Cypriot elites from both sides as manipulators of both the Cold War politics and ethno-nationalist politics in their desire to bring about *enosis* or partition respectively.[11] The majority of these studies have not been accepted by political elites in Cyprus even today because they would mean accepting responsibility as both victims and perpetrators for the start and perpetuation of the Cypriot Civil War of 1963–1964.

Although there has not been at least one comprehensive study on what transpired by a professional historian, the historical facts have not remained elusive. Former president, Glafkos Clerides, revealed in his memoirs how both sides drifted towards civil war when he published documents relating to the plans of the Akritas Organisation, of which he was a member, and of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.[12] The Greek Cypriots planned through both political and violent actions to overturn certain provisions of the Zurich–London Agreements – to show that the 'partnership state' was unworkable and unfair – while the plan of the Turkish Cypriot leadership was 'prepare, wait, and defend', what they believed would be a provocation from the Greek Cypriots.

My conversations with Greek Cypriot men involved corroborate this view. One interviewee, a resident of Melbourne, Australia, since the early 1970s, aged now in his mid-70s, has been most willing to speak about his role in the Akritas Organisation of the Minister of Interior, Polycarpos Georgajis, which had also included Tassos Papadopoulos and Glafkos Clerides, and which was also sanctioned by President Archbishop Makarios III. This man reveals that he was intimately drawn in at the local level of his village (and surrounding villages) in the preparations and then the carrying-out of the events of December 1963 and those which followed, subsequently being rewarded by becoming mayor of his village later in the 1960s. He claims that weapons were hidden in chests and others buried and that Georgajis himself visited the region where men who took part would gather to be, as he put it, 'indoctrinated' by words of hatred against their Muslim neighbours and trained to use the weapons. On one particular visit in the Autumn of 1963, the man reveals

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9   Y. Papadakis (1993) 'The Politics of Memory and of Forgetting in Cyprus', *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, pp. 139–154; Y. Papadakis (1998) 'Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. XXV, No. 3, pp. 149–165; Y. Papadakis (2003) 'Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus', *History and Anthropology*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, pp. 253–270; S. Philippou and A. Varnava (2009) 'Constructions of Solution(s) to the Cyprus Problem: Exploring Formal Curricula in Greek Cypriot State Schools', in A. Varnava and H. Faustmann (eds), *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 194–212.

10 For example: C.M. Constantinou (2008) 'On the Cypriot States of Exception', *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 145–164.

11 M. Droushiotis (2008) *The First Partition: Cyprus 1963–1964*, Nicosia: Alfadi (orig. Greek 2005).

12 Glafkos Clerides (1989) *Cyprus: My Deposition*, I, Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, pp. 202–220.

that Georgajis explained the political situation and the plan to be adopted, namely that he believed that the Turkish Cypriots were planning an attack in early 1964 and that they had to engage them earlier, before the Turkish Cypriots were ready, and thus deliver a swift knockout blow. This is what was attempted in December 1963, with the Turkish Cypriot plan to withstand the Greek Cypriot actions and hope for Turkey's intervention. The man, who has thoroughly re-evaluated his role in these and subsequent violent events, believes that he and others were systematically indoctrinated and misled by immature and power-hungry politicians, who essentially wanted to get their own way, i.e. power in Cyprus, either through *enosis* or domination over Turkish Cypriots. He continues to feel that he was used, as well as sadness and remorse at being trained to attack his Turkish Cypriot neighbours although acknowledging that they too had been similarly trained. What is perhaps most disturbing is that he reveals knowledge of many other men living in Australia who either deny involvement or wrongdoing, and who perpetuate the state myth that it was the Turkish Cypriots who revolted.

And herein lies the problem, that the Cold War between Greek and Turkish Cypriots over who is right and who is wrong about the events of December 1963 still rages. Official versions of 'historical truth' dominate political discourse and education systems. When will the politicians admit the truth, and allow the historians, and only those without nationalist prejudice, to take over? They will inevitably find that victims and perpetrators belong to the same communities which claim exclusive victimhood, and therefore both sides were to blame and were responsible for the outbreak of the Cypriot Civil War 50 years ago. For this reason an apology from both sides for the violent crimes committed is necessary.

Can the Cyprus Problem be Solved?

HUBERT FAUSTMANN[*]

Within five years of the invasion and partition of the island, the formula for the solution of the Cyprus problem in the form it assumed after 1974 seemed to have been found. The leaders of both communities signed the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, which provide for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (BBF) as the framework for any solution. All efforts by the international community in the form of UN mediation have since focused on this approach and, in all likelihood, will continue to do so. The obvious questions to ask are: why has such a settlement failed to materialise, and can the causes for the non-solution of the Cyprus problem be overcome? Given that such a federation has been elusive for almost 40 years, one needs to ask: Is the *status quo* or an alternative approach a more likely scenario?

The Unpopularity of a Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation

One basic obstacle in the way of a solution is the lack of agreement about what kind of solution both communities want. This is in part due to the vagueness of the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation (BBF) solution formula. Since its inception, the two sides have differed considerably as to what this means. The High Level Agreements provided only for basic parameters of a settlement. They left the specifics open to interpretation. Therefore the leaderships on both sides have read it as closely as possible to their preferred solutions and have transmitted their views to the wider population. During the talks, the Turkish Cypriot side has favoured a loose federation, or even a confederation, of two largely sovereign states, whereas the Greek Cypriot side has, so far, preferred a strong central government within a federal system.

Since 1979, the vague principles of the High Level Agreements have been translated into ever more detailed proposals. Yet, it was not until the Annan Plan of 2004 that a fully-fledged solution model was presented. It came as a shock to a public that had been continuously exposed to maximalist interpretations of the High Level Agreements and to debate on the principles behind core issues, rather than details or even comprehensive solution proposals. Nevertheless, the Annan Plan, with all its real and alleged flaws, did not appear from nowhere. It was the result of 30 years of negotiations. Moreover, even though it is despised by a majority among the Greek Cypriots, it

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[*]   This is a longer version of a book chapter entitled 'Hydrocarbons: Cementing Partition or the only Hope for a Settlement', in James Ker-Lindsay (ed.) (2014) *Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution,* London: I.B. Tauris (forthcoming).

still serves as a reference point in the negotiations. The changes agreed in the ongoing talks since 2008 have modified the content of a BBF and have again provided a relatively precise framework for the reunification. So much so that some say the Cyprus problem could be solved over a long weekend if the three sides – Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as Turkey – really wanted to reach a deal (Greece will support any solution that is acceptable to the Greek Cypriots). Even on the unresolved core issues – including the particularly thorny issues, such as territory, property, security, Turkish Guarantees and military presence, return of Turkish mainland settlers, to name just the most contentious – there are plenty of models and ideas available. And thus far these issues still have the potential to wreck any deal because they often revolve around mutually exclusive goals, are highly emotionally charged and often securitised. Compromises on these points will inevitably be unpopular.

Indeed, even a grand compromise on the overall structure of a solution is ostracised. Since Turkish Cypriots in their majority prefer a two state solution, whereas Greek Cypriots want a unitary state based on majority rule, the compromise of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is a second best option. As a consequence, for all three main parties involved, any solution will face varying degrees of opposition and criticism. This will work as a domestic constraint on any final agreement. The situation is made all the more testing by the mass media in Cyprus. In this context, and in their majority, the media is part of the problem, and not part of a solution. Opposition to a solution will also be strengthened by the fact that plenty of the arguments put forward by opponents of a settlement will have a certain degree of validity. At the same time, the essential viability of a compromise solution can be called into question. Any bi-ethnic federation based on political equality will be very difficult to operate. The historic record of post-conflict, bi-ethnic federations is poor. In all likelihood, a post-solution Cyprus will function little better than today's Belgium, which is, at best, hardly a prospect to look forward to.

The Dilemmas of Outside Mediation and Direct Democracy

Moreover, the mutual legacy of distrust from the violent past of the 1950s, 60s and 70s and a zero sum perception of the negotiations are further impediments to any negotiated settlement. Another is the dilemma of outside mediation. It seems plausible that the current round of negotiations 'by Cypriots for Cypriots' (which were an illusion from the beginning because the Turkish Cypriot representative is always bound at least on many core issues by instructions from Ankara) is extremely unlikely to lead to an agreement. Therefore any solution requires outside pressure and mediation. But outside involvement is staunchly rejected, particularly by Greek Cypriots, who feel that this is the way in which the Annan Plan came about. The Greek Cypriot public is open to conspiracy theories and (not completely wrongly) strongly believes that the involvement of outside powers like Britain and the USA is likely to result in pro-Turkish proposals. This gives rejectionist parties leverage in their opposition to this kind of arbitration.

The introduction of direct democracy into the process poses another obstacle to a solution. Before the Annan Plan, an agreement, between the negotiators who had a mandate from their communities, would have been sufficient to finalise a deal. But since 2004, two simultaneous referenda have become part of any solution model and this is expected to remain so. This provides additional democratic legitimacy to an outcome and can strengthen the political acceptance of any deal. Then again, second best solutions, painful compromises and concessions are bad offerings for public approval. Given the inevitable unpopularity of any compromise, it is distinctly possible that the outcome will be rejected by at least one side (most probably the Greek Cypriots) in the referenda. At best, any approval of a BBF will be a close call, and the chances are that this may create post-solution division and tension, because a large minority, which did not approve the solution, will consider that an unjust compromise has been imposed on them.

The Presence of Spoilers

Another reason for the intractability of the dispute is the fact that for most, if not all, of the period since 1974, there has been at least one spoiler at the negotiating table. At least one of three negotiating parties had no interest in a negotiated settlement and was paying only lip-service to the High Level Agreements and to the feasible solutions on offer. Rauf Denktash was the most notorious of these spoilers. He pursued, more or less openly, an agenda of preserving the *status quo* and promoting separatism from 1974 until he was side-lined in 2004. Until the AKP government came to power in 2002, he was backed by Turkey. Whether the Turkish side became genuinely committed to reaching a solution after changing its official policy in 2003 from 'the Cyprus problem has been solved in 1974' to 'the Cyprus problem needs to be solved', is disputable. However, Ankara did officially back the Annan Plan in April 2004. At the same time, the majority of Turkish Cypriots endorsed it in the referendum. They also voted the moderate Mehmet Ali Talat into office as Prime Minister, in January 2004, and President, in 2005. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots have also produced their own spoilers. One need only consider Spyros Kyprianou (1977–1988) and Tassos Papadopoulos (2003–2008). Both pursued policies aimed at maintaining the *status quo* in preference to any feasible solutions on offer. Despite this, at least during the presidencies of George Vassiliou and Glafkos Clerides (from 1988–2003) the Greek Cypriot leadership genuinely sought a solution.

The only time that there appeared to be a genuine commitment by all three sides to work together to find a solution – and again, this is open to dispute – was during a brief period from 2008 until 2010, when two leftist moderate Cypriots, Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, led the two communities. Regardless, since 2010, the Turkish Cypriots have again appeared to adopt a rather more hard line by voting for Dervis Eroglu; a known rejectionist of the Annan Plan, who continued to negotiate though not very constructively under the instructions from Ankara. Having said this, the Turkish Cypriots are the least likely to pose problems in a solution attempt. Those Turkish Cypriots who do not want to become a minority in their own 'state' are particularly

desperate to see a settlement agreed. Any scenario that is based on political equality and addresses their vital interests – such as security, territory, property – is potentially attractive for a sufficient number to vote 'yes'. But in order to achieve another 'yes' vote, a considerable number of naturalised Turkish immigrants in the north will also have to be convinced. It is within the bounds of possibility for this to happen through a settlement that allows most of them to stay – a concession already made by the Greek Cypriot side, thus providing them with EU citizenship.

Christofias, too, was playing for time; neither exhibiting the courage to bring the negotiations into a final phase nor willing to defend the painful concessions required to reach a comprehensive settlement – with the exceptions of the right of residency for 50,000 settlers and a rotating presidency based on cross voting. Instead, he preferred to advance at a snail's pace until the negotiations stalled in 2012 during the EU presidency of the Republic of Cyprus. On top of this, Turkey has not made any move since 2008 that would allow a breakthrough. It has shown almost no interest in solving the dispute in recent years despite purely rhetorical claims to the contrary. The most recent turmoil in Turkey, following the Gezi demonstrations, brought a weakening of Erdogan's position and triggered a power struggle within the country. This undermines the willingness and ability of Erdogan to make a major move in the Cyprus question, which is in stark contrast to 2004 when the AKP government was desperate to gain a date for EU membership negotiations. At that time, EU accession was perceived as the best way to protect itself from the secularist deep state and, in particular, from the military. But, since the AKP government has now won the internal power struggle, and EU membership is not a realistic option for Turkey in the foreseeable future, the incentives for Ankara to solve the Cyprus dispute seemed to have all but disappeared. The Hydrocarbon findings in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus do, on the other hand, have the potential to change this.

Party Politics and the Greek Cypriots as a Self-blocking Community

Another problem is that in the south the political system and party politics are structurally hostile to any solution of the Cyprus problem. As a general rule, the two large moderate parties (though DISY, in particular, includes a strong 'hard line'/rejectionist segment) need the support of the smaller parties to win the presidential elections. These small parties regularly denounce any concessions as excessive, if not acts of treason, without providing realistic alternatives, hence the use of the term rejectionist. For that reason, any serious attempt to solve the Cyprus problem would inevitably lead to the collapse of the ruling coalition. At the same time, it would also mean that the incumbent president is then left with little chance of re-election. Once in power, few presidents have been willing to challenge these small parties. In the end, any president striving for a solution will have to overcome the opposition of DIKO, EVROKO, The Greens and EDEK. During any future referendum a considerable segment of the supporters of these parties, and also parts of DISY or even of AKEL, are anticipated to vote 'no'. This structural disincentive within the political

system and the high political risk for any president pursuing a solution will continue to exist even if DISY and AKEL can overcome their internalised hostility towards each other. Such an alignment in favour of a settlement in a formal or informal coalition is the only scenario in which a Greek Cypriot 'yes' vote is at all feasible.

Domestic opposition in the north is easier to overcome, mainly because the Turkish Cypriot community is suffering the most. It has the greatest interest in a settlement and stands to gain far more from it. Large parts of the mixed constituency in the north (Turkish immigrants and Turkish Cypriots) can be influenced by Ankara – and there will be no deal without Turkish support. Even so, the increased Turkification of the north and the marginalisation of Turkish Cypriots will become an additional problem in a future referendum, and also in attempts to find a settlement. The Turkish Cypriots, who have historically been offered only a choice between domination by either the Greek Cypriots or mainland Turkey (except for the short period between 1960 and 1963 when there was still a possibility for the 1960 constitution to function), are no longer masters of their own fate. Very soon, the Greek Cypriots will have to conduct negotiations with a Turkish Cypriot leader whose majority constituency will be Turkish immigrants from the mainland and their descendants. Moreover, one day the President of the 'TRNC' will himself be of Turkish descent. It is inconceivable that there will be a Greek Cypriot desire to reunify with a Turkish dominated north. And just such a Turkish dominated north, in terms of citizens but also economically, politically and, gradually, culturally as well, is being consciously created by the AKP government which, in this respect, continues the work of its predecessors. With this policy, Turkey secures the ability to maintain influence in the north should there be a solution, and even more so should there not be one.

It is because of these developments that have been proceeding for many years that the rejectionist camp in the south has been involuntarily serving the Turkification agenda of Ankara. By pursuing non-feasible solutions (or rather objecting to all feasible ones) their policies make them *status quo* supporters by default. They have traditionally claimed that their policies prevent Greek Cypriots from signing their own defeat, or from accepting an 'unjust' settlement, from legalising the facts created by the Turkish invasion, and from relinquishing Greek rights and claims. But adherences to their policies will probably lead to the permanent partition of the island, and consequently the transformation of the north into a *de facto* and, possibly, one day *de jure* Turkish province. Because of this, instead of promising and holding out for pipe dream solutions, the 'rejectionists' should be honest and tell Greek Cypriots openly that there cannot be a solution of the Cyprus problem that is based on reunification, since there cannot be a 'good' or 'just' one. Once this step is made, an honest debate among the Greek Cypriots could determine their future.

The three options for a solution of the Cyprus problem from a Greek Cypriot perspective are:

1. Continuation of the *status quo* with the high likelihood of no return of territory, or hardly any, and an ever more rapidly taiwanising Turkish (not Turkish Cypriot) north;
2. A solution that allows for reunification, which will, at best, be acceptable but almost certainly 'bad' and 'unjust', though it will bring some territory back (hopefully even if it

fails), might or might not function and has a chance to prevent the complete Turkification of the north;

3. Recognition of the north in exchange for maximisation of territorial returns, which will keep the south a Greek Cypriot state and avoids power sharing with the Turkish Cypriots (if the Turkish Cypriots do not migrate en masse to the south, which is quite unlikely) and Turkey. Ideally the state in the north will join the European Union providing the Greek Cypriots with significant rights in the north (though the prospect of Annan Plan like restrictions is to be expected in this case).

A debate of the third option has not yet taken place among the Greek Cypriots, though it could arguably be the best option in view of the kind of settlement feasible, and in particular with respect to viability and stability, although clearly not in terms of justice from a Greek Cypriot perspective. Permanent partition is also secretly favoured by a significant proportion of the Greek Cypriots, though they would not dare to say so publicly. Many fear the prospect of living together and in political equality with Turks and Turkish Cypriots in a reunited Cyprus. Be that as it may, any politician seriously making such a proposal to pursue negotiated partition would be handing his political opponents and the mass media a golden opportunity to brand him a traitor. Since this policy option has been left out of their possible choices, the Greek Cypriots have become a self-blocking community in this respect while, as outlined above, the result of pursuing the continuation of the *status quo* but also possibly even of pursuing a solution based on reunification, could very well be even worse from a Greek Cypriot perspective.

Developments in Favour of Settlement

While none of the feasible solution scenarios is attractive for the Greek Cypriots, and it seems as though a political miracle is needed to bring about a favourable settlement (which is nowhere on the horizon), all is not lost. The avoidance of something worse than the *status quo*, which is at least acceptable, if not comfortable, could still bring about majority support for a settlement. One such negative development is the ongoing Turkification of the north. But because this happens gradually and, at the same time, the available solution options are unattractive from a majority Greek Cypriot perspective, Turkification has failed (and will, in all likelihood, continue to fail in the future) to create a moment of truth or a deadline which could create enough pressure to make Greek Cypriots 'desperate' for change. In the meantime, Taiwanisation – the recognition of the north by some states and, at minimum, functional recognition by others – is another important factor. Without a solution, Taiwanisation is a potential development that would put considerable pressure on the Greek Cypriots to accept a deal. But, again, such recognition will almost certainly happen gradually. Moreover, it is not an option for the EU member states and many other members of the international community. All things considered, only a second Greek Cypriot 'no' in another referendum could trigger the recognition of the north by a considerable number of

states in the foreseeable future. Recognition by some Muslim states remains a prospect. However, it is not realistic to assume that Greek Cypriots could be bullied into a settlement given that they have *de facto* already lost the north and perhaps will not be willing to give up the security of their own homogenous state just to avoid further formalisation of the existing situation.

Another factor which has increased the chances for a settlement is the possibility that the Greek Cypriots, under President Nicos Anastasiades, might pursue a loose federation as a new basis for a solution. This is probably more viable as a starting point for reunification, because it minimises the issues on which both sides have to agree. Also, it seems to be a better option for Greek Cypriots than the strong federation they envisaged up to now. Since it is much closer to the solution designs of the Turkish side, this could be a promising policy shift that might serve the interests of all three sides. One cannot yet tell if Anastasiades will really pursue such a model, or how the vague formula of a loose federation will be interpreted by the wider Greek Cypriot society (or even if Anastasiades would be willing and able to sell the idea to the Greek Cypriots). Nevertheless, his political strength has been undermined by his controversial role in the bailout agreement for Cyprus with the Troika (consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) in March and April 2013. It is yet unclear to what extent and duration his position in the Greek Cypriot community has been severely weakened and if the prospects to settle the Cyprus dispute will become collateral damage of the bailout agreement aimed to avoid the bankruptcy of the Republic. The Cyprus Problem has clearly taken a back seat throughout 2013 wherein no substantial negotiations took place and the Greek side were quite obviously not in a hurry to return to the negotiating table. Presiding over a country in severe economic depression and having to implement harsh austerity measures might very well torpedo any chance for him to push through a settlement.

Hydrocarbons and Greek Cypriot Indebtedness as Potential Game Changers

Is there a thinkable scenario in which all three sides have a strong incentive to overcome the *status quo*? The hydrocarbon findings and the current financial and economic crises in the south, might, in spite of everything, be a decisive game changer. For Turkey, only EU accession and now the supply of cheap natural gas (and possibly one day oil) from the Republic of Cyprus (and the Eastern Mediterranean) might provide a sufficient incentive to pursue a solution. Otherwise, non-solution has so far been Ankara's preferred choice. Given the absence of a realistic EU accession perspective, the hydrocarbon issue is now widely understood to be the only factor that has the potential to bring about a solution of the Cyprus problem. If Turkey were willing to settle the issue, it could dramatically facilitate the export of natural gas from various Eastern Mediterranean countries, including Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, possibly Egypt and maybe even Syria one day. All of the above could export their energy via a pipeline across Turkey to Europe. This would make Turkey, and Cyprus, extremely important energy hubs. Turkish-Israeli talks about the export of Israeli gas to Turkey are already taking place.

Meanwhile, the discovery of natural gas off the coast of Cyprus can create a win-win situation for all three sides to the Cyprus dispute. It is conceivable that the only way the Greek Cypriots will be able to export their rich gas, and possible oil reserves, in a politically and economically viable way is by solving the Cyprus problem and exporting the gas via a pipeline to Turkey. In the light of new huge findings globally, due to improved technology (including fracking), it is very possible that gas prices will be too low for many years to make the idea of exporting liquefied gas (LNG), an option favoured by Greek Cypriots, economically viable. Liquefied gas is expensive and LNG plants are notoriously costly to build. But even if a plant is to be built and liquefied gas could be sold at market prices, there is always the possibility that Turkey will take steps, including military measures, to block the Greek Cypriots from exporting their hydrocarbons prior to a solution. In such a case, the highly indebted Greek Cypriots could find themselves in a desperate situation where a solution of the Cyprus problem might become necessary for economic reasons and therefore 'worth the risk'. The trouble is that under such circumstances the Greek Cypriots would be negotiating from a position of weakness. According to this calculation, there is a good argument to be made for seeking a settlement sooner rather than later. Alternatively, if the Greek Cypriots are able to export oil and gas profitably without obstruction from Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, then it is quite feasible that the hydrocarbon issue will hinder a solution. The Greek Cypriots will have no strong incentive to change the *status quo* and thus share revenues with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. This will naturally lead to increased tensions with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots although the latter simultaneously might even support a solution if it becomes clear that this is the only way to benefit or benefit fully from the revenues. Meanwhile, it is also unclear whether the Turkish side would be willing and able to make use of this opportunity by making concessions as well (in particular within the security aspect of the settlement – Turkish right to intervene and Turkish military presence on the island). Judging from developments to this point where both sides are locked in a tit-for-tat escalation spiral, it seems extremely plausible that the oil and gas issue might well serve as a bone of contention, deepening the dispute rather than act as a catalyst for a solution.

Conclusion

The combination of the Greek Cypriot economic crisis and the discovery of hydrocarbons have given rise to cautious optimism regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem. This is further aided by the election of Nicos Anastasiades, who has a record of support for 'realistic' solution scenarios like the Annan Plan, and could be politically strong enough to strike a deal leading his community to another referendum. Should he be able to overcome the obstacles he now faces as a result of the financial crisis, then the natural gas issue could provide the most promising constellation for a settlement since 2004. At any rate, for all this to be worthwhile, a solution needs to be reached relatively soon. Moreover, countless things have to happen to make a settlement a reality. Unfortunately, the domestic and regional circumstances remain too volatile to give much reason

for hope. Bearing this in mind and given the historic record of settlement efforts since 1963, and 1974, one has to end on a rather pessimistic note. The continuation of the *status quo* remains clearly the most credible scenario. Keeping the situation as it is does not require a decision for which any political leader has to take political risks, or pay an immediate political price. Besides, the *status quo* is stable and sustainable for many years to come if need be. Most probably, at least one of the three sides will remain unwilling to settle for a price that is acceptable to the other parties. Consequently, Greek Cypriots are possibly destined to end up with a *de facto*, and maybe one day, *de jure* Turkish (not Turkish Cypriot) north. The Turkish Cypriots have long since lost control over their own fate and depend on Turkish willingness to give up its loot from 1974. Their future is that of a disappearing community, unless the Cyprus problem is solved.

As long as a Cyprus problem exists, there will be actors who will try to do something about it – or at least pay lip service to such attempts. But the likelihood of a reunification decreases with every failed attempt and the passing of time. The Taiwanisation of the north with a recognition by some states arguably remains the most believable scenario. It is difficult to see how the division will not become formalised one way or another 20, 40 or 100 years from now. The Cyprus problem in its current form has been with us for almost 40 years. It can easily last another 40 years and longer if it comes to that.

Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War

Over the past few years, academics, journalists and other commentators have delved into the British and American National Archives in order to analyse recently declassified government documents and produce detailed studies of US and British foreign policy on Greece, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in general. Alexandros Nafpliotis has now extended and made a valuable contribution to this historiography by reviewing recently declassified documents in the US, British and Greek National Archives and has produced a detailed study of Britain's foreign policy towards the seven years of military rule in Greece from 1967–1974.

Throughout Nafpliotis sets out to examine the factors that influenced the policy decisions of both the Labour (1964–1970) and Conservative governments (1970–1974) with regards to Europe's first post-World War II military regime. He does so by virtue of a compelling analysis of primary sources from the archives of the US, Britain and Greece. As with some of the revisionist studies that have recently looked at British and American policy in the Eastern Mediterranean during the late 60s and early 70s, Nafpliotis convincingly highlights the pragmatic approach adopted by Britain during this period in prioritising political and commercial interests over a more ethical approach and therefore demonstrating and putting forward a case study of how the Western powers accommodated 'unpleasant' governments during the Cold War.

Britain's policy, and this is true of both the Labour and Conservative governments, towards the junta can be summarised as wanting to maintain a 'good working relationship'. In Chapter I, the author cites a 1966 memorandum from the Foreign Office to Prime Minister Harold Wilson which clearly outlined Britain's desire for a stable Greek government in order to maintain British interests. These are described as (a) Cyprus (retention of Britain's Sovereign Base Areas), (b) the Greek role in NATO, (c) British commercial interests and (d) the containment of the Communist threat. The memorandum adds that 'an extra-parliamentary solution of present Greek political problems would not necessarily conflict with these interests provided it was successful' (p. 15). When put into the context of the historiography that relates to nefarious British and American activity in both Greece and Cyprus during this period, this once again emphasises the reality of foreign policy namely that just because Western governments considered and made contingencies for events such as military coups, this does not necessarily equate to actively encouraging or even engineering the overthrow of democratically, yet perhaps unwanted, governments.

Throughout *Britain and the Greek Colonels*, the author highlights the internal disagreements and struggles within the British government over how to deal with the junta. Divisions within the Labour Cabinet, differences in approach between the Foreign Office's Southern European Department and the British Embassy in Athens and the demand for more pressure to be put on Athens to make moves towards constitutional reform from within parliament and the public all reveal the way in which British interests were constantly being constrained within the limits of both public and parliamentary approval.

Ultimately, Nafpliotis determines that Britain's weak position financially and internationally dictated its pragmatic policy. It is worth mentioning two examples which clearly highlight this. Firstly, whilst the issue of selling arms to a military government was naturally controversial, the reality was, Nafpliotis argues, that had Britain changed its policy on this issue, countries such as France, the US and Germany would simply have picked up the pieces. In order to maintain a 'good working relationship' and ensure continued arms sales, the British government intended on arranging a ministerial visit but was well aware of the hostile reaction this would receive within both the House of Commons and the press. The result was that in 1972 Lord Carrington, Defence Secretary, who happened to be planning his holiday in Greece, visited Athens. The Conservative government were able to justify this by claiming that as he had planned his holiday in Greece, this was merely a private visit. The importance of this kind of visit was made clear when similar ministerial visits from French and US officials subsequently saw trade with Greece increase. A second example which clearly underlines Whitehall's pragmatic political approach is the way in which the British Government attempted to appease the Colonels by adopting a neutral attitude towards King Constantine, who was at the time anathema to the military regime. Nonetheless, officials stressed the value of not severing relations completely, as the King could one day return as 'a political force' (p. 104).

Britain's policy throughout these seven years proved to be a balancing act. Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson judged the decision to support Greece's removal from the Council of Europe to be politically more acceptable than any equivalent move in NATO, thereby, at least temporarily, relieving the Labour government of some degree of parliamentary and public pressure. The value of Greece to NATO's south-eastern flank also had a counter-effect, namely that whilst the junta provided some stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, this was used by the Colonels, leaders of a relatively small country, to exploit its geo-strategic position to essentially force the Western powers to adopt a pragmatic approach towards them. Colonel Papadopoulos makes this abundantly clear when informing Sir Robin Hooper, Britain's Ambassador to Greece, in 1973 that Greece's economic policy was governed by the political attitudes adopted by its trading partners.

It is impossible to produce a study of the Greek Colonels without acknowledging the relevance of *Britain and the Greek Colonels* to the historiography on Cyprus. Nowhere is this better encapsulated than in Nafpliotis' claim that the island was the junta's 'most predominant foreign policy preoccupation' which would ultimately, somewhat ironically, bring about the junta's

demise (p. 59). By removing this irritant (i.e. the 'Cyprus Problem'), the Colonels believed, it would not only increase prestige at home but also end the regime's international isolation. Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath's government believed that Papadopoulos was well aware a clash with Turkey over Cyprus would mean the end of the junta (p. 101). This corroborates the findings of some of the recent revisionist studies on US/British policy on Cyprus that have made the same argument in explaining Papadopoulos' *rapprochement* with Ankara in stark contrast to his successor's, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannides, reckless decision to overthrow Cypriot President Makarios on 15 July 1974 thereby precipitating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. In fact, Nafpliotis describes the importance of the moment when Papadopoulos in late 1973 lifted martial law, announced the formation of a civilian government and parliamentary elections, denounced General George Grivas, leader of EOKA-B who was openly advocating *enosis* (union with Greece), and aligned himself with Makarios. By doing so, Papadopoulos alienated himself from some of his nationalist colleagues within the military and paved the way for the November 1973 coup which overthrew him and brought the obscurantist Ioannides to power.

One of the biggest ongoing debates within the historiography of US/British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean during this period remains the extent to which both Whitehall and Washington actively supported the overthrow of democratic governments in order to secure their own national interests. Nafpliotis quotes Sir Robin Hooper who in his annual review of 1974 wrote that the theories *vis-à-vis* the CIA's involvement in the 1967 and 1973 military coups were 'absurd' and that 'even intelligent and otherwise quite reasonable Greeks believe that the US is responsible for everything that happens here' (p. 208).

Nafpliotis convincingly exposes the harsh reality of *Realpolitik* which underpinned Britain's arguably unethical yet pragmatic approach and allowed a relatively small country in the Eastern Mediterranean to exploit its geo-strategic importance within the context of the Cold War. This is in line with the findings contained within those more recently published revisionist studies which have sought to challenge the previous predominance of the more conspiracy-based theories within this historiography. In a telegram sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in March 1974, Sir Robin Hooper referred to the 'US preponderance in the junta's foreign relations':

> 'Only the US government disposes of sufficient means – strategic, military aid and financial and political involvement – to make pressure effective. If we act on our own or even in conjunction with the like-minded Western Europeans, we run the risk not only of failing to achieve our objective but of seeing what we are bound to lose commercially and in other ways picked up by other (e.g. the French and Japanese) who are less scrupulous politically. In my view, therefore, the process should begin in Washington' (p. 215).

This is identical to the assertion made by British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan during the Cyprus crisis that Washington had far more influence in Athens and Ankara than Whitehall leaving Britain in a position of 'responsibility without power' (Constandinos, A., *Cyprus Crisis*, University of Plymouth Press, 2011, p. 104).

Nafpliotis' detailed and scrupulous analysis of the available primary sources material has enabled *Britain and the Greek Colonels* to make a valuable contribution to our understanding of British policy towards Greece from 1967–1974, enhanced our understanding of the junta's attitude towards Cyprus and provided us with a detailed case study in the way in which smaller countries were able to manipulate their geo-political significance within the context of the Cold War.

ANDREAS CONSTANDINOS

International Law and Diplomacy

Ambassador Andrew Jacovides is one of the most highly regarded and long-serving diplomats at the United Nations. He is rightly considered as one of the experts concerning a sensitive and timely subject, especially for Cyprus, such as law of the sea. Serving in the Cyprus delegation in every regular session of the General Assembly since Cyprus was admitted to the United Nations as a Republic, Ambassador Jacovides has acquired a unique theoretical and practical knowledge of issues pertaining to international law and diplomacy which is the title of his latest book.

The collected academic writings of Ambassador Jacovides, published for the first time in a single volume, confirm that he is one of a rare breed of diplomat who has achieved the combination of a long successful professional career alongside the composition of major academic works. As he notes in his introduction to the volume: 'on the basis of experience I can say with conviction that, given the appropriate circumstances, international law and diplomacy interact and expertise in one can be of great relevance and usefulness in the conduct of the other'. This book enables the reader to become familiarised with the most significant texts of Ambassador Jacovides.

The book is divided into three parts, which effectively interact and fall under the general theme of international law and diplomacy. The first part refers to International Law and is further divided into six sub-categories: (a) State Responsibility, (b) Law of Treaties, (c) Law of the Sea, (d) UN Peacekeeping, (e) Terrorism and (f) International Law and Diplomacy. Perhaps, the key part, without undermining his other contributions in any way, is the one pertaining to Law of the Sea, a subject where he has unparalleled expertise. The second part of the book concerns the country that Ambassador Jacovides has served over such a lengthy period of time, Cyprus. The international dimensions of the Cyprus problem present unique peculiarities in the international law bibliography and Ambassador Jacovides deliberates these issues in several articles, book reviews, letters and speeches. The third brief part entitled Related Topics contains three speeches by Jacovides on relevant topics.

It is well-known that since 1966 Jacovides has challenged the compatibility of provisions of the Zurich–London Agreements with rules of international law of a *jus cogens* character. His important work is hereby reproduced in full, enabling the reader to reflect on the accuracy of his analysis, as well as its authority when bearing in mind that those provisions which conflict with peremptory norms of international law are the ones alleged by Turkey in order to justify the 1974 invasion of Cyprus.

As Jacovides correctly notes on p. 45 of the book:

> 'It is submitted that these interlocking provisions, the combined effect of which was to arrest the constitutional and political development of the Republic by putting it into a straight jacket at its infancy as a sovereign entity and to subject it to the will of three outside Powers, created a state of affairs inconsistent with the basic elements of the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention.'

Cyprus has the potential in the near future to become a major net energy exporter of oil and gas. This seems to fit very elegantly with the European energy policy in terms of security in supply and energy autonomy. The green paper of 29 November 2000 'Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply' has the objective to maintain an overview of the principal questions and risks linked to the future growth of European dependence on energy. An effectively functioning and competitive internal energy market, with Cyprus being a substantial player, could also provide major advantages in terms of security of supply and high standards of public service. Within this framework and in light of Turkey's objections, the academic work of Ambassador Jacovides concerning Law of the Sea is an essential source.

The stated position of Turkey is that the so-called '*Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*' has rights and authority over the maritime areas around the island of Cyprus and that Greek Cypriots do not represent the island as a whole. Consequently, Turkey argues that neither the legislation enacted, nor the bilateral agreements concluded by the Republic of Cyprus have any effect. Turkey has repeatedly threatened that it is determined to protect its legitimate rights and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and will not allow any attempt to undermine such rights, and calls upon all companies and neighbouring countries to refrain from any endeavour that would be contrary to Turkish interests. Turkey has further alleged that the President of the Republic of Cyprus has no power to represent the Turkish Cypriots or to sign any agreements, maintaining that such behaviour of the Greek Cypriots will have a negative impact with respect to the Cyprus problem.

The Government of the Republic of Cyprus has rejected Turkey's threats and claims that Turkey has no right to challenge the delimitation of the EEZ between Cyprus and its neighbouring states and refutes any claims that Cyprus is not a sovereign state. The position of Cyprus has been supported by Greece, Egypt, Israel and other neighbouring countries, whereas the EU, the UK and the USA have all reiterated that Cyprus is a sovereign state, a member of the UN and the EU, additionally noting that they continue to support a solution of the Cyprus problem so that all Cypriots can profit from the existence of hydrocarbons.

As Jacovides correctly notes, it is undisputed, not least from the point of view of international law, that the Republic of Cyprus is the sole legitimate government, which represents all its citizens, either Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, following the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union on 1 May 2004 the great majority of Turkish Cypriot citizens of the Republic were issued birth certificates, identity cards and passports, a fact which reconfirms that Turkish Cypriots also recognise that they are citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and, through

the Republic of Cyprus, citizens of the European Union.

It is, therefore, submitted that Turkish objections should be rejected as they are founded on arguments repeatedly rejected by the international community. The Republic of Cyprus can legally conclude agreements with its neighbouring states with respect to the exploration of hydrocarbons and legally represents the island as a whole. It is thus paramount that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus should not consider the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem as necessarily interwoven with the separate issue of exploration of hydrocarbons.

The need to seriously take into account international law during the negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem is eminent. As Jacovides accurately notes on p. 344 while reviewing Claire Palley's book on the Annan Plan:[1]

> 'despite the availability of learned opinions by outstanding international lawyers … on the key issues of international law involved, it appears that these formidable weapons in the Greek Cypriot arsenal were not actively used during the 1999–2004 negotiations – except in the very final phase at Burgenstock, where they were effectively ignored by the UN negotiators as having been put forward too late. The only apparent explanation for this self-inflicted act of omission is that, at the relevant times, the Greek Cypriots' top negotiators decided not to insist on these legal points lest the prospects of a political settlement and EU entry be jeopardized – an attitude that this reviewer finds difficult to accept since it is unlikely that a lasting settlement could be achieved outside the parameters of basic norms of international law.'

It is considered that this book by Ambassador Jacovides is an important addition to the bibliography and should be carefully read by lawyers, diplomats and politicians alike.

ACHILLES C. EMILIANIDES

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1   C. Palley (2005) *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999–2004*, Oxford: Hart.

Η Κυπριακή Αριστερά στην Πρώτη Περίοδο της Βρετανικής Αποικιοκρατίας: Εμφάνιση, Συγκρότηση, Εξέλιξη

[The Cypriot Left during the First Period
of British Colonialism:
Emergence, Formation, Development]

Edited by Giorgos Georgis and Yiannos Katsourides
Taxideftis (Athens, 2013), 166 pp. [in Greek]
ISBN: 978-960-9692-20-5

The book is the outcome of a conference organised by the Promitheas Research Institute, based in Nicosia. It examines the history, influence, aspirations, and actions of the influential Communist Party of Cyprus (hereafter CPC), during the period 1926–1941. This compilation of papers is a rare attempt at tackling an aspect of the history of Cyprus – that of the Communist Left – which is almost absent in the Cypriot literature. For a long time there has been no systematic endeavour to analyse the communist party in spite of it being one of the oldest and longest-living political parties/institutions in the island, apart from the institution of the Church. The book focuses exclusively on Cyprus but it also offers findings, which can be useful to compare and contrast with eras, institutions and perceptions in other colonised countries of the Commonwealth and elsewhere. The Promitheas Research Institute, in collaboration with the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Cyprus, aims to bring to academic scrutiny, through this volume, the subject of the Left in relation to alternative readings of Cypriot history and society. The volume comprises fourteen papers plus an introduction.

The lack of archival sources, or negligence on the part of researchers in seeking such sources, makes the CPC difficult to study. Any account of the party is doomed to be based on limited secondary sources such as the memoirs and personal accounts of its past members. The available literature is the focus of Konstantinos Kouratos in his contribution, which also indirectly responds to the alleged argument that there is a 'secret' archive hidden by AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People). It is regrettable that the CPC archives were destroyed by the colonial administration of the island and the only other archival material was destroyed by Yiannis Lefkis, one of the leading members of the party and the person in charge of the archive, years later.[1]

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1   Personal communication with Rolandos Katsiaounis, 27 April 2013, Nicosia. According to Katsiaounis, the

The remainder of the contributions in the volume can easily be divided into sections, each one examining a specific aspect of the history of the communist movement. The first section concerns itself with the framework through which the communist movement made its appearance, the passage from the Ottoman rule to British colonial rule, and the international influences that helped the movement to take shape. Menelaos Menelaou reviews the transition from Ottoman to British colonial rule, but the impression given is that the author holds the belief that for all the ills of the history of Cyprus during the twentieth century, it is the era of British colonial rule that is held largely responsible. Although Menelaou's argument has a valid point, a false impression is conveyed that the British were the only guilty ones, thus neglecting, or assigning secondary significance to other factors. The paper succeeding Menelaou's is by Kolokassidis. His contribution describes the international developments that provide the structure for the ideological osmosis that would follow. He bases his account on two documents, both by leading figures of CPC. The first is a text by Leonidas Striggos that was sent to the Central Committee of AKEL in July 1976, while the second is based on Yiannis Lefkis' publication, *The Roots*. In both writings, the consequence of the October Revolution in Russia had the most direct, dynamic and influential effect, coupled with the port of Limassol that functioned as the channel through which communist ideas were introduced in Cyprus.

The next section, consisting of four papers, deals with the press in Cyprus up until 1940. Christos Alexandrou focuses on how the October Revolution was perceived by the Cypriot bourgeois press, and gives a depiction of the Revolution. The author provides fascinating insights concerning the language that was employed in the press, such as the use of the term 'maximalists' when referring to the Bolsheviks, and 'minimalists' – an expression unknown in terms of communist terminology – in reference to the Mensheviks. At the same time, however, it constructed – consciously, I would add – a negative image of Lenin himself, presenting him as a 'German spy' no less. Andreas Sofokleous then discusses the leftist press in Cyprus. But the title of his paper is rather misleading, allowing the unsuspecting reader to assume that the first leftist publication took place in 1878, a date that refers generally to the first newspaper in Cyprus, while the first leftist newspaper dates from the early 1920s. Sofokleous locates 11 newspapers and a journal. The vast amount of the leftist printed material is by itself important when considering that since 1931 the CPC, and its materials, were declared illegal and banned. The author, for instance, recounts useful information on all the printed material such as establishment dates, names of the founders with brief biographical information and, most importantly, the basic ideological characteristics of each one of them. Leftist ideas and a programme different from the irredentist vision of *enosis*, is heard for the first time. For example, *Neos Anthropos* [New Man], the official organ of the party established in 1925, is quite revealing. Specifically, it takes an active stand against the racial hatred that divides the Greek and Turkish communities of the island, and lends support in favour of a common anti-imperialist struggle

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keeping of the CPC archive was assigned to Lefkis; however, he had to destroy it many years later, out of fear of it falling into the wrong hands.

for the independence of Cyprus. Moreover, this was the first time that a newspaper had taken an active stance against *enosis* with Greece, and the policy of the Church.

One might expect that the themes of the press would be limited to ideological and organisational issues but instead, the themes are diverse in content. By way of illustration, the review *Avgi*, which is the topic of Andreas Chatzithomas' paper, is characterised by its important role in shaping the intelligentsia of the island; establishing ties with Greek intellectuals in an effort to preserve Greek elements in Cyprus – regardless of the fact that it was because of *Avgi* and despite the great reactions this caused, that the demotic language was promoted on the island. The last paper in this section, by Kyriakos Iakovidis, studies the bourgeois press and its riposte to the Popular Fronts in France and Spain that made their appearance during the 1930s. Making great use of the press and secondary bibliographical material, the author very eloquently broaches the negative attitude of the Cypriot press, since they believed that the Popular Fronts were 'demons that threatened societies' and aimed at their 'bolshevization'.

In the subsequent section the paper by Chrysanthos Chrysanthou is devoted to the leadership of the Left. Chrysanthou extends a brief biographical sketch of the main actors who played a role and contributed significantly to the formation of the CPC and the communist movement in general, while the papers by Tonia Yeorgiou and Maria Mavrou respectively, centre on Ploutis Servas, the man responsible for the rejuvenation of the party after 1935, and Kleio Christodoulidou, one of the first female figures of the leftist movement.

The founding of the CPC in 1926 is the topic of Alexis Alekou's paper. The author presents the framework that helped the formation of the CPC prior to 1926. He describes how the party came to be an active and emergent group, and how the communist bodies all gathered around a coherent party organisation. Michalis N. Michael turns his attention to the anti-colonial rhetoric in Cyprus, and how this wound up being monopolised by the Church and the bourgeoisie. Within this structure, simultaneously and against the 'modernising conservatism' of the Church and the bourgeoisie, there was another anti-colonial oratory emerging – that of the Left. As the author correctly argues, the anti-colonialism of the Left is politicised, and it challenges the role of the Church, while, at the same time, this rhetoric carries elements that move beyond the dividing ethnic differentiation line, and talk about a unified political entity. Following on from Michael, Yiannos Katsourides reviews the relationships between the trade unions and guild movements with the CPC. He articulates very powerfully not only the gradual organisation of the trade union movement and the promotion of a bi-communal agenda, but also the difficulties and deficiencies which the movement had to face due to poor industrial development and state interventionist policies. The last paper of the volume belongs to Giorgos Georgis who covers the topic of the Cypriot volunteers in the Spanish Civil War. It is quite remarkable to note the number, considering the size and population of Cyprus. One of the most prominent Cypriot figures in the Spanish Civil War is perhaps Ezekias Papaioannou, the then future general secretary of AKEL. Additionally, the author expands on how the press in Cyprus handled the civil war, the role of the British authorities and the attempts to gather money through fund raisers in order to help the anti-fascist struggle in Spain.

On the negative side, for the most part the book is edited poorly and numerous errors abound, the most important of them being the date on which the CPC was declared illegal, i.e. November 1926 (p. 47). The party was declared illegal following the October events in 1931. The papers of the volume are a depiction of the oral presentations made during the conference, or at least this is the impression gleaned by this reviewer when reading them. Some of the papers are extremely short, rather like encyclopaedia entries which provide no analysis whatsoever. Moreover, the book lacks a standardised stylistic form concerning footnotes, or even names, as in the case of *Λεύκης* and *Λέφκης*, both versions are used in the book but the form used by the author himself is *Λέφκης*. In conclusion, because there is a dearth of available sources, almost all of the papers fall into the trap of continuously repeating the same information. As an instance, by the time Alekou has dispensed with the actual establishment of the CPC, all the information, scattered as it is throughout the book, has already been stated, implicitly or explicitly, leading to a disquieting echo of repetition. A better structured book would perhaps avoid such pitfalls.

Finally, apart from the difficult task of studying the Cypriot communist Left, there are several questions that emerge concerning the available data. We might, for example, enquire what efforts were made by scholars and researchers, or even AKEL itself, to locate any archival material in the UK or elsewhere such as in Greece, in the archive of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Is there any information about the CPC in the Greek communist publications, i.e. *Neos Kosmos* [New World]*, Kommounistiki Epitheorisi* [Communist Review], or in *Rizospastis* [Radical], the official newspaper to date of KKE, or to locate and make use of the personal archives of past members? These sources might also prove to be very useful. *Rizospastis,* for example, even criticised the CPC '... for not taking into consideration the Turkish Cypriots',[2] a comment which leads me to my next remark. Apart from Michael and Katsourides, and then only briefly and in haste, there are no references to the Turkish Cypriots and the role they played in the communist/workers' movement in the island. A paper by a Turkish Cypriot scholar, or at minimum a paper concerned exclusively with the Turkish Cypriot influence on the communist movement in Cyprus, could undoubtedly be of vital significance and advance a useful contribution to such an understudied subject, perhaps providing other angles to approach the issue of the communist movement during the first colonial period of the island. Instead, the Turkish Cypriot factor is totally neglected and absent in the book, thus diminishing its importance.

To sum up, the outcome is rather disappointing in spite of all the good intentions. Most of the information offered in the book is already known, or easily accessible. The book provides no fresh information on the CPC, relegating it to just another reference book. Hopefully, the Research Institute will afford better studies in the future.

NIKOS CHRISTOFIS

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2   *Rizospastis,* 'About A Manifesto', 14 November 1928, p. 1; *Rizospastis,* 'Cyprus', 18 October 1930, p. 1.

European Integration and the Communist Dilemma: Communist Party Responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy

The book is not exclusively about Cyprus, but Cyprus forms a very major focus of the study. The book examines three case studies of contemporary communist parties: the KKE in Greece, Rifondazione in Italy, and AKEL in Cyprus. It therefore manages to do two things that ought to be of considerable relevance for The Cyprus Review: a very significant proportion of the book concentrates squarely on contemporary Cypriot politics, and it does so by placing the Cypriot experience in a comparative European political context, rather than treating it as an isolated or unique or sui generis issue. For this, it is to be strongly commended.

The study engages with three important strands of contemporary political science analysis: with theories regarding the Europeanisation of political parties (in other words, the analysis of how European integration has impacted on parties); with theories regarding euro-scepticism as a phenomenon; and with more general theories about the behaviour of and influences on political parties. The audience is likely to be primarily an academic one, but that is a commentary on audiences rather than on this book: it fully deserves a wider readership. In particular, it deserves to be read by party activists (especially those on the left, though the lessons of the book have a wider applicability), by media commentators, and by anyone with an active interest in European politics.

The main argument is set out in chapter two: what the author terms 'the communist dilemma', although later in the book he is careful to point out that the same dilemma can be seen to apply more broadly, not just to communist and former communist parties. Essentially, the dilemma is about a trade-off between ideological purity on the one hand and the hunt for votes and office on the other. The book uses European integration as a device for exploring this issue, examining how the three case study parties have dealt with the EU in terms of patterns of political competition (in other words, the way the parties have placed themselves in the context of rival parties in the political system), programmatic positions on EU issues (essentially, what positions they have taken on EU issues and how they have responded to EU policies), and transnational affiliations (their relations with EU-level party federations, in this instance particularly the European Left Party). The focus is very contemporary, starting at the end of the 1980s with the collapse to the Soviet Union and going up to the present day responses to the European financial crisis.

A brief introduction sets out the general approach of the book, before chapters 2 and 3 set out the theoretical framework. Chapter 2 concentrates on the 'communist dilemma', examining 'the overarching dichotomy … between ideological consistency and moderation towards a more pragmatic stance' (p. 31). The chapter makes an important and useful clarification that too often communist parties are treated as a single undifferentiated mass, whereas this book insists that each such party deserves to be analysed and evaluated in terms of its own distinctive context and characteristics. This is not an original assertion, as the author makes clear, but it is a useful and relevant reminder. Chapter 3 explores the literature on political parties and European integration, focusing particularly on Robert Ladrech's seminal work on Europeanisation of political parties and on Taggart and Szczerbiak's equally influential work on euro-scepticism. The book then proceeds to an evaluation of the three case studies in chapters 4, 5 and 6, before presenting comparative findings in chapter 7 and presenting a very brief concluding commentary.

In general, this is an excellent book. The author shows real knowledge and mastery of a wide range of relevant literature, and weaves these different strands together most effectively to construct an interesting and coherent analytical framework. The case studies provide an in-depth examination of three political parties that tend to get overlooked in broader surveys.

I can see why the choice was made to concentrate on these three parties, and to try to differentiate between 'communist parties' and 'radical left' parties. However, my initial reaction on seeing that differentiation was to think 'I wonder how well this will hold up?', and having read the three case studies, I am still a little unconvinced. I think that the experiences of those such as the Swedish Left Party or Die Linke in Germany or Spain's Izquierda Unida, to pick just three examples, are not so far removed at all from those of the parties dealt with in this book. I am not suggesting that the book would have benefited from including more case-studies – quite the contrary, since one of its strengths is the analytical depth it generates by not trying to spread itself too wide. However, particularly having read the cases of Rifondazione and AKEL, I am not so sure that the distinction between communist and radical left is quite so impermeable.

In addition, I would have liked to have seen a little more discussion about how each of these parties has responded to the current financial crisis. This is discussed, and it is one of the strengths of the book that it tries to bring this right up to date, but perhaps inevitably the discussion is rather curtailed. However, I trust that this work can serve as an inspiration for further research along these lines.

But these are quibbles. Overall, this is a very worthwhile and commendable contribution to the literature.

MICHAEL HOLMES

Books available for Review

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
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