

Volume 16:2 Fall 2004

SPECIAL EDITION

Cyprus, the EU and the Referenda on the Annan Plan

Glen Camp

Cyprus and East Mediterranean Security Problems:
New Developments – Old Problems

13 – 36

We posit a former ‘Loose Bipolar Model II’ prior to the end of the Cold War now temporarily replaced by a ‘unipolar’ model with the US as sole remaining superpower. This unipolar system is clearly in transition and unstable as the absolute power of the US declines even as its military power increases. We further posit a set of concentric ‘levels’: a world, a regional, and a ‘local’ level.

Why is Cyprus important geopolitically? Because of its location and propinquity to two metropolises: Greece and Turkey. Thus Cyprus serves as an ‘anchor’ which has dragged Athens and Ankara to the brink of war. Thus rapprochement between Athens and Ankara has trumped justice for Cyprus as viewed from both capitals. But it failed to persuade Greek Cypriots who opted for ‘half a loaf’ policy: safe entry into the European Union as preferable to the terms offered by the UN on 24 April 2004. They saw the Annan Plan (I-V) as tilting too far to the Turkish Pole. The Turkish Cypriots supported the Referendum for its economic and political advantages of reunification and improved living standards.

*With the Greek Republic of Cyprus in the EU and the Turkish Cypriots left out, Ankara will have to decide which of three routes it will follow: **Status quo, Annexation, or Renegotiation** of Annan Plan V and the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. We believe the AKP-led government will choose renegotiation as part of its Kemalist yet moderate Muslim stance. Yet despite its remarkable rapprochement with Greece and reforms to join the EU, Cyprus remains a thorn in it’s and the EU’s side. The stringent changes required for EU membership may yet destabilise it. Those changes will necessarily include a fairer distribution of power between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots since Cyprus is neither Switzerland nor Belgium. We hope the major powers and Athens will help.*

Alexis Heraclides

The Cyprus Problem: An Open and Shut Case?
Probing the Greek Cypriot Rejection of the Annan Plan

37 – 54

This article tries to probe the reasons for the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, by following two lines of inquiry. One is to access the dominant view among the Greek-Cypriots before and after the appearance of the Plan. A second line of reasoning is to try to chart the reasons for the rejection at the level of the Republic of Cyprus. As regards the first approach, (a) in the days before the Plan, the Greek-Cypriots

were in their majority not prepared to accept a loose federation; (b) from the 1st Annan Plan and up until the Referendum there was never a clear majority for the Plan. The article then goes on to examine seven Rational Actor hypotheses as explanations for the unflinching posture of the Greek-Cypriot leadership: sheer bad faith; international conspiracy theory; tough negotiating strategy; the asset of EU membership negotiation-wise; poker strategy; a 50-year backward leap; and the nationalist mind-set.

Tozun Bahcheli

Saying Yes to EU Accession:

Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome

55 – 66

What accounts for the decisive Turkish Cypriot endorsement of the Annan plan in the referendum on 24 April 2004? In spite of considerable reservations, most Turkish Cypriots supported it and the prospect of imminent EU citizenship. Offering better economic prospects and an end to their isolation in the midst of an economic crisis, the Annan plan's prospects were considerably enhanced. Also, even as the plan foreclosed independent statehood, most Turkish Cypriots were satisfied with the wide measure of autonomy that they would be able to exercise in the envisaged constituent state in northern Cyprus, and the fact that Turkey would retain its status as guarantor.

Furthermore, by endorsing the Annan plan, Tayyip Erdogan's AK party government in Turkey influenced the referendum outcome in an important way, emboldening those who favoured the plan to overcome the opposition led by veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş.

Van Coufoudakis

Cyprus – The Referendum and its Aftermath

67 – 82

The paper analyses the process that led to the 24 April 2004 referendum on 'Annan-5' and its overwhelming rejection by the Greek Cypriot community. The essay asks how we got to the referenda, why the insistence to have the 'Annan Plan' approved by referendum, what motives guided American, UN and EU initiatives, and the lessons learned from this process. The essay concludes with questions about the day after the 24 April vote and the future.

Thanos Veremis and Philippos Savvides

Cyprus after the Referenda of April 24: What Next?

83 – 94

Since April 2004 and Cyprus's accession into the EU, important developments have been taking place on the island. In addition, there have been noticeable changes in the ways in which the international community is now approaching the two communities of Cyprus. There is generally a more positive attitude towards the Turkish Cypriot

community and a more sceptical one towards the Greek Cypriot one. These developments have created a new climate in the island and have influenced international perceptions significantly. The current state of affairs and the prospects for a solution must, therefore, be reassessed. This paper offers an evaluation of current developments as well as an assessment of the prospects for a solution in the near future. It concludes with some proposals for action in order to keep the prospects for a solution alive.

George Vassiliou

The Cyprus Problem and the European Union

95 – 102

In the first part the author presents the arguments as to what membership would imply.

***Supporters** considered that with accession we could address the two Major worries of Greek Cypriots: (a) the functionality of the solution, (b) the threat from Turkey.*

***Opponents** believed that: (a) Cyprus will enjoy the full support of the EU but instead, the EU's main objective now is how to help the Turkish Cypriots and not to 'punish' the Greek Cypriots as they now claim, (b) There will be prospects for a 'European' solution. The EU disagrees; it considers the Plan compatible with the *acquis* and made it clear that it will not take any initiative to help solve the problem.*

*We need to take action now, before and not after the December Council, says the author. We need at last to spell out what we want and never forget Makarios' doctrine to demand what is **feasible** to achieve and not what we **desire**. We cannot afford not to take action now; the Union can afford to wait but not Cyprus. In twenty years' time when Turkey might be joining we may end switching from the *de facto* to the *de jure* partition.*

Plus Commentary Articles by:

Mehmet Ali Birand

Papadopoulos has Saved Us from Our Complex

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Keith Kyle

Twenty-one years with Cyprus

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Book Review:

*The Cyprus Question and the EU:
The Challenge and the Promise,
by AndreasTheophanous
(Michalis Attalides)*

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